A number of media outlets have continued to follow the disaster closely. For the first part of today’s post, I have put together the latest information released by the Chinese side, including casualty figures, risks at the disaster site, how far Chinese rescue teams have reached, China-Nepal cooperation in the relief effort, and what Chinese experts say caused the disaster.

For the second part, I selected a report published by The Paper on August 29 about a disaster risk reduction and cryosphere conference held in Chengdu on the very day of the disaster. It brought together experts from China, Nepal, India, Pakistan and other Himalayan countries, and happened to provide a direct channel for experts on both sides to exchange information within hours of the disaster.

I found their discussion particularly useful because it addresses, from another angle, many of the questions raised since the disaster: why an event like this is so difficult to predict, the practical obstacles to building a cross-border disaster warning system, and the efforts China and Nepal have already begun to make toward more regular cooperation.

Rescuers observe a moment of silence for the victims of the Aug. 26 mudslide near the Gyirong Port in Gyirong County, southwest China’s Xizang Autonomous Region, Sept. 1, 2026. [Photo/Xinhua]

Part I: The latest on the disaster

Casualties on the Chinese side

According to a Xinhua report on Sept. 3, 21 people have been confirmed dead and 541 others remain missing after the mudslide struck the border port, the regional government said at its latest news briefing.

Rescuers have recovered 847 personal belongings from the disaster area. Local authorities have also received 876 phone calls from relatives of those killed or still missing and have been responding to their inquiries.

Casualties on the Nepalese side

The death toll from the devastating August 26 mudslide in Nepal has risen to 1,252, with another 4,875 people still missing as of 10 a.m. local time on September 3, according to a Xinhua report citing Nepalese police.

Road access

Road access to the zone was basically restored at 10 a.m. Wednesday after days of round-the-clock repair work on the G216. Over 10 pieces of heavy machinery have entered the core area to aid on-site rescuers.

China-Nepal cooperation

China’s Ministry of Water Resources said Wednesday that the ministry is now providing Nepal with daily updates on the development of a barrier lake above Gyirong Port, cascading risks associated with the Cuojian River impact crater in Nepal, glacial lake risks in the Gyirong Zangbo River basin, the development and risk forecasts of new barrier lakes, and emergency hydrological monitoring.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun told a regular press briefing that China is preparing a third batch of emergency relief supplies, including Bailey bridges, epidemic prevention materials and emergency communications equipment. China is ready to send a second group of DNA identification experts based on Nepal’s needs, he added.

What caused the disaster?

Xinhua has released a three-minute animation on Aug. 28 explaining how the Gyirong mudslide developed.

On September 1, Xinhua published a more detailed account of new research led by the Institute of Tibetan Plateau Research under the Chinese Academy of Sciences on how the Gyirong disaster developed.

The researchers reconstructed the full chain of events from the initial ice-rock collapse high in Nepal to the destructive mudslide that eventually struck Gyirong Port. Their analysis suggests that the disaster was not simply triggered by a short period of heavy rainfall. Instead, several longer-term factors — including sustained glacier movement, warmer spring and summer conditions, increased meltwater and possible degradation of high-altitude permafrost — may have gradually weakened the stability of the source area. The researchers stress, however, that there is not yet enough evidence to identify a single direct trigger.

One of the study’s key findings is that the scale of the disaster was determined not only by the initial collapse. As the debris traveled through roughly 22 kilometers of valley, it continuously eroded the channel and picked up additional material from the riverbed and slopes. This process greatly increased the volume and destructive force of the flow before it reached Gyirong Port.

Researchers also detected several unusual seismic signals in the hours before the main collapse, some of which appear to coincide with smaller ice and snow movements. They say these signals may offer clues for future monitoring, though more evidence is needed before they can be treated as reliable warning signs.

The full analysis goes into considerably more geological detail than I want to reproduce here. Readers interested in the technical explanation can read Xinhua’s Sept. 1 report and use an AI translation tool if needed. The research was published the same day in the academic journal Science Bulletin. [Photo/Xinhua]

Rescuers conduct search and rescue operations at the core affected zone of the mudslide-hit Gyirong Port in southwest China’s Xizang Autonomous Region, Sept. 2, 2026. [Photo/Xinhua]

Part II: Why was this disaster so difficult to predict?

That is the latest information on the disaster itself.

But many readers are also interested in two related questions: why was an event of this scale not detected and warned of earlier, and what kind of cross-border warning cooperation currently exists between China and Nepal?

A report published by The Paper on Aug. 29 provides quite a few useful details. It focuses on a meeting that was already underway in Chengdu on Aug. 26, the day the disaster struck.

A meeting of Himalayan disaster experts was already underway

The annual meeting on disaster risk reduction and the cryosphere, organized by the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development, or ICIMOD, was being held on Aug. 26 at the Institute of Mountain Hazards and Environment under the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Water Resources in Chengdu.

Zhang Qianggong, head of climate and environmental risk at ICIMOD, said the meeting happened to bring together experts in cryosphere research, geology and disaster reduction from China, Nepal, India, Pakistan and other Himalayan countries.

After the disaster, the participants quickly pooled the information available to them and concluded that the mudslide had been triggered by an ice-rock collapse.

Could China and Nepal build a regular coordination mechanism?

“This kind of timely exchange of information and interaction is not yet routine,” Zhang said.

One of the subjects being discussed at the meeting was precisely whether China, Nepal and other Himalayan countries could create a cross-border disaster information-sharing platform and establish a regular coordination mechanism.

“We hadn’t even finished discussing it when the disaster happened,” Zhang said.

For now, exchanges among research institutions can be seen as an early step toward cross-border warning and coordinated disaster management.

But moving from scientific cooperation to an institutional mechanism would require interaction between governments and go well beyond research cooperation alone.

What Nepalese officials said about the current warning system

When the disaster happened on August 26, researchers from China and Nepal who had long worked on geological hazards were gathered in Chengdu.

Among them was Pradip Kumar Koirala, joint secretary at Nepal’s Ministry of Home Affairs and coordinator at the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority, or NDRRMA.

“I think neither side received any warning information,” Koirala said at the meeting.

People could see the water level rising and some realized something was wrong, he said, but the hydrological sensors did not respond effectively.

Smaller ice collapses had occurred in the past, he explained, but normally snow or ice slid down a valley and accumulated at the bottom.

This time, the collapse struck the river and pushed the water to an unprecedented level.

“In terms of scale, this was the first time we had seen something like this,” he said.

Based on previous experience, Koirala said, it was essentially impossible to predict.

He compared it to someone saying that nothing had happened in a certain place for 200 years, so it should be safe to build a market there — only for an extreme event to occur anyway.

Nepal does have some geological-hazard monitoring stations similar to those in China, he said, but its funding and technical capacity are limited and much of the monitoring still depends on human observation.

In the China-Nepal border region, local residents also have informal warning channels. People upstream may call or message those downstream when they see something unusual.

“But this disaster happened too suddenly,” Koirala said. “There probably wasn’t enough time. After all, this is an informal, community-based practice, not a formal government mechanism.”

Natural disasters in Nepal are becoming more frequent, and Koirala linked much of that trend to climate change.

He acknowledged that investment has been insufficient and that Nepalese authorities have been criticized for this.

“We always use past experience to predict the future and design response plans,” he said. “But we never imagined something beyond our expectations like this could happen. Many of the methods other countries have taught us failed in the face of this disaster. At present, no person or country can reliably warn of or respond to something like this.”

Koirala said China-Nepal cooperation on cross-border disaster warnings remains relatively underdeveloped.

There are academic exchanges and documents expressing willingness to cooperate between relevant departments, but no substantial operational mechanism is yet in place.

How the Chengdu meeting helped during the disaster

Before this disaster, Su Pengcheng, a researcher and doctoral supervisor at the Chengdu Institute of Mountain Hazards and Environment, had spent years studying disaster prevention and warning in the central Himalayan region around Shigatse.

On July 8, 2025, a sudden mudslide upstream from Gyirong Port caused the Donglin Zangbo River to surge, destroying the Resuo Bridge, also known as the Friendship Bridge, and leaving 11 people missing.

After that event, Su’s team installed online observation systems at several high-risk glacial lakes in Shigatse, including cameras that continuously monitor lake conditions.

“When news came that Gyirong Port had been hit by another mudslide (on Aug. 26, 2026), I immediately went to Professor Su Pengcheng’s office,” Zhang said. “He was already there with his students assessing what had happened.”

The researchers pulled up real-time monitoring images from glacial lakes on the Chinese side of the region. None showed abnormal changes. That allowed them to rule out a glacial lake outburst flood.

During this process, Su obtained a video apparently filmed by a Nepalese resident or herder. It showed a large volume of debris collapsing, with clearly visible white ice mixed into the material.

Experts at the meeting concluded that this was an ice-rock collapse — rock mixed with snow and ice falling into the river and forming a temporary blockage. Once the Chinese experts had identified the type and location of the event, the Nepalese experts at the meeting immediately passed the information to Nepal’s NDRRMA and Department of Hydrology and Meteorology.

Feedback from the Nepalese side further confirmed the Chinese experts’ assessment. The whole process took only a few hours.

That evening, Su left for Gyirong. “This kind of efficiency was highly contingent,” Zhang said.

The fact that so many relevant experts from both countries happened to be in the same room made rapid information exchange possible.

Building a permanent cross-border information-sharing platform and mechanism was already one of the major topics on the meeting agenda.

According to information shared by the Nepalese side, some downstream villages may have learned that a mudslide had occurred upstream before the disaster reached them, but the information did not spread quickly enough to other villages.

Nepal’s Department of Hydrology and Meteorology also reportedly sent more than 600,000 warning text messages. But the disaster developed so quickly that some monitoring facilities were destroyed by floodwaters before they could function effectively.

Why is routine monitoring so difficult?

Ice-rock collapses often occur in extremely remote, high-altitude areas that are very difficult for people to reach.

Zhang said some potential hazard sites require two days on horseback from the nearest village, followed by further travel on foot.

“How do you monitor a place like that?” he asked.

That is one of the basic practical problems.

“Ice-rock collapse is an extremely difficult type of disaster to warn against,” said Wang Lin, a pseudonym used by another expert who attended the meeting.

【Editor’s note: This is not a challenge unique to the Himalayas. According to Nature, in July 2022, the collapse of Italy’s Marmolada glacier sent some 200,000 cubic meters of ice down the mountain, killing 11 people:

In July, 200,000 cubic metres of ice fell from Italy’s Marmolada glacier, causing 11 deaths. Glaciers and nearby slopes are expected to collapse increasingly frequently in the Alps and elsewhere as a result of climate change (see, for example, D. Li et al. Nature Geosci. 15, 520–530; 2022). More research is needed into how such events are triggered before we can develop reliable warning systems.

Researchers later warned that limited understanding of what triggers such failures still makes reliable early-warning systems difficult to develop.】

A potentially unstable slope may remain in that condition for a long time, while the final trigger that causes collapse can be very small.

Wang cited an ice-rock collapse in the Sedongpu Valley in Nyingchi, Xizang, in 2018.

Only after researchers went back through large amounts of historical imagery did they conclude that an earthquake may have destabilized a hanging glacier about a year before the collapse.

Snowfall, melting and other processes followed, until the glacier finally gave way.

“Even if we were only talking about glaciers that could affect major transport infrastructure, rather than the entire Himalayan region, regular monitoring would still be extremely difficult,” Wang said.

Artificial intelligence and large-scale computing resources can help, but continuously scanning such a vast mountain region at high frequency would still require enormous resources.

Many potentially unstable areas also lie on extremely steep slopes, where remote-sensing imagery itself can contain errors.

Given the size and complexity of the Himalayan terrain, current technology alone cannot provide continuous, high-precision monitoring of every potential hazard point.

Climate change is adding another layer of uncertainty.

Zhang said both the frequency and scale of related disasters are increasing.

“At the same time, our understanding of changes in high-mountain glaciers and glacial lakes, as well as our monitoring and risk-assessment capacity, has not improved at the same pace,” Wang said.

The risks are also inherently cross-border.

A relatively small event high in the mountains can develop into a chain of hazards as it moves through a river valley and eventually crosses a national boundary.

Zhang said cross-border warning and disaster management in the region face several practical obstacles.

The first is cost. Scientific expeditions in high-altitude mountain areas are expensive. Sampling and monitoring equipment often has to be carried into the mountains by people, and a single expedition can cost hundreds of thousands of yuan.

The second is institutional. This is no longer simply a scientific question. Can monitoring stations be installed on the other side of the border? How should monitoring systems be connected? What data can be shared? Who is responsible for transmitting warnings? These are questions that scientific cooperation alone cannot answer.

The challenge of building a cross-border disaster warning system

“The fact that Chinese experts were able to use academic channels this time to quickly identify the type and location of the disaster and pass the information to Nepal’s national disaster authorities should not be taken to mean that a regular official cross-border warning channel already exists,” Zhang said.

For cross-border disasters in particular, he said, the main challenge is how to build a stable and mature information-sharing mechanism.

According to Zhang, the two sides are now trying to move in that direction.

China has built a relatively developed domestic emergency-response system, he said, but gaps remain once information has to move across borders or reach the grassroots level.

County governments do not have direct authority over foreign affairs, so cross-border communication often has to be reported upward and approved layer by layer.

At the village level, there are even fewer channels for direct and rapid communication between communities on the two sides.

Researchers are now trying to help address this gap, Zhang said, and China and Nepal already have dialogue mechanisms at higher levels.

A report published by Yangtze University provides one example of recent efforts.

From May 22 to June 3, a joint expedition involving China’s Ministry of Water Resources, the Foreign Ministry, water authorities in Xizang, Yangtze University, ICIMOD and other institutions traveled to Nepal and border river basins in Xizang.

The team carried out joint research on glacial lake outburst floods in China-Nepal transboundary rivers and worked on disaster prevention and mitigation capacity building.

Zhang said officials and researchers from both countries discussed information sharing during that trip.

In mid-August, ICIMOD also invited a team from the Chengdu Institute of Mountain Hazards and Environment to Nepal for further exchanges, with the aim of advancing cooperation on glacial-lake monitoring and related areas.

For now, however, these efforts remain at an early stage.

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I have long been interested in how local governments in China are run, and longtime readers may have noticed that. I have previously written about what happens when local authorities add layers of requirements as policies move down the administrative chain, the respective roles of a city’s Party secretary and mayor, and debates over whether local governments really need to run social media accounts.

These are not always the topics that attract the most attention, and no single article can cover every aspect of local governance. But I think they offer an interesting way to look at Chinese society.

Today’s post is about local government officials, including mayors, answering calls from residents on government hotlines.

Having senior officials pick up hotline calls is not exactly new, either in China or elsewhere. But I found a recent Southern Weekly article on the subject worth reading for several reasons.

First, the calls themselves offer a glimpse of the concerns people raise in everyday life, and of how those concerns are changing along with Chinese society.

Take western Baotou City, north China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Since 2020, the largest category of calls to the city’s government service hotline has concerned human resources and social security, accounting for about 30 percent of the total.

Most of those callers are not filing complaints. They are asking practical questions about social insurance, employee rights, personnel files and similar matters. Social security alone accounts for roughly 85 percent of calls in this category.

“Most people are asking about social insurance contributions and retirement pensions,” said Cao Weizhi, a manager at Baotou’s government service hotline center.

Calls about childcare subsidies, by comparison, are relatively uncommon. That broadly tracks China’s demographic changes: a rapidly aging population and a declining number of births.

In other words, the changing mix of calls reflects changes in society itself. Other problems are hardly unique to Baotou:

Complaints about property management and consumer rights each account for roughly 10 percent of calls to the city’s hotline. Cao said that, as elsewhere in China, complaints about property management companies, including their service and fees, are a highly visible issue.

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Across China, education and school enrollment, housing and property management, transportation and urban management consistently rank among the most common issues raised when senior officials answer the hotline.

A change in shopping habits has also changed the kinds of disputes citizens bring to the government, and the challenges facing the legal and administrative processes used to resolve them:

Consumer complaints increasingly involve online shopping. “E-commerce disputes are more difficult to investigate, verify and collect evidence for, and they also take longer to resolve,” Cao said.

There is another reason I found the article worth reading. It does not simply celebrate the practice of having the top official personally answer calls. Lai Jingping, an associate professor at Nanjing University’s School of Government, pointed out one of the model’s inherent limitations:

The core of modern governance is to rely on stable, standardized and predictable institutional procedures. If large numbers of everyday problems cannot be solved until the top official personally intervenes, that suggests the routine mechanisms for interdepartmental coordination and handling cases are not working properly.

The article also acknowledges that the effectiveness of this model depends heavily on the personal commitment of the official in charge:

Since the beginning of 2026, senior Party and government officials in Anhui, Guangdong, Hainan, Beijing and other places have personally taken calls on the “12345” government service hotline. The practice of top officials answering public hotlines dates back to the 1980s, but its effectiveness has often been closely tied to the willingness of the official himself or herself to get involved.

My own view is that there are things this kind of direct intervention can do that ordinary procedures sometimes cannot. It can sharply increase the chances that a particular problem gets resolved quickly, and it also sends a visible message about officials paying attention to citizens’ concerns.

But the more important task is to build durable mechanisms that can solve these problems without requiring the personal intervention of the top official.

Mao Shoulong, a professor at Renmin University of China’s School of Public Administration and Policy, makes a similar point in the article:

When administrative and legal institutions are still incomplete, he said, intervention by the top official can fill gaps. But as those institutions mature, officials should make clear that answering hotline calls is a temporary demonstration rather than a normal channel for resolving complaints.

The aim, he said, should be to encourage people to use standardized procedures first and to “eliminate the expectation that every problem should be taken to the top official.”

No governance system is perfect. Having senior officials answer hotline calls can be a useful supplement when certain problems prove difficult to resolve through normal channels. This kind of hybrid approach to governance is not hard to understand in practice.

On the morning of August 4, 2026, staff at Baotou’s 12345 government service hotline center briefed Water Resources Bureau officials before they began taking calls.

Below is the full article.

“You don’t need to go looking for anyone else about this. I’ll see it through.”

That promise, made by Baotou Mayor Meng Qingwei on May 22, 2026, quickly spread online and once again drew attention to the Inner Mongolian city known as the “Grassland Steel City.”

Meng made the remark while taking calls at the city’s “12345” government service hotline center.

Baotou began having top officials — the yibashou (一把手), literally the person in charge of a government or department — answer 12345 calls in October 2025. Since then, the head of a government body has taken calls every week.

Baotou launched its government hotline in November 2000. Over the years, the 12345 platform has developed into the city’s main channel for collecting public feedback and handling complaints and suggestions.

The city’s Bureau of Administrative Approval and Government Services had previously tried to coordinate appearances by the heads of districts, counties and municipal departments, but the effort achieved only limited results.

That changed in 2025.

After Chen Zhichang, who had previously worked in Beijing and Jiangsu, became a member of the Standing Committee of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regional Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Party secretary of Baotou, he pushed the program with unprecedented force.

Baotou is not alone. Since the beginning of 2026, senior Party and government officials in Anhui, Guangdong, Hainan, Beijing and other regions have sat down behind the phones at 12345 centers.

The practice of senior officials personally answering hotlines dates back to the 1980s. Its results, however, have often depended on the commitment of the official in charge.

At the same time, Baotou and other cities are trying to move beyond solving individual cases and use what they learn from the calls to improve the way government works more broadly.

“Let leaders see where the problems are”

“Boss, when you start taking calls in a moment, there are three things you cannot say: ‘I don’t know,’ ‘That’s not my responsibility,’ or ‘There’s nothing I can do about it.’”

At 9 a.m. on August 4, 2026, Gao Chong, director of the Baotou Water Resources Bureau, walked into the hotline studio.

Before the session began, staff gave Gao and officials from the relevant divisions a short briefing.

A PowerPoint presentation listed some of the main problems found in the Water Resources Bureau’s handling of requests from residents and businesses between January and August 2026. Among them: revealing callers’ personal information in responses and uploading documents in incorrect formats.

Yun Lei, director of Baotou’s 12345 Government Service Hotline Center, told Southern Weekly that the purpose of this part of the session was to “let leaders themselves see where their department is falling short in handling 12345 cases.”

Yun added another detail.

Under arrangements made by the Baotou municipal Party committee and government, every Tuesday the head of a district or government department answers hotline calls.

This was the Water Resources Bureau’s first session on its own. On Monday afternoon, officials from the bureau had already visited the hotline center to discuss the session and ask for suggestions on how they could improve their work.

Although the activity is called “the top official answering the hotline,” the official does not work alone. A deputy director, division heads and more than a dozen other officials usually take part.

During the 90-minute session that day, officials from the Water Resources Bureau handled 30 calls from residents and businesses, mainly concerning water supply, water-resource management and river-basin administration.

Yun said that, based on past experience, the volume of calls is extremely high when a senior official is taking calls. Hotline operators first screen incoming requests, identify those related to the department taking part that day, and transfer them to the officials.

Gao personally answered five calls.

One came from a resident who suspected that the quality of drinking water supplied directly to his home did not meet safety standards.

Gao told Southern Weekly that he found the claim puzzling.

Water quality is a serious matter, he said. “We test the water according to national standards before it is supplied every day. If it failed the standards, we could not supply it.”

After asking several questions, Gao learned that the caller had bought test strips online that claimed to detect water quality problems.

“The accuracy of those strips cannot be guaranteed,” Gao replied. “How about this: we’ll arrange for a professionally certified testing agency to come to your home and test the water.”

At 10:30 a.m., the phone session ended.

Gao led his team out of the call room and into a consultation room across the hall.

Waiting there were Zhang Yifu, deputy director of Baotou’s Bureau of Administrative Approval, Government Services and Data Management, as well as representatives from what China calls the “two representatives and one committee member”: Party congress delegates, people’s congress deputies and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

The 12345 hotline center is itself a division of Zhang’s bureau.

This consultation is another part of the program.

Cases received that day are discussed on the spot with these representatives. Each representative takes responsibility for following up on one case. The department that answered the calls also selects several cases for a rapid-response list. Officials are generally expected to visit the site that same afternoon, or by the following day at the latest.

Zhang also raised one unresolved case with the Water Resources Bureau.

A municipal street-cleaning vehicle had sprayed dirty water onto a legally parked car. The owner wanted an apology from the staff involved.

“All the resident is asking for is an apology. There is no reason for this case to have dragged on for so long,” Zhang said. “The city has made it clear that cases are not supposed to pile up. I hope everyone takes this seriously.”

Gao responded:

“This involves management, the details of our work, and even our attitude toward the work. When residents bring us a problem, we need to put ourselves in their position.”

On the morning of August 4, 2026, Gao Chong, director of the Baotou Water Resources Bureau, took calls on the 12345 government service hotline.

Scaling it up

Baotou’s program of having agency heads answer 12345 calls began in October 2025.

Its expansion was closely tied to support from the city’s top leadership.

Yun Lei said that several years earlier, Baotou’s Bureau of Administrative Approval and Government Services — later reorganized into the Bureau of Administrative Approval, Government Services and Data Management — had already tried to invite the heads of banners, counties, districts and municipal departments to take hotline calls.

But the bureau had limited authority to coordinate senior officials, and “the results were fairly average.”

In July 2025, Chen Zhichang, then mayor of Nanjing, was transferred across provincial lines and appointed to the Standing Committee of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regional Committee of the CPC and as Party secretary of Baotou.

By early August, the Baotou Party committee and municipal government had already begun making arrangements for senior officials to answer 12345 calls.

Chen had spent more than two decades working in Beijing and had paid considerable attention to the hotline system.

In July 2018, when he was acting district head of Beijing’s Shijingshan District, Chen answered calls on the 12345 hotline and led efforts to repair a badly damaged road south of Beijing Chaoyang Hospital’s western campus after residents complained about it.

In April 2020, when he was mayor of Huai’an in east China’s Jiangsu Province, Chen again took calls on 12345 and told the media how he viewed the hotline:

“It is a bridge, and more than that, it is a promise.”

In May 2025, just over a month before his transfer to Inner Mongolia, Chen, then mayor of Nanjing, appeared on Jiangsu Province’s televised government accountability program Government Conduct Hotline: The Mayor Goes On Air.

With support from the city’s top official, Baotou’s program moved quickly.

It was launched in mid-October 2025. Within a month and a half, the heads and senior officials of seven districts and departments had taken part.

In March 2026, the program resumed in an expanded form.

The city planned 44 sessions for the year, with one every Tuesday, as well as two special sessions for the mayor and vice mayors, one in the first half of the year and another in the second.

Yun explained that the program had been paused at the start of 2026 because of the Lunar New Year and the annual national “two sessions,” when government priorities temporarily shifted.

The timing of each department’s appearance is also planned carefully.

Yun said hotline calls have clear seasonal patterns.

Water use and street vending tend to peak in summer, for example, so the Water Resources Bureau and urban management authorities are scheduled around that time.

The Education Bureau appears around the start of the school year. Housing and construction officials take calls during the winter heating season.

Huang Jie, a member of the Jiangsu Provincial Political Science Association, told Southern Weekly that many of the problems residents raise may look trivial but often involve several government departments and are costly to coordinate.

Many livelihood issues cross departmental, administrative and territorial lines. Some have accumulated over long periods.

Ordinary hotline staff have limited authority to coordinate all of the bodies involved, Huang said, so intervention from a higher level may be needed to break the deadlock.

On May 22, 2026, Mayor Meng Qingwei encountered exactly this kind of problem.

A homeowner at the Yuanzhou Daduhui residential compound in Baotou’s Jiuyuan District called the hotline about installing an electric-vehicle charger in a parking space he owned.

The electricity provider said the installation met the requirements, but the property management company refused to allow it.

Meng told the caller:

“You don’t need to go looking for anyone else. Once it reaches me, this is where it ends.”

With Meng’s direct intervention, the dispute was quickly resolved.

Between the launch of the program in October 2025 and May 2026, 18 senior officials in Baotou had taken hotline calls.

They handled 2,011 requests and helped resolve 1,959 of them.

The city’s backlog of unresolved cases fell from more than 20,000 in 2025 to just over 3,000.

What people are calling about

What are residents actually calling the government about?

Cao Weizhi, a manager at Baotou’s 12345 hotline center, told Southern Weekly that since 2020 the single largest category has been human resources and social security, accounting for roughly 30 percent of all calls.

Most of those calls are not complaints.

People are asking practical questions about social insurance, workers’ rights, personnel files and other administrative matters.

Social security alone accounts for around 85 percent of calls in this category.

“Most people are asking about social insurance contributions and retirement pensions,” Cao said.

Calls about childcare subsidies are much less common, a pattern consistent with broader demographic changes as the population ages and the number of newborns continues to decline.

Complaints about property management account for around 10 percent of total calls, as do complaints involving consumer rights.

Cao said problems involving the service and fees charged by property management companies are a highly visible issue in Baotou, as they are elsewhere in China.

Consumer complaints, meanwhile, increasingly involve online shopping.

Changing consumer habits have made consumer protection more difficult.

“E-commerce disputes are harder to investigate and verify, harder to collect evidence for, and they tend to take longer,” Cao said.

Since April 2026, senior Party and government officials in places ranging from Inner Mongolia and Anhui to Guangdong and Hainan have taken seats at 12345 call centers.

Across China, education and school enrollment, housing and property management, transportation and urban management consistently rank among the most common issues raised when senior officials answer the hotline.

In Beijing’s Chaoyang District, statistics for the first five months of 2026 showed that the most common hotline keywords were concentrated in four areas: market regulation, private training and education services, housing, and labor and social security.

On April 22, 2026, Chen Jianrong, head of Guangzhou’s Tianhe District, answered 16 calls from residents.

They covered market regulation, urban and rural construction, education, science, culture and sports, including consumer disputes, unauthorized construction and property management.

The situation was similar in Hainan.

On May 9, 2026, Wuzhishan Mayor Chen Guoliang answered five calls involving urban management, social welfare and planning inquiries.

A resident on the 13th floor of a residential compound in Baotou reported low water pressure during peak hours. On the morning of August 5, 2026, staff from the Baotou Water Resources Bureau visited the home to inspect the problem.

Reducing the expectation that everything requires the top official

Senior officials directly listening to complaints is not a new form of governance.

The logic is similar to regular petition-reception days, televised government accountability programs and online platforms where officials respond to public concerns.

Lai Jingping, an associate professor at Nanjing University’s School of Government, told Southern Weekly that 12345 hotlines began spreading around the late 1990s and early 2000s.

By around 2010, some localities had already experimented with having senior officials take calls, although it did not become a nationwide or routine practice. Only in recent years has the model spread more widely.

According to the Shenyang municipal government website, in September 1983 the city government established a public telephone line for the mayor.

It was the first mayoral hotline in China and became the starting point for more than four decades of government hotline development.

Other cities soon followed.

On June 15, 1999, Hangzhou established a public-call center for the mayor and assigned it the number 12345.

That number gradually spread nationwide and became the standard number for government public-service hotlines.

When Jinan launched its 12345 citizen hotline in September 2008, then-mayor Zhang Jianguo went to the call center himself and answered residents’ calls.

Jinan later established a regular system under which senior officials took calls on designated days, making it one of the earlier Chinese cities to institutionalize the practice.

According to China Central Television, Zhengzhou in Henan Province began arranging for the mayor or a vice mayor to take calls once a month from January 2005, making it one of the earliest publicly documented efforts to formalize hotline duty for senior local officials.

Over the next two decades, Xiamen, Beijing, Zhejiang and other localities tried similar approaches.

There is no national requirement forcing local leaders to do so.

Beijing’s approach is one of the more developed examples.

Its “Listening to Public Opinion, Addressing Public Concerns” initiative has now been running for eight years. The program has developed a rotating format involving the Party secretaries of Beijing’s 16 districts, supported by on-site consultation and follow-up supervision.

In practice, local 12345 hotlines have resolved many residents’ problems.

When the top local official personally answers calls, the impact can be immediate.

But Lai argues that this model also has an inherent limitation.

The core of modern governance, she said, is to rely on stable, standardized and predictable institutional procedures.

If large numbers of everyday problems can only be resolved after the top official steps in, that indicates that routine mechanisms for interdepartmental coordination and case handling have broken down.

Mao Shoulong, a professor at Renmin University of China’s School of Public Administration and Policy, holds a similar view.

When administrative and legal institutions are incomplete, he said, intervention by the top official can compensate for their shortcomings.

Once those systems are mature, however, it should be made clear that senior officials answering hotline calls is a temporary demonstration rather than the normal way for citizens to seek help.

People should be guided toward standardized administrative channels first, Mao said, so as to “eliminate the expectation that every problem should be taken to the top official.”

That is why one of the main questions facing local governments is how to turn individual cases raised during hotline sessions into changes in the system itself.

Baotou is also trying to do this.

Zhang Yanbin, a fourth-level researcher at the Baotou Urban Management Bureau, has firsthand experience of why broader institutional solutions are needed.

On July 27, 2026, when the head of the bureau took part in a 12345 hotline session, Zhang also answered six calls.

The one he remembers most clearly involved a factory built on collectively owned village land in one of the city’s districts.

Years earlier, the local township government had allowed the factory to be built as part of an investment-promotion effort.

Under current law, however, the structure is considered illegal.

Resolving a case like this takes time.

“If you want to make sure the entire enforcement process complies with the law, you first need to seek the planning department’s opinion, then issue formal notices, and eventually apply to a court for compulsory demolition,” Zhang said.

“You are looking at at least six months.”

Li Yang, director of the Baotou Urban Management Bureau’s monitoring and command center, told Southern Weekly that the case is now being handled jointly with the local district government, with senior officials directly following its progress.

The Urban Management Bureau has already developed a set of procedures for complicated 12345 cases.

Different plans are used for disputes involving multiple departments or administrative levels, cases where responsibilities are unclear, cases that have failed to be resolved after repeated negotiations, recurring problems shared by many residents, and cases that could create public controversy if officials respond only after a complaint has escalated.

There have also been changes at the city level.

Materials provided to Southern Weekly by the Baotou municipal government office show that since senior officials began taking part in the 12345 program, the city has established several new working mechanisms.

One of the more notable is a system for interdepartmental coordination.

Under this arrangement, the municipal government brings together the main departments responsible for areas that frequently generate livelihood complaints.

They prepare contingency plans in advance and add temporary specialist desks to the hotline center when necessary, with the aim of responding more quickly and precisely to high-frequency problems.

After the senior-official hotline program began in October 2025, Baotou’s housing and construction authorities also began renovation work in several areas that had generated large numbers of complaints.

Some places that had not originally been included in renovation plans were brought forward because officials identified them as likely sources of recurring problems.

The basic idea is simple: solve common problems before they require the personal attention of the city’s top officials.

Chinese robotics companies are also gaining ground overseas. Data from the General Administration of Customs on China’s goods trade for the first half of the year highlighted some remarkable figures: exports of industrial robots reached 6.29 billion yuan (about 936 million U.S. dollars), up 18.6%, reaching 141 countries and regions; surgical robot exports surged to 480 million yuan, a 3.3-fold increase; and combined exports of cleaning robots and smart bionic robots totaled 18.09 billion yuan.

Robotics is one of several Chinese technology stories drawing attention this summer.

A month earlier, Beijing-based Moonshot AI released Kimi K3, a 2.8-trillion-parameter open-weight model with a one-million-token context window. Its release drew attention well beyond China, adding to a broader debate over the growing presence of Chinese models in the global open-weight AI ecosystem.

By Executive President of China Finance 40 Forum (CF40) Institute Guo Kai‘s estimation, the AI supply chain now accounts for 22% of China’s total exports and contributes to roughly half of the export growth. Guo noted that large-scale investment in the overseas AI industry continues to drive China’s exports of high-end hardware, computing infrastructure and related products.

(I know the figure that AI-related supply chains account for 22% of China’s exports sounds a little startling. I was skeptical when I first saw it too. But more than one expert has cited a similar estimate, so I checked with someone in the industry who works closely with the data. The answer I got was that the figure is indeed roughly on that scale. Optical transceiver companies, for example, are now among the major contributors to export growth.)

A similar shift is visible in China’s biotech sector. Overseas licensing deals involving Chinese innovative drugs exceeded 100 billion U.S. dollars in total potential value in the first half of 2026, setting a new record, according to China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT).

In May 2026, Hengrui Medicine, headquartered in eastern Chinese city of Lianyungang, and Bristol Myers Squibb (BMS), an American multinational pharmaceutical company, announced a landmark global partnership to co-develop 13 early-stage programs across oncology, hematology and immunology.

These three sectors — robotics, artificial intelligence and innovative drugs — have recently been grouped together in China under a new label: the “New New Trio” (新“新三样”).

The comparison is easy to see. China’s previous “New Trio” of electric vehicles, lithium batteries and solar products became symbols of the country’s industrial rise in the first half of this decade. By 2025, “New Trio” exports neared 1.3 trillion yuan, a 3.5-fold increase from 2020, according to the General Administration of Customs of China (GACC).

Yet the analogy only goes so far. Robots can be counted at customs. AI models can spread through downloadable weights and APIs. Drugmakers can license molecules overseas years before a finished medicine reaches the market. Together, these sectors point to a broader change in how Chinese industrial capabilities are reaching the world: through software, intellectual property, research and production systems as well as manufactured goods.

Why Are These Sectors Emerging Together?

Robotics, AI and innovative drugs may look like three separate stories. Their routes overseas are certainly different. But their rise at roughly the same time is not entirely coincidental.

In robotics, Chinese companies are drawing on capabilities already built at scale in industries such as electric vehicles and consumer electronics. Batteries, motors, sensors, power electronics, machine vision and control systems are all important to both EVs and robots. It is no surprise that Chinese automakers such as BYD and XPeng are also developing humanoid robots.

AI adds another layer. Chinese companies are competing in foundation models, but the industry also rests on a much larger network of servers, data centers, communications infrastructure and power systems. The models can in turn feed back into manufacturing, robotics and scientific research. The recent overseas attention around Kimi and other Chinese open-weight models shows how some of these capabilities can reach international users without taking the form of a physical export.

Biotech has followed a different path, but it also benefits from accumulated capabilities elsewhere in the economy: China’s chemical industry, clinical research resources, engineering talent and growing computing capacity. The surge in overseas licensing deals shows that Chinese pharmaceutical companies are increasingly able to sell research assets and intellectual property, rather than simply manufacture drugs developed elsewhere.

These links point to a deeper explanation for why several internationally competitive Chinese industries are emerging together: China’s industrial system has become denser and more interconnected.

For decades, the advantage of having a broad manufacturing base was largely associated with scale and cost. Today, another advantage is becoming more visible. Technologies, supplier networks and production know-how developed in one industry can be reused in another, while engineers and technical talent can move across sectors.

The EV industry helped build supply chains that robotics companies can tap. Advances in AI can be applied to robots, factories and drug discovery. Computing infrastructure built for the digital economy can support both industrial automation and scientific research.

China therefore does not have to build every new industry entirely from scratch. New sectors inherit part of the infrastructure, talent and technical knowledge accumulated by the ones that came before them.

That helps explain both the number of new industries appearing and the speed at which some Chinese companies are reaching the global market.

From the “Old Three” to the “New New Trio”

The familiar Chinese labels offer a useful way to trace the change. The so-called “Old Three” of clothing, furniture and home appliances represented the classic export model of the 1990s and early 2000s. Global demand was already well established. China combined low labor costs, foreign investment, processing trade and increasingly efficient manufacturing to supply it at enormous scale.

The “New Trio” of EVs, batteries and solar products followed a different path. Demand for cleaner energy and transport was growing, but high costs still limited adoption. China’s domestic market, supply chains and manufacturing scale helped bring those costs down.

The industries now described as the “New New Trio” are emerging at an earlier stage of market development. Their end markets, business models and technology paths are still taking shape, yet Chinese companies have already become serious players.

Their eventual positions remain uncertain. What has changed is the timing. Chinese companies are entering these industries earlier, with a greater role in shaping how technologies are developed and commercialized.

Beyond containers

The older export story was relatively easy to measure. Factories made goods, ships carried them abroad, and customs recorded the value.

That picture becomes less complete as technology and intellectual property account for more of the value being created. Trade statistics capture only part of the international reach of the “New New Trio.”

Commercial relationships are also becoming more intertwined. A foreign company may use Chinese technology in its own products while competing with Chinese firms elsewhere. A global pharmaceutical company can license Chinese drug candidates to strengthen its pipeline. Similar overlaps are emerging in AI and advanced manufacturing, making the line between customer, supplier, partner and competitor less clear than in traditional merchandise trade.

China’s domestic market is an important part of this process. Rising labor costs are creating demand for automation, an aging population is putting pressure on health care, and companies across the economy are experimenting with AI to improve productivity. These pressures give emerging technologies a large market in which to be tested and refined.

China’s latest five-year plan reinforces that direction, placing AI, embodied intelligence, biomedicine and other emerging technologies high on the industrial agenda:

瞄准引领未来发展重点领域，构建未来产业全链条培育体系，推动量子科技、生物制造、氢能和核聚变能、脑机接口、具身智能、第六代移动通信等成为新的经济增长点。

Targeting key areas that will shape future development, China will build a full-chain system to foster future industries and promote quantum technology, biomanufacturing, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy, brain-computer interfaces, embodied intelligence, sixth-generation mobile communications and other fields as new drivers of economic growth.

Overseas expansion is increasingly built on this domestic base. Chinese companies can improve products at home, build scale and then reach foreign users through several routes, including direct sales, licensing and technology platforms. This differs from the older model of factories built mainly to serve overseas orders.

进一步引导和规范企业境外投资方向，支持有条件的企业开展互利共赢的境外投资合作，鼓励互联网平台、人工智能等新兴产业企业拓展海外应用场景。

Further guide and regulate the direction of enterprises’ outbound investment, support qualified enterprises in carrying out mutually beneficial overseas investment cooperation, and encourage companies in emerging industries such as internet platforms and artificial intelligence to expand their applications and use cases overseas. -- China’s national 15th Five-Year Plan

Will there be another “China Shock”?

Whether the global expansion of these industries will produce another “China shock” is still too early to tell. Their technologies, business models and routes overseas differ considerably from the manufactured exports that defined earlier waves of China’s industrial rise.

What is already visible, however, is a more cautious response in some countries as Chinese companies expand into these sectors. The U.S. Federal Communications Commission has introduced restrictions affecting certain foreign-made advanced robots. In Washington, the growing capabilities and low cost of Chinese open-weight AI models have also raised questions about cybersecurity, technological dependence and the strength of American alternatives.

Such resistance does not appear to be unexpected in China. Discussion of the “New New Trio” combines optimism about their growth with caution about the external environment they may face. On Wednesday, the CPC journal Qiushi reposted an article titled “The ‘New New Trio’ Is Reshaping China’s Development Logic” from Southern Daily, warning that technology restrictions, patent barriers, trade protection and higher overseas market-access thresholds could become increasingly important constraints:

从外部环境看，全球科技竞争日趋激烈，部分国家实施技术打压、专利限制、贸易保护政策，人工智能、生物医药、高端装备领域技术封锁加剧，海外市场准入门槛持续抬高。

From the external environment, global competition in science and technology is becoming more intense. Some countries have introduced technology restrictions, patent constraints and trade protection measures. Barriers are also rising in areas such as artificial intelligence, biomedicine and high-end equipment, making access to overseas markets more difficult.

从产业自身看，部分高端核心元器件、底层算力芯片、高端医疗设备材料仍存在短板，顶尖基础人才供给不足，中小企业创新转化能力偏弱，产学研深度融合机制仍需完善。

Within the industries themselves, gaps remain in some high-end core components, foundational computing chips, and advanced materials for medical equipment. There is also a shortage of top-tier talent in basic research, while small and medium-sized enterprises remain relatively weak in turning innovation into commercial applications. Closer integration among industry, universities and research institutions is still needed.

从行业生态看，人工智能伦理监管、生物医药国际审批、机器人行业全球统一标准等规则体系建设，仍滞后于产业扩张速度。

At the industry ecosystem level, rulemaking has not kept pace with market expansion in areas such as AI ethics and regulation, international approval of biopharmaceutical products, and globally harmonized standards for the robotics industry. -- Southern Daily

To address these challenges, the article proposes two responses: “strengthening weak links in the industrial chain and building an independent, controllable, secure and efficient science and technology innovation industrial chain,” and “improving the industrial ecosystem, facilitating the commercialization and application of scientific and technological achievements, and taking a more active role in shaping global rules for science and technology.” Both priorities are also written into China’s 15th Five-Year Plan.

The article concludes by spelling out the respective roles of the “old three,” the “new trio,” and the “New New Trio” in China’s development:

“老三样”承载稳定就业、保障民生供给，数字化改造后向功能性、高端化转型，持续稳住外贸基本盘；“新三样”依托成熟绿色产业链，持续扩大全球领先优势，夯实绿色发展底座；“新新三样”作为未来产业先导，带动全行业智能化、高端化升级，为传统产业转型提供技术工具。

The “Old Three” continue to support stable employment and meet everyday needs. With digital upgrading, they are moving toward higher-end and more specialized products while helping anchor China’s foreign trade. The “New Trio,” backed by mature green-industry supply chains, continue to strengthen their global competitiveness and provide a foundation for green development. As emerging industries, the “New New Trio” can help drive smarter and higher-end development across the economy and provide new technological tools for the transformation of traditional industries.

Given that the industries grouped under the “New New Trio” are still at an early stage, it may take more time before we can see the full picture. Commercial aerospace, quantum technology, low-altitude aviation and other sectors could eventually join this group of globally competitive industries. Will we one day be talking about a “New New New Trio”? Or perhaps some of them are already taking shape around us.

China’s gaming industry is another sector I would put on the watchlist. After Black Myth: Wukong made a considerable impact overseas in 2024, I was curious about how far that success had actually reached beyond Chinese and overseas Chinese players. So I asked ChatGPT to look at the available data. Its conclusion was that Black Myth: Wukong had not become “a mass cultural phenomenon in Europe and the United States,” but it had “become a mainstream title among core gamers worldwide.” That is already a fairly high bar to clear.

So I will end this article with the 15-minute gameplay demo of Black Myth: Zhong Kui, the new title from the studio behind Black Myth: Wukong, released on Thursday. I would also be very interested to hear what you think of the game. If you’re short on time, you can just watch the final minute. The first 14 minutes stay with a few longer sequences, while the last minute cuts quickly across many more settings and scenes from the game.

Hello and welcome to “Big Argument,” a commentary column in Beijing Scroll that takes a different look at major debates involving China, especially where perspectives from China are missing or underrepresented in mainstream international coverage.

Some of the views in this article may differ from those more commonly encountered in Western media and policy discussions. But hearing arguments you may not encounter elsewhere is also part of the reason many of you read this newsletter.

Much of the international discussion about the Taiwan Strait begins with the possibility of war. Attention tends to focus on military drills, defense budgets, arms sales to Taiwan and whether the United States would intervene if conflict broke out.

By comparison, far less attention is paid to the shortage of regular communication and people-to-people contact across the Strait.

Since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) returned to power in 2016, official cross-Strait communication has largely broken down. The DPP’s party platform still retains the goal of “establishing the Republic of Taiwan as a sovereign, independent, and autonomous nation.” Beijing has accused both Tsai Ing-wen and Lai Ching-te of working with external forces to advance separatist “Taiwan independence” goals.

It argues that Lai’s remarks since taking office — including his statement that “Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are not subordinate to each other” and his description of China as a “foreign hostile force” — have made that position more explicit, and has criticized his approach as a new “two states” theory.

The 1992 Consensus emerged in the early 1990s as the political formula that made cross-Strait dialogue possible. The DPP rejects that framework, while Beijing insists that official talks cannot resume without it. This disagreement over the basic political premise for dialogue has left the two sides without stable official channels through which to manage disputes and pursue peace.

The Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) party, led by Cheng Li-wun, has spent much of the first half of 2026 trying to fill part of that gap.

In April, Cheng led a KMT delegation to the mainland, becoming the first sitting party chair to make such a visit in about a decade. The trip also produced the first meeting between the leaders of the KMT and the Communist Party of China (CPC) in ten years. During the six-day visit, she met the CPC leadership and also visited companies, ports, local governments and historical and cultural sites.

Her message was straightforward: Taiwan should not become another crisis in an already unsettled world. The two sides should rebuild trust and give people more opportunities to travel, meet and interact.

Cheng Li-wun speaks at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing, east China’s Jiangsu Province, on April 8, 2026.

On the final day of Cheng’s visit, Beijing announced ten measures aimed at expanding cross-Strait exchanges and co-operation. They included plans to resume individual travel to Taiwan for residents of Shanghai and Fujian, restore or add more direct passenger flights, and widen market access for Taiwanese agricultural and fishery products.

But Cheng and the KMT cannot put these measures fully into effect. The party remains in opposition, and decisions involving entry permits, transport arrangements and official negotiations remain in the hands of the DPP administration.

Even so, unofficial engagement should not be dismissed simply because it cannot resolve the underlying political dispute. A recent report by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) noted that experts from the United States, the Chinese mainland and Taiwan still saw sustained dialogue as one of the few practical tools available to reduce mistrust and lower the risks of accidental escalation.

Cheng’s mainland trip, together with some of the steps the KMT has taken in Taiwan since then, belongs to this broader effort to put engagement back on the agenda. It has created more room for cross-Strait exchanges and mutual visits to return to public discussion.

Some recent polling also points to clear demand in Taiwan for better relations and renewed communication. A June survey by the Taiwan-based Democracy Foundation found that 59.6% of respondents supported Taiwan taking the initiative to pursue peace talks with the mainland, while 68.7% supported improving cross-Strait relations and working for peace.

Can cross-Strait exchanges become two-way again?

“Communication is an urgent priority.”

That was how the NCAFP summarized one of the main conclusions of a recent high-level Track II dialogue involving experts from the United States, the Chinese mainland and Taiwan.

The report noted that “official cross-Strait dialogue is absent and even unofficial exchanges on issues in cross-Strait relations are rare ... With cross-Strait political trust at a low ebb and formal channels of communication absent, the risk of miscalculation remains uncomfortably high.”

Participants in the dialogue called for expanding cross-Strait exchanges and connections to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and make today’s fragile stability durable.

There is good reason for that argument. Exchange does not equal peace. But the past two decades provide at least one period in which political stability and closer interaction reinforced each other.

Between 2008 and 2016, during a period of relatively peaceful cross-Strait relations, two-way travel doubled and reached nearly 10 million trips in 2015. Cross-Strait movement became part of everyday life, creating something of a soft buffer between the two sides.

The experience suggests that political easing and people-to-people contact can work in both directions. Greater political trust made expanded tourism, flights and trade possible. More frequent travel and commerce, in turn, gave more people a direct stake in preserving stability.

Taiwan tourists pose for photos upon their arrival at Xiuying port in Haikou, capital of China’s Hainan Province, Feb. 8, 2010.

After the DPP returned to power in 2016, political relations deteriorated, and the scale of cross-Strait travel declined. Since pandemic restrictions were lifted, Beijing has repeatedly announced steps to restore travel to Taiwan for residents of selected regions and cities and has proposed adding more flights. The DPP administration, however, has yet to lift key pandemic-era restrictions on mainland visitors, while direct flights remain far below pre-pandemic levels.

As a result, cross-Strait travel has been recovering, but the flow remains markedly uneven.

According to China’s National Immigration Administration, there were 3.12 million cross-Strait trips in the first half of this year, up 22.1% from a year earlier. Taiwan residents accounted for 2.85 million trips to the mainland, an increase of 24.9%.

The figures also show that political tension has not eliminated the demand for contact. People from Taiwan continue to visit the mainland for work, study, family reasons and tourism. Movement in the other direction remains far more restricted.

The DPP administration has yet to produce a plan that can actually restart mainland tourism to Taiwan. It has also said that broader cross-Strait exchanges will be placed under a tighter “risk management” framework.

Earlier this year, the Financial Times published an article titled “Let Chinese mainland tourists return to Taiwan.” It argued that Beijing had already made high-profile political statements about restoring tourism and begun limited reopening measures without securing substantive concessions from Taipei. The article called on Taiwan to show greater flexibility and to compartmentalize tourism from the broader political dispute.

That argument found sympathy within Taiwan’s tourism industry, but it has not received the same response from the DPP administration.

The KMT’s role

The opposition KMT is now trying to serve as a channel of communication across the Strait.

After returning from the mainland, Cheng said the CPC leadership understood that Taiwan had developed a different political system and way of life. She also argued that people in Taiwan should be willing to acknowledge the mainland’s development achievements. Cheng offered to brief Lai personally on what she had heard and observed during the trip.

Her comments predictably drew criticism from political opponents in Taiwan. Some argued that Cheng was too willing to present Beijing’s perspective and paid too little attention to the military pressure around the island. Others worried that party-to-party contacts could allow Beijing to decide which Taiwanese political figures it regards as acceptable interlocutors.

Those concerns are not without basis, but they should not become a reason to reject all engagement.

Cheng’s approach also reflects a simple principle of communication across political divides: dialogue is often most valuable when differences are greatest. Explaining the mainland to people in Taiwan does not amount to endorsing its political system. Engaging and communicating with Beijing does not automatically mean entering talks on unequal terms.

The KMT also has historical experience with this approach.

In 2005, then-KMT chairman Lien Chan led a delegation to the mainland on what became known on both sides of the Strait as an “ice-breaking journey.” It produced the first formal meeting between the top leaders of the KMT and the CPC in six decades. Cheng was the KMT spokeswoman for that trip.

Lien Chan, then-KMT chairman, poses for a photo with other members of the delegation during a visit to the Tianfei Palace in Nanjing, east China’s Jiangsu Province, on April 27, 2005. Cheng Li-wun is third from right.

Three years later, the KMT returned to power, and the heightened cross-Strait tensions that had marked much of the Chen Shui-bian years gave way to a more stable period. Between 2008 and 2016, direct flights, tourism and trade expanded rapidly. In 2015, the leaders of the two sides met face-to-face for the first time since 1949.

Cheng’s decision to travel to the mainland as a sitting KMT chair therefore inevitably invites comparisons with that effort two decades ago.

Engagement matters beyond the Strait

At this year’s meeting between the leaders of the KMT and the CPC, the CPC leadership reiterated that Beijing would respond positively to proposals conducive to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. It also described “Taiwan independence” as the principal threat to peace in the Strait.

The DPP does not accept that definition. But Beijing’s view of the issue remains impossible to ignore when trying to understand why official dialogue has been suspended for so long.

What is less disputed is that peace across the Taiwan Strait matters far beyond the two sides themselves.

For the United States, maintaining deterrence in its strategic competition with China and avoiding war are not contradictory goals.

After returning from China in May, U.S. President Donald Trump told Fox News that he did not want to see Taiwan move towards independence. He also questioned the idea of the United States traveling 9,500 miles to fight a war over the island, adding that he did not want such an outcome.

American public support for direct military intervention is also limited. A report published by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs on November 17, 2025 found that, in the event of a war over Taiwan, 51% of Americans opposed sending U.S. troops to defend Taiwan directly.

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during an interview with Fox News, in which he discussed his views on tensions across the Taiwan Strait.

For the rest of the world, the stakes are no less serious.

Taiwan is one of the world’s most important centers for advanced semiconductor production and a key node in East Asia’s manufacturing network. The Taiwan Strait is also one of the busiest maritime corridors. A conflict could hit semiconductor supplies, shipping, trade and financial markets within a very short period.

A Bloomberg Economics study published in February estimated that, in the most severe scenario, a U.S.-China war over Taiwan could cost the global economy 10.6 trillion U.S. dollars, roughly 9.6% of global gross domestic product, in the first year alone. The damage would extend far beyond the main parties. Japan, South Korea, the European Union, India and the United Kingdom could all face severe economic contractions.

A conflict in the Taiwan Strait would therefore be far more than a regional security crisis. It could quickly affect prices, production, investment and employment around the world.

Governments around the world may have limited ability to resolve the underlying political dispute. They do, however, have a clear interest in supporting measures that reduce the risk of escalation.

Economic interdependence and dense people-to-people ties across the Strait can provide additional buffers when tensions rise and preserve more channels for co-operation. Their value becomes greater, not smaller, when the risk of escalation is growing.

The exchanges promoted by Cheng and the KMT cannot resolve all the differences across the Strait. But expecting an opposition party to settle a decades-old cross-Strait issue would set an unreasonable standard.

What the KMT’s efforts help illustrate is that regular flights, functioning ports and ordinary people traveling across the Strait can give both sides a more tangible stake in keeping stability part of everyday life. They can also remind more people that political disagreement does not require all civilian contact to stop.

At a time when conflict has become more common in several parts of the world, creating room for cross-Strait relations to move back towards dialogue and exchange is, at the very least, a starting point worth taking seriously.

Beijing Scroll

China’s cross-Strait integration experiment in Xiamen and Kinmen

Nearly three years have passed since Chinese authorities unveiled a plan in September 2023 to support its eastern Fujian Province in exploring new approaches for integrated development across the Taiwan Strait…

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3 months ago · 10 likes · Jiang Jiang

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There have already been several good write-ups of the mission on Substack. So instead of recapping the launch itself, I’d like to look at another dimension of China’s commercial space industry: its rapidly expanding network of commercial launch sites.

The day after the recovery mission, City Evolution (城市进化论), a WeChat publication operated by the National Business Daily, argued that 2026 marks an important turning point for China’s commercial space sector. With reusable rockets entering an intensive phase of flight validation and the country’s national satellite internet constellations accelerating deployment, the industry, it argued, is moving from an experimental stage into a period of rapid growth.

The article also highlighted one increasingly important bottleneck: launch capacity. As more private rocket companies come online, launch pads have become scarce, and securing launch windows is becoming increasingly difficult.

This fits into a broader national strategy. China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) calls for accelerating the development of strategic emerging industries, including aerospace, and for speeding up the construction of an aerospace powerhouse.

Against this backdrop, local governments across the country are racing to position themselves within the commercial space economy, with new launch facilities becoming one of the key areas of competition.

Today, let’s take a look at how China’s commercial launch infrastructure is taking shape.

Most Chinese media now identify three major commercial launch sites currently in operation:

• the Hainan commercial spacecraft launch site in south China’s Hainan Province

• the Dongfeng commercial space innovation pilot zone in northwest China

• the Oriental Spaceport in Haiyang, a coastal city in east China’s Shandong Province

The Hainan commercial spacecraft launch site (Wenchang)

The rocket recovery mission that drew global attention last week took place at the Hainan commercial spacecraft launch site.

According to Oriental Outlook, a magazine affiliated with Xinhua, Wenchang is home to China’s first dedicated commercial space launch site. Its advantages begin with geography.

Located at low latitude and relatively close to the equator, Wenchang allows rockets to take greater advantage of the Earth’s rotational speed, reducing fuel consumption while increasing payload capacity. Unlike China’s inland launch centers, rockets launched from Wenchang fly almost entirely over the ocean, significantly reducing risks to populated areas. Its coastal location also makes it much easier to transport large rocket components by sea, an increasingly important advantage as China’s launch vehicles continue to grow in size.

One feature of the launch site that particularly impressed me is its versatility.

Traditionally, Chinese launch pads were designed around individual rocket models — essentially one launch pad for one type of rocket. That approach works for a government-led space program, but becomes inefficient when dozens of commercial rocket companies are developing different launch vehicles.

To address this, Hainan developed what it calls a universal launch pad. Rather than being customized for a single rocket, Launch Pad No. 2 can support rockets from more than ten companies across over twenty different rocket models.

As Yang Tianliang, chairman of the Hainan International Commercial Aerospace Launch Co., Ltd., explained to Oriental Outlook, engineers created a standardized launch interface, while each rocket company develops its own adapter to connect to it.

“Think of it like a universal charging station,” Yang said. “Different phone brands may use different connectors, but with the right adapter, they can all use the same charging point.”

Currently, all rockets with diameters below five meters can use the facility. The result is much higher launch-pad utilization.

This matters because Wenchang’s tropical climate brings frequent rainstorms, thunderstorms and typhoons. The less time a rocket occupies the launch pad, the less likely weather delays become.

To further improve efficiency, Hainan has adopted what’s known in China as the “three-horizontal” launch process: horizontal assembly, horizontal testing and horizontal transportation. Instead of standing vertically throughout preparation, rockets remain horizontal until shortly before launch.

According to Yang, this allows a rocket to arrive lying down, be raised vertically only at the final stage, and reduce its occupancy of the launch area to roughly three days.

By redesigning the entire workflow, the launch site aims to support a much higher launch cadence — an increasingly important capability as more commercial launch providers compete for access.

The Dongfeng commercial space innovation pilot zone in northwest China (Jiuquan)

If Wenchang represents China’s newest commercial launch hub, Jiuquan represents the industry’s roots.

The Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center is China’s oldest comprehensive launch facility. Within it, the Dongfeng commercial space innovation pilot zone serves as a dedicated area supporting commercial launch activities.

Today, many of China’s private rocket companies have built their own launch infrastructure there.

According to Xinhua, rocket developer LandSpace recently completed a static fire test of its reusable carrier rocket Zhuque-3 at the site. Zhuque-3 is a domestically developed, reusable launch vehicle powered by liquid oxygen-methane. It has been developed for large-scale satellite constellation networking missions.

The company said all key ground verification work before the launch has now been completed. In the next phase, the test team will carry out launch preparations as planned, fully preparing for the flight test mission.

The Oriental Spaceport (Haiyang, Shandong)

Haiyang represents a different model altogether. Rather than focusing primarily on land launches, Haiyang’s Oriental Spaceport specializes in sea-based launches.

Chen Yao, vice president and secretary-general of the China Regional Economics Association, told City Evolution that Haiyang’s biggest advantage lies in what he described as an integrated “port-behind-factory” model.

Rocket assembly facilities are located only a few kilometers from the launch terminal, allowing rockets to move almost directly from the factory to the launch vessel.

The city has also developed what Chinese media describe as a complete industrial chain covering satellites, rockets and support vessels, while simultaneously building a growing aerospace tourism industry.

According to the aerospace WeChat blog Hello Space (你好太空), China’s first sea launch took place off the coast of Haiyang on June 15, 2019, when a Long March 11 solid-fuel rocket successfully lifted off from an offshore platform.

By 2025, Haiyang had supported more than ten sea-launch missions and helped place over fifty satellites into orbit.

More launch sites are on the way

The expansion doesn’t stop with these three launch centers.

According to City Evolution, Sichuan’s Liangshan, Yangjiang in Guangdong, and Ningbo in Zhejiang are all planning commercial launch facilities as local governments compete for positions within China’s emerging commercial space industry.

Northeastern China is also joining the race. Liaoning Province’s recently released its 15th Five-Year Plan for the marine economy proposes building a commercial offshore launch base.

Chen Yao argues that the three northeastern provinces are already developing complementary roles: Jilin Province has built strengths in satellite manufacturing and applications through projects such as the Jilin-1 satellite constellation. Heilongjiang Province benefits from Harbin Institute of Technology’s aerospace research capabilities, particularly in satellite design and testing.

Liaoning Province, meanwhile, possesses something the other two provinces lack: a coastline. As China’s only coastal province in the northeast, it already has a well-established shipbuilding and offshore engineering industry, providing a natural foundation for developing launch vessels and offshore launch platforms without starting from scratch.

That gives it a comparative advantage in sea-based launch services that its inland neighbors cannot easily replicate.

I’m not an aerospace specialist, so today’s post is intended as a broad overview rather than a technical analysis. If you’d like to dive deeper into any of the topics covered here, I’ve embedded links to the original Chinese-language reporting throughout the article. Feel free to explore the original reporting in greater detail.

In a political commentary published by Xinhua News Agency on Jun. 29 to mark the Party’s 105th anniversary, the article noted that during the Party-wide campaign on establishing and practicing a correct view on governance performance, some cases involving deviations, distortions, and misplaced priorities in officials’ understanding of governance performance had been publicly reported and seriously dealt with. This, the commentary said, sent a strong signal that new achievements in Party self-governance would help safeguard the broad journey of Chinese modernization.

If you have been following China closely in recent years, you would be aware that after the 20th National Congress of the CPC, the Party launched a series of education campaigns: one in 2023 focused on studying and implementing Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era; one in 2024 on studying CPC discipline; and one in 2025 on strengthening compliance with a code of conduct known as the “Eight-Point Rules,” which many of you have read about in this newsletter. The campaign on the view of governance performance is this year’s equivalent theme.

Therefore, I believe this campaign is worth paying attention to.

As with many similar CPC campaigns, the Party has presented both model cases and cautionary cases. This is a very common method in such campaigns: using concrete cases to tell the whole Party what should be advocated, and what kinds of mistakes should be avoided as much as possible.

Just last month, the website of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) published five “typical cases of deviations in the view of governance performance.” One of them involved a local official who, in a one-sided pursuit of short-term economic benefits, placed economic indicators above ecological red lines and blindly introduced multiple highly polluting chemical companies into a county industrial park.

Meanwhile, in the 12th issue of China Discipline Inspection and Supervision (《中国纪检监察》杂志), a magazine overseen by the CCDI, published in June this year, a column on the view of governance performance included a model case related to ecological protection. The article was titled “Planting Trees for the People for 76 Years — The Plain View of governance performance in the ‘Youyu Spirit.’”

Because the concept of governance performance covers many fields, I will not summarize all of them in a single piece. So in today’s observation of the CPC’s campaign on the view of governance performance, I have decided to focus on ecological protection. I think readers from different countries can probably understand this topic more easily.

First of all, if you look at the CPC from a longer historical perspective, you will find that the Party has always attached considerable importance to ecology.

An article published in 2021 on the website of the Institute of Party History and Literature of the CPC Central Committee noted that during the revolutionary war years, the CPC carried out tree-planting and afforestation activities in revolutionary base areas. It also said that after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the first generation of the Party’s central leadership began to promote ecological civilization construction nationwide. The article further discussed the theoretical and practical achievements of China’s continued ecological civilization efforts after reform and opening-up, as well as in the current era.

In March this year, Guangming Daily, a newspaper run by the CPC Central Committee and mainly read by intellectuals, published an article titled “Understanding the Ecological and Environmental Dimension of the CPC’s Revolutionary History.” The author was Li Jinzheng, a professor at the Center for Chinese Social History and the School of History at Nankai University. The article offered a deeper discussion of the relationship between the CPC’s revolutionary history and the natural environment.

In its conclusion, the article said that the CPC “turned favorable natural conditions into advantages, and turned unfavorable natural conditions into favorable ones,” arguing that this reflected the Party’s strong initiative and creativity.

Against this broader backdrop, the article in China Discipline Inspection and Supervision about 76 years of tree planting in one county becomes particularly interesting.

The place in question is Youyu County in north China’s Shanxi Province.

I usually live in Beijing. One of the most visible changes I have felt over the years is that many international visitors who have been to Beijing now say that the weather is clearer than they had imagined. In the past, sandstorms often hit Beijing, and there were days when you could not see the blue sky.

Looking at the map, Youyu is basically at the same latitude as Beijing. It sits at the junction of Shanxi Province and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Given this geographic location, strong winds and sandstorms were hardly surprising.

According to the magazine article, in June 1949, Zhang Ronghuai, the first Party secretary of Youyu County, arrived to take up his post. On the very day he arrived, he happened to encounter a strong wind:

“It was not an ordinary wind. It was the kind of wind that turned the sky yellowish brown. In broad daylight, you could not clearly see the face of someone standing opposite you. The sand hit people’s faces so hard that it hurt.”

This scene made even Zhang Ronghuai, who had been through battlefields, feel a sudden heaviness in his heart: What path was there for the people of Youyu to survive?

After discussing the issue with his colleagues, he came to believe that planting trees was the only way out for the county. This marked the beginning of stories in which 22 successive Party secretaries of Youyu County, over 76 years, led local people in planting trees.

During this process, a reporter once asked a local official: “If you always follow the same path, won’t people laugh at you for lacking ability?”

But the article noted that although the 22 county Party secretaries served in different eras and had different personalities and working methods, not one of them wavered on the question of “planting trees.” Some planted arbors, some planted shrubs, and some planted economic forests. The thinking was optimized over time, but the direction never shifted.

By the 1980s, as China began reform and opening-up and the tide of the market economy surged, in Youyu, some people began to argue that afforestation had already reached its limit. They said there were already enough trees, that the yellow sand had been brought under control, and that it was time to develop industry.

The article recorded one specific debate:

In the mid-to-late 1980s, as China began experimenting with GDP accounting, surrounding counties were opening small coal mines and setting up factories. Youyu had proven underground coal reserves of 500 million tonnes. At the time, someone calculated that opening a small coal mine could bring in 20 million yuan (about 3 million U.S. dollars) a year — equivalent to the county’s entire annual fiscal revenue.

At a meeting about the debate, Yuan Haoji, the 12th Party secretary of Youyu County, slammed the table and said: “Cutting down the forest to open coal mines may become the political achievement of our current leadership team, but it would leave a bad name for thousands of years!”

According to the article, 76 years later, Youyu has delivered a hard-core ecological answer: 90 percent of its desertified land has been effectively treated. The county, once pushed to the brink by wind and sand, has now become an important ecological barrier protecting the Beijing-Tianjin region. Every year, it reduces the amount of sediment flowing into the Yellow River by one million tonnes.

Today in Youyu, afforestation has developed into a mature green industry. For example, the county’s 300,000 mu of sea buckthorn forests have formed an industry with an annual output value of around 300 million yuan (about 44.2 million U.S. dollars).

China’s drone technology, which many of you are familiar with, has also found a role in Youyu. Today, drones are replacing manual labor in carrying saplings up the mountains. One drone can transport 120 saplings a day. The survival rate of Youyu’s afforestation has reached 92 percent, 18 times higher than in the early years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

There are many other interesting details in the article. If you are interested, you can read the full text with the help of a translation tool. I just want to add two more details.

First, a local journalist who has covered Shanxi for many years told me that while burning joss paper during the Qingming Festival, also known as Tomb-Sweeping Day, is a long-standing tradition across much of China, today, people in Youyu commemorate their ancestors by offering flowers instead of burning paper in order to protect the forests and the environment. Environmentally friendly forms of remembrance like this are, of course, not unique to China — I have encountered similar practices elsewhere in the world.

Second, he told me on that, according to the Youyu County Gazetteer, the county had just over 30 bird species in the 1980s. Today, that number has grown to more than 160, making Youyu a popular destination for birdwatchers.

In summarizing the view of governance performance represented by the “Youyu Spirit,” the article said:

True political achievement is not only about how many “highlights” an official creates during his or her term, but more importantly about how much foundation is left for future development. Seventy-six years. Twenty-two county Party secretaries. 130 million trees. Behind these numbers is a view of governance performance that goes beyond the individual, beyond the term of office, and beyond immediate interests. Local officials in Youyu often say: “Those who plant trees may not see the day when the trees become a forest, but they cannot refuse to plant them just because they may not see that day.”

The Youyu Spirit reminded me of the long-termism that is so often discussed today. This kind of trade-off is in fact not easy, because people sometimes tend to choose things that are beneficial to themselves in the short term, or pursue novelty in order to distinguish themselves from their predecessors. For that reason, the story of Youyu is indeed impressive.

I didn’t want to make this article too long, so I chose to focus on just this one case. I hope you found it helpful.

In March this year, Fujian released what it described as the first batch of milestone achievements in the construction of the cross-Strait integrated development demonstration zone. Among the achievements highlighted by the Fujian government was progress toward creating “same-city living circles” between Xiamen and Kinmen, and between Fuzhou and Matsu.

Having visited both Xiamen, the port city in Fujian, and Kinmen, a Taiwan-administered island group lying just off the mainland coast, I wanted to take a closer look at how integration between the two places has developed over the past three years.

This post was prompted by the recent 18th Straits Forum in Xiamen. Several side events focused on cooperation between Xiamen and Kinmen, bringing together officials, business representatives, researchers and residents familiar with developments on both sides. Journalist friends in Xiamen were therefore able to help me obtain some relatively detailed information about the projects now being pursued.

First, however, it is worth briefly considering the historical background. A line widely attributed to a Qing-dynasty edition of the Taiwan gazetteer compared Taiwan and Xiamen to “the two wings of a bird,” adding that local people regarded the two as closely interconnected.

The historical relationship was also examined in Xiamen’s Economic and Social Development Strategy, 1985–2000 (《1985年——2000年厦门经济社会发展战略》 ）, a long-term development study prepared in the 1980s. The book discussed the movement of people and goods between Xiamen and Taiwan and the importance of those connections to Xiamen’s development.

What, then, has made the relationship between Xiamen and Kinmen a testing ground for cross-Strait integration?

More than two decades ago, limited direct postal, trade and transport links were established between Fujian and the Taiwan-administered offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu. These arrangements became known as the “mini three links (“小三通”),” as distinct from the broader postal, trade and transport links established across the Taiwan Strait.

On Jan. 2, 2019, at a meeting marking the 40th anniversary of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, the Chinese leadership called for smoother economic and trade cooperation, infrastructure connectivity, the sharing of energy and resources, and the alignment of industry standards across the Strait. These proposals became known as the “new four links (“新四通“).”

The Chinese leadership also proposed that Kinmen and Matsu could take the lead in establishing direct links with nearby parts of Fujian in four specific areas: water, electricity, gas and bridges. These are commonly referred to on the mainland as the “mini four links.”

Kinmen, together with Xiamen and other coastal areas of Fujian, has therefore served as a testing ground for broader forms of cross-Strait integration.

The Chinese mainland has continued to promote this approach. In April 2026, the mainland rolled out a package of 10 policies and measures -- spanning inter-party communication, infrastructure, travel, trade and culture -- aimed at boosting exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan. They included renewed support for water, electricity, gas and bridge connections between coastal Fujian and Kinmen and Matsu, as well as a proposal allowing Kinmen residents to make use of Xiamen’s new airport.

The connections already in operation

How much integration between Xiamen and Kinmen currently exists in practice?

The passenger ferry offers one of the clearest indicators.

Ten vessels currently operate on the Xiamen–Kinmen route, with 24 sailings each day. The one-way journey takes about 30 minutes. According to data from the Xiamen General Station of Exit and Entry Frontier Inspection, annual passenger journeys on the route rose sharply over the past three years:

• 710,000 in 2023

• 1.25 million in 2024

• 1.74 million in 2025

These are passenger journeys rather than the number of unique travelers, meaning that a person making a round trip is normally counted twice. Even so, the figures show a substantial recovery and expansion of cross-Strait movement through the route.

Among the proposed water, electricity, gas and bridge connections, water is by far the most advanced.

Fujian began supplying water to Kinmen on August 5, 2018. According to Fujian Water Resources Investment & Development Group, Fujian has since supplied Kinmen with more than 49 million tonnes of water. Daily deliveries now stand at about 21,000 tonnes, accounting for approximately 87 percent of the water handled by Kinmen’s public water system.

When I was reporting in Kinmen earlier this year, I met Zhang Yangyang, a Kinmen native who moved to Xiamen in 2009 to study traditional Chinese medicine at Xiamen University. He recalled that water shortages were once a defining feature of everyday life for a generation of Kinmen residents.

“I remember that when I was a child, the water would sometimes be cut off, and we had to take storage containers and wait for water,” he said. “That no longer happens.”

Integration has also extended into selected areas of public services.

Xiamen has made school and kindergarten places available to children from Kinmen, with preferential policies applying at different stages of education. It has encouraged Kinmen residents to seek employment in the city and offers certain subsidies to qualifying companies that recruit talent from Kinmen.

Kinmen residents working or living in Xiamen may also be eligible for employee medical insurance, temporary assistance and a range of basic public-health services, including health records and vaccinations. Some can apply for public rental housing or subsidized housing.

These policies represent an effort to incorporate Kinmen residents into parts of Xiamen’s public service system.

Infrastructure prepared on one side

The remaining three elements of the “mini four links” — electricity, gas and a bridge — have made some progress on the Xiamen side, but none has yet resulted in a functioning connection across the water.

On electricity, the supporting alternating-current grid on the mainland side has been put into operation, while preparatory procedures for a planned converter station have been completed.

Academic and technical discussions on connecting the Xiamen and Kinmen power grids have taken place several times since 2020. The two power systems operate at different frequencies, so the proposed link would use a flexible direct-current conversion system in Xiamen to make the electricity compatible with Kinmen’s grid before sending it across the water by subsea cable.

According to people familiar with the project, there are no fundamental technical obstacles, but the main difficulty is the Taiwan authorities’ refusal to engage in direct communication.

Taiwan authorities have questioned whether such a connection is necessary. In August 2022, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council said that linking the power grids would involve the exercise of public authority by both sides and that no consultations had taken place. It added that, according to an assessment by Taiwan Power Company, existing generating capacity could meet projected growth in demand in Kinmen and Matsu for another decade. It therefore saw neither an urgent need nor an immediate necessity for a connection with Fujian.

On gas, an LNG supply station and part of the related pipeline network have been built on the Xiamen side. According to the Xiamen Municipal Bureau of Municipal Administration and Landscape, Taiwan authorities have not formally responded to the proposal for a Xiamen–Kinmen gas link, while the Kinmen county government has expressed support.

Regarding the proposed bridge, which is probably the most visible one of the projects, the Xiamen section of the Xiamen-Kinmen Bridge project is scheduled to open by the end of this year, and the project serves to link Xiamen island to Xiang’an International Airport and includes a reserved interface for a future extension to Kinmen. Taiwan authorities have not announced a corresponding construction plan on the Kinmen side.

Kinmen residents have told me that flights at Kinmen Airport are sometimes delayed or cancelled because of fog. In their view, access to the much larger airport in Xiamen could provide an alternative route when weather disrupts local services.

For Kinmen passengers to use the airport through a dedicated arrangement, the two sides would need to address immigration controls, customs procedures, transport links, aviation regulation and security responsibilities.

Why did water come first?

The contrast among the four projects raises an obvious question: why was water supply implemented while electricity, gas and a bridge remain incomplete?

Yang Kunfu, a council member of Xiamen Association for Taiwan Studies, argues that the main reason was the severity of Kinmen’s water shortage. A shortage of fresh water presented an immediate and widely recognized public need.

Compared with electricity, gas or a bridge, the water project also involved relatively straightforward engineering and was regarded as less politically sensitive. A bridge, by contrast, would have considerable symbolic as well as practical significance, making it much more difficult to advance in Taiwan’s current political environment.

Yang believes the four projects therefore need to proceed gradually, beginning with those that are easier to implement.

His explanation points to a broader distinction among the projects. Water, electricity, gas, a bridge and shared airport access are not one-off transactions. Each would create a long-term relationship involving investment, pricing, maintenance, emergency arrangements, regulation, security and the allocation of responsibility.

Infrastructure can be prepared by one side alone. A functioning cross-boundary connection cannot.

There is also a difference between local support and the authority to implement a project. The Kinmen county government and some local political and business figures have expressed support for deeper links with Xiamen. But decisions involving electricity, energy, cross-boundary roads, immigration and customs cannot be made by Kinmen alone.

In addition to several key reports, such as the government work report, and several key pieces of legislation, this year’s agenda also centers on the widely anticipated draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan for national economic and social development.

Compared with the Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership’s recommendations for formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan, released last October, the draft outline provides far more detail.

Spanning more than 70,000 Chinese characters and organized into 18 sections and 62 chapters, the outline is too extensive to cover fully in a single article.

So in this piece, I focus on a concept that has been widely discussed in Chinese policy circles over the past year: “invest in people,” or “investment in human capital” (投资于人).

The Emergence of the “Invest in People” Concept

The idea did not appear overnight. As early as 2023, the Chinese leadership mentioned in a high-level meeting that China should not only continue “investing in physical assets,” but should closely combine this with “investing in human capital.”

A year ago, during the 2025 “two sessions,” the government work report used the phrase “investment in people” for the first time, saying that “more funds and resources will be used to serve the people and meet their needs.”

The recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan released last year emphasized:

坚持扩大内需这个战略基点，坚持惠民生和促消费、投资于物和投资于人紧密结合

Guided by the strategy of expanding domestic demand, we should work toward improving living standards while increasing consumer spending and combine investment in physical assets with investment in human capital.

The draft outline released on March 5 continues this formulation.

Why Emphasize “Investing in People”?

An article published in December 2025 in Qiushi, a flagship magazine of the CPC Central Committee, helps clarify the policy logic.

According to the article, as China’s development stage and conditions change, the returns on “investing in physical assets,” such as infrastructure, housing, and machinery, have declined significantly. Between 2008 and 2023, China’s incremental capital-output ratio rose from 2.84 to 9.44, meaning that generating each additional yuan of GDP now requires several times more capital investment than before.

At the same time, capital-driven investment can expand production capacity in ways that do not necessarily match evolving consumer demand, leading to localized overcapacity and structural imbalances.

Meanwhile, rising incomes and the expansion of China’s middle-income population are increasing demands for better public services and higher quality of life. Yet mismatches in the domestic supply-demand structure continue to constrain people’s pursuit of a better life.

What Does “Investing in People” Mean?

In an interview with Qiushi, economist Yu Chunhai, a professor at Renmin University of China, explained the concept:

“投资于人”，是指将更多财政资金和公共资源投向教育、就业、医疗、社会保障等民生领域，投入到人的能力提升、健康维护、职业发展和潜力开发中，以消费潜力释放和人力资本提升驱动经济高质量发展。

“Investing in people” refers to directing greater fiscal funding and public resources toward livelihood-related sectors such as education, employment, healthcare, and social security, and toward enhancing human capabilities, safeguarding health, advancing career development, and unlocking individual potential, so as to drive high-quality economic development through the release of consumption potential and the strengthening of human capital.

Yu emphasized that “investing in people” is not merely a type of investment or a particular investment direction. Rather, it represents a new development orientation — one that serves as a correction to past models of investment, capacity expansion, and even the broader development paradigm.

Furthermore, “investing in people” aims to raise individuals’ levels of knowledge, skills, health, and social adaptability, thereby improving the overall human capital and professional skills of society. The goal is to transform “human resources” into “human capital” capable of sustainable value creation, and to move from a “demographic dividend” to a “talent dividend.”

Where Will China “Invest in People”?

Following this logic, “investing in people” covers a wide range of areas. From the draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan, I’ve picked out a few examples that, in my view, highlight how this people-centered investment approach will shape China’s policy priorities over the next five years.

1. New Livelihood-Focused Targets & Major Livelihood Projects

Among the plan’s 12 key expected indicators, many relate directly to people’s well-being. Compared with the 14th Five-Year Plan, some targets have been adjusted. Here are examples:

• Life expectancy is expected to rise from 79.25 years to 80 years.

• The previous indicator of basic pension insurance participation rate has been replaced with the share of nursing-care beds in eldercare institutions, expected to increase from 68% to 73%.

• The metric of childcare slots per 1,000 people has been replaced with childcare enrollment for children under age three, expected to increase by 6 percentage points.

• The indicator of physicians per 1,000 people has been refined into two metrics: licensed physicians (3.7 per 1,000) and registered nurses (5.1 per 1,000).

To me, these adjustments suggest a more refined approach to people-centered services and a stronger emphasis on their tangible outcomes.

In addition, it is noteworthy that Chinese policymakers have emphasized that “the most important indicator of modernization is still the health of the people” and that “health is 1, and everything else is the zeros that follow,” characterizing the steady increase in average life expectancy as a reflection of the advantages of China’s socialist system.

加强人力资源开发和人的全面发展投资，在“一老一小”服务、基层医疗卫生、普通高中和优质高等教育扩容、职业技能培训等领域实施一批民生工程，提高民生类政府投资比重。

Strengthen investment in human resource development and in the comprehensive development of people. Implement a number of public welfare projects in areas such as services for the elderly and children, primary-level healthcare, the expansion of general high schools and high-quality higher education, and vocational skills training, while increasing the share of government investment devoted to livelihood-related areas.

Among the 109 major projects listed in the draft outline, 25 are related to improving people’s livelihoods, including 4 projects on building a high-quality education system, 7 projects related to healthcare, 5 projects focused on services for “the elderly and the children” populations.

This morning, the heads of five ministries related to people’s livelihood held a joint press conference, answering journalists’ questions on issues in the livelihood sector during the 15th Five-Year Plan period. The full transcript is available for those interested.

2. Paid Leave and New School Vacation Policies

落实职工带薪休假制度，鼓励弹性错峰休假，探索推行中小学生春秋假。

Implement the paid annual leave system for employees, encourage flexible and staggered vacation arrangements, and explore the introduction of spring and autumn breaks for primary and secondary school students.

The earlier policy recommendations already mentioned paid leave. The new outline adds concrete language about staggered vacations and school holiday experiments. The government work report, which includes plans for the coming year, also reiterated this point, suggesting implementation may accelerate.

According to People’s Daily, several provinces in China have already begun experimenting with spring and autumn breaks.

Lu Ming, a professor at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, has long advocated optimizing holiday arrangements across the year. According to him, short breaks in spring and autumn could stimulate consumption while also giving children and families much-needed breathing room.

He argues that China hopes to make consumption a new driver of economic growth — and much of the potential lies in sectors such as education, healthcare, culture, and tourism. But these forms of consumption depend on people having both the time and the well-being to enjoy them.

Lu, who is also a national political advisor, points out that many workers today feel they cannot take leave even when legally entitled to it, due to widespread overtime culture. Policies such as school breaks may therefore need to be paired with flexible leave arrangements for parents.

3. Talent Development in Strategic Technologies

围绕科技创新、产业发展和国家战略需求协同育人，提高人才自主培养质量。聚焦优势学科适度扩大“双一流”建设范围，新建若干所新型研究型大学。

Coordinate talent development with technological innovation, industrial development, and national strategic needs, and improve the quality of independently trained talent. Focus on key disciplines and appropriately expand the scope of the “Double First-Class Initiative,” while establishing several new research-oriented universities.

健全高等教育学科专业设置调整机制，超常规布局人工智能、集成电路等新兴领域急需学科专业，深入实施基础学科和交叉学科突破计划。

Improve the mechanism for adjusting disciplines and programs in higher education, make extraordinary arrangements for urgently needed disciplines in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence (AI) and integrated circuits, and advance in-depth implementation of breakthrough plans for basic and interdisciplinary disciplines.

China’s AI-related industries will be valued at more than 10 trillion yuan (1.45 trillion U.S. dollars) by the end of the 15th Five-Year Plan period, Zheng Shanjie, head of the National Development and Reform Commission, said at a press conference on Friday.

Such projections underscore the importance of investing in people in frontier technological fields. Planning talent development early in sectors such as AI can ensure that more people have opportunities to apply their skills and build careers in emerging industries.

As AI becomes a defining technology of the next technological revolution, strengthening the talent pipeline is critical. According to Li Jinghong, a national political advisor and a professor at Tsinghua University, AI is not only a key technology for the next technological revolution but also a crucial indicator of national innovation capacity. This, he said, requires systemic reforms that allow education, science, and industry to reinforce one another.

4. Building a Birth-Friendly Society

坚持生育友好的政策取向，推动生育支持融入经济社会发展各项政策。

Adhere to a birth-friendly policy orientation and enhance childbirth support through various economic and social policies.

While last year’s recommendations called for improving childbirth support policies (”优化生育支持政策”), the new outline goes further, emphasizing that birth support should be integrated into various economic and social policies.

Specific measures include:

• effectively eliminating out-of-pocket costs for hospital childbirth within policy coverage

• fully implementing maternity leave systems

• encouraging flexible work arrangements for parents with children under three

• allowing children from multi-child families to attend the same school

• direct housing policies in favor of families with two or more children

These policies signal a stronger commitment over the next five years to building a birth-friendly social environment.

5. Reforming Population Management and Urbanization

探索建立全国统一的人口管理制度，逐步实现由常住地登记户口。稳步提高农民工参加城镇职工社会保险比例，推动更多城市将符合条件的未落户常住人口纳入公租房保障范围。

Explore the establishment of a nationally unified population management system, and gradually realize household registration based on place of habitual residence. Steadily increase the proportion of migrant workers participating in the urban employee social insurance system, and encourage more cities to include eligible long-term residents without local household registration in the public rental housing support system.

因地制宜放宽在流入地参加中考报名条件，推进符合条件的随迁子女连续接受基础教育。

According to local conditions, relax the requirements for registering for the senior high school entrance examination in the place of residence, and promote the continuous access to compulsory education for eligible children who move with their parents.

An analysis published in February in the journal Governance （《国家治理》), affiliated with the People’s Daily, notes that many regions still require household registration (hukou) to access subsidized medical and pension insurance. This creates barriers to equal social protection between registered and non-registered residents.

The analysis noted that the issue is significant because, as labor markets become more integrated and population mobility increases, the separation between a person’s place of residence and their household registration has become increasingly common. For example, in Zhejiang, more than 16 million of the province’s 66 million residents do not hold local household registration. The proportion is even higher in Guangdong.

Advancing people-centered urbanization, therefore, becomes crucial. Policies such as establishing a unified population management system help ensure equal access to social security and public services, representing another important dimension of China’s emerging “investing in people” development strategy.

There are many other elements in the draft outline related to “investing in people” that I have not covered here. If you think there are important points that I missed, feel free to leave a comment and share your thoughts.

I’d like to end this newsletter with an explanation from Qiushi:

“投资于人”不是摒弃“投资于物”，而是追求两者之间的紧密结合和良性互动。物的投入与积累，最终是为了实现人的发展 ...... 二者的紧密结合，是对我国投资理念、方向、重点的提升和优化。

“Investing in human capital” does not mean abandoning “investing in physical assets.” Rather, it seeks close integration and positive interaction between the two. Investment in and accumulation of material resources ultimately serve the purpose of human development ... The close combination of “investing in human capital” and “investing in physical assets” represents an upgrading and optimization of China’s investment philosophy, direction, and priorities.

Please note that the analysis in this piece does not represent any official view, and reflects only my personal analysis and judgment.

According to a report by China Youth Daily, on Dec. 30, 2025, scholars, government officials and industry practitioners gathered at a symposium on the structure and employment impact of China’s micro-drama sector. At the event, Peking University National School of Development (NSD) released a comprehensive study titled The 2025 Report on the Development Landscape of China’s Micro-Drama Industry and Its Employment Effects.

On Wednesday, NSD’s WeChat account made the full report available for download.

Around the same time, Qiushi, a flagship magazine of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, published a feature article in the second issue of 2026 on the development of the short-drama sector. The piece, written by Hu Yifeng, deputy director of the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles’ theory research office, didn’t directly cite the NSD report, but echoed several of its key data points.

Meanwhile, practitioners across Chinese social media have been sharing their own, ground-level observations about the business.

I don’t personally watch micro-dramas, but I think this industry is worth paying attention to.

Today, I want to walk through what stood out to me in these two pieces, especially how official and academic observers are evaluating the sector, and what the numbers suggest about its growing connection to employment and flexible work.

Before diving in, a brief word about the institution behind the report.

NSD, formerly the China Center for Economic Research (CCER), was founded in the 1990s and has long played a key role in China’s reforms. In 2024, the school marked its 30th anniversary. Its current dean, Huang Yiping, described it as a key driver of China’s systemic economic reforms. Over the years, many scholars affiliated with the school have written candid accounts of how academic research fed into policymaking. One memoir I’d especially recommend is by founding professor Zhang Weiying, for anyone curious about how university think tanks have shaped China’s reform trajectory.

According to NSD, the micro-drama study was led by Professor Zhang Dandan, together with a research team. In estimating the sector’s broader employment impact, they drew on methodologies used by organizations such as Boston Consulting Group and the Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre, as well as domestic research on China’s film and cultural industries.

1. The growing influence of micro-dramas in China

The article in Qiushi notes that in 2025, micro-dramas experienced explosive growth, emerging as a new frontier in China’s cultural consumption market.

China’s monthly output of micro-dramas has stabilized at around 3,000 titles, with the user base reaching 696 million — covering more than 60 percent of the country’s internet population. Hundreds of millions of viewers are hooked on these bite-sized shows, where twists come every five seconds and entire lifetimes unfold in just ten minutes.

The NSD report also sketches a profile of who is actually watching micro-dramas. It argues that the highly modular and easily replicable storytelling of micro-dramas, built around fast hooks and constant twists, neatly fills the fragmented downtime of food-delivery riders, commuting office workers, and even older viewers. The emergence of a user base exceeding 700 million, the report notes, reflects not a niche taste but a broad-based pattern of cultural consumption rooted in China’s mass audience.

Boosting consumption, of course, is a top priority for policymakers in China right now. From that perspective, the explosive growth of micro-dramas appears to align closely with the country’s broader push to optimize its economic structure and stimulate domestic demand.

2. Micro-dramas’ growing footprint overseas

The Qiushi article argues that micro-dramas have become an emerging force in China’s cultural “going global” push, with their international reach expanding rapidly. It also provides data to illustrate the sector’s rising overseas influence.

In just the first eight months of 2025, China’s overseas micro-drama market generated 1.525 billion U.S. dollars in total revenue, up 194.9 percent year on year.

The NSD report also highlights the industry’s growing international spillover effects:
“The wave of short dramas going overseas has created new professional niches serving foreign markets — including script translation, multilingual dubbing, overseas distribution and operations, and international rights trading. At the same time, foreign directors and actors have begun coming to China to produce English-language or bilingual short dramas, further expanding employment opportunities in cross-cultural production, audiovisual translation, and on-site coordination.”

3. The economic impact of micro-dramas, especially on employment in China

The micro-drama industry’s ecosystem has become more mature, with more than 100,000 companies now operating in the sector nationwide. In 2025, the industry directly employed about 690,000 people across China.

Both Qiushi article and the NSD report mentioned a key figure: the industry directly supports around 690,000 jobs. The NSD report provides a detailed explanation of how that number was calculated:

At present, there is no unified official statistical framework covering employment in either the production or acting segments of the micro-drama industry. Existing industry data tend to focus on market size or viewership, offering little systematic insight into the labor market. Against this backdrop, our research team conducted extensive fieldwork, in-depth interviews, and cross-verification across multiple data sources. Using a structured model built on clearly defined assumptions, we estimated the scale of employment in the short-drama sector. The findings show:

(1) Production crews — including in-house screenwriters, directors, producers, cinematographers, lighting technicians, art directors, costume and props staff, sound engineers, and post-production personnel — form the most stable and technically intensive segment of the industry’s workforce, totaling around 450,000 people.

(2) Lead and supporting actors represent a comparatively smaller but highly professional group, numbering about 32,000.

(3) Extras constitute the largest, most accessible, and most fluid segment of employment. This group most directly reflects the industry’s role in supporting flexible employment and migrant workers, with approximately 207,000 people.

Taken together, these three groups indicate that in 2025 the short-drama industry directly supported around 690,000 jobs nationwide.

Building on this baseline, the report applies an indirect employment multiplier of 1.95, estimating that in 2025 the short-drama sector indirectly supports another 1.34 million jobs across related industries.

It notes that employment multipliers in the broader cultural and film sector typically range between 1.95 and 3.0. Choosing 1.95 therefore represents a deliberately conservative assumption, helping avoid overstating the industry’s spillover effects.

Adding the 690,000 direct jobs to the 1.34 million indirect jobs, the report concludes that micro-dramas could support around 2.03 million jobs in total in 2025.

The study also places these numbers in the context of China’s broader employment pressures. The labor market, it argues, is marked by the coexistence of overall job pressures and structural mismatches. The number of university graduates continues to rise. The class of 2026 alone is expected to reach 12.7 million while key groups such as migrant workers face increasing uncertainty over job stability and job quality amid industrial restructuring and fluctuating demand.

Against this backdrop, an industry capable of generating roughly two million jobs is clearly worth paying attention to — especially given that many of these positions have relatively low entry barriers and offer flexible forms of work.

Qiushi also discusses the reasons behind the rise of micro-dramas and offers its own analysis of the sector’s rapid growth. Since I’m not approaching this from the perspective of an entertainment industry insider, I won’t go into detail here. If you’re curious, you can easily consult the original piece, or even have AI walk you through it.

4. “Growing pains” of a fast-developing industry

The magazine also lays out several of the industry’s current challenges:

As a new cultural format born of the digital age, micro-dramas have achieved rapid growth and impressive results. At the same time, however, the sector still faces shortcomings in areas such as content quality, industry governance, and evaluation systems — the inevitable “growing pains” of a fast-developing industry.

On the quality of micro-dramas, the article argues that the number of truly outstanding micro-dramas remains disproportionately small compared with the sector’s sheer scale. In its words, the situation resembles “vast forests producing only a tiny bit of coal,” a vivid way of saying that high output has yet to translate into high-quality hits.

Some productions are eager to brand themselves around “mainstream values,” yet lack careful script development or convincing performances. The result is often dull storytelling, rough production values, and lukewarm audience responses. Others manage to tap into popular social sentiments but stop at surface-level treatments of trending topics — with repetitive character setups, similar plots, and interchangeable aesthetics, making it hard to deliver anything substantive or memorable. Still others show little commitment to original storytelling, chasing clicks and traffic instead.

In terms of industry governance, the article notes that the workforce is highly fluid. While this mobility injects energy and speeds up iteration, it may also undermine the resilience and institutional stability the sector needs for long-term development. The piece also calls for improving platform algorithms to break out of “aesthetic echo chambers,” and for embracing innovation in response to new technologies such as AI-generated content (AIGC).

Finally, it points out that the evaluation system for micro-dramas — how quality and impact are assessed — remains relatively underdeveloped.

5. Viewing time & short-drama production bases

Beyond the headline numbers, a few other details in the report also caught my attention — particularly how much time people now spend watching micro-dramas, and the emergence of dedicated production hubs in cities like Zhengzhou and Xi’an.

The report notes that from January to August 2025, average daily usage per user rose steadily from 95.7 minutes to 120.5 minutes, and has since remained stable in the 1.5–2 hour range. What’s striking is that viewing time did not fall back after an initial burst of popularity. Instead, it continued to edge upward from an already high base. In other words, micro-dramas are no longer a passing trend — they have become deeply embedded in people’s daily routines, evolving into a highly “sticky,” habitual form of entertainment consumption.

Geographically, production has also begun to cluster. Zhengzhou and Xi’an have emerged as two of the country’s most important short-drama production bases. Industry estimates suggest that each city launches roughly 400–600 new productions per month, together accounting for nearly 30 percent of national output. Meanwhile, Hengdian, with its extensive historical and costume-drama sets, has become the filming location for nearly 90 percent of China’s period micro-dramas.

According to the report, this kind of regional specialization not only reduces homogenized competition but also improves professionalization and production efficiency across the industry.

If I get the chance, I’d love to visit one of these production hubs myself to see how these shows are actually made on the ground.

Have you watched any Chinese micro-dramas? If there’s anything you’re curious about, feel free to leave a comment.

Such meetings are a long-standing practice in China’s policy process. Before the Government Work Report is formally presented to the National People’s Congress, senior leaders typically convene representatives from different sectors to gather feedback and calibrate policy priorities.

At the meeting, Li urged officials to thoroughly implement the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee’s recommendations for formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan and the decisions made at the Central Economic Work Conference, using the certainty of high-quality development to address the uncertainties in the development environment, and called for a more proactive fiscal policy and a moderately loose monetary policy.

He also highlighted the need to closely integrate pro-people policies with consumption promotion, and combine investment in physical assets with investment in human capital to foster new drivers of economic growth and continuously enhance public welfare.

Nine representatives spoke at the symposium [video]. While official footage has not disclosed what each individual said, Xinhua’s readout notes that the speakers came from academia, the business community, and sectors including education, science, culture, public health, and sports.

On Tuesday, The Paper (澎湃新闻) published brief profiles of each of the nine speakers, drawing on their professional backgrounds and areas of expertise. I found these profiles particularly illuminating in understanding how policymakers may be thinking about the Government Work Report and the upcoming Five-Year Plan. Below, based on The Paper’s reporting, I share short introductions to the nine speakers who took part in this symposium:

1. 明明 Mingming: He received his master’s degree from the Tsinghua University People’s Bank of China School of Finance (PBCSF) and his PhD from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He previously worked at the Monetary Policy Department I and II of the People’s Bank of China and joined CITIC Securities in 2015. His research focuses on macroeconomics, interest rates, monetary policy, and liquidity.

2. 贺佳 He Jia: Professor, vice dean and PhD supervisor of the School of Finance at Nankai University, and a recipient of the Ministry of Education’s National Young Talent Program. She is a Fellow of the Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) and one of Nankai University’s “Top 100 Young Academic Leaders.” Her research interests include real estate finance, household finance, and consumer finance.

3. 闫俊杰 Yan Junjie: Born in 1989, he serves as CEO of MiniMax and represents China’s large AI model enterprises, making him the second such representative to attend Premier Li Qiang’s symposium after DeepSeek founder Liang Wenfeng. Public information shows that MiniMax was founded in early 2022 and is among the few large-model companies that have focused on full-modality model development since inception. MiniMax was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on January 9 this year, with a latest market capitalization of nearly HK$120 billion.

4. 张智刚 Zhang Zhigang: Currently an alternate member of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC, and Chairman and Party Secretary of State Grid Corporation of China.

5. 龚旗煌 Gong Qihuang: Currently an alternate member of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC, and the deputy party secretary and president of Peking University.

6. 余晓晖 Yu Xiaohui: Member of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, currently the president and deputy party secretary of the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, and a senior engineer. He has long been engaged in research on information and communications technology and industry, communication networks, informatization, industrial integration, and the digital economy.

In the 1990s, he focused on communication network simulation, routing technologies, and network optimization and planning. Since 2000, he has led systematic research in areas including the industrial internet, “Broadband China,” the internet and mobile internet, the Internet of Things, digital infrastructure, and digital transformation, helping to promote industrial technological innovation and applications.

7. 王拥军 Wang Yongjun: Academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences; deputy party secretary and president of Beijing Tiantan Hospital, Capital Medical University; chief scientist, professor and PhD supervisor of the Neurology Center; director of the National Medical Quality Control Center for Neurological Diseases; deputy director of the National Clinical Research Center for Neurological Diseases; and director of the Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Clinical Trials at Capital Medical University.

8. 周莉亚 Zhou Liya: Born in 1981, she and her partner Han Zhen are widely known in the dance community as the “Twin Stars of Dance.” They have jointly choreographed and directed dance dramas including A Tapestry of a Legendary Land (《只此青绿》) and The Eternal Wave, and also served as chief directors of China’s 80th Victory Anniversary Commemorative Gala. In 2021, the dance-poetry drama A Tapestry of a Legendary Land, which she co-directed with Han Zhen, became a nationwide cultural phenomenon and a landmark dance IP.

A Tapestry of a Legendary Land (《只此青绿》)

9. 石宇奇 Shi Yuqi: Born in 1996, he is a Chinese men’s singles badminton player and world champion.

Shi claimed the men’s singles title at the 2025 BWF World Championships, ending a decade-long title drought for China in the event.

As this move is unprecedented in scale, it has quickly attracted attention at home and abroad. Science and Technology Daily reported that a Chinese expert who has been deeply involved in ITU-related affairs said the filings should be viewed in a rational manner:

中国幅员辽阔，是卫星技术应用大国，结合卫星技术应用实际和未来发展需求，在国际规则框架下，此次申报了多份卫星网络资料，其中有两份超过9万颗卫星。

China is vast in territory and a major country in the application of satellite technologies. In light of the realities of satellite applications and future development needs, and within the framework of international rules, China has, this time, filed multiple sets of satellite network projects, two of which involve more than 90,000 satellites.

截至目前，已有多个国家根据自身情况申报了卫星规模10万颗以上的卫星网络资料。受卫星频率轨道资源国际协调、系统建设、市场需求变化等多种因素影响，多数情况下，相关公司后续实际部署的卫星规模、技术参数等还会进行动态优化调整。

As of now, multiple countries have, based on their own circumstances, filed satellite network projects involving more than 100,000 satellites. Influenced by a range of factors such as international coordination of satellite frequency and orbital resources, system construction, and changes in market demand, in most cases the actual number of satellites ultimately deployed, as well as technical parameters and other aspects, will be dynamically optimized and adjusted in subsequent steps by the relevant companies.

该专家表示，卫星系统从卫星网络资料国际申报、国际协调到卫星发射、系统建设、提供服务、应用推广，一般需要较长时间。此次我国相关单位申报的卫星网络资料，属于履行ITU相关程序的例行操作，应予以理性看待。

The expert said that the entire process—from international filing of satellite network information and international coordination, to satellite launches, system construction, service provision, and application rollout—generally takes a relatively long time. The satellite network information filed by relevant Chinese entities this time constitutes routine work in fulfilling ITU-related procedures and should be viewed rationally.

Yang Feng, founder and CEO of commercial satellite company Spacety, based in Changsha, Hunan province, said the 203,000 satellite filings reflect long-term national strategy and space resource planning rather than immediate engineering capability, China Daily reported.

A short explainer video released by the WeChat account of China Central Television’s flagship evening news program Xinwen Lianbo also noted that the filings amount to “a ticket for strategic reserve” (”战略储备的一张门票”), adding that China has the world’s largest demand for 5G and 6G communications, intelligent connected vehicles, and the Internet of Things. China’s vast market, the video said, is large enough to absorb massive volumes of satellite data services, providing a sustained flow of capital and momentum for the entire industry.

The video likewise called for a rational view of the applications, pointing out that under ITU rules governing frequencies used for broadband satellite internet, applicants must launch 10 percent of the satellites within seven years, complete 50 percent within nine years, and finish full deployment within 14 years. The number of satellites launched can also be adjusted in light of future conditions, including reductions in the overall scale.

The video further analyzed the long-term significance of the filings, highlighting several potential impacts:

1. No more loss of mobile connectivity. In the future, in areas such as oceans, deep mountains, deserts, and other terrestrial signal blind spots, ordinary mobile phones could connect directly to satellites, enabling voice calls and internet access without restrictions.

2. Smarter intelligent vehicles. Direct satellite connectivity could provide autonomous driving systems with round-the-clock, high-precision positioning and communications support.

3. More reliable emergency communications. When natural disasters cause ground-based networks to collapse, satellite networks could serve as the last lifeline.

In addition, the video noted that some Chinese companies have already achieved batch, assembly-line production of satellites, and that China’s capabilities in reusable rockets are expected to continue improving. As satellite mass production advances and launch costs decline, service prices are also expected to become more affordable.

It is worth noting that of the 203,000 satellites covered by the filings, roughly 193,000 of the satellites were proposed by the Institute of Radio Spectrum Utilization and Technological Innovation (无线电创新院), a newly registered national research institute on radio spectrum innovation and commercialization based in Hebei, according to an article published on the WeChat blog of China.com (中华网), a Chinese-language news and information website under China International Broadcasting Network (CIBN).

China.com reported that the institute was jointly established by seven entities, including the State Radio Monitoring Center (国家无线电监测中心) and China Satellite Network Group (中国卫星网络集团), underscoring strong organizational coordination and national-level planning. At the same time, China Satellite Network Group and China Mobile also filed their own constellation plans, forming a structure characterized by “state-led coordination with participation from multiple actors” (“国家队主导、多主体协同”)

China.com also analyzed the scarcity of low Earth orbit (LEO) resources. Although space may appear vast, the low-altitude orbital regions suitable for deploying communications satellites are in fact limited. Industry estimates suggest that even under the most relaxed assumptions on safe spacing, LEO can accommodate fewer than 180,000 satellites in total.

At present, U.S. company SpaceX has already deployed around 10,000 satellites for its Starlink constellation and plans to expand the network to as many as 42,000. Other countries, including Rwanda, have also submitted applications — often through third-party intermediaries — for hundreds of thousands of satellites, seeking to gain an early advantage.

From a broader perspective, China.com said that competition over orbital and frequency resources also reflects a struggle for influence in global space governance. For a long time, rules governing orbital slots and spectrum allocation have been dominated by Western countries. China’s active participation in this competition through compliant and rule-based channels represents not only adherence to international norms, but also a necessary step in securing fair development space for itself.

If you’re interested in the links between China’s latest filings and capital markets, you may want to read a related newsletter by Amber Zhang published on Baiguan, which explores this angle in greater detail.

Baiguan - China Insights, Data, Context

Space Race 2.0? 2026 is China’s "SpaceX Moment"

In the final days of 2025, China quietly filed a bombshell with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). China submitted plans for two “super-constellations,” CTC-1 and CTC-2, totaling over 193,428 satellites …

Read more

8 months ago · 7 likes · Amber Zhang

If you’d like to do your own close reading, I’ve included the full English text at the end of this newsletter.

The year 2025 marks the completion of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan for economic and social development ... Our economic strength, scientific and technological abilities, defense capabilities, and composite national strength all reached new heights.

Early in the address, Xi offers a retrospective on China’s development over the past five years. That framing matters: 2025 is the final year of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan, which likely explains why this year’s speech includes a more explicit assessment of China’s overall strength than last year’s did.

This language aligns closely with how Chinese policymakers currently describe the country’s trajectory. An official explanatory reader released this year alongside the 15th Five-Year Plan recommendations notes that “China’s international influence, appeal and capacity to shape the world continue to grow” (我国国际影响力、感召力、塑造力不断提升). Taken together, these formulations amount to a concise summary of how China’s leadership now evaluates China’s standing — and they also reflect a noticeably more self-assured national self-image.

We integrated science and technology deeply with industries, and made a stream of new innovations. Many large AI models have been competing in a race to the top, and breakthroughs have been achieved in the research and development of our own chips. All this has turned China into one of the economies with the fastest growing innovation capabilities.

The speech does not name DeepSeek, a “phenomenon-level” product that sparked a wave of attention in China’s tech sector at the start of the year. Still, when Xi turns to science and technology, he opens directly with AI models — a small but telling choice of emphasis. It signals both the priority Chinese leaders attach to this field and their confidence in China’s progress.

The description of China as “one of the economies with the fastest-growing innovation capabilities” reinforces a long-standing narrative about China’s development path. Many of you will be familiar with Dan Wang’s book Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future, which has been widely discussed in U.S. policy and analytical circles this year. The Economist called it “a useful way to think about industrial competition between America and China.”

Over the past year, the rights and interests of the workforce in new forms of employment have been better protected ... When the happy hum of daily life fills every home, the big family of our nation will go from strength to strength.

Any mention of the “workforce in new forms of employment” inevitably brings to mind China’s more than 10 million food-delivery riders. This year, several major internet platforms such JD.com began offering social insurance and other employee benefits to delivery workers — a move which marks a significant step toward standardizing the food delivery industry in China. Yuzhe He has an excellent piece on this shift.

China’s 7.48 million ride-hailing drivers are another group worth watching under this “new employment” umbrella. I’ve previously published a dedicated piece on them as well.

After announcing the three global initiatives on development, security, and civilization, I put forward the Global Governance Initiative to promote a more just and equitable global governance system. The world today is undergoing both changes and turbulence, and some regions are still engulfed in war.

The Global Governance Initiative is the fourth major global initiative China has proposed in recent years, following the Global Development, Security, and Civilization Initiatives. In an article published in Qiushi, the CPC Central Committee’s flagship magazine, Foreign Minister Wang Yi wrote that “global governance stands at a critical juncture. It will either move forward or fall back, and China’s diplomacy as a major country with Chinese characteristics has entered a historical stage in which it can accomplish more” (全球治理正处在承前启后、不进则退的关键时期；中国特色大国外交已进入可以更有作为的历史阶段).

This language is revealing when set against history. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Chinese leaders advanced the guideline often summarized as “keeping a low profile while accomplishing something” (韬光养晦，有所作为). Today’s formulation — “a historical stage in which it can accomplish more” (可以更有作为的历史阶段) — reflects how current policymakers assess both China’s development phase and the international environment.

If you want to dig deeper into what the Global Governance Initiative means, Wang Yi’s full article is worth reading.

We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait share a bond of blood and kinship. The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable!

References to Taiwan are a regular feature of China’s New Year addresses. Last year’s speech stated:
“We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one and the same family. No one can ever sever the bond of kinship between us, and no one can ever stop China’s reunification, a trend of the times.”

Personally, I don’t see a dramatic shift in tone this year. But if you read it differently, I’d genuinely like to hear your take.

Only a strong Communist Party of China can make our country strong. We launched the study and education program on fully implementing the central Party leadership’s eight-point decision on improving Party and government conduct. We exercised strict governance of the Party through credible measures, and promoted the Party’s self-revolution to fight corruption and advance healthy governance.

From March to July, a Party-wide education campaign was rolled out to implement the central Party leadership’s eight-point decision on improving work conduct.

Those familiar with China’s last decade will recall that the eight-point rules were issued by the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in December 2012 shortly after Xi Jinping first became the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee. The rules aim to reduce bureaucracy, extravagance and undesirable work practices of Party members.

Earlier this year, I published a standalone newsletter on the eight-point education campaign. It ended up being one of my ten most-read pieces of the year. At the time, I wrote:
“Looking forward to 2025, continuing to implement the spirit of the eight-point rules as a central theme in Party education holds profound importance.”

That framing now looks even more relevant. The article from the China Discipline Inspection and Supervision Newspaper explained that this year’s focus on the eight-point rules comes at a time when changes unseen in a century are unfolding across the world at a faster pace and an increasingly complex and severe external environment may exert a greater impact on China.

Even topics that appear highly domestic, such as the study and education campaigns around the eight-point rules, can offer useful insight for international readers trying to understand how China responds under pressure.

The year 2026 marks the beginning of the 15th Five-Year Plan. A successful venture should start with a good plan and with clear goals set.

If you want to read more about the 15th Five-Year Plan, I’ve linked two previous newsletters below.

The dream lofty, the journey long—bold strides will get us there. Let us charge ahead like horses with courage, vitality, and energy, fight for our dreams and our happiness, and turn our great vision into beautiful realities.

Readers familiar with China know that birth years follow a twelve-animal zodiac cycle. This year is the Year of the Snake — I was born in 1989, also a Snake year, for what it’s worth. From February 17, 2026, to February 5, 2027 (before Lunar New Year), it will be the Year of the Horse.

That timing makes it easy to understand why the speech includes several horse-related expressions of good fortune. Sometimes, the subtext is simply cultural.

Full text: Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2026 New Year Message

BEIJING, Dec. 31 (Xinhua) -- On New Year’s Eve, Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered his 2026 New Year message through China Media Group and the internet. The following is the full text of the message:
Greetings to all! Year after year, life opens a fresh chapter. As the new year begins, I extend my best wishes to you from Beijing!
The year 2025 marks the completion of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan for economic and social development. Over the past five years, we have pressed ahead with enterprise and fortitude, and overcome many difficulties and challenges. We met the targets in the Plan and made solid advances on the new journey of Chinese modernization. Our economic output has crossed thresholds one after another, and it is expected to reach RMB 140 trillion yuan this year. Our economic strength, scientific and technological abilities, defense capabilities, and composite national strength all reached new heights. Clear waters and lush mountains have become a salient feature of our landscape. Our people enjoy a growing sense of gain, happiness and security. The past five years have been a truly remarkable journey, and our accomplishments have not come easily. Your unwavering hard work has made our nation thrive and prosper. I salute you all for your exceptional diligence and invaluable contributions.
This year is full of indelible memories. We solemnly commemorated the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, and established the Taiwan Recovery Day. These grand national events were majestic and powerful, and the glory of victory will shine through the pages of history. They are inspiring all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation to remember history, honor fallen heroes, cherish peace, and create a better future. They are rallying a mighty force for the great rejuvenation of our nation.
We sought to energize high-quality development through innovation. We integrated science and technology deeply with industries, and made a stream of new innovations. Many large AI models have been competing in a race to the top, and breakthroughs have been achieved in the research and development of our own chips. All this has turned China into one of the economies with the fastest growing innovation capabilities. The Tianwen-2 probe began its star-chasing journey to explore asteroids and comets. Construction of the hydropower project at the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo River started. China’s first aircraft carrier equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system was officially commissioned. Humanoid robots did kung fu kicks, and drones performed spectacular light shows. Inventions and innovations have boosted new quality productive forces and added colorful dimensions to our lives.
We endeavored to nurture our spiritual home with cultural development. There was a surging public interest in cultural relics, museums, and intangible cultural heritage. A new Chinese cultural site was added to the World Heritage List. Cultural IPs such as Wukong and Nezha became global hits. The younger generation came to deem classic Chinese culture as the finest form of aesthetic expression. The cultural and tourism sectors thrived. The “super league” football games in our cities and villages attracted numerous fans. Ice and snow sports ignited people’s passion for the winter season. Tradition is now embracing modernity, and the Chinese culture is shining in even greater splendor.
We joined hands to build a better life and enjoyed it together. I attended celebrations in Xizang and Xinjiang. From the snow-covered plateau to both sides of the Tianshan Mountains, people of various ethnic groups are united as one, like seeds of a pomegranate sticking together. With white khatas and passionate singing and dancing, they expressed their love of the motherland and the happiness they enjoy. No issue of the people is too small; we care for every leaf and tend every branch in the garden of people’s well-being. Over the past year, the rights and interests of the workforce in new forms of employment have been better protected, facilities have been upgraded to bring more convenience to the elderly, and each family with childcare needs has received a subsidy of RMB 300 yuan per month. When the happy hum of daily life fills every home, the big family of our nation will go from strength to strength.
We continued to embrace the world with open arms. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Tianjin and the Global Leaders’ Meeting on Women were very successful; and island-wide special customs operations were launched in the Hainan Free Trade Port. To better address climate change, China announced new Nationally Determined Contributions. After announcing the three global initiatives on development, security, and civilization, I put forward the Global Governance Initiative to promote a more just and equitable global governance system. The world today is undergoing both changes and turbulence, and some regions are still engulfed in war. China always stands on the right side of history, and is ready to work with all countries to advance world peace and development and build a community with a shared future for humanity.
Not long ago, I attended the opening ceremony of the National Games, and I was glad to see Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao coming together in unity and acting in unison. We should unswervingly implement the policy of One Country, Two Systems, and support Hong Kong and Macao in better integrating into the overall development of our country and maintaining long-term prosperity and stability. We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait share a bond of blood and kinship. The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable!
Only a strong Communist Party of China can make our country strong. We launched the study and education program on fully implementing the central Party leadership’s eight-point decision on improving Party and government conduct. We exercised strict governance of the Party through credible measures, and promoted the Party’s self-revolution to fight corruption and advance healthy governance. As a result, the conduct of our Party and government steadily improved. We must stay true to our original aspiration and founding mission, and pursue our goal with perseverance and dedication. We should continue to give a good answer to the question on how to maintain long-term governance put forth in a cave dwelling in Yan’an and prove ourselves worthy of the people’s expectation in the new era.
The year 2026 marks the beginning of the 15th Five-Year Plan. A successful venture should start with a good plan and with clear goals set. We should focus on our goals and tasks, boost confidence, and build momentum to press ahead. We should take solid steps to promote high-quality development, further deepen reform and opening up across the board, deliver prosperity for all, and write a new chapter in the story of China’s miracle.
The dream lofty, the journey long—bold strides will get us there. Let us charge ahead like horses with courage, vitality, and energy, fight for our dreams and our happiness, and turn our great vision into beautiful realities.
The sun of the new year will soon rise. May our great motherland stand in magnificence! May the fields across the country deliver good harvest! May our nation bathe in the glory of the morning! May you all enjoy life to the fullest, and achieve every success! May all your dreams come true! Enditem

Like many others, I have been waiting for this day for a long time.

I have personally visited Hainan Island three times. Two of those trips were to attend friends’ seaside weddings — which, in a way, already says something about Hainan’s character. Through my regular interactions with people working and living there, I have also learned that the central government has dispatched a large number of officials from other provinces to support Hainan’s development. Over the years, I have consistently felt how strong Beijing’s determination is to make Hainan work.

For this newsletter, I reviewed official explanations of the launch of island-wide special customs operations and spoke with several Chinese experts, organizing their perspectives into this briefing.

I want to give special credit to my colleague Wu Maohui, a Xinhua reporter based long-term on Hainan Island. He has deep expertise on the Hainan FTP and provided me with a great deal of valuable background and insight.

Before diving in, two clarifications:

1. The views expressed by the experts quoted here represent their personal opinions. I have organized them by theme mainly to offer overseas readers a structured reference for understanding the Hainan FTP.

2. Information related to the Hainan FTP is vast. This piece does not aim to be exhaustive. Instead, it highlights issues that overseas readers may care most about. If you would like to explore further, or have feedback, feel free to write to me.

Where Is Hainan?

Hainan Province lies at the southernmost tip of China. It is separated from Guangdong Province to the north by the Qiongzhou Strait, faces Vietnam across the Beibu Gulf to the west, and borders the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia across the South China Sea to the east and south.

By the end of 2024, Hainan’s permanent population reached 10.48 million, an increase of 51,000 from the previous year, according to the official website of the Hainan FTP.

What’s Special About Hainan FTP?

Two-tiered special customs system. Under the island-wide customs operations, the Hainan FTP will implement a supervision model featuring “freer access at the first line, regulated access at the second line, and free flows within the island.”

The “first line” refers to Hainan’s connection with overseas markets. Meanwhile, the “second line” denotes the customs boundary between the island and China’s mainland.

In practice, “freer access at the first line” refers to freer trade between Hainan and areas outside China’s customs border, and “regulated access at the second line” means maintaining standard customs controls for China’s mainland.

What Does This Mean for Business?

Zero tariffs. With the launch of island-wide customs operations, the scope of zero-tariff treatment in Hainan will expand significantly. The number of tariff lines eligible for zero tariffs will increase from about 1,900 to around 6,600, raising the overall zero-tariff ratio from 21% to 74%.

Strong tax incentives. Companies can benefit from multiple policies across different stages of production and operation. Take a biopharmaceutical company as an example: during the construction and research phase, imported raw materials and equipment can qualify for zero tariffs, reducing import costs by 5 to 10 percent. In manufacturing, products made with zero-tariff imported inputs and meeting a value-added ratio of 30 percent or more can be shipped to the Chinese mainland free of import duties.

Once profitable, the company can also benefit from a preferential corporate income tax rate of 15 percent, while its executives and technical staff may qualify for a 15 percent personal income tax rate.

For foreign enterprises, this arrangement offers a stable interface through which they can simultaneously engage global markets and China’s vast domestic demand. For domestic firms, it provides a gateway to global resources, technologies and capital flows.

Why It Matters

Following the launch of island-wide customs operations, zero-tariff treatment now covers the entire industrial chain — from raw materials and components to final products. This is expected to help extend, reinforce, and optimize industrial chains, and support the cultivation of globally competitive industrial clusters in Hainan.

The 30% value-added threshold not only lowers operating costs for firms, but is also expected to attract more high-end manufacturing and high value-added processing industries to Hainan.

Key Industries

According to the Master Plan for the Construction of Hainan Free Trade Port and the Recommendations of the CPC Hainan Provincial Committee on Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, the post–customs-operations phase will focus on building a Hainan-specific modern industrial system.

The Hainan FTP will prioritize four leading sectors:

• Tourism

• Modern services

• High-tech industries

• Efficient tropical agriculture

At the same time, it aims to further develop consumer markets such as high-end shopping, healthcare, and international education.

Timeline: How We Got Here

(Analyzed by 赵晋平 Zhao Jinping, Vice Chairman of the China Association of Trade in Services, based on official documents)

Stage 1 (2018–2020): “Laying the foundation.”
In April 2018, The Chinese leadership announced the decision to build the entire island of Hainan into a pilot free trade zone. At the time, however, China already had more than a dozen FTZs nationwide. Hainan’s pilot FTZ did not yet differ fundamentally from others, nor did it fully reflect the ambition of “higher-standard opening-up.” This stage was primarily about accumulating experience.

Stage 2 (2020–2025): “Building institutions.”
In June 2020, China released the Master Plan for the Construction of Hainan Free Trade Port, emphasizing that by the time of customs operations, a basic institutional framework for the FTP should be “initially formed.” This phase focused on institutional construction on top of earlier groundwork.

Stage 3 (2025–2035): “Full coverage.”
Starting Dec. 18, 2025, island-wide special customs operations are implemented. “Full coverage” means replicating and institutionalizing the systems initially formed before customs operations across the entire province, turning them into long-term arrangements.

Stage 4 (After 2035): “Strengthening distinctive features.”

Financial Preparation

To facilitate high-level convenience for cross-border capital flows, China’s central bank and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange launched multi-functional free trade accounts in May 2024 to create an integrated local and foreign currency account system.

The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) said it has built a financial policy and institutional system specifically designed to support the high-standard construction of the FTP, providing strong momentum for the port’s development.

Other Points You May Find Interesting

How big is the Hainan FTP?
At 33,900 square kilometers, it is 31 times the size of Hong Kong and 47 times that of Singapore, making it the world’s largest free trade port by area, according to National Business Daily, a nationwide Chinese financial and economic daily newspaper.

Going Deeper: Geography and Strategy

In 2018, China unveiled the guidelines to support Hainan to deepen reform and opening up, making clear that the Hainan FTP is intended to serve as a key gateway for China’s opening-up toward the Pacific and Indian oceans

This positioning as a “key gateway of opening-up” is critical. Why does it matter so much?

迟福林 Chi Fulin, head of the China Institute for Reform and Development:

In my view, this point is particularly important. To begin with, the nature of globalization itself is changing. Regional economic integration has increasingly become the dominant feature of globalization, and this trend is now irreversible. Under these circumstances, the development of the Hainan FTP cannot be approached by “looking at Hainan from within Hainan.” Instead, it requires “looking at Hainan from beyond Hainan” — leveraging national strategy to drive Hainan’s development, and in turn using Hainan’s development to reinforce China’s broader strategic objectives.

Hainan’s orientation toward the South China Sea gives it a distinctive resource and geographic advantage. An estimated 60 to 70 percent of China’s imports and exports pass through the South China Sea, either entering the country or heading toward the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This geographic position is therefore of exceptional importance. Against the backdrop of deepening regional economic integration, Hainan’s regional role becomes particularly prominent.

Hainan’s locational advantages — especially its geographic, geopolitical, and resource advantages — are highly pronounced. Historically, Hainan has maintained close ties with regions centered on ASEAN. In building itself into an “important gateway of opening-up,” the most critical counterpart for Hainan is ASEAN. Hainan must become a hub for strategic cooperation between China and ASEAN. Without this hub role, the notion of an “important gateway of opening-up” would remain abstract and fail to materialize in practice. This positioning is therefore crucial — and at present, this trajectory is becoming increasingly evident.

What Does This Mean for Overseas Capital?

Hainan to issue 10-year offshore RMB aerospace bonds in HK -- China Daily (Sept. 12, 2025)

The government of Hainan province has announced plans to issue offshore renminbi bonds worth 5 billion yuan ($702 million) in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) this September, aiming to deepen cooperation between the island province and the HKSAR, advance the development of the Hainan Free Trade Port, and contribute to the internationalization of the yuan.

This year marks the fourth consecutive year that Hainan has issued offshore RMB bonds in Hong Kong. A global investor conference was held on Thursday at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) to provide more details about the issuance.

In addition to three-year green bonds and five-year blue bonds, this year will feature the inaugural issuance of a 10-year aerospace bond, with a portion of the proceeds allocated to infrastructure development at Hainan’s Wenchang Spacecraft Launch Site.

Hainan has now issued offshore RMB local government bonds in Hong Kong for four consecutive years. This carries two layers of significance, according to 曹远征 Cao Yuanzheng, former Chief Economist of the Bank of China and advisor to the Hainan FTP:

First, it serves as a signal of leading openness. It is relatively uncommon for local governments to issue renminbi-denominated bonds in Hong Kong, and even less common for the proceeds to be repatriated for use on the mainland. This, in practice, reflects the financial facilitation of the Hainan FTP.

Second, the issuance also carries strong symbolic meaning. Take the so-called “航天主题债” (”aerospace-themed bond”) as an example: Wenchang International Aerospace City in Hainan and related aerospace industries are experiencing rapid growth, and China is emerging as an important global leader in this field. These developments provide important support for Hainan’s successful bond issuance.

Looking ahead, as the Hainan FTP moves into the phase of special customs operations, Hainan will find it easier — and have greater confidence — to access international markets. As facilitation improves, more international capital is likely to flow into Hainan, helping to turn the province into a high ground for reform and opening-up.

Challenges Ahead (A Reality Check)

No ready-made model. Customs operations mark a new beginning rather than an endpoint for Hainan. There is no existing template to copy for Hainan FTP. China has explicitly called for building a “free trade port with Chinese characteristics,” meaning the model must be created through experimentation and continuous adjustment.
— 王新奎 Wang Xinkui, Chairman of the Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Center

Implementation discretion matters. The effectiveness of top-level design depends not only on how detailed it is, but also on the degree of flexibility local governments have in implementation. This requires both initiative at the local level and sufficient tolerance for trial and error from the center. Without such space, innovation becomes risky and policy implementation tends to fall into inertia.
— 刘尚希 Liu Shangxi, former President of the China Academy of Fiscal Sciences

Service trade remains a bottleneck. Although Hainan has a negative list for service trade, it still contains around 70 restrictive measures. Compared with CPTPP or even RCEP standards, gaps remain. During the 15th Five-Year Plan period, breakthroughs in this area will be crucial.
— 赵晋平 Zhao Jinping, Vice Chairman of the China Association of Trade in Services

More information:

1. Special customs operations promise broad gains for businesses, residents in Hainan FTP (Xinhua)

2. How individuals calculate income tax incentives in Hainan (National Business Daily)

3. Former Chongqing mayor Huang Qifan on the latest developments in Hainan FTP (New Economist)

It was Macron’s first visit to China since 2023 and his fourth state visit to China as French president. High on his agenda are economic issues such as bilateral trade and investment. Macron left for China just one day after he met the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Paris, and as expected, he and Chinese President Xi Jinping discussed the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

BEIJING AND CHENGDU -- A TALE OF TWO CITIES

Macron and his wife Brigitte arrived in Beijing on Dec. 3, where he was greeted at the airport by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who travelled to France days earlier to arrange this trip.

On Dec. 4, Xi Jinping and his wife, Peng Liyuan, held a welcome ceremony for Macron and Brigitte Macron. The two leaders then held talks and oversaw the signing of a range of cooperation documents covering nuclear energy, agriculture, food, education, and ecological environment. Following their discussions, they addressed the press together.

Later the same day, Xi and Macron attended the closing ceremony of the seventh meeting of the China-France Business Council. Macron also met with Chinese Premier Li Qiang, and Zhao Leji, China’s top legislator, on Thursday.

In the evening, the French presidential couple traveled to Chengdu, capital of southwest China’s Sichuan Province. The city of Chengdu, which established a sister-city relationship with Montpellier in 1981, holds historical significance as the first such partnership between the two countries.

Chengdu is also home to a research base of giant panda breeding, where a famous pair of giant pandas is undergoing quarantine after returning last month from France. The pair is retiring after spending more than a decade at ZooParc de Beauval.

On Dec. 5, Macron and his wife visited Dujiangyan, a 2,200-year-old irrigation system in Chengdu that made the local area a major grain-producing area and a “Land of Abundance” (天府之国), which continues to function to this day.

At the irrigation system site, Xi said ancient engineers of this irrigation system tailored measures to local conditions (因地制宜) and designed in harmony with the natural flow of water (顺势而为). Xi told Macron that this spirit can be used in many other fields. “We can draw inspiration for governing the country from this ancient wisdom and make sound decisions.”

It is worth noting that during a single state visit, President Macron held two separate meetings with President Xi Jinping in two different Chinese cities — an arrangement that is relatively uncommon and has drawn attention.

In recent years, a notable feature of interactions between Xi and Macron has been their efforts to broaden their exchanges beyond the capitals of their respective countries. In 2023, Macron traveled to Guangzhou, where he enjoyed a performance of the ancient Guqin melody “High Mountain and Flowing Water.” The following year, at Macron’s invitation, Xi traveled to the Hautes-Pyrénées department in France.

Shortly before returning to France, Macron also delivered a speech at Sichuan University and played table tennis with players from both countries, including Chinese world champions. He was spotted running around a lake in Chengdu on that morning and greeted local citizens. His encounters with cheering Chengdu locals later went viral on Chinese social media, showing crowds rushing to shake hands and take selfies with the French president -- a warmth and spontaneity that Macron himself might find increasingly rare in Paris.

On Friday, Brigitte visited the giant panda research and breeding base in Chengdu, where she was reunited with Yuan Meng, a panda born in France and named by the French first lady, who serves as his godmother.

During Macron’s stay in China, the two sides issued joint statements on global governance, climate and environmental challenges, nuclear energy, agriculture and food, and the situations in Ukraine and Palestine.

Notably, their statement on global governance introduces a new narrative regarding the international system -- one based on international law and rules of solidarity (基于国际法及团结规则的国际体系). This reminds people of the so-called “rules-based international order” long promoted by the United States. While the term “rules-based” sounds palatable to the ears, in practice, the U.S. takes liberty in interpreting what those “rules” actually entail.

The two couples at Dujiangyan, Chengdu City. (Xinhua)

SUBSTANTIVE, DETAILED PRESS READOUT

The most closely watched events of Macron’s visit included his talks with President Xi on Thursday, their joint press appearances, and speeches to both Chinese and French entrepreneurs. Xinhua News Agency released three detailed reports on these events. Below are the key points made by the two world leaders during their interactions.

*During his talks with Macron, Xi described China and France as independent, visionary and responsible major countries (有远见、有担当的独立自主大国). The two countries should demonstrate a sense of responsibility, uphold multilateralism, and stand firmly on the right side of history, he said.

*Xi encouraged the two countries to consolidate cooperation in traditional fields such as aviation, aerospace and nuclear energy, while tapping into the potential for cooperation in areas including the green economy, digital economy, biopharmaceuticals, artificial intelligence and new energy.

*China is willing to import more high-quality French products, welcomes more French enterprises to develop in China, and also hopes that France will provide a fair environment and stable conditions for Chinese enterprise, he added.

*China and France should practice true multilateralism, and uphold the UN-centered international system and the international order underpinned by international law, said Xi.

*Citing the interconnectedness of global industrial and supply chains, Xi emphasized that openness and cooperation will bring opportunities for development, while decoupling and severing supply chains will lead to isolation.

*Macron said France firmly upholds the one-China policy. It is ready to work with China to promote mutual investment, strengthen cooperation in such areas as economy, trade and renewable energy, and deepen friendly cultural exchanges.

*Given the global geopolitical instability and challenges to the multilateral order, cooperation between France and China is even more important and indispensable, said Macron.

*On Ukraine, Xi said China supports all efforts that are conducive to peace and will continue to play a constructive role in the political settlement of the crisis in its own way. He said China supports European countries in playing their due role toward the establishment of a balanced, effective and sustainable European security architecture.

*When meeting with the press, Xi revealed that the two leaders agreed to enhance political mutual trust, expand practical cooperation, promote people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and advance the reform and improvement of global governance.

*It is hoped that all parties can reach a fair, lasting and binding peace deal that is accepted by all parties involved through dialogue and negotiation, Xi told journalists on the spot. He also added that China will continue to play a constructive role in the political settlement of the crisis, while firmly opposing any irresponsible actions that shift blame or distort the situation.

*When addressing Chinese and French entrepreneurs in Beijing, Xi called on the two countries to collaborate in reforming and improving global governance. During the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2025 Summit, held in Tianjin from late August to early September, Xi put forward the Global Governance Initiative. Macron told Xi during their talks that France fully endorses President Xi Jinping’s proposals for reforming and improving global governance and promoting a more balanced global economy.

Macron speaks at Sichuan University, Chengdu (Xinhua)

TRADE, TRUST AND BEYOND

Beyond the immediate discussions on tariffs and trade, Macron’s visit revealed deeper layers of engagement -- a mutual quest for trust, investment reciprocity, and a shared vision for a multipolar world.

Zhao Yongsheng, professor from Beijing-based University of International Business and Economics and visiting scholar at Sorbonne University in Paris, told us that Macron’s visit was characterized by a high level of welcome and hospitality, widely regarded as “treatment of the highest caliber.” This reflects China’s strong emphasis on its relations with France and suggests that France may represent interests beyond its own on certain issues.

Analysts say France holds special value to China today, as it poses a notable challenge when the U.S. seeks Western leadership. In its foreign policy, China emphasizes rationalism and realism, always considering the bigger picture. The country handles trade disputes, such as those over electric vehicles, on a case-by-case basis, while its overall diplomatic framework, including France’s role, remains steady and unshaken.

Macron is a passionate advocate for European strategic autonomy and is trying to play a leading role in the EU after Angela Merkel’s retirement. Although trade is an EU competence, China hopes that France can do more for Beijing’s relations with Brussels, both on economic and political issues.

The core focus of the visit remained on economic and trade cooperation, as planned. A key new concept introduced during the discussions was Macron’s proposal to “promote mutual investment,” a formulation explicitly put forward for the first time. Zhao suggested that the emphasis lies particularly on increasing Chinese investment in France and the EU.

To achieve such mutual growth in investment, a critical obstacle remains the currently stalled EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) since 2021. It is speculated that the two sides may have discussed the possibility of France persuading other EU member states to resume negotiations on the agreement, according to Zhao.

French media observed a historical reversal: for four decades, technology had predominantly flowed from Europe to China. Today, Beijing ships electric vehicles, solar panels, batteries, and electronic components to Europe -- in other words, everything Europe needs to succeed in its energy transition. France is seeking technology transfers from China, said BFMTV.

Prof. Philippe Aghion, the 2025 Nobel laureate in economics, said, “Europe is still ahead of China in terms of research publications. We have very good researchers, but we do not always have the means to translate that research into breakthrough innovations. China, however, knows how to innovate. So the Chinese may well be interested in collaborations.”

Ukraine did not appear to be a central focus of Macron’s visit to China. Meanwhile, on trade frictions between the two sides — including the EU’s tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, a move in which France played a role, and China’s retaliatory anti-dumping measures on EU cognac — there has so far been no clear indication of a breakthrough.

Zhao believed that the visit held multi-layered significance. It is expected to advance China-EU relations positively, with Macron serving as an important channel for high-level dialogue on behalf of the EU.

Yin Jianlong, director of the European Union Studies Center at Anhui University, said that both France and the EU need to bolster their credibility in dealings with China, in a veiled reference to Macron’s support for EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Macron’s visit, he said, was essentially an attempt at self-preservation, aimed at strengthening France’s ties with China amid a challenging international environment for both France and the European Union.

At a strategic level, amid a U.S. tilt toward unilateralism, China and France jointly reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism. Moreover, their preference for resolving disputes through consultation -- rather than threats or sanctions -- offers a constructive model for global trade conflict resolution.

Airbus’s second Final Assembly Line for A320 family aircraft in Tianjin, China, is an icon of China-France cooperation (Xinhua)

As I explained in the previous piece, the publication of two official “tutorials” after major Communist Party of China (CPC) meetings or the release of major documents has become routine in recent years. These tutorial-style books contain signed articles by senior officials on national development, as well as detailed Q&As on key strategic issues. They offer substantial information and nuance not found in the Recommendations themselves, making them essential reading for anyone who wants to understand China’s development trajectory.

Today’s theme is technology.

Given the global environment, I had expected that technology would be the topic mainstream international media jump on first—and that prediction was quickly confirmed. Reuters’ earliest headline on the Recommendations was “China’s five-year plan emphasizes tech self-reliance amid U.S. rivalry.”

Combined with the heightened interest in Chinese tech — from Silicon Valley to other global innovation hubs —it feels timely to dedicate one full issue of this newsletter to the technology-related content in the Recommendations. What follows are the key passages from the two tutorial books that I believe deserve highlighting, along with my comments. As with last time, I’ll cite the source and page number for each excerpt. I have yet to obtain the Chinese e-versions of these books, and they will not be published in English, based on past practice. However, a few of the included articles have been published by People’s Daily; where relevant, I will attach links for your reference.

Please note that while most of the essays in these two books are signed articles written by senior officials, the 108 questions and answers in the Q&A Guidebook are not attributed to individual authors. They can be viewed as the collective intelligence of the compilation team — essentially the group with the deepest involvement in, and the most comprehensive understanding of, the formulation of China’s five-year plans.

Let’s dive in.

1. “Major-power competition is a contest of productive forces.”

从现实逻辑看，发展新质生产力是推动高质量发展、赢得大国博弈战略主动的内在要求 ...... 大国博弈说到底是生产力的竞争，焦点是发展新质生产力。我们必须时不我待、主动作为，加快形成更多标志性、原创性、颠覆性科技和产业创新成果，在大国博弈中赢得战略主动。

From a practical standpoint, developing new quality productive forces is an intrinsic requirement for driving high-quality development and gaining strategic initiative in major-power competition. … Ultimately, major-power competition is a contest of productive forces, with the focus on developing new quality productive forces. We must seize the moment and act proactively, accelerating the creation of more iconic, original, and disruptive scientific and industrial breakthroughs to gain the strategic upper hand.

(Source: Tutorial on the Recommendations…, p.80, Article “Developing New Quality Productive Forces According to Local Conditions,” by He Lifeng, Chinese vice premier and a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee)

The phrase “major-power competition” (“大国博弈”) appears only once in the Recommendations. But in the tutorials, Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng — who has led China’s economic and trade talks with the U.S. across multiple locations this year — further underscores the centrality of technological development in this broader strategic context.

2. Technology and the race for “first-mover advantage”

要增强抢占发展先机的紧迫感，强化未来产业布局的前瞻性。纵观近现代历史，科技革命是产业变革的先导，每一次科技革命都会孕育出一批重塑全球竞争格局的新产业，引发大国兴衰。

We must heighten our sense of urgency in seizing development opportunities and strengthen forward-looking planning for future industries. Throughout modern history, scientific revolutions have preceded industrial transformations. Each technological revolution has birthed new industries that reshape global competition and trigger the rise and fall of major powers.

…

科技革命和产业变革没有到“临界点”并不意味着各国都“处在同一条起跑线上”，早做多做积累才能占领先机、赢得优势。

The fact that the current technological revolution has not yet reached a “tipping point” does not mean all countries are standing at the same starting line. Early and sustained accumulation is the only way to gain the advantage.

当今世界，新一轮科技革命和产业变革加速突破，正催生出一批事关战略全局和长远发展的未来产业，它们可能就是“明天”的战略性新兴产业、“后天”的支柱产业。我们必须更加注重前瞻规划布局未来产业发展，走在产业体系现代化的前列，掌握全球创新版图重构、经济结构重塑的主动权。

Today, a new round of scientific and industrial transformation is accelerating. A range of future industries with strategic, long-term significance is emerging — industries that may become tomorrow’s strategic emerging sectors and the day after tomorrow’s pillar industries. We must strengthen forward-looking planning, stay at the forefront of industrial modernization, and seize the initiative in the restructuring of global innovation and economic systems.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p.21, Q10: “How should we understand forward-looking planning for future industries?”)

Again, the urgency China feels around technology development is clear.

3. AI and global competition: China’s self-assessment

尽管我国人工智能发展处在全国第一方阵，但在基础理论、关键核心技术等方面还存在短板弱项。

Although China’s AI development is among the leading group globally, we still have shortcomings in basic theories and key core technologies.

...

许多国家纷纷出台人工智能发展战略，加强人工智能产业布局，催生出无人驾驶、人形机器人、自主飞行无人接、脑机接口、智能手机、智能电视、智能电脑、智能穿戴设备等新领域新赛道，这些都可能成长为改变未来商业格局、重塑全球经济的“竞技场”。在激烈国际竞争面前，谁在人工智能技术产品化、产业化上先行一步，谁就在市场开拓上占有先机。

Countries around the world are releasing AI strategies and expanding industrial layouts, giving rise to new arenas such as autonomous driving, humanoid robots, autonomous drones, brain–computer interfaces, smart phones, smart TVs, smart computers, and wearable intelligent devices. These emerging sectors may become the competitive battlegrounds that reshape global commerce and the world economy. In the face of intense international competition, whoever achieves earlier breakthroughs in AI productization and industrialization will gain the first-mover advantage in the marketplace.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p.41, Q20: “Why does China fully implement the ‘AI+’ initiative?”)

The first sentence is perhaps the most concise — and clearest — official statement of how China judges its current global position in AI. The second paragraph underscores China’s close tracking of global AI developments and its view of AI as a transformative economic arena.

4. Basic research as China’s key bottleneck

人工智能、量子科技、生物技术等领域深入发展，我国迎来换道超车的历史机遇。新一轮科技革命和产业变革抓住了就是机遇，抓不主就是挑战。

With advances in AI, quantum technology, and biotechnology, China faces a historic opportunity for leapfrogging. The new round of scientific and industrial transformation is an opportunity if seized, and a challenge if missed.

作为科学探索的源头，基础研究不仅是技术突破的基石，更是产业变革的底层驱动力；它既为技术突破提供理论支撑，又为产业升级注入持续动力。

As the source of scientific discovery, basic research is the cornerstone of technological breakthroughs and the underlying driver of industrial transformation. It provides the theoretical foundation for innovation and continuous momentum for industrial upgrading.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p.29, Q14: “Why strengthen original innovation in scientific research and technology development?”)

This emphasis on basic research echoes a recent Qiushi Journal article (Issue No. 22, 2025) by Shanghai official Xiao Guiyu. Qiushi Journal is the CPC Central Committee’s flagship magazine. Citing comparative data, Xiao notes:

• China’s basic research expenditure in 2024 accounted for 6.9% of total R&D, versus

  • 18% in the U.S.

  • 13% in Japan

  • 19% in EU member states

• Less than 10% of Chinese university patents were commercialized in 2024

  • compared with over 50% in the U.S. and Germany

Much scientific output in China, he argues, remains stuck in papers, labs, and technical reports rather than being translated into productivity.

The Q&A Guidebook make this link even more explicit when discussing “tech bottlenecks.”

“卡脖子”技术问题的根子是基础理论研究跟不上，源头和底层的东西没有搞清楚

The root cause of “bottleneck” technological problems is that our basic theoretical research has not kept pace— we have not fully understood the foundational and underlying principles.

...

关键核心技术攻关要防止简单的模仿性创新，陷入“追赶——落后——再追赶”模式，必须注重加强原始创新和颠覆性创新，从根本上解决原理性、基础性问题，在新一轮科技革命和产业变革的时代浪潮中抢占科技制高点、掌握发展主动权，构筑新动能新优势。

In tackling key core technologies, we must avoid imitative innovation and the pattern of “catch up — fall behind — catch up again.” Instead, we must strengthen original and disruptive innovation, solve fundamental theoretical problems, seize the commanding heights of technology in the new wave of global scientific and industrial transformation, and secure strategic initiative.”

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p.28, Q13: “Why pursue decisive breakthroughs across the full chain of key core technologies?”)

Taken together, these passages show a clear strategic objective: to escape the cycle of perpetual catch-up and instead position China at the front of emerging fields through deep investment in basic research.

5. Reforming China’s talent evaluation system (“the hats problem”)

...... 统一规范教育科技人才评价的原则、标准。切断人才“帽子”与各类创新资源的关联，不把人才“帽子”作为承担国家科技计划项目、获得科技奖励、职称评定、岗位聘用、薪酬待遇确定的限制性条件，使人才称号回归学术性、荣誉性本质。

... We must unify and standardize principles and criteria for evaluating education, science, and talent. The link between talent “hats” and innovation resources must be severed. Titles must no longer serve as restrictive conditions for undertaking national science projects, receiving awards, gaining professional titles or positions, or determining compensation. Talent designations should return to their academic and honorary nature.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p.35, Q17: “How to promote positive interaction between scientific innovation and talent cultivation?”)

“The hats problem” (“帽子问题”) is a term used to describe the heavy reliance on honorary titles, talent labels, and designated status categories as gateways to resources in China. These “hats” are not merely academic honors — they are tied to research funding, project eligibility, institutional support, and career advancement. As a result, they have become highly competitive, quasi-credentialized markers of prestige and access within China’s scientific system.

An August report in Guangzhou Daily illustrates the pressures created by this system:

The article notes that researchers today face not only the widely discussed “45-and-under” eligibility limit for major talent programs, but also a proliferation of newer thresholds—“35-and-under,” “38-and-under,” “40-and-under.” Each of these age caps corresponds to a different category of national or local talent sponsorship. For scientists whose careers should ideally allow long periods of deep thinking, experimentation, and failure, these rigid cutoffs create what the paper calls a “breathless climb up the staircase,” forcing young scholars into a race against time.

Instead of focusing on long-term research questions, many feel compelled to maximize the number of papers published and the volume of grants secured to build a résumé strong enough to win a coveted “hat.” In practice, a “hat” can signify not only academic recognition but also privileged access to state-funded laboratories, major research platforms, and high-value projects. Guangzhou Daily describes these hats as having become “universal ration coupons” — highly sought-after tokens that determine access to scarce scientific resources.

In other words, the overemphasis on titles has gradually distorted incentives, pushing young scientists away from their original motivations for pursuing research and toward short-term metrics that are easier to quantify but less conducive to scientific breakthroughs.

This is essentially a debate about resource allocation and incentives in China’s scientific ecosystem.

6. AI and the future of warfare

To close, here are passages from the tutorials on AI and military development:

人工智能在军事领域的广泛应用，给军队武器装备和组织形态带来重大影响，引发军事领域链式突破，催生军事发展模式和战争制胜机理发生重大变化，推动战争形态加速演进。

The widespread application of artificial intelligence in the military has had a profound impact on weapons, equipment, and force structures, triggering chain reactions of breakthroughs across the military domain. It has led to major changes in models of military development and mechanisms for winning wars, and is accelerating the evolution of the very forms of warfare.

在近期发生的几场局部战争和武装冲突中，无人智能装备大量运用，智能化支援保障彰显威力，人工智能系统在辅助作战筹划、支撑指挥通信、加持认知对抗等方面大放异彩，智能化作战方式不断涌现，展现出军事智能改写战争规则的前景，现代战争智能化特征日益显现。

In several recent regional wars and armed conflicts, unmanned intelligent equipment has been deployed on a large scale, and intelligent support systems have demonstrated significant effectiveness. AI systems have excelled in assisting operational planning, supporting command and communications, and enhancing cognitive confrontation. New forms of intelligent combat are continually emerging, revealing the potential of military intelligence to rewrite the rules of warfare and making the intelligent characteristics of modern war increasingly evident.

世界主要国家纷纷加大军事智能化投入和布局，出台相关战略和规划，加快军事智能力量建设和运用，围绕智能化加紧推进军事转型，抢占军事战略制高点。

Major countries are increasing investment in military intelligence, releasing strategies and plans, accelerating the development and application of intelligent military forces, pushing forward military transformation, and competing to seize strategic heights.

适应技术发展和军事变革潮流，我们应当抓住军事智能化发展的历史机遇，融入国家加快发展新一代人工智能的战略布局，构建具有我军特色的智能化军事体系，推动军事实力加速提升。

To adapt to technological and military trends, we must seize this historic opportunity in military intelligence, integrate with the national strategy for accelerating next-generation AI development, build an intelligent military system with Chinese characteristics, and accelerate the enhancement of military capabilities.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…,p.196, Q93: “How should we understand building an intelligent military system?”)

I am not a military expert, so I offer no further technical commentary. But given global interest in how recent regional conflicts have deployed drones and AI-enabled systems, this section may be of particular interest.

The two publications are:

• Tutorial on the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (《〈中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划的建议〉辅导读本》)

• Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (《党的二十届四中全会〈建议〉学习辅导百问》)

Readers familiar with China—especially many of you—may know that after major political events or the release of key guiding documents, China has in recent years published two supplementary reading books: one “tutorial” volume and one “Q&A” guidebook. For instance, after the Third Plenary Session last year adopted the reform master plan, two similar books were released. I wrote multiple newsletters at that time summarizing key themes from those books.

Why these two books matter

1. They collect essays written by China’s top policymakers.

Such compilation is rare. These essays offer a more direct window into policymakers’ strategic thinking in key areas. In line with past practice, these articles are also being published—one by one—in People’s Daily.

So far, signed articles by Li Qiang, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, who are members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, and Wang Yi, Liu Guozhong, Li Shulei, who are members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, have already appeared in People’s Daily.

If the publication sequence continues to follow the order of the Tutorial volume, articles by 9 more senior officials will be released in the coming weeks. Reading the tutorial books now allows an early look at all the essays at once. The two books also include articles by other officials, along with extensive explanatory content.

2. Compared with the Recommendations document, the tutorial books offer more specifics and directional signals.

For example, regarding the “domestic circulation” part of China’s economic strategy, the Recommendations state:

“Strengthen the domestic circulation” 做强国内大循环 and “enhance the endogenous driving force and reliability of the domestic circulation” 增强国内大循环内生动力和可靠性.

[Note: Domestic circulation is part of the new development paradigm of “dual circulation”, which was unveiled by the CPC Central Committee in 2020 to meet the challenge of mounting global uncertainties. Dual circulation takes the domestic market as the mainstay, with the domestic and international markets reinforcing each other.

Domestic circulation relies on a unified domestic market to optimize production, distribution, circulation, consumption and other aspects, with a view to stimulating domestic demand potential and enhancing economic resilience.]

But in his signed article in the Tutorial, Premier Li Qiang makes the priority explicit:

“十五五”时期要把发展立足点更多放在做强国内大循环上

During the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-2030), we will place greater emphasis on strengthening the domestic circulation as the foundation of development.

Li explains the logic:

大国经济具有内需为主导、内部可循环的独特优势 ...... 以国内大循环的内在稳定性和长期成长性对冲国际循环的不确定性

A major economy has the unique advantage of demand-led growth and an internally sustainable circulation ...... The stability and long-term growth of the domestic circulation can hedge the uncertainties arising from the international circulation.

This does not mean the international circulation — trade and external engagement — becomes unimportant. Rather, it reflects policymakers’ strategic assessment of today’s geopolitical environment.

This is not Li’s first time expressing such a view. Li made similar remarks in May at a State Council meeting to promote domestic circulation. What is new here is that the Tutorial places this strategic shift explicitly within the time horizon of the next five-year plan.

Another example:

The Recommendations call for:

深化文明交流互鉴。

Deepening exchanges and mutual learning among civilizations.

They do not specify how. But in the Tutorial, in his signed article, Li Shulei, who is also the head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, writes:

支持社交媒体平台国际化发展

Support the international development of social media platforms

Clearly, this refers to Chinese social media platforms. Traditionally, platforms like Douyin (China’s version of TikTok), Xiaohongshu (RedNote), and Weibo (China’s version of “X”) served mainly domestic users. But the “TikTok Refugee” wave earlier this year brought many overseas users to RedNote. How China responds—open or restrict—has been debated.

Li’s wording signals a possible direction: supporting platforms like RedNote in developing more functions to serve international users, making “civilizations exchanges” concrete rather than abstract.

What I’m doing with the books

I have finished all articles in both books — nearly 700 pages in total. My plan is to produce two to three newsletter issues, each centered on a theme. If interest turns out low, I will keep it to one.

Today’s theme is “China’s assessment of the external environment,” covering topics such as major-country competition, military development, and the relationship between security and development.

Below are selected excerpts, with my interpretation. Please note that while most of the essays in these two books are signed articles written by senior officials, the 108 questions and answers in the Q&A Guidebook are not attributed to individual authors. They can be viewed as the collective intelligence of the compilation team — essentially the group with the deepest involvement in, and the most comprehensive understanding of, the formulation of China’s five-year plans.

Table of contents of Tutorial on the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development

Table of contents of Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development

少数西方国家对多极化进程的快速发展明显不适，仍妄图维持单级霸权，但遭到国际社会的广泛抵制。

Some Western countries are uncomfortable with the rapid advance of multipolarity and still attempt to maintain unipolar hegemony, but such actions face widespread resistance from the international community.

......

经济全球化虽遭遇逆流但仍是不可阻挡的历史潮流。

Economic globalization is encountering headwinds, yet it remains an unstoppable trend.

......

战略安全威胁增多，拥核国家互信减弱，有可能陷入新一轮军备竞赛。

Strategic security risks are increasing, mutual trust among nuclear-armed countries is weakening, and a new round of arms race is possible.

......

周边涉我安全环境复杂因素增多。

More complex factors are involved in China’s surrounding security environment.

......

(Source: Tutorial on the Recommendations…, pp. 175–177; Article: Profound and Complex Changes in China’s Development Environment During the “15th Five-Year Plan” Period, By Tian Peiyan, deputy head of the Policy Research Office of the CPC Central Committee.)

The first sentence does not name any country, but the phrase “unipolar hegemony” could be interpreted as indirectly referring to the United States.

The second sentence shows that China’s policymakers continue to believe that economic globalization will persist in the long run. This suggests that China intends to remain integrated into the global economy as much as possible — while ensuring security.

The third sentence feels particularly timely, as it appears in the book before President Trump ordered the U.S. military to immediately restart the process for testing nuclear weapons on Oct. 30 after a halt of 33 years.

The fourth sentence immediately reminded me of the Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries, which China convened again in April this year after a 12-year gap — a meeting I analyzed at the time. One of the conclusions from that conference was that “China’s relations with its neighboring countries are currently at their best in modern times.” When read together with this sentence, it raises the possibility that the “complex factors” mentioned here may be referring to actors outside China’s immediate neighborhood.

进入机遇和挑战并存、不确定难预料因素增多的时期，唯有保持昂扬的斗志、顽强的意志，锻造敢斗善斗的过硬本领，才能在风高浪急甚至惊涛骇浪重大考研中赢得主动，立于不败之地。

As China enters a period where opportunities and challenges coexist and where uncertainties and unpredictable factors are on the rise, only by maintaining high morale and strong willpower, and by forging the capability to face difficulties head-on and prevail in struggles, can we seize the initiative amid turbulent waves and remain invincible.

面对外部围堵遏制打压，要保持不畏强暴、反抗强权的风骨，核心利益不让步，原则问题不妥协，威胁讹诈不退缩。

In the face of external containment, suppression and coercion, we must stand firm — never yielding to power politics or intimidation. On matters involving core interests, we will not concede; on matters of principle, we will not compromise; and under threats or blackmail, we will not back down.

(Source: Tutorial on the Recommendations…, p. 182; Article: Profound and Complex Changes in China’s Development Environment During the “15th Five-Year Plan” Period, By Tian Peiyan, deputy head of the Policy Research Office of the CPC Central Committee.)

These two sentences make it clear that if China faces threats or challenges in trade or other areas, its strategy will remain unchanged: it will not back down, but will continue to “fight” until the end.

别国越是搞“小院高墙”、“脱钩断链”，我们越要坚持高水平对外开放不动摇。“十五五”时期，进一步扩大高水平对外开放，需要稳步扩大制度型开放，维护多边贸易体制，拓展国际循环。

The more others build ‘small yards with high fences’ or push for decoupling, the more firmly we will promote high-level opening up. During the 15th Five-Year Plan period, we will steadily expand institutional opening up, uphold the multilateral trading system, and broaden the international circulation.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p. 15, Article: Deepening Reform of the Economic System and Promoting High-quality Development, By Wang Huning, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the CPPCC National Committee)

This sentence shows that China continues to value openness as a strategic choice, and that the “international circulation” component of the “dual circulation” strategy remains important. In fact, the idea of “the more others close up, the more we should open up” has frequently appeared in China’s academic discussions over the past two years. For example, prominent scholar Zheng Yongnian has repeatedly called for further opening-up — including unilateral opening: “Even if some Western countries do not open to us, we have to open to them. “

In practice, China is acting on the idea of further opening up its economy. According to a post on the Ministry of Commerce’s WeChat blog, Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao on Tuesday signed the framework agreement to upgrade economic partnership with representatives from five Pacific Island countries — the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of Nauru, the Republic of Vanuatu and the Republic of Fiji.

On the same day, Wang also signed an arrangement on the early outcomes on shared development of an economic partnership between the governments of China and Congo, an important step in implementing the zero-tariff policy announced by Chinese top leader. It is also a concrete action to advance the spirit of the Third and Fourth Plenary Sessions of the 20th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and to expand China’s self-initiated opening-up, according to a statement from the website of Ministry of Commerce.

必须着眼国际军事竞争战略制高点前瞻先机。不仅要赶上潮流、赶上时代，还要力争走在时代前列。

We must focus on the strategic high ground of international military competition. We should not only keep pace with the times, but strive to lead.

......

要坚持自主可控，扭住高水平科技自立自强，大力推进自主创新、原始创新，解决好关键技术“卡脖子”问题。

We must uphold self-reliance and maintain control in key areas, pursue high-level scientific and technological self-sufficiency, vigorously advance independent innovation and original innovation, and resolve bottlenecks in critical technologies.

......

实施国防发展重大工程，加紧国防科技创新和先进技术转化，研制建造更多制强制胜的“杀手锏”武器装备。

We will advance major defense development projects, accelerate innovation and application of defense technologies, and develop more “trump card” equipment capable of gaining decisive advantage.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, pp. 87–89, Article: Promoting the Modernization of National Defense and the Armed Forces, By Zhang Youxia, member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission)

There are quite a few articles in the tutorial books related to China’s military development, but since I am not a military expert, I won’t comment on them in detail here. What stands out is China’s recognition that foreign technology restrictions make self-reliance in defense science and technology a necessity.

回顾新中国成立以来的历史，在“站起来”阶段，我们党更加注重安全；在“富起来”阶段，我们党更加注重发展；在“强起来”的新阶段，要统筹好发展和安全。要进一步树立发展是硬道理、安全也是硬道理的理念，在发展中固安全，在安全中谋发展，有效防范化解各类风险。

Looking back at the history since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Party placed greater emphasis on security during the stage of “standing up,” and greater emphasis on development during the stage of “becoming prosperous.” In the new stage of “becoming strong,” development and security must be better coordinated. We must further establish the notion that development is the absolute principle and security is also the absolute principle — strengthening security through development and pursuing development in a secure environment, while effectively preventing and defusing various risks.

.....

要完善涉外国际安全机制，构建海外安全保障体系，加强发制裁、反干预、反“长臂管辖”斗争，深化国际执法安全合作。

We must improve mechanisms for safeguarding international security in foreign-related affairs, build a comprehensive system for protecting China’s overseas security interests, strengthen efforts to counter sanctions, interference and long-arm jurisdiction, and deepen international law-enforcement and security cooperation.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, pp. 107–108, Article: Building a Higher Level of Peace and Security in China, By Chen Wenqing, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Commission for Political and Legal Affairs of the CPC Central Committee)

The “standing up” stage probably refers to the period from the founding of the People’s Republic of China to the beginning of reform and opening-up. The “becoming prosperous” stage probably refers to the period after reform and opening-up began. The “becoming strong” stage likely refers to the period from 2012 to the present.

The reform master plan released last year included a dedicated section on “strengthening the rule of law in foreign-related affairs.” The second sentence above aligns closely with that direction.

国际力量对比深刻调整，世界多极化在曲折中发展，我国国际影响力、感召力、塑造力不断提升，在国际事务中已经并将继续发挥重要作用。

With major changes in the balance of international forces, multipolarity is advancing amid twists and turns. China’s international influence, appeal and capacity to shape the world continue to grow. China has played, and will continue to play, an important role in global affairs.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p. 7, Q&A No. 3: How to Understand the International and Domestic Situation During the 15th Five-Year Plan period)

This sentence can be seen as a summary assessment by policymakers of China’s international influence.

The commentaries are titled:“The Origin and Nature of the Taiwan Question” (台湾问题的由来和性质), “The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Reunification” (两岸关系发展和统一利好), and “National Reunification Is Inevitable and Unstoppable” (祖国必然统一势不可挡)

Some seasoned overseas China-watchers noted that, based on naming conventions commonly used in the articles published by China’s central news organizations, “Zhongtaiwen” is almost certainly a collective pen name rather than an individual author. The name likely indicates commentary associated with agencies or institutions responsible for Taiwan-related affairs.

Xinhua later published an English-language piece on Tuesday summarizing these three commentaries, and said “Xinhua News Agency was entrusted to publish” them—but without explaining the meaning of “Zhongtaiwen.”

During those three days, some overseas China-watchers and several friends asked me the same question:

What is the purpose of these articles, especially when they clearly emphasize the theme of “reunification”?

From my reading, four points stand out:

1. The articles are consistent with the message conveyed at Saturday’s gathering.

At the commemorative meeting, China’s top political advisor Wang Huning said that after peaceful reunification, with the support of a strong motherland, Taiwan will enjoy better economic development, stronger energy and resource security, improved infrastructure, enhanced security, broader external exchanges, better livelihoods for its people, and a more vibrant cultural and spiritual life. 和平统一之后，有强大祖国做后盾，台湾经济发展会更好、能源资源保障会更好、基础设施建设会更好、安全保障会更好、对外交往会更好，台湾同胞民生福祉会更好、精神文化生活会更好。

Addressing about 500 attendees, Wang, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference National Committee, called on people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to work together to advance national reunification, and to leave no room for “Taiwan independence” separatist activities in any form.

2. The emphasis on reunification is not entirely new — it reflects themes already present in recent top-level documents.

“Promoting national reunification” is already written into the report to the 20th CPC National Congress in 2022, as a guiding policy direction. In the full text of the newly released Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, the Taiwan-related section once again highlights 推进祖国统一大业 (“advancing the cause of national reunification”).

Seen through this lens, the purpose of the commentaries is consistent and expected:

• to explain the historical and political logic of the Taiwan question

• to outline the governance framework envisioned after reunification,

• and to convey Beijing’s confidence and determination that reunification is inevitable.

3. The commentaries offer clues about what Beijing envisions after reunification

Below are several excerpts I found noteworthy, with my interpretation.

我们追求的国家统一，不仅是形式上的统一，更重要的是两岸同胞的心灵契合。

Our goal is not only an institutional reunification but also unity between hearts of people across the Strait.

(from Article 2: The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Reunification” )

This suggests Beijing is emphasizing emotional and social integration, not just administrative control. Implicitly, reunification without mutual trust could lead to new tensions.

两岸在文化教育、医疗卫生、社会保障等民生领域可以实现资源同享，长期困扰台湾同胞的民生难题，可以得到根本性解决。

Resources in education, healthcare and social security can be shared across the Strait after reunification, thereby addressing long-standing livelihood challenges.

(from Article 2: The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Reunification” )

This indicates that Beijing believes it understands Taiwan’s socioeconomic issues and is positioning reunification as a solution provider. Understanding must come before solving.

…… 私人财产、宗教信仰、合法权益将得到充分保障，爱台爱乡的感情将得到充分照顾。

…… Personal property, religious beliefs and the legal rights and interests of local people will be fully protected in Taiwan, while their connections to the island’s traditions and heritage will be valued.

(from Article 2: The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Reunification” )

Religions widely practiced in Taiwan—Chinese folk religion or traditional religion (folk Taoism + ancestral worship), Buddhism, Taoism, and related Chinese cultural beliefs—already align with mainland traditions, so Beijing does not appear to view religion as a major post-reunification challenge.

经中国中央政府批准，外国可以在台湾设立领事机构或其他官方、半官方机构，国际组织和机构可以在台湾设立办事机构，有关国际公约可以在台湾适用，有关国际会议可以在台湾举办。

(After reunification) With approval from the central government, foreign countries could set up consulates and other official or semi-official institutions in Taiwan, and international organizations will have offices in Taiwan. In addition, international agreements could be applied in Taiwan and international events held there.

(from Article 2: The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Reunification” )

This suggests that a post-reunification Taiwan could, in theory, host major international events — for example, APEC or Shanghai Cooperation Organization summits.

4. The articles underline that Beijing sees reunification as inevitable

统一不是一种选择，而是一种必然。

Reunification is not a matter of choice, but an inevitability.

...... 决定两岸关系走向的关键因素是祖国大陆的发展进步。...... 中华民族一定是强必统，统更强。从两岸实力对比和国际格局演变趋势看，只会对支持统一的正义一方越来越有利。

The key factor determining the direction of cross-Strait relations is the development and progress of the mainland. ...... A strong nation must be unified; reunification will further strengthen the nation. Given the shifting cross-Strait balance of strength and global dynamics, situation will only become increasingly favorable for the just cause of supporting reunification.

(from Article 3: “National Reunification Is Inevitable and Unstoppable” ）

While some observers argue that “time is not on Beijing’s side,” the commentaries express the opposite view: the stronger China becomes (economically, technologically, socially), the more favorable the environment for reunification. In other words, China’s attractiveness and influence—including innovation, lifestyle and development—are viewed as important drivers, not just hard power.

Final thought

These commentaries reveal not only Beijing’s messaging about why reunification will happen, but also how it imagines governing Taiwan afterward. Regardless of one’s position, they offer rare insight into Beijing’s internal framing of the issue.

Liu Yanhua, an associate research fellow at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, highlighted several of these maps in an article published Tuesday on the institute’s WeChat blog. Today’s piece is a translation of the main points of Liu’s article by Jiang Jiang, Xia Tian and Wang Xiaopeng.

In this piece, Liu noted that

中国拥有南海诸岛主权建立于长期的历史实践中，具有发现、命名、开发利用、行政管辖的完整证据链条。但是，早期西方国家“获得”主权的方式却带有浓厚的殖民色彩，往往是来到一块“未知”土地、插旗鸣炮就“获得”主权，这种主权获得是建立在漠视原住民权利的基础之上，也让英国、法国、日本尽管在南海诸岛见到驻岛生产的中国渔民，仍将其视为“无主地”。

China’s sovereignty over the Nanhai Zhudao was established through a long course of historical practice, supported by a complete chain of evidence covering discovery, naming, development and utilization, and administrative jurisdiction. By contrast, the ways in which early Western powers “acquired” sovereignty were deeply colored by colonialism. Typically, they would arrive at a so-called “unknown” land, plant a flag, fire ceremonial shots, and claim sovereignty — a process that disregarded the rights of indigenous peoples. As a result, even when British, French or Japanese explorers encountered Chinese fishermen living and working on the islands, they still regarded the Nanhai Zhudao as terra nullius, or land belonging to no one.

Liu then gave an example: In 1947, when France sought arbitration with China over sovereignty of the Xisha Islands, Qiu Zuming, then First Secretary and Acting Chargé d’Affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Turkey, noted in reference to China’s traditional mode of territorial administration:

“按照国际公法，无主荒地之占领，依照占领时之国际法规，我国将该岛划归粤省管辖时，远在国际法成为专书之前，只有渔人前往，自无设官之必要。”

“According to international law, the occupation of terra nullius should be judged in light of the legal norms in effect at the time of occupation. When China placed the islands under the jurisdiction of Guangdong Province, it was long before international law had been systematized. At that time, only fishermen went there, and therefore there was no need to establish official administration.”

Such differences in legal concepts and practices concerning territorial sovereignty, in effect, provided Western countries with a pretext for encroaching upon China’s sovereignty over the Nanhai Zhudao, said Liu. Recognizing the harm caused by these differences, the Chinese government later adopted approaches in line with international norms to reaffirm its sovereignty.

For example, Li Zhun’s patrol of the Xisha Islands was acknowledged by the Western world — though in their eyes, his patrol was seen as an “occupation” rather than an assertion of sovereignty over China’s own territory.

In 1909, Li Zhun, commander of the Guangdong Fleet of the Qing Dynasty, conducted the first official inspection of the Xisha Islands on behalf of the Chinese government, proclaiming the islands as Chinese territory.

In the article, Liu introduced maps that included those published by China in 1935 concerning the South China Sea. These maps represented the efforts of the then Republic of China (ROC) government to assert China’s sovereignty over the region. Liu noted that such efforts have been deliberately downplayed — for instance, the Wikipedia entry on the “Spratly Islands Dispute” claims that China only began asserting sovereignty over the Nansha and Xisha Islands after drawing the nine-dash line map in 1947.

The maps in 1935 were worked out as numerous errors and inconsistencies were found in maps published in China at the time, particularly regarding national boundaries, according to the first issue of the Journal of the Commission for the Examination of Land and Water Maps. To address this, the then Ministry of the Interior convened an inter-ministerial meeting in 1930 to discuss and formulate rules for the examination of land and water maps, and in 1933, the Commission for the Examination of Land and Water Maps (“水陆地图审查委员会”) was officially established. Each participating ministry assumed specific responsibilities — the Ministry of the Interior was in charge of reviewing administrative divisions and related matters, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for boundaries and treaty-related territories, while the Ministry of Education oversaw academic terminology, historical evolution, meteorology, and the intended uses of the maps.

From its establishment on June 7, 1933, to the end of December 1934, this commission held a total of 26 meetings. At its 25th meeting on December 21, 1934, the commission approved a list of 172 Chinese and English names for islands in the South China Sea. These names were published in the first issue of the Journal of the Commission for the Examination of Land and Water Maps in January 1935, followed by the publication of the Map of the Islands in the South China Sea of China in the second issue in April that year.

The compilation of these maps was deeply rooted in China’s long-standing historical practice of exercising sovereignty over the Nanhai Zhudao. From a cartographic perspective, it continued the tradition of depicting the South China Sea islands —historically referred to as “Changsha” and “Shitang” since the Ming and Qing dynasties — on territorial maps such as the Complete Map of the Everlasting Unified Great Qing Empire. The depiction of the Nanhai Zhudao thus evolved from collective references to more detailed representations of individual islands, reefs, and shoals. Subsequent Chinese maps followed this model, marking both the extent of the Nanhai Zhudao and the names of their features.

Created in the 15th year of the Jiaqing reign (1810) during the Qing Dynasty, the map is printed in two colors on paper, composed of 24 joined sheets, with the artist unspecified. (This map was shown in the exhibition)

Liu said that the effort to explain China to the international community in ways accepted by Western audiences took shape in various aspects of modern Chinese history. A group of Chinese scholars well-versed in both Chinese and Western learning undertook this important task.

To “meet the long-felt needs of English readers,” The Chinese Year Book 1935–1936 was published by the Commercial Press in Shanghai in 1935. Unlike The China Year Book, edited by British scholar H.G.W. Woodhead since 1921, this was the first English-language Chinese Year Book written entirely by Chinese editors and scholars.

According to Liu, the yearbook contained 45 chapters covering subjects such as history, geography, climate, population, the military, industry, culture, religion, and government institutions. Its contributors included leading Chinese scholars of the time, such as Gu Jiegang, Zhu Kezhen, Wang Shijie, and Weng Wenhao. Publication of The Chinese Year Book continued in different locations after China started a whole-of-nation resistance against Japanese aggression in July 1937.

Beginning with the 1938–1939 edition, the English-language Chinese Year Book took on the mission of presenting China’s war efforts to the world. In the foreword to that edition, Xu Shuxi, then Director of the Commission for International Affairs, wrote that this was a “war issue,” with three-fourths of its content devoted to the war and related matters. “Just as the 1937 edition bore testimony to the achievements of reconstruction under the National Government before Japan’s destruction of it,” Xu wrote, “we hope this volume will serve as a record for posterity — of how the Chinese people, against great odds, heroically defended their nation and the civilization they share with the rest of the world, including the aggressors themselves.”

The Map of China compiled for the English-language Chinese Year Book vividly demonstrated the Chinese people’s determination to safeguard their territorial sovereignty. In the 1936–1937 edition, the Map of China was published as a separate supplement, said Liu. It featured a brick-red hardcover with the title MAP OF CHINA and the note “Drawn Specially for the Chinese Year Book by Sheng-tsu Wang.”

Wang Shengzu, one of China’s earliest geographers to study in the United States, obtained a master’s degree in geography from the University of Chicago in 1929. Upon returning to China, he taught at Tsinghua University and other institutions. His research combined a national perspective with an international outlook, and his strong command of English likely made him the ideal author for the English version of the Map of China. In the same edition, Wang also wrote the section on “Northeast China,” which systematically described Japan’s military invasion, economic plunder, and colonial rule in the region.

In the MAP OF CHINA, the lower-right corner featured a boxed inset labeled “South China Sea.” The area was shaded in the same color as the Chinese mainland, with the islands marked and named in accordance with the official designations published by China in 1935 — serving as an English-language presentation of China’s sovereignty claims over the Nanhai Zhudao. The 1938–1939 edition also carried an updated English version of the Map of China, copies of which are still preserved in libraries in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere.

In November 1937, to strengthen international communication and win foreign support, the National Government established the International Information Division under its Central Headquarters, led by Dong Xianguang, a prominent journalist educated in the United States. The division had a Compilation Section responsible for foreign-language publications. From February 1938, it was placed under the Central Publicity Department, with an overseas office established in New York — then a key hub for international publicity — and branches in London and other cities.

According to incomplete statistics, during the war years the division published over 290 foreign-language periodicals exposing Japanese atrocities and publicizing China’s war efforts and major political figures. It also distributed more than 11,000 publicity photographs abroad, including to Japan. This indicates that the 1938–1939 edition of The Chinese Year Book was likely promoted through this external publicity network, giving it broad international circulation and readership. Alongside China’s resistance narrative, the publication also conveyed China’s claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea islands.

After 14 years of arduous struggle, China achieved victory in 1945, recovering all territories seized by Japan, including the South China Sea islands.

In February 1948, the Chinese government (ROC) officially published the Administrative Map of the ROC. The map included an inset titled Location Map of the South China Sea Islands. (This map was shown in the exhibition)

In 1947, when the Ministry of the Interior and other departments convened to discuss the scope of the South China Sea islands, they reaffirmed the boundaries announced in 1935: “The southernmost extent of China’s South China Sea territory reaches Zengmu Shoal. Before the war, this demarcation had been consistently used by government agencies, schools, and publishers, and had been formally filed with the Ministry of the Interior. The original record remains unchanged.”

At the end of the article, Liu concluded that China’s sovereignty claims over the Nanhai Zhudao thus continued to gain international recognition after the war, supported by its renewed administrative and developmental activities over the islands.

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In the previous edition of the meeting in 2015, Xi also delivered a keynote address. He presented four key proposals in both his 2015 and 2025 addresses. Comparing the two reveals important shifts that highlight China’s latest progress and top-level policy guidance on gender equality, as well as its evolving perspective on women’s development from a global standpoint.

First, we should jointly foster an enabling environment for women’s growth and development. Their all-round development is achieved under the prerequisite of peace and tranquility. We need to uphold the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, and must safeguard world peace, so that all women can bask in the sunlight of happiness and tranquility and stay away from the shadow of war and turmoil.

The shift in the ordering of points is notable. In 2015, “combating violence against women” and “peace and tranquility” were addressed as the third and fourth points, respectively. This year, they were moved to the first point, with significant emphasis on the importance of peace. This change comes against the backdrop of an increasingly turbulent world marked by frequent regional conflicts and multiple humanitarian crises.

Additionally, in 2015, the statement “We must eradicate all forms of violence against women, including domestic violence“ specifically highlighted domestic violence. Just a year later, the Anti-Domestic Violence Law of the People’s Republic of China came into effect, signaling a rapid legislative response to the issue.

拓宽妇女参政议政渠道，支持妇女广泛参与国家和社会治理。共同营造尊重妇女的良好氛围，使性别平等真正内化为全社会的文明共识和行为准则。

We should broaden the channels for women to participate in and deliberate on political affairs, and support their extensive engagement in state and social governance. We should jointly nurture an environment that respects women, and morph gender equality into a common value and a code of conduct embraced by everyone in our society.

Reuters suggests in a report that the first sentence above, which calls for greater political participation for women, will “ensure” gender equality being “truly internalized” within society as noted in the second sentence.

BEIJING/HONG KONG, Oct 13 (Reuters) - Chinese President Xi Jinping on Monday called for greater representation for women in politics and government at a global women’s summit in Beijing, a move he said would ensure that gender equality is “truly internalized” within society.

Reuters’ interpretation suggests a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the two. However, given the conventions of Chinese official speeches and documents, as well as the structure of this paragraph, the two sentences are more likely intended as separate points addressing different dimensions of gender equality — one concerning policy-level participation, and the other broader cultural and societal change. In this sense, Reuters’ report misrepresented the logical relationship between the two.

To further compare those two sentences with the statement made in 2015, the shift reflects a clear change in focus.

2015 version:

要增强妇女参与政治经济活动能力，提高妇女参与决策管理水平，使妇女成为政界、商界、学界的领军人物。

We must build up women’s capacity to play their part in society and economy, involve women in higher levels of decision-making, and support them in becoming leaders in political, business, and academic fields.

In 2015, the emphasis was on individual empowerment, focusing on enhancing women’s personal capabilities and providing opportunities for leadership roles across various sectors. The statement targeted personal development, encouraging women’s involvement in politics, business, and academia.

In contrast, the 2025 statement places greater emphasis on systemic support, particularly within political and governance structures. The focus is on creating broader channels for women’s participation and influence in decision-making processes, signaling a clear message to support women’s roles in governance.

The absence of specific references to business and academia in the 2025 statement likely reflects the progress women have already made in these areas. It reminds me of a recent podcast episode with Professor Yueping Song from the School of Population and Health at Renmin University of China, who noted that eight of her ten PhD students are women.

Ginger River Review

How far has China come on gender equality? - with Yueping Song

This week on Inside the China Room with Jiang Jiang, I’m joined by Professor Yueping Song from the School of Population and Health at Renmin University of China to explore the current landscape of gender equality in China…

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a year ago · 1 like · Jiang Jiang and Yifei Shi

According to a white paper on China’s achievements in women’s well-rounded development, released by the State Council Information Office in September, points out that women now make up over 50 percent of internet entrepreneurs, indicating significant strides in these sectors.

今天，中国妇女在经济社会发展中真正发挥着“半边天”作用。中国全社会就业人员中女性占比超过四成，互联网领域创业者中女性超过一半，过去4届夏季奥运会奖牌获得者中女性占比超过60%。新时代的中国女性正在以前所未有的自信和活力参与国家和社会治理全过程，奋战在乡村振兴和共同富裕第一线，拼搏于科技创新和数字转型最前沿，书写着昂扬奋进的巾帼华章。中国式现代化新征程上，每一位妇女都是主角！

Today, women in China truly “hold up half the sky” in economic and social development. They make up more than 40 percent of the workforce, more than half of internet start-up founders, and more than 60 percent of all medalists in the past four Summer Olympic Games. In the new era, Chinese women, more confident and vibrant than ever before, are taking part in the whole process of state and social governance. They are fighting on the front lines for rural revitalization and common prosperity as well as scientific innovation and digital transition. They are writing a splendid history of the cause of women in China. On the new journey of Chinese modernization, every woman is a star.

Aligning with the idea of women as stars in Chinese modernization, the chair’s statement emphasizes “fully leveraging the principal role and transformative power of women in development, and empowering women to participate in and lead the pursuit of sustainable development and prosperity.”

It should be noted that the concept of “a Chinese path to modernization” holds significant weight in China’s political sphere. In his report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi emphasized that it is the central task of the Party leadership.

Compared to the corresponding section 2015 (below), this year’s address highlights more specifically Chinese women’s achievements in key areas of modernization, such as entrepreneurship, sports, tech innovation, and grassroots governance.

Two key stats: over 50 percent of internet entrepreneurs are women, and women account for more than 60 percent of medalists in the past four Summer Olympics.

2015 version:

在中国人民追求美好生活的过程中，每一位妇女都有人生出彩和梦想成真的机会。中国将更加积极贯彻男女平等基本国策，发挥妇女“半边天”作用，支持妇女建功立业、实现人生理想和梦想。中国妇女也将通过自身发展不断促进世界妇女运动发展，为全球男女平等事业作出更大贡献。

As the Chinese people pursue a happy life, every Chinese woman has the opportunities to excel in life and make their dream come true. China will do more to enhance gender equality as its basic state policy, give play to women’s important role as “half of the sky” and support them in realizing their own dreams and aspirations in both career and life. The Chinese women, through their own development, will also play a greater part in global women’s movement and make greater contribution to gender equality in the world.

The phrase “Women hold up half the sky,” first introduced in the 1950s in China to promote gender equality, has been widely used for over 70 years.

Compared to a decade ago, when the role of women as “half the sky” was mentioned, there is a clear tone shift, which reflects a subtle but strategic evolution in messaging.

The earlier statement, “China will give play to women’s important role as ‘half of the sky,’” was framed in terms of potential -- an aspirational goal indicating intention but not yet fully realized. It projected a need for action, implying women’s role was something to be nurtured.

In contrast, the current statement, “Today, women in China truly ‘hold up half the sky’ in economic and social development,” firmly establishes that this goal has been achieved. It’s no longer aspirational but declarative, positioning women’s contributions as not only integral but already embedded in the nation’s core development narrative.

Another big difference, compared with many Western countries, lies in China’s residential communities. Here, many people live in what’s called a xiaoqu “小区” — a cluster of apartment buildings grouped together within a gated compound, with multiple entrances for people and vehicles. Whether it’s a luxury development, a middle-class complex, or what locals half-jokingly call an old , shabby little community (lao po xiao “老破小”), one thing is consistent: there are usually security guards posted at the gates.

When I lived in the U.S., I rarely saw this. Some upscale apartment buildings might have a front desk on the first floor, but that’s quite different from the setup in China. And the guards you see at the entrances here—often middle-aged uncles in their forties or fifties—don’t exactly project overwhelming defensive power. Still, they’re part of the standard landscape of almost every community. Think about it: millions of Chinese people pass by their community’s guards every day on their way to work or errands, and in turn, these guards quietly watch over the daily comings and goings of one of the most populous countries on Earth.

But who are these guards, really? Beyond the official role of “keeping the community safe,” do they serve other functions? And how do Chinese residents view them?

Today’s newsletter is about China’s community security guards. Guangzhou-based Southern Weekly recently interviewed Dr. He Wapi, a cultural anthropology Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin–Madison, who conducted fieldwork between 2017 and 2018 in Shanghai’s Dadi Community—an enormous residential compound of more than 100 high-rise buildings, once home to some 60,000 residents. I found the interview fascinating and wanted to share it with you.

Dr. He Wapi

Dr. He is also a novelist and the writer behind the WeChat blog Meiyao Garden, which explores criminal cases in China, with a special focus on unsolved mysteries and headline-making incidents.

Security guards, as the name implies, exist to protect safety. In a residential community, one might assume that when a sudden violent incident occurs, guards should be the first to respond. That was precisely what He Wapi thought at first.

For her doctoral dissertation, He Wapi chose to study security guards in Chinese residential communities. Between 2017 and 2018, she conducted fieldwork in Dadi Community, a Shanghai neighborhood with over 100 high-rise buildings and a population that once peaked at 60,000. Only then did she realize that reality was far from what she had imagined.

While having meals with the guards, she heard them discuss a 2016 homicide that occurred in the community. She casually remarked that if they had arrived earlier that day, they might have saved the victim.

“Are you kidding? How could we stop someone who’s gone mad? He had a knife, and we had nothing,” one guard said. “I wouldn’t even try.”

She asked the other guards what they would do if they faced a similar situation again.

“Run, of course!” one said. Another added that they would call the police before fleeing.

Of course, the likelihood of encountering such emergencies is low. After 2010, the SkyNet surveillance project expanded across cities in China. As a result, urban crime rates began to fall, yet the number of residential security guards continued to rise. Why does the guard presence keep growing even as the environment becomes safer? He Wapi sees it as a reflection of middle-class anxieties over social status and wealth.

1. Moving Stone Blocks, Clearing Trash, and Cracking Down on Illegal Group Rentals

Southern Weekly: What inspired you to study security guards?

He Wapi: I’ve always been interested in crime research and have paid close attention to public safety data. Compared to other developing countries and even some developed nations, urban crime rates in China are actually very low. According to official reports, China’s homicide rate in 2016 was 0.62 per 100,000 people—one of the lowest in the world. By contrast, the U.S. rate in 2015 was 4.88. Between 2012 and 2016, major violent crimes in China dropped by 43%.

Given how safe Chinese cities are, I wondered: why are there so many security guards in residential communities? How much does their daily work actually relate to public safety? In a global context, Chinese residential guards are quite unique.

Southern Weekly: What were communities like when you lived in the U.S.?

He Wapi: I initially lived in graduate dormitories, scattered along sloping hills with no walls. Any outsider could walk into the apartments. The only community I lived in with security measures had controlled access at each building entrance, but the overall area was open. I never saw community guards where I lived.

In the U.S., only a few gated, upscale communities can afford 24-hour guards. These guards usually receive training in restraint techniques, first aid, and emergency equipment. Even without firearms, they carry tools like batons, pepper spray, and handcuffs. China is different. Today, whether it’s a luxury development or an old neighborhood, guards are standard. I have relatives living in an old Shanghai lane — there’s no property management, but the local residents’ committee still hires guards for them.

Southern Weekly: Was your fieldwork in Dadi Community as you imagined?

He Wapi: I chose Dadi Community because of its reputation for chaos and danger. I thought I would witness many dangerous incidents and see guards actively perform their security duties. But reality was very different.

Within two days of arriving, the property management needed to move three large stone blocks that were blocking a road, so that an engineering vehicle could pass. Captain Ade and two guards arrived. Each block weighed 100-150 kilos, difficult for two people to lift. Guards spend most of their time handling such trivial tasks.

Southern Weekly: So what role do guards actually play during emergencies?

He Wapi: In Dadi Community, the security contract clearly instructs guards not to harm themselves or others, and not to let themselves be harmed. When danger arises, they are not encouraged to confront criminals directly—they are told to call the police.

Most guards have no combat training and are not allowed to carry weapons. In 2014, a Shanghai guard killed his team leader with a knife after being reprimanded in front of other guards. Following that, many security companies banned dangerous tools in monitoring rooms or dormitories. Today, when faced with danger, community guards simply dial 110 or 119. In some new communities, guards are now provided with shields and anti-riot forks.

Southern Weekly: Shields and forks are defensive—guards cannot actively attack.

He Wapi: Exactly. It reflects a lack of trust in guards. For security companies, any injury to a guard is costly. In Dadi, a company earns about 10,000 yuan per month—an accident could wipe out years of profit. Some companies now deduct 30 yuan from guards’ salaries monthly to buy accident insurance, so the insurance covers any injuries.

Southern Weekly: Besides moving stone blocks, what other “trivial tasks” do guards perform?

He Wapi: For example, after renovations, residents often leave building materials in stairwells. Since the cleaning staff are mostly elderly with limited strength, guards are asked to clear the trash. Another example: in 2017, shared bikes were popular. Despite signs forbidding them in the community, hundreds of bikes still entered daily. Two guards would search the entire community each night, load the bikes onto carts, and move them outside in batches.

Southern Weekly: These tasks don’t seem like they should be part of a guard’s duties. Why are they willing to do this work?

He Wapi: The thing is, in Dadi Community there’s a lot of manual labor in public areas that needs to be done every day. Who else could handle it besides the guards? The scope of a guard’s responsibilities is vague —there’s little clarity on which resident requests or emergencies they should respond to. Because of this ambiguity, security companies, residents, property management, and the local neighborhood committee often overstep boundaries, asking guards to handle chores beyond traditional security duties.

The most obvious example is “Cracking Down on Illegal Group Rentals.” In 2016, when the campaign to regulate illegal group rentals began (per capita living space below the legal standard, or occupancy exceeding the permitted number per room), the street office required the security team to send four or five guards to participate in routine apartment inspections. It was physically demanding work, requiring four half-days per week. The street office promised 50 yuan per guard per day, but the payment was never delivered. Although the guards were disappointed, no one asked the street office about it.

I asked a guard why he hadn’t followed up. His response was, “We didn’t really lose anything, we just spent the time.” They tend to underestimate the value of their time and labor, and property managers, residents, and street offices may share the same mindset: a guard’s time and effort aren’t considered valuable.

2. Male, Young, Strong

Southern Weekly: You mention in your book that in 2017 the Dadi Community guards underwent changes: instead of being directly hired from Shanghai locals, property management outsourced to security companies, which mostly employed guards from outside the city. What differences exist between local and non-local guards?

He Wapi: Dadi Community is divided into east and west sections. The east outsourced its guards in 2014, while the west followed in 2017. In that year, a local guard in his fifties suffered a fatal heart attack during a night shift. The property management compensated his family 700,000 yuan (about 98,000 U.S. dollars). After that, they outsourced the west section too, so that any future incidents would be the company’s responsibility, not theirs.

Local guards are usually over 55, sometimes over 60. Most live in Dadi or nearby neighborhoods, with socioeconomic backgrounds similar to the residents. The property management pays them only Shanghai’s minimum wage, 2,600 yuan every month (about 365 U.S. dollars), but provides social insurance. They are legally aware, largely undisciplined, and difficult to manage. They work 8-hour shifts, enjoy paid sick leave, and legal holidays.

I conducted fieldwork with Wenwu Security Company in the east section. There, outsourced guards work 12–13 hours a day, 7 days a week, with no holidays. If they take a day off for illness or personal matters, their pay is deducted.

Southern Weekly: How did local guards gradually get replaced by non-local ones?

He Wapi: China’s first security company was founded in December 1984 in Shekou, Shenzhen. It was a state-owned enterprise, established by a police officer, Zhang Zhongfang, who borrowed 100,000 yuan from the local government. Later, the government allowed property companies to hire guards from the market, but private capital was barred from entering the industry. Around 2000, policies stipulated that security service companies could only be fully state-owned, often led by mid-level police officers.

In 2010, the Regulations on the Administration of Security Services allowed private capital into the market. From then on, security companies became independent of the police. Newly established private companies competed for contracts, offering lower prices and better services. Property management, seeking profit maximization, easier oversight, and lower risk, increasingly outsourced guards.

Southern Weekly: You mention that guard age is a standard set by security companies.

He Wapi: At Wenwu, service standards are strictly age-based. Grade A guards are under 35, Grade B between 35 and 45, and Grade C between 45 and 55.

Wenwu Company implements Grade C standards at Dadi Community. Yet even so, not everyone meets the criteria. Out of 40 guards, many are over 55.

Captain Ade believes he advanced quickly in the industry due to his height—1.88 meters (6’2”)—and young, being in his twenties. He assigns older or smaller guards to night shifts, thinking the property manager and residents won’t notice their age at night.

Southern Weekly: Don’t personality or education matter?

He Wapi: When Ade interviews new guards, age and physique are his main concerns. Work experience, education, personality, mental resilience, and even criminal history are largely ignored.

In 2018, 25-year-old Xiao Liang was promoted to team leader. He spoke softly and had a slight stutter. Even without a commanding personality, a young, fit guard can be made team leader. In Dadi, although guards change frequently, most are over 45, while day and night shift leaders never exceed 30.

Southern Weekly: Why are age and physique so important?

He Wapi: Residents view this as the most visible sign of a community’s status. Young, tall, handsome guards signal that high property fees are needed to afford them—indicating a high-end neighborhood. Conversely, a community staffed with elderly guards lowers the perceived status and can affect property values. Whether residents truly believe younger guards provide better safety is secondary. Based on my field interviews, appearance and symbolism matter more.

At the start of the 20th century, Thorstein Veblen coined the term “conspicuous consumption,” describing how the leisure class uses spending to showcase power, wealth, and status. At its core, conspicuous consumption is about wasting time and resources. The demand for young, tall guards carries this same logic: in an aging society, among those willing to work as security guards, such labor is increasingly scarce—and therefore costly.

Southern Weekly: In China, security guards aren’t highly regarded socially. Why do young people choose this job?

He Wapi: Many have limited education, making other jobs hard to come by. Plus, long-term guard work gradually dulls reaction speed and focus. Once people settle into the routine, switching to jobs like food delivery becomes difficult—it requires constant attention, quick reflexes, and vigilance on the roads.

At the same time, young guards are more mobile. Dadi Community is near the train station, so some can move into the guard dorm the day they arrive, saving on hotels. They can work as guards while job hunting, then leave as soon as they find a better opportunity.

3. Expressing Fear as a Marker of Status

Southern Weekly: When you interviewed residents, many mentioned wanting more guards. What reasons did they give?

He Wapi: Most residents officially cite fear of crime. But when I asked dozens of them about the issues that actually bothered them, they almost always mentioned group rentals, aging facilities, poor maintenance, or lack of parking.

They want more guards and a fully gated community mainly to prevent outsiders from using community amenities, like the greenery or parking spaces.

Online complaints about Dadi often focus on property values. Residents paid a premium—between 5 million and 20 million yuan—but over time, the neighborhood became comparatively cheap. They blame property management for disorder and high group-rental rates, which hurt the community’s reputation. Guards are a key part of that management.

Southern Weekly: So residents’ demand for guards isn’t just about fear of crime?

He Wapi: Exactly. What residents seek in a gated community is not just physical safety but also protection of asset value and social status. In major cities, a family’s biggest investment is usually their home, often under a decades-long mortgage. Fluctuations in property value can directly affect their social and economic standing.

For example, wealthy buyers of large luxury apartments prefer communities made entirely of large units rather than mixed-size developments. Fewer residents and uniform socioeconomic status—the “purity” I describe in my book—are the goals. A visible, disciplined team of young, tall guards not only keeps outsiders out but also signals the residents’ wealth and status.

Southern Weekly: In your research, guards themselves often didn’t know how to respond when asked if they were afraid.

He Wapi: That’s right. People often focus on middle-class residents’ fears, but rarely ask guards, “Are you afraid on night shift?” If asked, guards may be uninterested—or amused. They usually say things like, “What’s there to be afraid of?” or “Shanghai is safe. Dadi is safe.”

Research shows that people living in safe communities often report more fear than those in dangerous ones. U.S. data indicate low-income residents are more likely to experience violent crime or burglary. For them, fear revolves around losing housing or income, not crime itself, so they rarely voice concerns about neighborhood safety.

Middle-class anxiety over social stability or food safety is common, while migrant workers worry about pensions and long separations from family. These are fundamental survival issues, real worries that aren’t expressed. Middle-class fear, however, is socially amplified, reinforced through communication and shared concern.

Southern Weekly: Why aren’t guards’ basic survival worries given more attention?

He Wapi: Many reasons. They may lack the skills or experience to express themselves. They may feel they’re at the bottom and unqualified to speak.

Meanwhile, middle-class residents rarely admit worry over status or wealth in public. Instead, they translate it into fear of crime. Fear of crime allows them to adopt a victim role, gain moral authority, justify more guards and stricter gates, and indirectly protect property values.

Low-income groups don’t have an alternative mode of expression, so they stay silent. In this context, expressing fear becomes a symbol of status, a marker of membership or class.

Southern Weekly: Can this situation change?

He Wapi: Anthropologist Caroline Humphrey argues that fear comes from knowing others have nothing and may act desperately. One way to reduce that fear is to acknowledge the “other’s” right to express all emotions, including fear, and empower them to avoid desperation.

When the fears of marginalized groups are recognized, and “the other” is accepted as part of “us,” anxiety can truly be eased. For the middle class, whose main worry is downward mobility, well-managed security personnel provide both safety and peace of mind.

Southern Weekly: Are you still in touch with the guards you interviewed? What are they doing now?

He Wapi: Some, yes. A few have returned home after sending their children to college, prioritizing family over income. Others have switched to delivery work. Captain Ade now works for a security company in another city as a regional manager, overseeing multiple communities.

Xiao Liang, who worried about finding a girlfriend, moved to a higher-end community as a team leader, earning over 8,000 yuan a month. He told me that even as a team leader, he’s still a guard—less desirable than a university graduate earning 3,000-yuan a month when it comes to dating in Shanghai. He faces a dilemma: in his thirties, he can’t find a girlfriend in Shanghai, and at home, he can’t find a job with comparable pay. Whenever I ask, he says he must return home soon—or it’s “over.” Yet he hasn’t left, because the job opportunities are here.

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