Born in 1866, Sun led the Revolution of 1911 more than a century ago to abolish the absolute monarchy that had ruled China for thousands of years. Sun died in 1925.

Addressing the event in the Great Hall of the People, Xi hailed Sun as a great national hero, a great patriot and a great pioneer of China’s democratic revolution.

Sun was also the founder of the Kuomintang, or KMT, which remains a major political party in Taiwan today. Commemorative events marking Sun’s 160th birth anniversary have also been held in Taiwan.

When Cheng Li-wun, chairperson of the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT), visited the Chinese mainland in April, she led a KMT delegation to pay homage to Sun Yat-sen at his mausoleum in Nanjing, capital of east China’s Jiangsu Province.

Sun Yat-sen may not be an especially familiar name to some international readers today. But his place in modern Chinese history remains highly significant.

At the state dinner held at the White House during Xi’s visit to the United States in September, U.S. President Donald Trump also invoked Sun, placing him alongside the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu: “China draws on thousands of years of history and tradition from Sun Tzu to Sun Yat-sen.”

Coincidentally, both men share the Chinese surname Sun. The reference also offers a glimpse of Sun Yat-sen’s enduring place in narratives about China’s history and national development.

Xinhua News Agency has published the full Chinese text of Xi’s speech delivered at today’s event. I used AI to produce an English translation of the entire speech, which I am sharing below for readers who want a quick look at the full text. Please note that this is an AI-assisted translation and may contain errors. It is not an official English version and is provided for reference only.

A few parts of the speech caught my attention:

Chinese communists are the most steadfast supporters, loyal collaborators, and faithful successors to the revolutionary cause initiated by Sun.

This sentence neatly summarizes how the Communist Party of China (CPC) positions its historical relationship with Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary cause. Historically, Sun promoted cooperation between the Kuomintang and the CPC, and brought some CPC members into the reorganization of the KMT.

Xi also said:

Many of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s visions for China’s future development -- including the grand plans he outlined in The International Development of China for building railways and roads, expanding communications, developing water conservancy, digging canals, constructing ports, and building factories and mines -- have long since become reality, and what has been achieved is even richer and more extensive than what he envisioned.

This passage also echoes the earlier description of the Chinese Communists as Sun’s “faithful successors,” linking many of Sun’s visions for China’s modernization with the country’s subsequent development.

Below, I have reproduced in full the section of the speech dealing with Taiwan, as I suspect this will be of particular interest to many overseas China watchers:

Dr. Sun always upheld national unity and ethnic solidarity, and resolutely opposed any word or act attempting to split the country and divide the nation. He stressed that “China is a unified country,” declared that “’unification’ is the hope of all the Chinese people,” and said that he “would use all my influence to work for national unification.” His strong aspiration and firm resolve for the reunification of the motherland have continued to enlighten, educate and inspire all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation.

Throughout the more than 5,000-year history of Chinese civilization, the conviction that our territory must not be divided, our country must not be thrown into chaos, our nation must not be split, and our civilization must not be interrupted has always been deeply ingrained in all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation. Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing the complete reunification of the motherland is an unwavering historical mission for the CPC, the shared aspiration of all Chinese people, and a natural requirement for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are all Chinese. We are one family bound by blood, and blood is thicker than water. Among family members, as long as we talk things over in good faith and consult more when issues arise, there are no differences or disputes that cannot be resolved. For a long time, we have upheld the conviction that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family, continuously deepened cross-Strait exchanges and integration, and improved the well-being of compatriots on both sides.

Looking ahead, we will continue to uphold the policy of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems.” On the basis of the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, we are willing to engage in dialogue and consultation with people of insight from all sectors in Taiwan on cross-Strait relations and national reunification. We will certainly give full consideration to the realities in Taiwan and fully accommodate the interests and feelings of Taiwan compatriots, but we will never leave any room for separatist activities seeking “Taiwan independence” in any form.

The future of Taiwan lies in national reunification, and the well-being of Taiwan compatriots depends on the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation at home and abroad should join hands, jointly oppose the separatist forces seeking “Taiwan independence,” and work together for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and the complete reunification of the motherland. The tide of history is unstoppable. The complete reunification of the motherland must be realized and can surely be realized!

This is not the first time a Chinese leader has explicitly linked resolving the Taiwan question with national rejuvenation. But its inclusion in a speech commemorating Sun Yat-sen is still notable. It reflects Beijing’s clear framing of complete reunification as an integral part of national rejuvenation, as well as the importance it continues to attach to achieving that goal.

The full text of the speech is below:

Speech at the Meeting Commemorating the 160th Anniversary of the Birth of Dr. Sun Yat-sen

Comrades and Friends,

We are gathered here today to commemorate the 160th anniversary of the birth of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, to remember his immortal contributions to national independence, social progress and the people’s well-being, to learn from, carry forward and promote his valuable spirit, and to inspire all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation at home and abroad to unite and strive for building a strong country and advancing national rejuvenation on all fronts through Chinese modernization.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen was a great national hero, a great patriot, and a great forerunner of China’s democratic revolution. At the time of his birth, our country was suffering from the savage aggression of Western powers and the corrupt rule of feudal autocracy, and the Chinese nation was mired in profound suffering caused by both domestic turmoil and foreign aggression. Faced with a shattered country in a precarious situation, the heroic Chinese people never yielded. Countless dedicated patriots rose up in resistance and painstakingly explored ways to save the country and the people. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was an outstanding representative among them.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen “devoted himself to the national revolution for 40 years.” He spared no effort and devoted his entire life to transforming China, making outstanding contributions to the Chinese people and the Chinese nation. He held high the banner of opposition to feudal autocracy, put forward the political program of the Three People’s Principles -- nationalism, democracy and the people’s livelihood -- and was the first to sound the clarion call of “revitalizing China.” He spread revolutionary ideas far and wide and launched successive armed uprisings, helping build momentum for revolution. The Revolution of 1911, which he led, overthrew the absolute monarchy that had ruled China for thousands of years, opened the floodgates of progress in China, established the first republic in Asia, profoundly advanced social transformation in China, and explored a path toward the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Influenced by the October Revolution and Marxism-Leninism, and with the help of the Communist Party of China (CPC), he developed the old Three People’s Principles into the new Three People’s Principles, adopted the Three Great Policies of alliance with Russia, cooperation with the Communist Party and assistance to the peasants and workers, reorganized the Chinese Kuomintang, helped advance the Northern Expedition toward victory, and pushed forward the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s outstanding contributions will forever be recorded in history. He enjoys high prestige among the Chinese people and is sincerely revered by all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation at home and abroad. Today, the Chinese people are advancing Chinese modernization with great vigor, and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has entered an irreversible historical process. At this moment, as we look back on Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary career and remember his great achievements, our hearts are filled with even deeper respect.

Comrades and Friends,

Chinese communists are the most steadfast supporters, loyal collaborators, and faithful successors to the revolutionary cause initiated by Sun. Over the past century and more, our Party has led the people in securing great achievements in the New Democratic Revolution, socialist revolution and construction, reform, opening up and socialist modernization, and socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era, writing the most magnificent epic in the millennia-long history of the Chinese nation. Many of Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s visions for China’s future development -- including the grand plans he outlined in The International Development of China for building railways and roads, expanding communications, developing water conservancy, digging canals, constructing ports, and building factories and mines -- have long since become reality, and what has been achieved is even richer and more extensive than what he envisioned. Today, our great motherland stands tall and firm in the East. China has remained the world’s second-largest economy, its people have achieved moderate prosperity in all respects, and the Chinese nation has achieved a tremendous transformation from standing up and growing prosperous to becoming strong. China is also making new contributions to the development and progress of human society. All this would surely bring comfort to the spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Comrades and Friends,

For more than a century, Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s call to “revitalize China” has inspired generation after generation of Chinese people and has continuously taken on new meaning and substance in keeping with the times. Today, the best way for us to commemorate Dr. Sun Yat-sen is to learn from, carry forward and promote his valuable spirit and continue advancing the great cause of building a strong country and realizing national rejuvenation.

-- Dr. Sun Yat-sen devoted his life to loving and saving the country. To learn from, carry forward and promote his valuable spirit, we must vigorously promote patriotism and strive to make our motherland prosperous and strong.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen was driven by a strong patriotic passion, declaring, “I am determined to devote myself to the struggle to repay my country.” He believed that “the greatest thing in being a person” was “to know how to love one’s country,” that “if the right to development rests in our own hands, we will survive; if it rests in the hands of others, we will perish,” and that “saving China is entirely our own responsibility.” It was with the determination to shoulder this responsibility that he struggled tirelessly throughout his life -- to “prop up the tottering edifice,” and to make China “the most prosperous and powerful country in the world” and “the happiest and most peaceful country in the world.”

On the new journey, we must uphold the unity of love for the country, love for the Party and love for socialism; uphold the Party’s overall leadership and the centralized, unified leadership of the CPC Central Committee; remain confident in the path, theory, system and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics; inspire all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation at home and abroad to deepen their patriotic commitment and strengthen their resolve to build a strong country; advance Chinese modernization from victory to victory; and work together to make our great motherland an even better place.

-- Dr. Sun Yat-sen cared deeply about the people throughout his life. To learn from, carry forward and promote his valuable spirit, we must always put the people first and serve them wholeheartedly.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen had a deep affection for the people. He believed that “the foundation of a country lies in its people,” pledged to “work for the happiness of the people’s livelihood,” and firmly believed that the purpose of revolution “is to remove the people’s suffering.” He said, “What the people cannot do, we must do for them; rights the people do not have, we must fight for them.” He stressed that “the Three People’s Principles were formulated for the people,” advocated the “equalization of land ownership” and the “regulation of capital,” and sought to ensure that “everyone enjoys the happiness of economic equality, free from the troubles of inequality.” He worked tirelessly throughout his life so that the Chinese people could become “the happiest people in the world.”

On the new journey, we must keep firmly in mind that this country is its people and the people are the country. We must stand firmly with the people, respond to their wishes, respect their creativity and pool their wisdom. We must develop whole-process people’s democracy, safeguard and improve the people’s well-being, ensure that the fruits of modernization benefit all our people more fully and fairly, and make solid progress in promoting well-rounded human development and common prosperity for all.

-- Dr. Sun Yat-sen pursued truth throughout his life. To learn from, carry forward and promote his valuable spirit, we must uphold the “Two Integrations” and continue advancing theoretical innovation on the basis of practice.

From a young age, Dr. Sun Yat-sen aspired to “explore the mysteries of heaven and earth.” Throughout his life, he extensively studied advanced knowledge and beneficial intellectual achievements in order to “adapt to the trends of the world and meet the needs of the people.” After devoting himself to the revolution, he came to understand clearly that “the success of a revolution depends on changes in thought.” He actively sought truth from revolutionary practice and worked constantly to improve his revolutionary ideas and strategies of struggle. He spent his life making arduous and persistent efforts to bring about “a genuine solution to China’s problems.”

On the new journey, we must continue to integrate the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s specific realities and with China’s fine traditional culture. We must have the courage to explore and innovate in theory, provide sound answers to the questions posed by China, by the world, by the people and by the times, enrich and develop Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era in keeping with the times, and continue opening new chapters in adapting Marxism to the Chinese context and the needs of our times.

-- Dr. Sun Yat-sen remained indomitable throughout his life. To learn from, carry forward and promote his valuable spirit, we must have the courage to tackle difficulties and challenges and open up new horizons for our cause through tenacious struggle.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen experienced repeated setbacks and tremendous hardships in his revolutionary career, yet he always upheld the conviction that “where my aspiration lies, I will forge ahead without hesitation; the more setbacks I encounter, the more determined I will become, and I will keep up my efforts.” With a boldness and perseverance that “could not be bent by hardship even when there seemed to be no way forward,” he fought resolutely against all forces running counter to the trend of the times. He was never shaken by external threats, internal divisions or temporary failures, demonstrating firm revolutionary resolve and fearless heroism. Even on his deathbed, he remained preoccupied with “peace, struggle and saving China,” truly fighting without cease until the end of his life.

On the new journey, we must take into account both the domestic and international situations, coordinate development and security, carry forward the fighting spirit and strengthen our ability to fight. We must fear no difficulty and yield to no enemy, always stand ready to withstand major tests involving high winds, choppy waters and even dangerous storms, make every effort to overcome all risks and challenges on the road ahead, and continue winning new victories in the great struggle of the new era.

-- Dr. Sun Yat-sen advocated unity throughout his life. To learn from, carry forward and promote his valuable spirit, we must uphold the united front and continue consolidating and developing the great unity of all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation.

In advancing the revolution, Dr. Sun Yat-sen always stressed that “the revolutionary cause originates from the people and is also accomplished by the people.” He devoted himself to “awakening the people.” Traveling extensively and overcoming obstacles from many quarters, he seized every opportunity to promote revolutionary ideas among people in China and overseas Chinese communities, attract more people to support the revolutionary cause, and broadly unite forces from all sides to “move forward in step, put the country’s long-term interests first, and strive with all our strength.” His united front policy, together with the political program of the Three People’s Principles and his spirit of arduous struggle, was praised by Comrade Mao Zedong as “the most central, essential and greatest legacy he left us.”

On the new journey, we must always uphold great unity and solidarity, unite all forces that can be united and mobilize all positive factors that can be mobilized. We must promote harmony in relations among political parties, ethnic groups, religions, social strata, and compatriots at home and abroad; consolidate and develop the broadest possible patriotic united front; and pool a mighty force for advancing Chinese modernization.

-- Dr. Sun Yat-sen had a broad vision of the world throughout his life. To learn from, carry forward and promote his valuable spirit, we must vigorously promote the common values of humanity and actively advance the building of a community with a shared future for humanity.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen viewed the relationship between China and the world from a broad perspective. He placed the Chinese revolution in the context of the times while also examining China’s development in the context of global trends. He stressed that once China became strong and prosperous, it “would also have to shoulder a great responsibility for the world.” He predicted that once the great goal of transforming China was achieved, “all humanity would also be able to share a brighter future.” He regarded “a world for the common good” as “the goal of human evolution” and “the aspiration of humanity.” He advocated “a policy of openness,” attached importance to exchanges and mutual learning among civilizations, but insisted that China must never “follow the old path of Western civilization.”

On the new journey, we must always take a global perspective in considering the future and destiny of humanity, and properly understand and handle China’s relations with the outside world from the perspective of the broad trend of human development, the overall pattern of changes in the world, and the long course of China’s development. We must promote peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom -- the common values of humanity -- actively advance the implementation of the four major global initiatives, and make China’s contribution to building a community with a shared future for humanity.

Comrades and Friends,

Dr. Sun always upheld national unity and ethnic solidarity, and resolutely opposed any word or act attempting to split the country and divide the nation. He stressed that “China is a unified country,” declared that “’unification’ is the hope of all the Chinese people,” and said that he “would use all my influence to work for national unification.” His strong aspiration and firm resolve for the reunification of the motherland have continued to enlighten, educate and inspire all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation.

Throughout the more than 5,000-year history of Chinese civilization, the conviction that our territory must not be divided, our country must not be thrown into chaos, our nation must not be split, and our civilization must not be interrupted has always been deeply ingrained in all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation. Resolving the Taiwan question and realizing the complete reunification of the motherland is an unwavering historical mission for the CPC, the shared aspiration of all Chinese people, and a natural requirement for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are all Chinese. We are one family bound by blood, and blood is thicker than water. Among family members, as long as we talk things over in good faith and consult more when issues arise, there are no differences or disputes that cannot be resolved. For a long time, we have upheld the conviction that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family, continuously deepened cross-Strait exchanges and integration, and improved the well-being of compatriots on both sides.

Looking ahead, we will continue to uphold the policy of “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems.” On the basis of the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus, we are willing to engage in dialogue and consultation with people of insight from all sectors in Taiwan on cross-Strait relations and national reunification. We will certainly give full consideration to the realities in Taiwan and fully accommodate the interests and feelings of Taiwan compatriots, but we will never leave any room for separatist activities seeking “Taiwan independence” in any form.

The future of Taiwan lies in national reunification, and the well-being of Taiwan compatriots depends on the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation at home and abroad should join hands, jointly oppose the separatist forces seeking “Taiwan independence,” and work together for the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and the complete reunification of the motherland. The tide of history is unstoppable. The complete reunification of the motherland must be realized and can surely be realized!

Comrades and Friends,

Advancing the building of a strong country and the great cause of national rejuvenation on all fronts through Chinese modernization is a new Long March for the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people, and the only path toward realizing Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s aspiration to “revitalize China.”

I call on all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation at home and abroad to unite even more closely, carry forward Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s legacy, join hands and work together for the great cause of national rejuvenation, and continue turning the great dream that people of all ethnic groups in China have tirelessly pursued since the advent of modern times into a splendid reality!

According to the communique, the plenum adopted the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPC on Certain Major Issues concerning Persevering with Full and Rigorous Party Self-Governance. Xi Jinping delivered explanatory remarks on the draft Resolution.

This morning, the CPC Central Committee held a press conference to brief reporters on the plenum’s guiding principles. I’ve also spoken with experts in relevant fields in China.

In today’s newsletter, I’ve included the full official English text of the communique, along with some notes of my own. If you’d rather not work through the entire document on your own, you can follow along with my notes as we go.

The official text appears in blockquotes, with my notes in between.

Communique of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

The communique begins with the basics: when and where the meeting was held, who attended, and what was discussed:

Adopted at the fifth plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on October 29, 2026

The 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China convened its fifth plenary session in Beijing from October 26 to 29, 2026.

A total of 162 members and 117 alternate members of the Central Committee attended the session. Members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and leading officials from relevant departments were present at the meeting in a non-voting capacity. Some of our primary-level colleagues and a number of experts and scholars, serving as delegates to the 20th National Party Congress, also attended the meeting in a non-voting capacity.

The Political Bureau of the Central Committee presided over the meeting. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Central Committee, delivered an important address.

The Central Committee heard and discussed a report on the work of the Political Bureau, presented by Xi Jinping on behalf of the Political Bureau. They also deliberated and adopted the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Certain Major Issues concerning Persevering with Full and Rigorous Party Self-Governance. Xi Jinping delivered explanatory remarks on the draft Resolution.

The next paragraph reviews the work of the Political Bureau since the fourth plenary session of the 20th CPC Central Committee:

At the session, the Central Committee fully affirmed the work of the Political Bureau since the fourth plenary session of the 20th Central Committee. It was unanimously agreed that the Political Bureau has secured progress in the following respects: earnestly implementing the guiding principles from the Party’s 20th National Congress and the plenary sessions of the 20th Central Committee; adhering to the general principle of pursuing progress while ensuring stability; fully and faithfully applying the new development philosophy on all fronts; implementing the Five-Sphere Integrated Plan and the Four-Pronged Comprehensive Strategy in a coordinated way; balancing domestic and international imperatives; ensuring both development and security; delivering tangible results in high-quality economic development; advancing socialist democracy and the rule of law; improving public communication and cultural work; ensuring the people’s wellbeing and promoting ecological conservation; safeguarding national security and social stability; further strengthening full and rigorous Party self-governance; modernizing national defense and the armed forces; carrying out work related to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; and pursuing major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. Thanks to these efforts, the 14th Five-Year Plan has been brought to a successful conclusion and the 15th Five-Year Plan period is off to a good start with new progress and results achieved in the cause of the Party and the country. It was also noted that, this year, we launched a study campaign on establishing and practicing the correct view of performance and celebrated the 105th anniversary of the Communist Party of China. These occasions have further harnessed the mighty force that stems from the entire Party and the whole nation forging ahead in unity.

It then looks back over the CPC’s 105-year history:

Looking back on the Party’s journey since its founding, the Central Committee pointed out at the session that the key to the success of the Communist Party of China in winning one victory after another lies in its pursuit of the high ideal of communism, its dedication to achieving lasting greatness for the Chinese nation, and its commitment to seeking happiness for the Chinese people and rejuvenation for the Chinese nation. During each historical period, the Party has attached great importance to its self-governance, had the courage to uphold truth and correct errors, and grown ever stronger by relying on its own efforts and the support of the people to resolve its own problems, ultimately emerging as the strong leadership core in the cause of the Party and the people. The Party advanced Party building as a great project and then a great new project in the periods of revolution, development, and reform, and it has made further progress in this regard in the new era since its 18th National Congress. During this course, the Party has found two answers to the question of how to escape the historical cycle of rise and fall: the people’s oversight over government and the Party’s self-reform. These are the unique discoveries of the Communist Party of China, and will forever stand out in the history of Marxist parties.

The next two paragraphs review the achievements in full and rigorous Party self-governance since the 18th CPC National Congress and discuss the significance of Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building. At today’s press conference, Tang Fangyu, head of the Policy Research Office of the CPC Central Committee, highlighted these themes, as well as the Party’s confidence and resolve to continue advancing full and rigorous Party self-governance.

These passages in the communique likely correspond to the relevant parts of the resolution, which are expected to provide more details. Based on past practice, the full text of the resolution is likely to be released within a week of the communique's publication. However, no release date has been announced for this particular resolution.

Participants at the session gave a highly positive assessment of the great achievements our Party has made in exercising full and rigorous self-governance in the new era. It was unanimously agreed that the Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core demonstrated tremendous political courage and a strong sense of responsibility in confronting the grave situation marked by weak, hollow, and watered-down Party leadership, lax, superficial, and ineffective self-supervision and self-governance, as well as some startling problems within the Party. Staying firmly committed to full and rigorous Party self-governance, the Central Committee introduced the most stringent measures and dedicated continuous efforts to tackle all these prominent issues. As a result, the problem of lax and weak self-supervision and self-governance has been addressed at the root, unhealthy tendencies that had long gone unchecked have been curbed, deep-seated problems that had plagued the Party for years have been remedied, and serious dangers hidden within the Party, the state, and the military have been removed. The Party has thus grown stronger through revolutionary tempering. The endeavors to advance full and rigorous governance over the Party in the new era have broken new ground in the self-reform of our century-old Party and brought about historic achievements and transformations in the cause of the Party and the country. The Party and the people have thus seized the historic initiative in building a great party and a great country.

It was pointed out that as the Party endeavors to supervise, govern, develop, and strengthen itself in the new era, the Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has put forward a series of new ideas, new thinking, and new strategies in response to the major questions of our times -- what kind of long-term governing Marxist party we should build and how we should build it, thereby giving birth to Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building. This thought has enriched and developed Marxist theory on party building, and it represents a major achievement in advancing the Party’s theoretical innovation through the integration of the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s specific realities and its fine traditional culture. It stands as a crystallization of the practical experience and collective wisdom of the Party and the people. As an important component of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, it provides fundamental guidance and a road map for further advancing the great new project of Party building in the new era.

The next paragraph addresses the challenges and problems facing full and rigorous Party self-governance. Tang said this discussion was intended to strengthen the sense of responsibility and urgency throughout the Party to sustain these efforts:

It was stressed that many favorable conditions are now in place for advancing full and rigorous Party self-governance, while we are also facing many new circumstances and new issues in this endeavor. Profound changes in global, national, and Party conditions have made the Party’s tasks of uniting and leading the people in safeguarding China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests, of uniting and leading the people in promoting reform and development and maintaining social harmony and stability, and of maintaining its advanced nature and integrity even more arduous. All this poses formidable challenges to the Party’s governance and leadership capacity, the quality of its membership, and its resistance against corruption and moral decline under the new circumstances. Moreover, the “four tests” and “four dangers” confronting our Party are still protracted, complicated, and serious.

According to an official website of the CPC, the “four tests” refer to the tests of governance, reform and opening up, the market economy, and the external environment. The “four dangers” are lack of drive, incompetence, alienation from the people, and corruption.

The following paragraphs set out the guiding ideology for persevering with full and rigorous Party self-governance:

On this account, all of us in the Party must gain a deep understanding of the great significance of persevering with full and rigorous Party self-governance from the strategic perspective of consolidating the Party’s long-term governing position and realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. We must build firm confidence, maintain resolve, and adopt higher standards and more concrete measures to carry forward the valuable experience of full and rigorous Party self-governance in the new era, handle and resolve the prominent problems in Party building, and consolidate and develop the sound political situation formed through Party self-supervision and self-governance.

It was stated that in persevering with full and rigorous Party self-governance, we must uphold Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, and the Scientific Outlook on Development, fully implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and thoroughly study and apply Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building. Dedicated to fulfilling the Party’s missions and tasks, we must act in line with the overall requirements for Party building in the new era, take the Party Constitution as our fundamental guide, maintain the Party’s vanguard nature, and uphold the overall leadership of the Party and the centralized, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee. We must focus on enhancing the Party’s capacity for long-term governance, preserving its advanced nature and integrity, and maintaining its close bond with the people. We must unwaveringly apply strict principles, improve the system of exercising full and rigorous Party self-governance, and take strengthening the Party politically as the overarching principle to advance Party building on all fronts. We must stimulate greater motivation, initiative, and creativity within the whole Party, continue working to purify, improve, renew, and excel ourselves, and constantly strengthen the Party’s capacity for providing political leadership, giving theoretical guidance, organizing the people, and inspiring society. In doing so, we will see that the Party always remains a vibrant Marxist governing party that stays at the forefront of the times, enjoys the wholehearted support of the people, and is able to withstand all tests, and that it always remains the strong leadership core of the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

The communique then identifies seven guiding principles for persevering with full and rigorous Party self-governance:

At the session, the guiding principles for persevering with full and rigorous Party self-governance were highlighted as follows: serving the Party’s missions and tasks; taking strengthening the Party politically as the overarching principle; exercising rigorous governance across the board; adopting a problem-oriented approach; upholding fundamental principles and breaking new ground; adhering to a top-down approach; and running the Party according to regulations.

These seven principles are worth a closer look. Han Xiping, a chief expert with the Central Project for the Study and Development of Marxist Theory and deputy chair of the University Affairs Committee at Jilin University, told me that “serving the Party’s missions and tasks” is a new formulation that represents an important theoretical innovation.

He explained: “The underlying logic is that our Party has a founding aspiration and mission. To fulfill that mission successfully, it must first strengthen itself. This requires the Party to maintain its vitality and continue working for national rejuvenation and the well-being of the people. That is a fundamental expression of Party spirit.”

Based on Tang’s explanation of the resolution’s structure at today’s press conference, the following paragraphs of the communique appear to correspond to the resolution’s second and third sections.

The next paragraph provides an overview of both sections. It covers the specific plans for related work in seven parts in the second section and the two issues covered in the third: improving Party and state oversight systems and ensuring that political responsibility for full and rigorous Party self-governance is fulfilled.

Systematic plans for persevering with full and rigorous Party self-governance were also made at the session with the emphasis on strengthening the Party spirit of Communists; strictly practicing democratic centralism; cultivating high-caliber officials capable of shouldering the mission of national rejuvenation; building a well-knit organizational system characterized by cross-level alignment and effective implementation; improving conduct and tightening discipline on an ongoing basis; taking firm and coordinated action against corruption; running the Party with systems and regulations; refining Party and state oversight systems; and ensuring all responsibilities of Party self-supervision and self-governance are fulfilled in earnest.

The following seven paragraphs explain the seven parts of the specific plans, one by one:

It was pointed out that strengthening the Party spirit represents a fundamental task of our efforts to ensure full and rigorous Party self-governance. We must, therefore, encourage all Party members and officials to uphold the Party’s nature and purpose, raise Party consciousness, have a better understanding of their identity as Party members and the Party’s vanguard nature, and maintain a lifelong commitment to cultivating stronger Party spirit. We must also encourage them to devote efforts to strengthening ideals and convictions, forging strong loyalty to the Party, fostering deep affection for the people, always seeking truth from facts, building moral character, and preserving honesty and integrity. These efforts will help them to be loyal, upright, and responsible and always preserve the true political character of Communists. In this regard, measures will be taken to strengthen education on loyalty to the Party, build cohesion and inner strength with the Party’s latest theories, nurture the Party spirit with the Party’s good traditions and fine traditional Chinese culture, temper the Party spirit in practice, and enhance Party spirit appraisal.

It was noted that democratic centralism is the Party’s fundamental organizational principle and leadership system, and its implementation is therefore an inherent requirement for exercising full and rigorous Party self-governance. We must improve and implement the institutions of democratic centralism, giving full play to intraparty democracy while effectively practicing correct centralism. This will allow us to better draw on the political, organizational, institutional, and working strengths of democratic centralism. In practice, measures will be taken to uphold and strengthen the Party Central Committee’s centralized, unified leadership, improve the efficacy of intraparty democracy, strictly implement deliberation rules and decision-making procedures for leadership teams, and regulate leadership team heads’ performance of duties and exercise of power.

It was stated that strict management of officials is the key to full and rigorous Party self-governance. We must implement the Party’s organizational line for the new era and apply stringent standards to the education, cultivation, selection, appointment, management, and oversight of officials. On this basis, we will build up the ranks of high-caliber officials with firm political commitment, outstanding professional competence, excellent work conduct, and strict discipline. Following sound guidelines in appointing officials, we should take targeted, well-designed measures to select and appoint officials, inspire officials to foster and act on the correct view of performance, enhance officials’ competence in fulfilling their duties and breaking new ground, improve the training and selection of outstanding young officials, and strengthen management and oversight of officials, with a view to promoting the training, recruitment, and utilization of talented people across the board.

It was stated that Party organizations at all levels play the principal role in exercising full and rigorous Party self-governance. It is therefore essential to systematically advance the development of Party organizations at all levels and in all sectors to strengthen their political and organizational functions. This will help ensure that the Party’s lines, principles, and policies, as well as the Party Central Committee’s decisions and plans are implemented through well-coordinated, targeted, and effective efforts. More specifically, we should give play to the exemplary role of Party organizations of central Party and state organs, bolster the functions of local Party committees, take coordinated steps to improve primary-level Party organizations across all sectors, promote Party building in emerging sectors, build a strong contingent of Party members, and refine mechanisms to ensure alignment across different levels of Party organizations.

It was pointed out that improving conduct and tightening discipline are effective measures to advance full and rigorous Party self-governance. We must work in concert to enhance Party spirit, improve Party conduct, and tighten Party discipline, and integrate conduct improvement and discipline enforcement with anti-corruption measures. Drawing on the experience gained in advancing full and rigorous Party self-governance through conduct improvement efforts, we will ensure steady improvements in our conduct, supervise and govern the Party with strict discipline, and pool support and strength with a positive image. In practice, we will follow the Party’s mass line in the new era, steadfastly implement the central Party leadership’s eight-point decision on improving work conduct, put in consistent and sustained efforts to improve conduct, ensure more rigorous discipline enforcement, and make full use of discipline as a guide, restraint, guarantee, and incentive.

It was noted that taking integrated steps to ensure that officials do not have the audacity, opportunity, or desire to commit corruption is both an important strategy for full and rigorous Party self-governance and a fundamental guideline for our fight against corruption. The Party tolerates no corruption, as it has no special interests of its own besides the interests of the working class and the greatest possible majority of the people. Keeping this firmly in mind, we must steadfastly follow a distinctive Chinese path of anti-corruption and strengthen the Party Central Committee’s centralized, unified leadership over anti-corruption work. We must take systematic steps to address both symptoms and root causes of corruption and adopt a holistic approach that combines severe punishment, targeted remedy, and effective prevention, carrying this fight through to the end. While maintaining a tough stance against corruption, we should also strengthen checks on and oversight over the exercise of power, fortify the cultural-ethical foundations for championing integrity and disdaining corruption, and enhance coordinated efforts to prevent corruption by rooting out audacity, opportunity, and desire.

It was noted that strengthening Party regulations and institutions represents a long-term, fundamental strategy for ensuring full and rigorous Party self-governance. We must uphold the Party Constitution as the fundamental code of conduct for all Party members, deepen institutional reforms related to Party building, and integrate law-based governance of the country and regulation-based self-governance of the Party, thus providing strong institutional support for persevering with full and rigorous Party self-governance. For this purpose, stronger measures will be taken to improve the framework of Party regulations and institutions, ensure the enforcement of institutions, and eliminate hidden rules.

That brings us to the end of the seven parts of the plans. The next two paragraphs appear to correspond to the resolution’s third sections.

It was stated that persevering with full and rigorous Party self-governance entails further improvement to Party and state oversight systems. With this in mind, we should ensure that Party committees (leading Party members groups) exercise general oversight, improve the dual leadership system for discipline inspection and supervision, pursue greater integration and efficient collaboration between intraparty oversight and other avenues of oversight, and give play to the role of inspections as a powerful tool of comprehensive oversight.

It was stressed that persevering with full and rigorous Party self-governance is the common political responsibility of all Party members. Attaching crucial importance to the responsibility system for Party self-supervision and self-governance, we will establish a robust, unified system where all sides perform their respective responsibilities in close collaboration. Furthermore, relevant performance assessment mechanisms will be improved, so that those who have failed to effectively carry out Party self-supervision and self-governance and caused serious problems in this regard are strictly held to account.

Based on the pattern of recent years, study guides explaining the guiding principles of a plenary session usually become available roughly a week after it concludes. I’ve covered these publications before and will continue to keep an eye out for them:

It was pointed out that studying and implementing the guiding principles from this plenary session represent a major political task for the entire Party both at present and in the period to come. With this in mind, we should fully grasp the guiding principles from the session, strengthen organization and leadership, and make tenacious efforts to solve prominent problems, seeing that all arrangements of the Resolution are implemented to the letter.

The next paragraph sets out priorities for the country toward the end of this year and the beginning of next. It calls for ensuring that the main targets and tasks for economic and social development are met this year. It also mentions the leadership transitions taking place in Party organizations across China in the second half of 2026 and into 2027, and again emphasizes the importance of the correct view on governance performance, which was the focus of a nationwide study campaign among Party members from January to July this year:

It was stressed that all aspects of our work agenda should be steadily advanced at the turn of the year. To fulfill this year’s main goals and tasks for economic and social development and secure a good start for the 15th Five-Year Plan period, we will adhere to the general principle of pursuing progress while ensuring stability; fully and faithfully apply the new development philosophy on all fronts; move faster to foster a new pattern of development; make full and proper use of macro policies; tap deeper into the potential of domestic demand; further deepen reform and opening up; and pursue sustained and high-quality economic growth driven by innovation. In an effort to ensure security while pursuing development, we will press ahead with initiatives to see that public services are inclusive, meet essential needs, and provide a cushion for the people most in need, and deliver better results in our work related to workplace safety, disaster prevention, mitigation, and relief, food and drug safety, as well as social stability. As part of our endeavors to consolidate and expand the progress made in the study campaign on establishing and practicing the correct view of performance, we will, in the midst of a new round of elections at all levels, step up training for new members of leadership teams, particularly their heads, on the view of performance to inspire and guide them to deliver for the people through hard work in line with the requirements of serving the public good, benefiting the people, making sound decisions, and taking solid, down-to-earth actions.

The next paragraph addresses the timing of the 21st CPC National Congress, a subject of considerable interest both in China and overseas. It confirms that the congress will be held in the second half of 2027, but does not specify the dates:

The Central Committee decided at the session that the Party will convene its 21st National Congress in Beijing in the second half of 2027 and stated that this congress, which is to be held at a critical stage for basically realizing socialist modernization and on the new journey toward the Second Centenary Goal, will be a highly important meeting and an event of great political significance for both the Party and the country. The entire Party must unite and lead the Chinese people in forging ahead with one heart and one mind to achieve the goal of basically realizing socialist modernization and continue to break new ground in building a great country and advancing national rejuvenation on all fronts through Chinese modernization. With concrete actions, we will set the stage for the successful convening of this congress.

The following paragraphs set out several important personnel changes:

At the session, Zhang Shengmin was elected member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.

It was decided that, in accordance with the Party Constitution, empty seats on the Central Committee were filled by alternate members Lu Dongliang, Bao Gang, Xing Shanping, Qu Yingpu, Lv Jun, Zhu Tianshu, Zhu Guoxian, Liu Jun, Liu Jie and Liu Qiang.

At the session, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection’s reports on the grave violations of discipline and the law involving Ma Xingrui, Lan Tianli, Liu Jianchao, Wang Lixia, Jin Zhuanglong, Lei Fanpei, Yi Huiman, Wang Xiangxi, Sun Shaocheng, Li Yunze, Fei Dongbin, Wu Shenghua, Yu Jianfeng, Yuan Jie, Zhang Zhongyang, Wen Gang, Jin Donghan and Fang Hongwei were deliberated and adopted. The Central Military Commission’s reports on the grave violations of discipline and the law involving Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, Wang Renhua, Liu Qingsong, Huang Ming, Li Qiaoming, Li Wei, Zhang Hongbing, Wang Haijiang, Zhang Lin, Wang Peng, Liu Faqing, Yang Cheng, Zhong Shaojun, Zhao Xiaozhe and Fang Yongxiang were also deliberated and adopted. The Political Bureau’s previous decisions to expel Ma Xingrui, Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, Lan Tianli, Liu Jianchao, Wang Lixia, Jin Zhuanglong, Lei Fanpei, Yi Huiman, Wang Xiangxi, Sun Shaocheng, Wang Renhua, Liu Qingsong, Huang Ming, Li Qiaoming, Li Wei, Zhang Hongbing, Wang Haijiang, Zhang Lin, Wang Peng, Liu Faqing, Yang Cheng, Zhong Shaojun, Zhao Xiaozhe, Fei Dongbin, Wu Shenghua, Yu Jianfeng, Yuan Jie, Zhang Zhongyang, Wen Gang, Jin Donghan, Fang Hongwei and Fang Yongxiang from the Party and to remove Li Yunze from his position within the Party were confirmed.

Finally, the communique concludes with a call to action:

At the session, all Party members were called upon to rally more closely around the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core and fully implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era; forge ahead with dedication and enterprise, persevere with full and rigorous Party self-governance, and continually break new ground in supervising, governing, developing, and strengthening the Party; and unite and lead the Chinese people of all ethnic groups in a tireless effort to build China into a great modern socialist country in all respects and advance national rejuvenation on all fronts through Chinese modernization.

What makes the piece interesting to me is that it looks beyond China’s battery exports to show how companies in one of the country’s internationally competitive manufacturing industries are building their businesses abroad. Through examples of investments in Europe, the United States and Southeast Asia, it illustrates a shift toward local manufacturing, coordinated supply chains and battery recycling systems.

The article also offers a useful perspective on how Chinese companies are thinking about the relationship between commercial interests and long-term, sustainable growth in overseas markets.

I see a connection between this report and a recent essay by Chinese economist Keyu Jin in TIME, titled “China Cannot Remain the World’s Factory. What Comes Next?“ Published on the same day, Jin’s essay argues that China’s future role in the global economy may increasingly involve exporting industrial and technological capabilities, rather than simply manufactured products. The lithium battery industry provides some concrete examples of how such a shift is taking shape.

Another perspective came a day later from Cheng Yawen, a professor at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Shanghai International Studies University. In a commentary, Cheng discussed the restrictions Chinese companies face in Western markets while also warning of two longer-term risks associated with overseas expansion: the potential weakening of China’s domestic industrial base through the relocation of production and supply chains, and resistance from host countries if Chinese companies fail to adequately address local interests.

Cheng acknowledged that Chinese investment has contributed to development in many countries and received positive feedback, but argued that negative reactions should not be overlooked. He suggested that Chinese companies still have much to learn about expanding internationally in ways that benefit both their home economy and the countries where they operate.

These questions have also come up in my recent conversations with scholars and investors in Asia and Europe, and I’ve been struck by the different ways people approach them.

One European scholar questioned whether Chinese companies building factories in Europe would be enough to ease industrial tensions, given that European manufacturers still need to survive and develop their own capabilities.

In conversations with investors in Asia, I heard a different concern: expanding overseas could expose Chinese companies, and potentially China itself, to new vulnerabilities that foreign governments might exploit. Meanwhile, a Chinese scholar offered another perspective, arguing that deeper economic ties between China and the rest of the world could give both sides stronger incentives to avoid conflict.

These conversations have reminded me how complicated the issue is, and how much can be missed when we look at it through a single lens. I think greater localization of Chinese manufacturing overseas is a path worth exploring, but it also raises difficult questions about China’s domestic industries and how businesses and workers in host countries can adapt to the changing industrial landscape.

The Securities Daily report offers a concrete look at how Chinese battery companies are approaching this process. While it focuses mainly on the perspectives of Chinese companies and industry analysts rather than those of host countries, I think the examples are worth examining.

Below is the translation of the article, originally written by Li Wenshan and published in Securities Daily on October 23, 2026. All links and videos were added by me.

From Selling Products to Building an Ecosystem: China’s Lithium Battery Industry Explores New Paths Overseas

By Li Wenshan | Securities Daily

A recently released 15th Five-Year Plan for the Development of the New-Type Battery Industry, jointly issued by China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and six other government departments, calls for guiding enterprises to expand overseas in an orderly manner.

The plan emphasizes the need to strengthen analysis of global new energy market demand and the geopolitical environment, make coordinated use of domestic and international markets and resources, and guide enterprises in pursuing diversified and orderly overseas investment. It also calls for improving risk prevention and emergency response mechanisms to better protect enterprises operating abroad.

As one of China’s “New Trio“ major export products, alongside electric passenger vehicles and solar cells, lithium batteries have continued to record strong export growth, while listed companies across the battery supply chain are accelerating overseas projects.

The industry’s international expansion is gradually moving beyond the traditional model of shipping finished products overseas. New approaches include establishing local factories, developing industrial clusters and building ecosystems covering the entire battery life cycle.

Amid these overlapping developments, overseas expansion has evolved from an option for companies seeking new markets into an increasingly necessary part of the industry’s long-term sustainable development.

Putting Down Roots in Local Markets

According to the latest data released by the China Automotive Power Battery Industry Innovation Alliance, China’s combined exports of power and energy storage batteries reached 302.9 GWh in the first nine months of 2026, up 51.6 percent year on year and accounting for 18 percent of cumulative sales.

Of the total, power battery exports reached 199.7 GWh, accounting for 65.9 percent and rising 54.7 percent year on year. Energy storage battery exports reached 103.2 GWh, accounting for 34.1 percent and increasing 45.9 percent.

Behind these strong export figures lies a shift in the overseas expansion strategies of lithium battery companies.

Rather than relying solely on finished-product exports to enter foreign markets, companies are accelerating the development of overseas production capacity, making a strategic transition from selling products to manufacturing locally and establishing a more lasting presence in host markets.

Leading lithium battery manufacturers are at the forefront of this transition.

On September 22, Chinese battery giant Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited (CATL) officially began trial production of battery cells at its factory in Debrecen, Hungary. The facility is the largest overseas production base established by a Chinese lithium battery company.

The start of cell production marks an upgrade in CATL’s European manufacturing capabilities, from assembling battery modules to producing battery cells locally. The development complements the company’s overseas production footprint in countries including Germany, Spain and Indonesia.

Hithium Energy Storage, based in Xiamen, has also made progress in establishing overseas manufacturing operations.

Its first overseas factory, located in Mesquite, Texas, has a planned annual production capacity of 10 GWh for battery modules and systems and has entered the stage of mass production and commercial deliveries.

Meanwhile, Hithium’s manufacturing base in Navarra, Spain, remains under construction. The first phase involves an investment of approximately 400 million euros and is expected to begin production by the end of 2027.

“Overseas expansion is a process of continuous deepening,” Wang Pengcheng, president of Hithium, told Securities Daily.

“Against the backdrop of an accelerating global energy transition, Hithium remains committed to a globalization strategy that recognizes the importance of both a stable domestic base and a strong international presence. We will continue to pursue a differentiated, localized and integrated approach to overseas development to strengthen our competitiveness in global markets.”

Beyond Europe, Chinese battery companies are also developing localized production lines in Southeast Asia.

Companies including EVE Energy, Sunwoda Electronic and Guangdong Greenway Technology are pursuing projects in the region. Some involve jointly establishing battery pack assembly facilities or cell factories with local automakers and energy companies, while others involve building independently owned battery manufacturing bases.

“Overseas markets are placing increasingly high demands on localized manufacturing,” Feng Yongqi, an analyst covering high-end equipment manufacturing at Wanlian Securities, told Securities Daily.

“Leading lithium battery companies need to establish local manufacturing capabilities in major consumer markets to get closer to customers, better understand local standards and accumulate technological expertise.”

Feng added that global manufacturing capacity can also help companies achieve economies of scale and spread research, development and manufacturing costs over a larger production base.

This can create a positive cycle of “economies of scale, technological iteration and cost optimization,” helping companies build lasting competitive advantages in global markets.

Building a Coordinated Industrial Ecosystem

If establishing local factories is the main direction of lithium battery companies’ overseas expansion, the accompanying investments by upstream and downstream suppliers mark a new stage in which entire industry clusters are moving abroad.

According to data from Wind, 13 listed Chinese companies across the lithium battery supply chain, including EVE Energy, Shenzhen Capchem Technology and Yunnan Energy New Material, have established production operations or invested in factories in Malaysia, with combined investment exceeding 25 billion yuan.

These companies cover key parts of the battery supply chain, including cathode materials, anode materials, separators and electrolytes.

Thailand, which has Southeast Asia’s most developed automotive manufacturing industry, has also attracted investment from numerous Chinese lithium battery supply chain companies.

Their operations are centered on battery manufacturing but extend to cathode materials, components and structural parts, creating industrial coordination across vehicle manufacturing, battery production, battery pack assembly and component manufacturing.

For example, Sunwoda has invested approximately 740 million U.S. dollars in two phases of lithium battery factory projects in Thailand. The facilities will produce power and energy storage batteries for Southeast Asian and global markets.

BYD has already begun operations at its vehicle manufacturing plant in Thailand, which has an annual production capacity of 150,000 vehicles. The company has also developed supporting battery production lines.

As a result, BYD’s operations in Thailand extend beyond vehicle assembly to include power battery manufacturing, improving the efficiency of localized production.

There are two main considerations behind the decision of supply chain companies to follow battery manufacturers overseas.

First, they can secure orders from overseas battery customers and establish an early presence in Southeast Asian and global markets for power and energy storage batteries.

Second, they can reduce their exposure to risks associated with relying on a single market. Overseas production bases have become an important way for supply chain companies to develop new sources of revenue growth.

“The model of expanding overseas as an industrial cluster is a core capability that distinguishes China’s lithium battery industry from its international competitors,” Yu Qingjiao, chairman of the Zhongguancun New Battery Technology Innovation Alliance, told Securities Daily.

“By drawing on China’s experience in coordinating a complete and mature domestic supply chain, companies can replicate an entire supporting industrial system at overseas production bases and develop a healthy industrial ecosystem.”

Yu said this approach represents a sustainable model of industrial development that combines internationalization with localization.

Building a Circular Resource System

As their overseas expansion deepens, lithium battery companies are broadening the scope of their international operations.

Rather than focusing solely on manufacturing, companies are increasingly developing integrated operations covering resource extraction, battery production, applications and maintenance, and material recycling.

Under this model, companies are looking beyond battery manufacturing and sales to build circular resource systems, recover valuable materials from retired batteries and improve the long-term profitability of overseas projects.

At the end of January this year, EVE Energy made progress in its international development strategy in Indonesia.

Working with several local companies across the supply chain, EVE Energy is developing an integrated new energy industrial system covering upstream nickel resource development, midstream material processing, downstream battery manufacturing and recycling.

A consortium comprising a CATL subsidiary, Indonesian state-owned mining company ANTAM and other partners is jointly investing in a nickel resource and battery supply chain project in Indonesia.

The project’s planned total investment is nearly 6 billion U.S. dollars. Its annual battery production capacity is designed to support between 200,000 and 300,000 electric vehicles, with plans to expand further into energy storage applications.

“The project integrates key stages from mineral resources and battery materials to battery manufacturing and recycling, establishing a complete industrial chain covering the entire battery life cycle,” said Li Ping, co-founder and vice chairman of CATL.

He added that the project would contribute to Indonesia’s transition toward a green economy and its goal of achieving net-zero carbon emissions.

As early as 2016, Chinese battery recycling company GEM proposed building a full life-cycle value chain for new energy products in the field of power lithium battery recycling.

The company has developed a system covering battery recycling, raw material remanufacturing, battery material remanufacturing and battery reassembly.

It has established partnerships with more than 1,100 automakers and battery manufacturers worldwide.

“For listed companies, establishing operations across the entire life cycle of new energy products opens up new avenues for profitability,” Luo Huanta, founder of Dadong Times, told Securities Daily.

“As overseas power batteries and energy storage batteries begin to reach the end of their useful lives on a large scale, the market for battery recycling will continue to expand.”

From an industry-wide perspective, the three emerging approaches to overseas expansion — establishing local factories, developing supply chain clusters and building ecosystems covering the entire battery life cycle — are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they are evolving in parallel.

Some companies continue to rely on product exports as their core business, while others are developing local joint ventures and manufacturing facilities. Supporting supply chain clusters are also taking shape, and a smaller number of leading companies are investing ahead of demand in closed-loop battery recycling systems.

Together, these overlapping models are creating a more diversified approach to the global development of China’s lithium battery industry.

From the early model of exporting products and seeking overseas market share, to developing local partnerships and industrial clusters, and eventually building ecosystems encompassing resources, manufacturing, operations, maintenance and recycling, China’s lithium battery industry continues to refine and upgrade its approach to international expansion.

Looking ahead, the global energy transition and China’s policies encouraging companies to expand overseas will provide further opportunities.

Lithium battery companies that tailor their investments to local conditions, carefully manage operational risks and build a lasting presence in host markets will be better positioned to compete globally and further strengthen the international reputation of China’s lithium battery industry as part of the green economy.

According to Xinhua News Agency, Xi said the great spirit of the Long March demonstrates the power of loyalty, truth, justice and unity. “It will always be a precious treasure and a powerful driving force inspiring us to overcome difficulties and forge ahead courageously.”

The Long March, which took place between 1934 and 1936, remains one of the defining events in the history of the CPC. As Xinhua notes, generations of Chinese leaders have viewed it as a metaphor for the ongoing task of transforming China.

Yesterday, Oct. 21, Xinhua published a lengthy English article titled “Xi Jinping’s new Long March.” The article traces Xi’s personal connections to the history of the Long March and explores how its legacy relates to China’s development today, covering economic reform, technological innovation, poverty alleviation, Party governance and China’s role in the world.

Given today’s commemorative event and the length of the original article, I have selected some highlights from the English version for the first part of this newsletter. The full article follows in the second part. Please note that the selections reflect my personal editorial judgment and do not necessarily represent the views of Xinhua.

Highlights

• In October 1934, some 86,000 Red Army soldiers crossed the river, little knowing that they were embarking on a grueling 12,500-kilometer journey, which American journalist Edgar Snow hailed as “an odyssey unequaled in modern times.” In October 1936, three main Red Army forces converged in northwestern China, marking the end of the Long March.

• The Long March was a strategic shift. In 1934, the fledgling CPC was forced to abandon its main base in the provinces of Jiangxi and Fujian after failing to repel the Kuomintang regime’s fifth encirclement and suppression campaign. The maneuver took the Red Army across nearly 100 rivers and more than 40 towering mountains, and through marshland known as a “death zone.” The troops fought more than 600 battles. Many lost their lives along the way. [Editor’s note: According to Xinhua, the Long March preserved the revolutionary forces and gave the Communist Party of China a new foothold to carry the revolution to victory]

• Far in the northwest, Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, and his comrades Liu Zhidan and Xie Zichang established the Shaanxi-Gansu revolutionary base. The existence of the base was an important factor in Mao Zedong’s decision to make it the Long March’s final destination.

• Growing up in such a revolutionary family, Xi developed a deep connection to the Long March and the region. He was not yet 16 when he left Beijing for a village in Yan’an, where he spent seven years living and working alongside farmers. There, he joined the Party, became the village Party chief, forged close ties with local people, and made a commitment to serving the people through public office. Yan’an, the Chinese revolution’s foothold after the Long March and its springboard for national victory, was thus the starting point of Xi’s political journey. “Whenever I went to Yan’an in those years, I felt a deep sense of reverence and excitement,” Xi recalled.

• As a young man, Xi was deeply fascinated by the history of the Long March. In the 1980s, he was acquainted with writer Wang Yuanjian, who devoted himself to chronicling the Red Army’s heroism. Wang had interviewed many Long March veterans. As he recounted their stories, Xi would pull a notebook from his pocket and carefully take notes, Wang’s wife recalled in an article.

• For generations of Chinese leaders, the Long March is not just a military campaign, but a metaphor for the ongoing task of transforming China. In 1949, more than a decade after the Long March ended, the People’s Republic was founded. Earlier that year, with victory in sight, Mao said that winning the revolution “would be only the first step of the Long March.” The journey of building a new China had just begun. ... “The Long March of our generation is to attain the ‘two centenary goals’ and realize the Chinese Dream -- the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” Xi said. ... “Every generation must undertake its own Long March,” Xi said.

• In the winter of 1934, the struggle reached a critical point at the Xiangjiang River. Under heavy bombardment, Red Army troops fought their way toward the crossing points. By the time the army broke through, its ranks had dwindled from some 86,000 at the start of the march to just over 30,000 ... Xi believes that overcoming the risks and challenges on the new journey requires the same revolutionary will forged during the Long March. “No matter how great the difficulties, think of the Red Army’s Long March, and think of the bloody battle at the Xiangjiang River,” he said.

• The new Long March Xi is leading would test the Party’s resolve against a different set of challenges. When he was elected the Party’s top leader in 2012, China had become the world’s second-largest economy and largest manufacturer after more than three decades of rapid economic growth. That transformation also brought new challenges. China needed to sustain its economic momentum while narrowing regional disparities, tackling corruption, eradicating absolute poverty, and easing mounting environmental pressures. Meanwhile, the international community’s expectations for China were rising. Talking about “today’s Long March,” Xi said that although the conditions and tasks differ greatly, it remains “a pioneering, arduous and complex undertaking.”

• Upon visiting an automobile factory years ago, he called for a shift from conventional fuel-powered vehicles to new-energy vehicles, identifying the transition as the future of China’s auto industry. Over a decade ago, Xi urged China’s top scientists to pay attention to a “robot revolution” that could reshape global manufacturing, emphasizing the need for China to strengthen its robotics capabilities and compete for a larger share of the market. During the Long March, the Red Army fought the enemy with outdated weapons. Today, the challenge is different: keeping pace with the scientific revolution and the explosion of technological innovation. As the pressure of overseas technology restrictions and trade barriers rises, Xi directs the country to strengthen independent innovation and the resilience of industrial and supply chains, and ensure both development and security.

• Meeting those challenges hinges above all on strengthening the Party’s leadership. The historical parallel is explicit. The Long March helped form a new central leadership with Mao at its core and opened a period in which the Party increasingly found its own answers to the problems the Chinese revolution faced. “After the Long March, the Party and the Red Army were stronger, not weaker,” Xi said. “This is because they had found the right path and the theory to guide them.” In the new era, the Party established Xi’s core position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole and established the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.

• In Yudu, residents took down doors and dismantled beds to build makeshift bridges that carried the Red Army across the river. Along the Long March, local people supplied them with food, served as guides and sheltered the wounded. ... He once recounted the story of “half a quilt.” During the Long March, three Red Army soldiers slept at a villager’s home, where the family lacked adequate bedding. Before leaving, they cut their only quilt in half and gave one half to the family to help them keep warm.

• Xi warned that unchecked corruption could spell the end of both the Party and the state. He soon introduced a code of conduct known as the eight-point rules to curb official extravagance. He launched the largest anti-corruption drive in the Party’s history, which has seen millions of people investigated for disciplinary violations. He also led improvements to the internal Party regulatory framework and established supervision commissions, all to “confine power to an institutional cage.” Earlier this year, Xi initiated a Party-wide study campaign, prodding Party members to fix their mindset regarding governance performance. A key target is to stamp out the tendency among some officials to sacrifice public well-being in seeking to polish their performance records.

Xi Jinping’s new Long March

BEIJING, Oct. 21 (Xinhua) -- On the banks of the Yudu River in east China, a choir sang of soldiers leaving home more than nine decades ago. Beside the singers, eight large red Chinese characters proclaimed: “May the spirit of the Long March shine forever.”

In October 1934, some 86,000 Red Army soldiers crossed the river, little knowing that they were embarking on a grueling 12,500-kilometer journey, which American journalist Edgar Snow hailed as “an odyssey unequaled in modern times.” In October 1936, three main Red Army forces converged in northwestern China, marking the end of the Long March.

As China commemorates the 90th anniversary of the Long March’s victorious conclusion this year, visitors have traveled to the mountainous county of Yudu in Jiangxi Province to see where it all began.

Yudu’s visitors number in the millions each year. Among those who have made the trip is Chinese President Xi Jinping.

During his visit in May 2019, Xi laid a floral basket at a Long March departure monument, went to the river crossing used by Red Army soldiers and met their descendants.

“I have come here to let people across the country know that the Party has not forgotten its original aspiration,” said Xi, who is also general secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission.

“We must build on the past, pack our bags and set out again,” he said.

CARRY THE BATON FORWARD

The Long March was a strategic shift. In 1934, the fledgling CPC was forced to abandon its main base in the provinces of Jiangxi and Fujian after failing to repel the Kuomintang regime’s fifth encirclement and suppression campaign.

The maneuver took the Red Army across nearly 100 rivers and more than 40 towering mountains, and through marshland known as a “death zone.” The troops fought more than 600 battles. Many lost their lives along the way.

Far in the northwest, Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, and his comrades Liu Zhidan and Xie Zichang established the Shaanxi-Gansu revolutionary base. The existence of the base was an important factor in Mao Zedong’s decision to make it the Long March’s final destination.

After the Long March, the Party established a firm foothold in northern Shaanxi, with Yan’an as its headquarters for more than a decade. From there, it grew in strength, led the Chinese people in fighting against Japanese invasion and eventually overthrew the Kuomintang regime.

Growing up in such a revolutionary family, Xi developed a deep connection to the Long March and the region. He was not yet 16 when he left Beijing for a village in Yan’an, where he spent seven years living and working alongside farmers. There, he joined the Party, became the village Party chief, forged close ties with local people, and made a commitment to serving the people through public office.

Yan’an, the Chinese revolution’s foothold after the Long March and its springboard for national victory, was thus the starting point of Xi’s political journey.

“Whenever I went to Yan’an in those years, I felt a deep sense of reverence and excitement,” Xi recalled.

A drone photo taken on June 16, 2026 shows a view of Yan’an in northwest China’s Shaanxi Province. (Xinhua/Shao Rui)

As a young man, Xi was deeply fascinated by the history of the Long March. In the 1980s, he was acquainted with writer Wang Yuanjian, who devoted himself to chronicling the Red Army’s heroism. Wang had interviewed many Long March veterans. As he recounted their stories, Xi would pull a notebook from his pocket and carefully take notes, Wang’s wife recalled in an article.

In 1996, while serving as Fujian’s deputy Party secretary, Xi joined a 1,000-person torch relay marking the Long March’s 60th anniversary. He set off at the front alongside an 82-year-old Red Army veteran.

In 2006, as Party secretary of Zhejiang, Xi visited a photo exhibition marking the 70th anniversary of the Long March. He described the Long March as both an extraordinary test of the human spirit and will, and a journey in pursuit of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Since taking the top office in late 2012, Xi has retraced the Long March routes on visits across the country: from Yudu, where the Central Red Army assembled and set out, to Quanzhou, where soldiers fought the bloody Battle of the Xiangjiang River; Zunyi, the site of a decisive turning point; and Jiangtaibu, where Red Army forces joined up at the end of the Long March.

At museums, Xi studied artifacts and asked questions. At monuments, he paid tribute to revolutionary martyrs by presenting flower baskets and bowing. He also instructed authorities to recover and properly bury soldiers’ remains and build memorial facilities.

On one visit, he paused before a painting of Chen Shuxiang, whose division served as the Red Army’s rear guard. Captured after covering the main force’s river crossing, Chen refused to surrender and died after tearing open his abdominal wound.

Xi asked how the Red Army had broken through encirclement and held together despite devastating losses, then offered his answer: the power of conviction.

For generations of Chinese leaders, the Long March is not just a military campaign, but a metaphor for the ongoing task of transforming China.

In 1949, more than a decade after the Long March ended, the People’s Republic was founded. Earlier that year, with victory in sight, Mao said that winning the revolution “would be only the first step of the Long March.” The journey of building a new China had just begun.

It significantly gained pace with the launch of the reform and opening up in 1978. Deng Xiaoping, a Long March veteran, proposed a three-step strategy for China’s modernization, which was later elaborated as follows: meet the people’s basic needs of food and clothing by 1990, achieve moderate prosperity by the end of the 20th century, and basically attain modernization by the middle of the 21st century. This modernization drive came to be known as the new Long March.

“The Long March of our generation is to attain the ‘two centenary goals’ and realize the Chinese Dream -- the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” Xi said.

The two goals refer to achieving moderate prosperity in all respects by the Party’s centenary in 2021 and building a great modern socialist country in all respects by the centenary of the People’s Republic around the middle of the century.

In 2017, Xi brought forward the timetable for basically achieving modernization under Deng’s three-step strategy by 15 years to 2035.

“Every generation must undertake its own Long March,” Xi said.

BRAVE THROUGH ALL ODDS

When the Long March began, the Red Army faced an enemy superior in both numbers and weaponry. Kuomintang forces pursued it from behind and blocked the routes ahead, seeking to encircle and destroy it. Breaking through meant fighting for every chance of survival.

In the winter of 1934, the struggle reached a critical point at the Xiangjiang River. Under heavy bombardment, Red Army troops fought their way toward the crossing points. By the time the army broke through, its ranks had dwindled from some 86,000 at the start of the march to just over 30,000.

The new Long March Xi is leading would test the Party’s resolve against a different set of challenges. When he was elected the Party’s top leader in 2012, China had become the world’s second-largest economy and largest manufacturer after more than three decades of rapid economic growth.

That transformation also brought new challenges. China needed to sustain its economic momentum while narrowing regional disparities, tackling corruption, eradicating absolute poverty, and easing mounting environmental pressures. Meanwhile, the international community’s expectations for China were rising.

Talking about “today’s Long March,” Xi said that although the conditions and tasks differ greatly, it remains “a pioneering, arduous and complex undertaking.”

The modernization drive Xi now leads is unprecedented in human history. A population exceeding 1.4 billion is collectively advancing toward modernity on a scale surpassing the combined populations of existing developed nations. His goal is common prosperity for all, encompassing both material wealth and cultural-ethical advancement. Harmony between humanity and nature is emphasized. China also pursues rejuvenation through peaceful development.

None of these is easy.

Xi believes that overcoming the risks and challenges on the new journey requires the same revolutionary will forged during the Long March. “No matter how great the difficulties, think of the Red Army’s Long March, and think of the bloody battle at the Xiangjiang River,” he said.

A humanoid robot greets people at an artificial intelligence distribution center in Nanjing, east China’s Jiangsu Province, on Dec. 4, 2025. (Xinhua/Ji Chunpeng)

He put forward a series of visionary strategies to ensure the march proceeds in the right direction. These include an extensive reform package -- the most comprehensive in history -- that gives the market a “decisive” role in allocating resources while making sure the government better fulfills its role. He promises broader market access for foreign investors. Since 2013, the number of pilot free trade zones in China has expanded from one to the current total of 23.

He put forward a new development philosophy that places greater emphasis on innovation, coordination, green development, openness and shared benefits. All these echo the important experience drawn from the Long March -- acting on one’s own initiative, seeking truth from facts, and proceeding from reality.

More recently, Xi introduced “new quality productive forces” -- his term for growth driven by technological advances and industrial upgrading. Like his predecessors during the Long March, Xi leads from the front, demonstrating his strategic vision and decisiveness.

Upon visiting an automobile factory years ago, he called for a shift from conventional fuel-powered vehicles to new-energy vehicles, identifying the transition as the future of China’s auto industry. Over a decade ago, Xi urged China’s top scientists to pay attention to a “robot revolution” that could reshape global manufacturing, emphasizing the need for China to strengthen its robotics capabilities and compete for a larger share of the market.

During the Long March, the Red Army fought the enemy with outdated weapons. Today, the challenge is different: keeping pace with the scientific revolution and the explosion of technological innovation. As the pressure of overseas technology restrictions and trade barriers rises, Xi directs the country to strengthen independent innovation and the resilience of industrial and supply chains, and ensure both development and security.

He spearheaded a campaign to build China into a sci-tech powerhouse, elevating the country to the world’s forefront in fields such as artificial intelligence, quantum technology and new energy.

From carrier rockets to nuclear submarines, China has named some of its major technological achievements after the Long March, honoring a history of self-reliance and perseverance while inspiring new technological advances.

In 2014, Xi led high-ranking generals to Gutian in Fujian, where a 1929 Red Army meeting established the principle of the Party’s absolute leadership over the army, to reinforce that principle. He initiated a sweeping military reform, laying the groundwork for achieving the goals for the centenary of the People’s Liberation Army in 2027 and building world-class armed forces.

The new Long March is progressing steadily with significant results. From 2012 to 2025, China’s GDP grew from about 54 trillion yuan to more than 140 trillion yuan, while per capita GDP rose from just over 6,000 to nearly 14,000 U.S. dollars. The country has built a complete industrial system covering all industrial categories in the United Nations classification.

China’s economy remains the largest engine of global growth, accounting for roughly one-third of the increase in global output in recent years, according to data from the Chinese government and international institutes. China’s technology and cultural influence are also increasingly viewed positively around the world.

A global survey released by the Pew Research Center in July found that views of China had improved in many countries in recent years. For the first time, China was viewed more favorably than the United States in a majority of the countries surveyed.

Yet, as the 2035 modernization target draws closer, Xi has warned against complacency. “There are still many ‘snowy mountains’ and ‘grasslands’ for us to cross,” Xi said.

Meeting those challenges hinges above all on strengthening the Party’s leadership. The historical parallel is explicit. The Long March helped form a new central leadership with Mao at its core and opened a period in which the Party increasingly found its own answers to the problems the Chinese revolution faced.

“After the Long March, the Party and the Red Army were stronger, not weaker,” Xi said. “This is because they had found the right path and the theory to guide them.”

In the new era, the Party established Xi’s core position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole and established the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.

Lu Yi, a professor at the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, said navigating the challenges of the new Long March requires sound strategic direction from the Party’s leadership, unity within the CPC and across the country, as well as discipline, commitment and dedication among all Party members.

“This is how the steel was tempered,” said Yuri Tavrovsky, a Russian expert on China. “The dramatic events of 1934-1936 brought to the fore and strengthened the CPC’s finest qualities, enabling it to unite a divided country and build a great one.”

ALL FOR THE PEOPLE

In his masterpiece “Red Star Over China,” first published in 1937, Snow recorded a Red Army soldier’s simple explanation of what he and his comrades were fighting for: “Here everybody fights to help the poor, and to save China.”

Lu, the Party school professor, said that the history of the Red Army’s epic march is also a history of the deep bonds between the army and the people, and of how the Party relied on the very people it sought to serve.

In Yudu, residents took down doors and dismantled beds to build makeshift bridges that carried the Red Army across the river. Along the Long March, local people supplied them with food, served as guides and sheltered the wounded.

“Back then, we relied on the people at every turn. We relied on them for food, and to fight our battles we had to mobilize them and rely on their support. Without them, we could not have accomplished anything,” said Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun, when recalling his early revolutionary years.

That reliance on the people remains central to Xi’s approach to governance. He has stressed that the Party must work for the people and draw on their wisdom and initiative, grounding its policies in their needs and experience.

Xi called on officials to draw inspiration from the Long March spirit and better understand the Party’s original mission, which is “to seek happiness for the Chinese people and rejuvenation for the Chinese nation.”

He once recounted the story of “half a quilt.” During the Long March, three Red Army soldiers slept at a villager’s home, where the family lacked adequate bedding. Before leaving, they cut their only quilt in half and gave one half to the family to help them keep warm.

When Xi took the top office, the Party had been in power for more than six decades, and some of its members had increasingly strayed from the traditions forged during the revolutionary years.

Xi condemned some officials for being so brazen in their misconduct, including cronyism, factionalism, dangling official posts and feigned compliance -- practices that alienated the Party from the people.

Xi warned that unchecked corruption could spell the end of both the Party and the state. He soon introduced a code of conduct known as the eight-point rules to curb official extravagance. He launched the largest anti-corruption drive in the Party’s history, which has seen millions of people investigated for disciplinary violations. He also led improvements to the internal Party regulatory framework and established supervision commissions, all to “confine power to an institutional cage.”

Earlier this year, Xi initiated a Party-wide study campaign, prodding Party members to fix their mindset regarding governance performance. A key target is to stamp out the tendency among some officials to sacrifice public well-being in seeking to polish their performance records.

“Ultimately, the Long March succeeded because the Party and the Red Army stood together with the people, maintained a close bond with the people, and shared weal and woe with the people. This is also a fundamental guarantee that enables us to overcome all difficulties and dangers,” Xi said.

Sustaining that bond means understanding what people hope for and acting on their most urgent concerns.

Xi spearheaded an unprecedented poverty alleviation campaign that lifted nearly 100 million rural residents out of absolute poverty over eight years. Since the start of reform and opening up in 1978, over 70 percent of the world’s poverty reduction has been attributed to China.

Xi used Long March metaphors for the tough battle against poverty. “Just as Liupan Mountain was the last high peak the Red Army had to cross during the Long March, lifting all people out of poverty is the final summit we must overcome to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects,” he said.

Xi’s anti-poverty war was vast in scale but granular in its approach, reaching into individual households to identify what kept them poor. Aid was tailored accordingly -- fostering industries suited to local conditions and relocating villagers out of inhospitable places. Over eight years, more than 3 million cadres were sent to villages to work on the frontline of fighting extreme poverty.

As in the Long March, some never lived to see the victory: more than 1,800 Party members and officials died in the line of duty. Xi has described the willingness to make sacrifices for the country and its people, whatever the hardship, as central to the spirit of the Long March.

An aerial drone photo taken on July 3, 2025 shows a solar power station for agricultural use in Weining County, southwest China’s Guizhou Province. (Xinhua/Tao Liang)

The snow-capped mountains and grasslands that the Red Army had to surmount on foot are now linked by highways and railways. China has built the world’s largest expressway and high-speed railway networks, which have brought agricultural products out of remote villages to boost income for local residents.

Ecological restoration is another feat. China has become the country with the largest and fastest increase in forest area worldwide. At the foot of the mountains along the Long March routes, ordinary visitors today may encounter giant pandas and other wild animals. Photovoltaic and wind power installations rise from the grasslands. Kerosene lamps that herders once provided to the Red Army are now mostly seen in museums.

The country has also built the world’s largest education, social security and health-care systems. Life expectancy reached 79.25 years in 2025. China now ranks among the best in upper-middle-income countries on major health indicators.

The Long March China pursues today requires no less effort than the historic Long March, British scholar Martin Jacques said.

“It’s a complicated challenge, but there’s so much possibility and so much potential in that. And the rewards will be enormous,” he said.

ECHO ACROSS THE WORLD

The international community, according to Xi, increasingly believes that the Long March was one of the key events that shaped world history in the 20th century, regarding it as an epic of ideals, devotion, willpower, and bravery whose inspirational power has transcended time and borders.

In the 1930s, Snow anticipated that someone would one day write the full epic of the Long March. In the decades since, many people have retraced its path, sought out survivors and written their own accounts. Among the best-known was American journalist Harrison Salisbury, who in his 1985 book “The Long March: The Untold Story” described the Long March as “sui generis,” with its heroism firing the dreams of a huge nation and setting it moving toward a destiny no man can yet divine.

Kenyan military officer Felix Gitaari Njage, among more than 100 officers from over 80 countries and regions who were studying in China, visited sites along the Long March routes this summer. He said the Long March spirit is a precious asset for the world, offering lessons for military personnel across nations.

“Its underlying spirit offers countries of the Global South strategic wisdom and intellectual strength for achieving unity and self-reliance and overcoming adversity,” he said.

This photo taken on April 10, 2026 shows part of a programmable quantum computing prototype called “Jiuzhang 4.0.” (Xinhua/Zhou Mu)

The Long March continues to draw interest from scholars in both developed and developing countries. They believe China’s success in the new Long March would benefit people beyond its borders as well as its own population.

In 2013, Xi put forward the vision of a “community with a shared future for humanity.” The vision, together with the initiatives he later proposed on global development, security, civilization and governance, set out China’s proposals and solutions to tackle shared challenges in a world marked by wealth gaps, conflicts, mistrust, unilateralism and bullying.

In September, at the BRICS summit in India, Xi urged the grouping to take the lead in promoting innovation, peace and stability, exchanges between civilizations, and reform of global governance.

Kirill Babaev, director of the Institute of China and Modern Asia at the Russian Academy of Sciences, interpreted China’s message as a call for other major countries to join a “new Long March” toward an international order based on equality and mutual respect. Its outcome, in his assessment, would matter to all humanity, not only to China.

Keith Bennett, vice chairman of Britain’s 48 Group, has drawn a similar connection between revolutionary memory and international cooperation. Writing in “China Today” in July, he said that the spirit of the Long March now finds expression in projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which connects countries through infrastructure, trade and development.

The Long March, he wrote, remains a guiding force in tackling difficult and complex tasks, overcoming development bottlenecks, and pressing ahead with long-term national goals.

For countries that look to China’s experience, its efforts to combine development with security, shift toward cleaner energy, and advocate common prosperity may offer insights into addressing challenges such as climate change, public health emergencies, food and energy insecurity, and inequality.

The Long March stands as a powerful testament to the boundless strength of the human spirit once awakened, said Professor Lu. “It offers confidence to developing countries and hope to all humanity, affirming that even in a world rife with uncertainties, there are still forces steadfastly defending justice and striving toward a brighter future,” he said.

The horizon stretches far ahead. The first of China’s “two centenary goals” has been achieved. The second, tied to the People’s Republic’s centenary in 2049, still lies ahead.

“Today, we are closer, more confident, and more capable than ever of reaching the goal of rejuvenating the Chinese nation,” Xi said.

“We will strive to safeguard world peace and development as we pursue our own development,” he added.

Several parts of this year’s speech differed from Lai’s previous addresses. To explore these changes and what they might mean, two Taiwan affairs experts on the Chinese mainland offered their analysis to this newsletter:

Wu Yongping, dean of the Institute of Taiwan Studies and a tenured professor at the School of Public Policy and Management at Tsinghua University.

Liu Kuangyu, a researcher at the Institute of Taiwan Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

How much did China-U.S. relations shape the speech?

Wu Yongping: This year’s speech came against a different background from previous ones. The biggest change is the state of China-U.S. relations.

After two meetings between the Chinese and U.S. presidents this year, bilateral relations have generally stabilized. At a minimum, the two sides have formed a shared understanding that the relationship should be kept stable. This is very different from the previous situation.

If China and the United States agree on stabilizing bilateral relations, many related issues will adjust accordingly. Within the overall U.S. strategic framework toward China, the priority of the Taiwan question has declined. This is the biggest difference between this year and previous years.

After the leaders’ meeting in May, U.S. President Donald Trump told Fox News that he did not want to see Taiwan move towards independence. He also questioned the idea of the United States traveling 9,500 miles to fight a war over the island, adding that he did not want such an outcome.

These remarks reflect Trump’s understanding of the Taiwan question: Taiwan must be subordinate to the broader goal of maintaining stability in China-U.S. relations and should not disrupt that process.

The September meeting helped consolidate the results of the May meeting and the constructive strategic stability between the two sides. On the Taiwan question, continuing along the consensus reached in May already creates significant pressure on Taiwan.

After Trump’s remarks in May, Lai soon indicated that he would avoid actions that could provoke a confrontation. Lai understands that he cannot provoke Trump on the Taiwan issue or challenge Trump’s current strategic arrangement. This is one important reason why the language on cross-Strait relations in the October 10 speech seemed more restrained.

Wu Yongping

How much was the speech aimed at Taiwan’s domestic politics?

Wu Yongping: Another important background factor is Taiwan’s upcoming local elections.

These two factors, China-U.S. relations and the election calendar, shaped the overall tone of the speech. The focus was placed on internal affairs, with a long list of policy achievements. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) hopes to use the speech to influence public opinion, highlight its governing record and serve its election needs.

But many of the advantages Lai cited were accumulated over decades. The foundation of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, including TSMC, was laid long before Lai took office.

Taiwan’s strong economic growth this year is also closely linked to the global AI boom, rather than being mainly the result of the current administration’s policies.

A key issue was largely avoided: Taiwan’s K-shaped economy. High-tech industries are thriving, but many traditional industries are under pressure. AI and semiconductors have lifted growth figures and the stock market, but the benefits have flowed mainly to a limited number of groups connected to high-tech industries.

This is a major underlying concern for Taiwan’s economy. If the AI cycle cools, Taiwan’s growth momentum could weaken quickly.

Why did Lai invoke “a city upon a hill”?

Wu Yongping: The phrase “city upon a hill” was mainly directed at the international community, especially the West and the United States.

The phrase comes from a religious and political tradition familiar to Western audiences. Using this language makes the message easier for them to accept.

Compared with previous speeches, this was a different narrative. Lai used to emphasize Taiwan’s strategic role in the first island chain. This time, that language was not used. He still talked about democratic values, but the expression changed.

The metaphor served two purposes. First, it suggested that Taiwan stands with the West in terms of values and uses a concept familiar to Western audiences to emphasize shared values. Second, it was meant to highlight Taiwan’s importance, perhaps reflecting Lai’s concern that Taiwan could lose support among the democratic partners he hopes to rally.

Liu Kuangyu: The use of religious language may also serve domestic political purposes. It could appeal to Christian voters and church networks in Taiwan, including some within the DPP’s southern support base. This could also be an election-oriented move, aimed at consolidating the base and reaching some middle-ground voters.

Lai has used different symbolic language for different audiences. In previous October 10 speeches, Lai used phrases such as “Republic of China Taiwan” and referred to historical events such as the 1958 artillery bombardment of Kinmen. These references may have been aimed at voters who identify with the Republic of China framework, including centrist voters and some light-blue voters.

This year, the phrase “city upon a hill” may also have been directed at the United States.

The political environment in Washington has changed. Trump’s support base includes evangelical Christians, and the phrase “city upon a hill” comes from a religious-political tradition that resonates with parts of the American right.

Lai may also be mindful of criticism from some U.S. conservatives who see the DPP as too closely associated with progressive politics. Lai now faces a difficult adjustment. The DPP long invested in ties with U.S. Democrats and liberal circles, but it also needs to adapt to the current political climate in Washington.

In an August 2025 article, Christian Whiton, a former senior State Department adviser who served during Trump’s first term, criticized Lai’s administration for its close ties to U.S. liberal political circles and its failure to adapt to the rise of the American New Right.

This framing could also complicate Taiwan’s relations with Japan and South Korea.

South Korea and Taiwan have considerable overlap in their industries and compete directly in several sectors. Samsung and TSMC compete fiercely in semiconductors, while companies from South Korea and Taiwan also compete in display panels and shipbuilding. Taiwan’s economic relationships with Japan and South Korea therefore involve both cooperation and competition.

Portraying Taiwan as a “city upon a hill” could, in this view, add another layer of complexity or even create tensions in these relationships.

Liu Kuangyu

Has Lai’s overall approach to cross-Strait relations changed?

Wu Yongping: To some observers, Lai’s language in the speech seemed more restrained, but his overall approach to cross-Strait relations has not fundamentally changed. His separatist stance remains unchanged. He has merely softened his rhetoric while continuing to pursue the same agenda.

The security-related parts of the speech also deserve attention. Lai mentioned defense reform, asymmetric capabilities, the development of Taiwan’s defense industry and social resilience. Compared with earlier speeches that emphasized Taiwan’s role in the first island chain, this speech placed more emphasis on Taiwan’s own defense preparedness. This would actually heighten tensions across the Taiwan Strait.

Liu Kuangyu: Lai’s core goal is not to serve U.S. interests. It is to advance his own political agenda and consolidate his position in Taiwan.

This creates risks for the United States. If Washington assumes that Lai’s agenda fully aligns with its own interests, it may underestimate the possibility that Taiwan’s domestic politics could draw the United States into a crisis it does not want.

Overall, the speech appears to reflect a tactical adjustment rather than a strategic shift. The language on cross-Strait relations seems to have been toned down in response to the current state of China-U.S. relations and Taiwan’s election calendar, but the underlying policy direction does not appear to have changed.

Editor’s note: You may not agree with everything the two experts have said, but understanding perspectives from Chinese experts may be one of the reasons you subscribe to this newsletter. Their views should not be taken as representing the official position of the Chinese government.

CPEC is often described as a flagship project under the Belt and Road Initiative. First proposed in 2013, it has now entered what China and Pakistan call the “2.0” stage.

Broadly speaking, compared with the first phase, CPEC 2.0 is expanding into areas that are less visible than the roads, power plants and ports that defined much of its earlier development.

A recent article published by a WeChat account called CPEC, titled “CPEC 2.0 Expands Into Marine Science and the Blue Economy,” caught my attention for exactly that reason.

When people think of CPEC, they are more likely to picture projects on land, whether infrastructure or industrial zones. So I found it interesting to see marine science and the blue economy becoming part of the conversation.

The immediate background is the China-South Asia Marine Cooperation Forum, held in Qingdao, east China’s Shandong Province, on September 17 and 18.

More than 100 government officials and experts from China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives and other South Asian countries attended the forum. Participants adopted the China-South Asia Marine Cooperation Initiative, with a focus on marine science, sustainable development and the blue economy.

China Natural Resources News (《中国自然资源报》) also covered the event. Sun Shuxian, head of China’s State Oceanic Administration, said China was willing to work with South Asian countries to build a closer blue partnership and participate together in global ocean governance.

The CPEC article argues that marine science and the blue economy are emerging as part of CPEC 2.0, connecting Pakistan’s coastline and marine resources with research, technology, environmental management and regional cooperation.

Below is the full article.

Pakistan has a coastline of around 1,000 kilometers and considerable room to develop its marine economy. Gwadar Port brings that potential directly into the CPEC framework.

Building China-Pakistan ties in marine science

The Qingdao forum focused on three main areas: ocean and climate observation, forecasting and disaster risk reduction; marine ecosystem protection and restoration; and integrated ocean management and the sustainable development of the blue economy.

Pakistani experts took part in the discussions, including representatives from the National Institute of Oceanography and Lasbela University of Agriculture, Water and Marine Sciences.

Dr. Abdul Malik, vice chancellor of Lasbela University of Agriculture, Water and Marine Sciences, highlighted Chinese support for Pakistan’s marine science capacity, particularly in talent training.

Other Pakistani participants pointed to opportunities in technology transfer, joint research and capacity building.

The forum was organized by the First Institute of Oceanography under China’s Ministry of Natural Resources. The institute said representatives from five South Asian countries, along with Chinese participants, attended the September meeting.

This provides a foundation for cooperation that goes beyond physical infrastructure and extends into knowledge and research capacity.

Why this matters for Gwadar

Gwadar Port gives the marine agenda a direct connection to CPEC.

The port is intended to form part of a broader connectivity and economic network. The CPEC Action Plan 2025-2029 calls for stronger cooperation in the marine economy, sustainable use of marine resources, marine research and environmental protection.

The action plan also calls for better connectivity between the New Gwadar International Airport and Gwadar Port, with the goal of developing Gwadar into a regional connectivity hub.

This means marine science can support CPEC in ways that are easy to overlook.

Better ocean observation can support marine planning. Marine research can strengthen environmental management. Better scientific knowledge can also support fisheries, aquaculture and other coastal economic activities.

The connection between research and commerce is therefore indirect, but important.

The blue economy is about more than fishing

The blue economy is often reduced to fisheries, but the concept is much broader.

It includes aquaculture, seafood processing, shipping, marine research, coastal tourism, environmental services, offshore resources, as well as technologies related to ocean monitoring and climate resilience.

Pakistan has already brought some of these areas into the CPEC 2.0 agenda.

At a business-to-business cooperation meeting organized by the CPEC Secretariat in April 2026, aquaculture and seafood processing were specifically identified as potential areas of cooperation.

The meeting also discussed industrial development and value-added processing in Gwadar.

This matters because there is a major difference between exporting basic marine products and building domestic capacity in processing, cold-chain logistics, packaging, certification and branded seafood products.

The latter can create considerably more economic value.

From ocean data to economic activity

One of the biggest potential contributions of marine science is information.

Fisheries and aquaculture depend on knowledge of marine ecosystems. Ports and shipping require reliable weather and ocean data. Coastal communities are affected by storms, flooding, erosion and changes in the marine environment.

That is why the Qingdao forum’s focus on observation, forecasting and disaster risk reduction has both environmental and economic value.

But scientific cooperation does not automatically translate into economic results.

Joint research projects, training and technical exchanges can build capacity. Turning that capacity into commercial output also requires institutions, investment, regulation and participation from the private sector.

A different form of CPEC 2.0

The first phase of CPEC was defined largely by major infrastructure and energy projects.

Pakistani officials have described the second phase as broader in scope, covering industry, agriculture, technology, mining, human capital and business-to-business cooperation.

Marine science fits naturally into that wider framework.

It can help build the knowledge base needed for coastal industries while also supporting environmental protection. It can also create more opportunities for Pakistani researchers and universities to work with Chinese institutions on challenges facing both countries.

This represents another form of connectivity, built through research networks, professional expertise and institutional cooperation rather than roads and other physical infrastructure alone.

Bringing Pakistan’s seas into its economic strategy

Pakistan has considerable marine potential, but potential does not automatically become economic output.

If the blue economy is to contribute more to growth, Pakistan will need stronger research capacity, better ocean data, more modern fisheries and aquaculture technology, cold-chain infrastructure, processing facilities, export standards and effective environmental regulation.

China can be a partner in this process, particularly through research cooperation, technical training and links between institutions.

For CPEC 2.0, this is where the longer-term value of marine cooperation may lie.

The next stage of China-Pakistan cooperation may no longer be measured only in kilometers of roads, electricity generated or cargo handled.

It could also be measured by researchers trained, scientific capacity built, marine resources managed more sustainably, and new industries developed along Pakistan’s coastline.

That is how the blue economy is beginning to enter the CPEC 2.0 story.

For readers interested in more on CPEC, the WeChat account South Asia Research Brief (南亚研究通讯) recently reposted an article titled “A Decade of CPEC: What Can Be Learned From Its Development Practices and Approaches to Risk?”

The piece originally appeared on the WeChat account Emei Mantan (峨眉漫谈）. It offers a broader review of CPEC’s development and the risks and challenges it faces, using an approach increasingly common in Chinese policy discussions: looking at development and security together.

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A number of media outlets have continued to follow the disaster closely. For the first part of today’s post, I have put together the latest information released by the Chinese side, including casualty figures, risks at the disaster site, how far Chinese rescue teams have reached, China-Nepal cooperation in the relief effort, and what Chinese experts say caused the disaster.

For the second part, I selected a report published by The Paper on August 29 about a disaster risk reduction and cryosphere conference held in Chengdu on the very day of the disaster. It brought together experts from China, Nepal, India, Pakistan and other Himalayan countries, and happened to provide a direct channel for experts on both sides to exchange information within hours of the disaster.

I found their discussion particularly useful because it addresses, from another angle, many of the questions raised since the disaster: why an event like this is so difficult to predict, the practical obstacles to building a cross-border disaster warning system, and the efforts China and Nepal have already begun to make toward more regular cooperation.

Rescuers observe a moment of silence for the victims of the Aug. 26 mudslide near the Gyirong Port in Gyirong County, southwest China’s Xizang Autonomous Region, Sept. 1, 2026. [Photo/Xinhua]

Part I: The latest on the disaster

Casualties on the Chinese side

According to a Xinhua report on Sept. 3, 21 people have been confirmed dead and 541 others remain missing after the mudslide struck the border port, the regional government said at its latest news briefing.

Rescuers have recovered 847 personal belongings from the disaster area. Local authorities have also received 876 phone calls from relatives of those killed or still missing and have been responding to their inquiries.

Casualties on the Nepalese side

The death toll from the devastating August 26 mudslide in Nepal has risen to 1,252, with another 4,875 people still missing as of 10 a.m. local time on September 3, according to a Xinhua report citing Nepalese police.

Road access

Road access to the zone was basically restored at 10 a.m. Wednesday after days of round-the-clock repair work on the G216. Over 10 pieces of heavy machinery have entered the core area to aid on-site rescuers.

China-Nepal cooperation

China’s Ministry of Water Resources said Wednesday that the ministry is now providing Nepal with daily updates on the development of a barrier lake above Gyirong Port, cascading risks associated with the Cuojian River impact crater in Nepal, glacial lake risks in the Gyirong Zangbo River basin, the development and risk forecasts of new barrier lakes, and emergency hydrological monitoring.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun told a regular press briefing that China is preparing a third batch of emergency relief supplies, including Bailey bridges, epidemic prevention materials and emergency communications equipment. China is ready to send a second group of DNA identification experts based on Nepal’s needs, he added.

What caused the disaster?

Xinhua has released a three-minute animation on Aug. 28 explaining how the Gyirong mudslide developed.

On September 1, Xinhua published a more detailed account of new research led by the Institute of Tibetan Plateau Research under the Chinese Academy of Sciences on how the Gyirong disaster developed.

The researchers reconstructed the full chain of events from the initial ice-rock collapse high in Nepal to the destructive mudslide that eventually struck Gyirong Port. Their analysis suggests that the disaster was not simply triggered by a short period of heavy rainfall. Instead, several longer-term factors — including sustained glacier movement, warmer spring and summer conditions, increased meltwater and possible degradation of high-altitude permafrost — may have gradually weakened the stability of the source area. The researchers stress, however, that there is not yet enough evidence to identify a single direct trigger.

One of the study’s key findings is that the scale of the disaster was determined not only by the initial collapse. As the debris traveled through roughly 22 kilometers of valley, it continuously eroded the channel and picked up additional material from the riverbed and slopes. This process greatly increased the volume and destructive force of the flow before it reached Gyirong Port.

Researchers also detected several unusual seismic signals in the hours before the main collapse, some of which appear to coincide with smaller ice and snow movements. They say these signals may offer clues for future monitoring, though more evidence is needed before they can be treated as reliable warning signs.

The full analysis goes into considerably more geological detail than I want to reproduce here. Readers interested in the technical explanation can read Xinhua’s Sept. 1 report and use an AI translation tool if needed. The research was published the same day in the academic journal Science Bulletin. [Photo/Xinhua]

Rescuers conduct search and rescue operations at the core affected zone of the mudslide-hit Gyirong Port in southwest China’s Xizang Autonomous Region, Sept. 2, 2026. [Photo/Xinhua]

Part II: Why was this disaster so difficult to predict?

That is the latest information on the disaster itself.

But many readers are also interested in two related questions: why was an event of this scale not detected and warned of earlier, and what kind of cross-border warning cooperation currently exists between China and Nepal?

A report published by The Paper on Aug. 29 provides quite a few useful details. It focuses on a meeting that was already underway in Chengdu on Aug. 26, the day the disaster struck.

A meeting of Himalayan disaster experts was already underway

The annual meeting on disaster risk reduction and the cryosphere, organized by the International Center for Integrated Mountain Development, or ICIMOD, was being held on Aug. 26 at the Institute of Mountain Hazards and Environment under the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Water Resources in Chengdu.

Zhang Qianggong, head of climate and environmental risk at ICIMOD, said the meeting happened to bring together experts in cryosphere research, geology and disaster reduction from China, Nepal, India, Pakistan and other Himalayan countries.

After the disaster, the participants quickly pooled the information available to them and concluded that the mudslide had been triggered by an ice-rock collapse.

Could China and Nepal build a regular coordination mechanism?

“This kind of timely exchange of information and interaction is not yet routine,” Zhang said.

One of the subjects being discussed at the meeting was precisely whether China, Nepal and other Himalayan countries could create a cross-border disaster information-sharing platform and establish a regular coordination mechanism.

“We hadn’t even finished discussing it when the disaster happened,” Zhang said.

For now, exchanges among research institutions can be seen as an early step toward cross-border warning and coordinated disaster management.

But moving from scientific cooperation to an institutional mechanism would require interaction between governments and go well beyond research cooperation alone.

What Nepalese officials said about the current warning system

When the disaster happened on August 26, researchers from China and Nepal who had long worked on geological hazards were gathered in Chengdu.

Among them was Pradip Kumar Koirala, joint secretary at Nepal’s Ministry of Home Affairs and coordinator at the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority, or NDRRMA.

“I think neither side received any warning information,” Koirala said at the meeting.

People could see the water level rising and some realized something was wrong, he said, but the hydrological sensors did not respond effectively.

Smaller ice collapses had occurred in the past, he explained, but normally snow or ice slid down a valley and accumulated at the bottom.

This time, the collapse struck the river and pushed the water to an unprecedented level.

“In terms of scale, this was the first time we had seen something like this,” he said.

Based on previous experience, Koirala said, it was essentially impossible to predict.

He compared it to someone saying that nothing had happened in a certain place for 200 years, so it should be safe to build a market there — only for an extreme event to occur anyway.

Nepal does have some geological-hazard monitoring stations similar to those in China, he said, but its funding and technical capacity are limited and much of the monitoring still depends on human observation.

In the China-Nepal border region, local residents also have informal warning channels. People upstream may call or message those downstream when they see something unusual.

“But this disaster happened too suddenly,” Koirala said. “There probably wasn’t enough time. After all, this is an informal, community-based practice, not a formal government mechanism.”

Natural disasters in Nepal are becoming more frequent, and Koirala linked much of that trend to climate change.

He acknowledged that investment has been insufficient and that Nepalese authorities have been criticized for this.

“We always use past experience to predict the future and design response plans,” he said. “But we never imagined something beyond our expectations like this could happen. Many of the methods other countries have taught us failed in the face of this disaster. At present, no person or country can reliably warn of or respond to something like this.”

Koirala said China-Nepal cooperation on cross-border disaster warnings remains relatively underdeveloped.

There are academic exchanges and documents expressing willingness to cooperate between relevant departments, but no substantial operational mechanism is yet in place.

How the Chengdu meeting helped during the disaster

Before this disaster, Su Pengcheng, a researcher and doctoral supervisor at the Chengdu Institute of Mountain Hazards and Environment, had spent years studying disaster prevention and warning in the central Himalayan region around Shigatse.

On July 8, 2025, a sudden mudslide upstream from Gyirong Port caused the Donglin Zangbo River to surge, destroying the Resuo Bridge, also known as the Friendship Bridge, and leaving 11 people missing.

After that event, Su’s team installed online observation systems at several high-risk glacial lakes in Shigatse, including cameras that continuously monitor lake conditions.

“When news came that Gyirong Port had been hit by another mudslide (on Aug. 26, 2026), I immediately went to Professor Su Pengcheng’s office,” Zhang said. “He was already there with his students assessing what had happened.”

The researchers pulled up real-time monitoring images from glacial lakes on the Chinese side of the region. None showed abnormal changes. That allowed them to rule out a glacial lake outburst flood.

During this process, Su obtained a video apparently filmed by a Nepalese resident or herder. It showed a large volume of debris collapsing, with clearly visible white ice mixed into the material.

Experts at the meeting concluded that this was an ice-rock collapse — rock mixed with snow and ice falling into the river and forming a temporary blockage. Once the Chinese experts had identified the type and location of the event, the Nepalese experts at the meeting immediately passed the information to Nepal’s NDRRMA and Department of Hydrology and Meteorology.

Feedback from the Nepalese side further confirmed the Chinese experts’ assessment. The whole process took only a few hours.

That evening, Su left for Gyirong. “This kind of efficiency was highly contingent,” Zhang said.

The fact that so many relevant experts from both countries happened to be in the same room made rapid information exchange possible.

Building a permanent cross-border information-sharing platform and mechanism was already one of the major topics on the meeting agenda.

According to information shared by the Nepalese side, some downstream villages may have learned that a mudslide had occurred upstream before the disaster reached them, but the information did not spread quickly enough to other villages.

Nepal’s Department of Hydrology and Meteorology also reportedly sent more than 600,000 warning text messages. But the disaster developed so quickly that some monitoring facilities were destroyed by floodwaters before they could function effectively.

Why is routine monitoring so difficult?

Ice-rock collapses often occur in extremely remote, high-altitude areas that are very difficult for people to reach.

Zhang said some potential hazard sites require two days on horseback from the nearest village, followed by further travel on foot.

“How do you monitor a place like that?” he asked.

That is one of the basic practical problems.

“Ice-rock collapse is an extremely difficult type of disaster to warn against,” said Wang Lin, a pseudonym used by another expert who attended the meeting.

【Editor’s note: This is not a challenge unique to the Himalayas. According to Nature, in July 2022, the collapse of Italy’s Marmolada glacier sent some 200,000 cubic meters of ice down the mountain, killing 11 people:

In July, 200,000 cubic metres of ice fell from Italy’s Marmolada glacier, causing 11 deaths. Glaciers and nearby slopes are expected to collapse increasingly frequently in the Alps and elsewhere as a result of climate change (see, for example, D. Li et al. Nature Geosci. 15, 520–530; 2022). More research is needed into how such events are triggered before we can develop reliable warning systems.

Researchers later warned that limited understanding of what triggers such failures still makes reliable early-warning systems difficult to develop.】

A potentially unstable slope may remain in that condition for a long time, while the final trigger that causes collapse can be very small.

Wang cited an ice-rock collapse in the Sedongpu Valley in Nyingchi, Xizang, in 2018.

Only after researchers went back through large amounts of historical imagery did they conclude that an earthquake may have destabilized a hanging glacier about a year before the collapse.

Snowfall, melting and other processes followed, until the glacier finally gave way.

“Even if we were only talking about glaciers that could affect major transport infrastructure, rather than the entire Himalayan region, regular monitoring would still be extremely difficult,” Wang said.

Artificial intelligence and large-scale computing resources can help, but continuously scanning such a vast mountain region at high frequency would still require enormous resources.

Many potentially unstable areas also lie on extremely steep slopes, where remote-sensing imagery itself can contain errors.

Given the size and complexity of the Himalayan terrain, current technology alone cannot provide continuous, high-precision monitoring of every potential hazard point.

Climate change is adding another layer of uncertainty.

Zhang said both the frequency and scale of related disasters are increasing.

“At the same time, our understanding of changes in high-mountain glaciers and glacial lakes, as well as our monitoring and risk-assessment capacity, has not improved at the same pace,” Wang said.

The risks are also inherently cross-border.

A relatively small event high in the mountains can develop into a chain of hazards as it moves through a river valley and eventually crosses a national boundary.

Zhang said cross-border warning and disaster management in the region face several practical obstacles.

The first is cost. Scientific expeditions in high-altitude mountain areas are expensive. Sampling and monitoring equipment often has to be carried into the mountains by people, and a single expedition can cost hundreds of thousands of yuan.

The second is institutional. This is no longer simply a scientific question. Can monitoring stations be installed on the other side of the border? How should monitoring systems be connected? What data can be shared? Who is responsible for transmitting warnings? These are questions that scientific cooperation alone cannot answer.

The challenge of building a cross-border disaster warning system

“The fact that Chinese experts were able to use academic channels this time to quickly identify the type and location of the disaster and pass the information to Nepal’s national disaster authorities should not be taken to mean that a regular official cross-border warning channel already exists,” Zhang said.

For cross-border disasters in particular, he said, the main challenge is how to build a stable and mature information-sharing mechanism.

According to Zhang, the two sides are now trying to move in that direction.

China has built a relatively developed domestic emergency-response system, he said, but gaps remain once information has to move across borders or reach the grassroots level.

County governments do not have direct authority over foreign affairs, so cross-border communication often has to be reported upward and approved layer by layer.

At the village level, there are even fewer channels for direct and rapid communication between communities on the two sides.

Researchers are now trying to help address this gap, Zhang said, and China and Nepal already have dialogue mechanisms at higher levels.

A report published by Yangtze University provides one example of recent efforts.

From May 22 to June 3, a joint expedition involving China’s Ministry of Water Resources, the Foreign Ministry, water authorities in Xizang, Yangtze University, ICIMOD and other institutions traveled to Nepal and border river basins in Xizang.

The team carried out joint research on glacial lake outburst floods in China-Nepal transboundary rivers and worked on disaster prevention and mitigation capacity building.

Zhang said officials and researchers from both countries discussed information sharing during that trip.

In mid-August, ICIMOD also invited a team from the Chengdu Institute of Mountain Hazards and Environment to Nepal for further exchanges, with the aim of advancing cooperation on glacial-lake monitoring and related areas.

For now, however, these efforts remain at an early stage.

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I have long been interested in how local governments in China are run, and longtime readers may have noticed that. I have previously written about what happens when local authorities add layers of requirements as policies move down the administrative chain, the respective roles of a city’s Party secretary and mayor, and debates over whether local governments really need to run social media accounts.

These are not always the topics that attract the most attention, and no single article can cover every aspect of local governance. But I think they offer an interesting way to look at Chinese society.

Today’s post is about local government officials, including mayors, answering calls from residents on government hotlines.

Having senior officials pick up hotline calls is not exactly new, either in China or elsewhere. But I found a recent Southern Weekly article on the subject worth reading for several reasons.

First, the calls themselves offer a glimpse of the concerns people raise in everyday life, and of how those concerns are changing along with Chinese society.

Take western Baotou City, north China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Since 2020, the largest category of calls to the city’s government service hotline has concerned human resources and social security, accounting for about 30 percent of the total.

Most of those callers are not filing complaints. They are asking practical questions about social insurance, employee rights, personnel files and similar matters. Social security alone accounts for roughly 85 percent of calls in this category.

“Most people are asking about social insurance contributions and retirement pensions,” said Cao Weizhi, a manager at Baotou’s government service hotline center.

Calls about childcare subsidies, by comparison, are relatively uncommon. That broadly tracks China’s demographic changes: a rapidly aging population and a declining number of births.

In other words, the changing mix of calls reflects changes in society itself. Other problems are hardly unique to Baotou:

Complaints about property management and consumer rights each account for roughly 10 percent of calls to the city’s hotline. Cao said that, as elsewhere in China, complaints about property management companies, including their service and fees, are a highly visible issue.

......

Across China, education and school enrollment, housing and property management, transportation and urban management consistently rank among the most common issues raised when senior officials answer the hotline.

A change in shopping habits has also changed the kinds of disputes citizens bring to the government, and the challenges facing the legal and administrative processes used to resolve them:

Consumer complaints increasingly involve online shopping. “E-commerce disputes are more difficult to investigate, verify and collect evidence for, and they also take longer to resolve,” Cao said.

There is another reason I found the article worth reading. It does not simply celebrate the practice of having the top official personally answer calls. Lai Jingping, an associate professor at Nanjing University’s School of Government, pointed out one of the model’s inherent limitations:

The core of modern governance is to rely on stable, standardized and predictable institutional procedures. If large numbers of everyday problems cannot be solved until the top official personally intervenes, that suggests the routine mechanisms for interdepartmental coordination and handling cases are not working properly.

The article also acknowledges that the effectiveness of this model depends heavily on the personal commitment of the official in charge:

Since the beginning of 2026, senior Party and government officials in Anhui, Guangdong, Hainan, Beijing and other places have personally taken calls on the “12345” government service hotline. The practice of top officials answering public hotlines dates back to the 1980s, but its effectiveness has often been closely tied to the willingness of the official himself or herself to get involved.

My own view is that there are things this kind of direct intervention can do that ordinary procedures sometimes cannot. It can sharply increase the chances that a particular problem gets resolved quickly, and it also sends a visible message about officials paying attention to citizens’ concerns.

But the more important task is to build durable mechanisms that can solve these problems without requiring the personal intervention of the top official.

Mao Shoulong, a professor at Renmin University of China’s School of Public Administration and Policy, makes a similar point in the article:

When administrative and legal institutions are still incomplete, he said, intervention by the top official can fill gaps. But as those institutions mature, officials should make clear that answering hotline calls is a temporary demonstration rather than a normal channel for resolving complaints.

The aim, he said, should be to encourage people to use standardized procedures first and to “eliminate the expectation that every problem should be taken to the top official.”

No governance system is perfect. Having senior officials answer hotline calls can be a useful supplement when certain problems prove difficult to resolve through normal channels. This kind of hybrid approach to governance is not hard to understand in practice.

On the morning of August 4, 2026, staff at Baotou’s 12345 government service hotline center briefed Water Resources Bureau officials before they began taking calls.

Below is the full article.

“You don’t need to go looking for anyone else about this. I’ll see it through.”

That promise, made by Baotou Mayor Meng Qingwei on May 22, 2026, quickly spread online and once again drew attention to the Inner Mongolian city known as the “Grassland Steel City.”

Meng made the remark while taking calls at the city’s “12345” government service hotline center.

Baotou began having top officials — the yibashou (一把手), literally the person in charge of a government or department — answer 12345 calls in October 2025. Since then, the head of a government body has taken calls every week.

Baotou launched its government hotline in November 2000. Over the years, the 12345 platform has developed into the city’s main channel for collecting public feedback and handling complaints and suggestions.

The city’s Bureau of Administrative Approval and Government Services had previously tried to coordinate appearances by the heads of districts, counties and municipal departments, but the effort achieved only limited results.

That changed in 2025.

After Chen Zhichang, who had previously worked in Beijing and Jiangsu, became a member of the Standing Committee of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regional Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Party secretary of Baotou, he pushed the program with unprecedented force.

Baotou is not alone. Since the beginning of 2026, senior Party and government officials in Anhui, Guangdong, Hainan, Beijing and other regions have sat down behind the phones at 12345 centers.

The practice of senior officials personally answering hotlines dates back to the 1980s. Its results, however, have often depended on the commitment of the official in charge.

At the same time, Baotou and other cities are trying to move beyond solving individual cases and use what they learn from the calls to improve the way government works more broadly.

“Let leaders see where the problems are”

“Boss, when you start taking calls in a moment, there are three things you cannot say: ‘I don’t know,’ ‘That’s not my responsibility,’ or ‘There’s nothing I can do about it.’”

At 9 a.m. on August 4, 2026, Gao Chong, director of the Baotou Water Resources Bureau, walked into the hotline studio.

Before the session began, staff gave Gao and officials from the relevant divisions a short briefing.

A PowerPoint presentation listed some of the main problems found in the Water Resources Bureau’s handling of requests from residents and businesses between January and August 2026. Among them: revealing callers’ personal information in responses and uploading documents in incorrect formats.

Yun Lei, director of Baotou’s 12345 Government Service Hotline Center, told Southern Weekly that the purpose of this part of the session was to “let leaders themselves see where their department is falling short in handling 12345 cases.”

Yun added another detail.

Under arrangements made by the Baotou municipal Party committee and government, every Tuesday the head of a district or government department answers hotline calls.

This was the Water Resources Bureau’s first session on its own. On Monday afternoon, officials from the bureau had already visited the hotline center to discuss the session and ask for suggestions on how they could improve their work.

Although the activity is called “the top official answering the hotline,” the official does not work alone. A deputy director, division heads and more than a dozen other officials usually take part.

During the 90-minute session that day, officials from the Water Resources Bureau handled 30 calls from residents and businesses, mainly concerning water supply, water-resource management and river-basin administration.

Yun said that, based on past experience, the volume of calls is extremely high when a senior official is taking calls. Hotline operators first screen incoming requests, identify those related to the department taking part that day, and transfer them to the officials.

Gao personally answered five calls.

One came from a resident who suspected that the quality of drinking water supplied directly to his home did not meet safety standards.

Gao told Southern Weekly that he found the claim puzzling.

Water quality is a serious matter, he said. “We test the water according to national standards before it is supplied every day. If it failed the standards, we could not supply it.”

After asking several questions, Gao learned that the caller had bought test strips online that claimed to detect water quality problems.

“The accuracy of those strips cannot be guaranteed,” Gao replied. “How about this: we’ll arrange for a professionally certified testing agency to come to your home and test the water.”

At 10:30 a.m., the phone session ended.

Gao led his team out of the call room and into a consultation room across the hall.

Waiting there were Zhang Yifu, deputy director of Baotou’s Bureau of Administrative Approval, Government Services and Data Management, as well as representatives from what China calls the “two representatives and one committee member”: Party congress delegates, people’s congress deputies and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.

The 12345 hotline center is itself a division of Zhang’s bureau.

This consultation is another part of the program.

Cases received that day are discussed on the spot with these representatives. Each representative takes responsibility for following up on one case. The department that answered the calls also selects several cases for a rapid-response list. Officials are generally expected to visit the site that same afternoon, or by the following day at the latest.

Zhang also raised one unresolved case with the Water Resources Bureau.

A municipal street-cleaning vehicle had sprayed dirty water onto a legally parked car. The owner wanted an apology from the staff involved.

“All the resident is asking for is an apology. There is no reason for this case to have dragged on for so long,” Zhang said. “The city has made it clear that cases are not supposed to pile up. I hope everyone takes this seriously.”

Gao responded:

“This involves management, the details of our work, and even our attitude toward the work. When residents bring us a problem, we need to put ourselves in their position.”

On the morning of August 4, 2026, Gao Chong, director of the Baotou Water Resources Bureau, took calls on the 12345 government service hotline.

Scaling it up

Baotou’s program of having agency heads answer 12345 calls began in October 2025.

Its expansion was closely tied to support from the city’s top leadership.

Yun Lei said that several years earlier, Baotou’s Bureau of Administrative Approval and Government Services — later reorganized into the Bureau of Administrative Approval, Government Services and Data Management — had already tried to invite the heads of banners, counties, districts and municipal departments to take hotline calls.

But the bureau had limited authority to coordinate senior officials, and “the results were fairly average.”

In July 2025, Chen Zhichang, then mayor of Nanjing, was transferred across provincial lines and appointed to the Standing Committee of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regional Committee of the CPC and as Party secretary of Baotou.

By early August, the Baotou Party committee and municipal government had already begun making arrangements for senior officials to answer 12345 calls.

Chen had spent more than two decades working in Beijing and had paid considerable attention to the hotline system.

In July 2018, when he was acting district head of Beijing’s Shijingshan District, Chen answered calls on the 12345 hotline and led efforts to repair a badly damaged road south of Beijing Chaoyang Hospital’s western campus after residents complained about it.

In April 2020, when he was mayor of Huai’an in east China’s Jiangsu Province, Chen again took calls on 12345 and told the media how he viewed the hotline:

“It is a bridge, and more than that, it is a promise.”

In May 2025, just over a month before his transfer to Inner Mongolia, Chen, then mayor of Nanjing, appeared on Jiangsu Province’s televised government accountability program Government Conduct Hotline: The Mayor Goes On Air.

With support from the city’s top official, Baotou’s program moved quickly.

It was launched in mid-October 2025. Within a month and a half, the heads and senior officials of seven districts and departments had taken part.

In March 2026, the program resumed in an expanded form.

The city planned 44 sessions for the year, with one every Tuesday, as well as two special sessions for the mayor and vice mayors, one in the first half of the year and another in the second.

Yun explained that the program had been paused at the start of 2026 because of the Lunar New Year and the annual national “two sessions,” when government priorities temporarily shifted.

The timing of each department’s appearance is also planned carefully.

Yun said hotline calls have clear seasonal patterns.

Water use and street vending tend to peak in summer, for example, so the Water Resources Bureau and urban management authorities are scheduled around that time.

The Education Bureau appears around the start of the school year. Housing and construction officials take calls during the winter heating season.

Huang Jie, a member of the Jiangsu Provincial Political Science Association, told Southern Weekly that many of the problems residents raise may look trivial but often involve several government departments and are costly to coordinate.

Many livelihood issues cross departmental, administrative and territorial lines. Some have accumulated over long periods.

Ordinary hotline staff have limited authority to coordinate all of the bodies involved, Huang said, so intervention from a higher level may be needed to break the deadlock.

On May 22, 2026, Mayor Meng Qingwei encountered exactly this kind of problem.

A homeowner at the Yuanzhou Daduhui residential compound in Baotou’s Jiuyuan District called the hotline about installing an electric-vehicle charger in a parking space he owned.

The electricity provider said the installation met the requirements, but the property management company refused to allow it.

Meng told the caller:

“You don’t need to go looking for anyone else. Once it reaches me, this is where it ends.”

With Meng’s direct intervention, the dispute was quickly resolved.

Between the launch of the program in October 2025 and May 2026, 18 senior officials in Baotou had taken hotline calls.

They handled 2,011 requests and helped resolve 1,959 of them.

The city’s backlog of unresolved cases fell from more than 20,000 in 2025 to just over 3,000.

What people are calling about

What are residents actually calling the government about?

Cao Weizhi, a manager at Baotou’s 12345 hotline center, told Southern Weekly that since 2020 the single largest category has been human resources and social security, accounting for roughly 30 percent of all calls.

Most of those calls are not complaints.

People are asking practical questions about social insurance, workers’ rights, personnel files and other administrative matters.

Social security alone accounts for around 85 percent of calls in this category.

“Most people are asking about social insurance contributions and retirement pensions,” Cao said.

Calls about childcare subsidies are much less common, a pattern consistent with broader demographic changes as the population ages and the number of newborns continues to decline.

Complaints about property management account for around 10 percent of total calls, as do complaints involving consumer rights.

Cao said problems involving the service and fees charged by property management companies are a highly visible issue in Baotou, as they are elsewhere in China.

Consumer complaints, meanwhile, increasingly involve online shopping.

Changing consumer habits have made consumer protection more difficult.

“E-commerce disputes are harder to investigate and verify, harder to collect evidence for, and they tend to take longer,” Cao said.

Since April 2026, senior Party and government officials in places ranging from Inner Mongolia and Anhui to Guangdong and Hainan have taken seats at 12345 call centers.

Across China, education and school enrollment, housing and property management, transportation and urban management consistently rank among the most common issues raised when senior officials answer the hotline.

In Beijing’s Chaoyang District, statistics for the first five months of 2026 showed that the most common hotline keywords were concentrated in four areas: market regulation, private training and education services, housing, and labor and social security.

On April 22, 2026, Chen Jianrong, head of Guangzhou’s Tianhe District, answered 16 calls from residents.

They covered market regulation, urban and rural construction, education, science, culture and sports, including consumer disputes, unauthorized construction and property management.

The situation was similar in Hainan.

On May 9, 2026, Wuzhishan Mayor Chen Guoliang answered five calls involving urban management, social welfare and planning inquiries.

A resident on the 13th floor of a residential compound in Baotou reported low water pressure during peak hours. On the morning of August 5, 2026, staff from the Baotou Water Resources Bureau visited the home to inspect the problem.

Reducing the expectation that everything requires the top official

Senior officials directly listening to complaints is not a new form of governance.

The logic is similar to regular petition-reception days, televised government accountability programs and online platforms where officials respond to public concerns.

Lai Jingping, an associate professor at Nanjing University’s School of Government, told Southern Weekly that 12345 hotlines began spreading around the late 1990s and early 2000s.

By around 2010, some localities had already experimented with having senior officials take calls, although it did not become a nationwide or routine practice. Only in recent years has the model spread more widely.

According to the Shenyang municipal government website, in September 1983 the city government established a public telephone line for the mayor.

It was the first mayoral hotline in China and became the starting point for more than four decades of government hotline development.

Other cities soon followed.

On June 15, 1999, Hangzhou established a public-call center for the mayor and assigned it the number 12345.

That number gradually spread nationwide and became the standard number for government public-service hotlines.

When Jinan launched its 12345 citizen hotline in September 2008, then-mayor Zhang Jianguo went to the call center himself and answered residents’ calls.

Jinan later established a regular system under which senior officials took calls on designated days, making it one of the earlier Chinese cities to institutionalize the practice.

According to China Central Television, Zhengzhou in Henan Province began arranging for the mayor or a vice mayor to take calls once a month from January 2005, making it one of the earliest publicly documented efforts to formalize hotline duty for senior local officials.

Over the next two decades, Xiamen, Beijing, Zhejiang and other localities tried similar approaches.

There is no national requirement forcing local leaders to do so.

Beijing’s approach is one of the more developed examples.

Its “Listening to Public Opinion, Addressing Public Concerns” initiative has now been running for eight years. The program has developed a rotating format involving the Party secretaries of Beijing’s 16 districts, supported by on-site consultation and follow-up supervision.

In practice, local 12345 hotlines have resolved many residents’ problems.

When the top local official personally answers calls, the impact can be immediate.

But Lai argues that this model also has an inherent limitation.

The core of modern governance, she said, is to rely on stable, standardized and predictable institutional procedures.

If large numbers of everyday problems can only be resolved after the top official steps in, that indicates that routine mechanisms for interdepartmental coordination and case handling have broken down.

Mao Shoulong, a professor at Renmin University of China’s School of Public Administration and Policy, holds a similar view.

When administrative and legal institutions are incomplete, he said, intervention by the top official can compensate for their shortcomings.

Once those systems are mature, however, it should be made clear that senior officials answering hotline calls is a temporary demonstration rather than the normal way for citizens to seek help.

People should be guided toward standardized administrative channels first, Mao said, so as to “eliminate the expectation that every problem should be taken to the top official.”

That is why one of the main questions facing local governments is how to turn individual cases raised during hotline sessions into changes in the system itself.

Baotou is also trying to do this.

Zhang Yanbin, a fourth-level researcher at the Baotou Urban Management Bureau, has firsthand experience of why broader institutional solutions are needed.

On July 27, 2026, when the head of the bureau took part in a 12345 hotline session, Zhang also answered six calls.

The one he remembers most clearly involved a factory built on collectively owned village land in one of the city’s districts.

Years earlier, the local township government had allowed the factory to be built as part of an investment-promotion effort.

Under current law, however, the structure is considered illegal.

Resolving a case like this takes time.

“If you want to make sure the entire enforcement process complies with the law, you first need to seek the planning department’s opinion, then issue formal notices, and eventually apply to a court for compulsory demolition,” Zhang said.

“You are looking at at least six months.”

Li Yang, director of the Baotou Urban Management Bureau’s monitoring and command center, told Southern Weekly that the case is now being handled jointly with the local district government, with senior officials directly following its progress.

The Urban Management Bureau has already developed a set of procedures for complicated 12345 cases.

Different plans are used for disputes involving multiple departments or administrative levels, cases where responsibilities are unclear, cases that have failed to be resolved after repeated negotiations, recurring problems shared by many residents, and cases that could create public controversy if officials respond only after a complaint has escalated.

There have also been changes at the city level.

Materials provided to Southern Weekly by the Baotou municipal government office show that since senior officials began taking part in the 12345 program, the city has established several new working mechanisms.

One of the more notable is a system for interdepartmental coordination.

Under this arrangement, the municipal government brings together the main departments responsible for areas that frequently generate livelihood complaints.

They prepare contingency plans in advance and add temporary specialist desks to the hotline center when necessary, with the aim of responding more quickly and precisely to high-frequency problems.

After the senior-official hotline program began in October 2025, Baotou’s housing and construction authorities also began renovation work in several areas that had generated large numbers of complaints.

Some places that had not originally been included in renovation plans were brought forward because officials identified them as likely sources of recurring problems.

The basic idea is simple: solve common problems before they require the personal attention of the city’s top officials.

Chinese robotics companies are also gaining ground overseas. Data from the General Administration of Customs on China’s goods trade for the first half of the year highlighted some remarkable figures: exports of industrial robots reached 6.29 billion yuan (about 936 million U.S. dollars), up 18.6%, reaching 141 countries and regions; surgical robot exports surged to 480 million yuan, a 3.3-fold increase; and combined exports of cleaning robots and smart bionic robots totaled 18.09 billion yuan.

Robotics is one of several Chinese technology stories drawing attention this summer.

A month earlier, Beijing-based Moonshot AI released Kimi K3, a 2.8-trillion-parameter open-weight model with a one-million-token context window. Its release drew attention well beyond China, adding to a broader debate over the growing presence of Chinese models in the global open-weight AI ecosystem.

By Executive President of China Finance 40 Forum (CF40) Institute Guo Kai‘s estimation, the AI supply chain now accounts for 22% of China’s total exports and contributes to roughly half of the export growth. Guo noted that large-scale investment in the overseas AI industry continues to drive China’s exports of high-end hardware, computing infrastructure and related products.

(I know the figure that AI-related supply chains account for 22% of China’s exports sounds a little startling. I was skeptical when I first saw it too. But more than one expert has cited a similar estimate, so I checked with someone in the industry who works closely with the data. The answer I got was that the figure is indeed roughly on that scale. Optical transceiver companies, for example, are now among the major contributors to export growth.)

A similar shift is visible in China’s biotech sector. Overseas licensing deals involving Chinese innovative drugs exceeded 100 billion U.S. dollars in total potential value in the first half of 2026, setting a new record, according to China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT).

In May 2026, Hengrui Medicine, headquartered in eastern Chinese city of Lianyungang, and Bristol Myers Squibb (BMS), an American multinational pharmaceutical company, announced a landmark global partnership to co-develop 13 early-stage programs across oncology, hematology and immunology.

These three sectors — robotics, artificial intelligence and innovative drugs — have recently been grouped together in China under a new label: the “New New Trio” (新“新三样”).

The comparison is easy to see. China’s previous “New Trio” of electric vehicles, lithium batteries and solar products became symbols of the country’s industrial rise in the first half of this decade. By 2025, “New Trio” exports neared 1.3 trillion yuan, a 3.5-fold increase from 2020, according to the General Administration of Customs of China (GACC).

Yet the analogy only goes so far. Robots can be counted at customs. AI models can spread through downloadable weights and APIs. Drugmakers can license molecules overseas years before a finished medicine reaches the market. Together, these sectors point to a broader change in how Chinese industrial capabilities are reaching the world: through software, intellectual property, research and production systems as well as manufactured goods.

Why Are These Sectors Emerging Together?

Robotics, AI and innovative drugs may look like three separate stories. Their routes overseas are certainly different. But their rise at roughly the same time is not entirely coincidental.

In robotics, Chinese companies are drawing on capabilities already built at scale in industries such as electric vehicles and consumer electronics. Batteries, motors, sensors, power electronics, machine vision and control systems are all important to both EVs and robots. It is no surprise that Chinese automakers such as BYD and XPeng are also developing humanoid robots.

AI adds another layer. Chinese companies are competing in foundation models, but the industry also rests on a much larger network of servers, data centers, communications infrastructure and power systems. The models can in turn feed back into manufacturing, robotics and scientific research. The recent overseas attention around Kimi and other Chinese open-weight models shows how some of these capabilities can reach international users without taking the form of a physical export.

Biotech has followed a different path, but it also benefits from accumulated capabilities elsewhere in the economy: China’s chemical industry, clinical research resources, engineering talent and growing computing capacity. The surge in overseas licensing deals shows that Chinese pharmaceutical companies are increasingly able to sell research assets and intellectual property, rather than simply manufacture drugs developed elsewhere.

These links point to a deeper explanation for why several internationally competitive Chinese industries are emerging together: China’s industrial system has become denser and more interconnected.

For decades, the advantage of having a broad manufacturing base was largely associated with scale and cost. Today, another advantage is becoming more visible. Technologies, supplier networks and production know-how developed in one industry can be reused in another, while engineers and technical talent can move across sectors.

The EV industry helped build supply chains that robotics companies can tap. Advances in AI can be applied to robots, factories and drug discovery. Computing infrastructure built for the digital economy can support both industrial automation and scientific research.

China therefore does not have to build every new industry entirely from scratch. New sectors inherit part of the infrastructure, talent and technical knowledge accumulated by the ones that came before them.

That helps explain both the number of new industries appearing and the speed at which some Chinese companies are reaching the global market.

From the “Old Three” to the “New New Trio”

The familiar Chinese labels offer a useful way to trace the change. The so-called “Old Three” of clothing, furniture and home appliances represented the classic export model of the 1990s and early 2000s. Global demand was already well established. China combined low labor costs, foreign investment, processing trade and increasingly efficient manufacturing to supply it at enormous scale.

The “New Trio” of EVs, batteries and solar products followed a different path. Demand for cleaner energy and transport was growing, but high costs still limited adoption. China’s domestic market, supply chains and manufacturing scale helped bring those costs down.

The industries now described as the “New New Trio” are emerging at an earlier stage of market development. Their end markets, business models and technology paths are still taking shape, yet Chinese companies have already become serious players.

Their eventual positions remain uncertain. What has changed is the timing. Chinese companies are entering these industries earlier, with a greater role in shaping how technologies are developed and commercialized.

Beyond containers

The older export story was relatively easy to measure. Factories made goods, ships carried them abroad, and customs recorded the value.

That picture becomes less complete as technology and intellectual property account for more of the value being created. Trade statistics capture only part of the international reach of the “New New Trio.”

Commercial relationships are also becoming more intertwined. A foreign company may use Chinese technology in its own products while competing with Chinese firms elsewhere. A global pharmaceutical company can license Chinese drug candidates to strengthen its pipeline. Similar overlaps are emerging in AI and advanced manufacturing, making the line between customer, supplier, partner and competitor less clear than in traditional merchandise trade.

China’s domestic market is an important part of this process. Rising labor costs are creating demand for automation, an aging population is putting pressure on health care, and companies across the economy are experimenting with AI to improve productivity. These pressures give emerging technologies a large market in which to be tested and refined.

China’s latest five-year plan reinforces that direction, placing AI, embodied intelligence, biomedicine and other emerging technologies high on the industrial agenda:

瞄准引领未来发展重点领域，构建未来产业全链条培育体系，推动量子科技、生物制造、氢能和核聚变能、脑机接口、具身智能、第六代移动通信等成为新的经济增长点。

Targeting key areas that will shape future development, China will build a full-chain system to foster future industries and promote quantum technology, biomanufacturing, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy, brain-computer interfaces, embodied intelligence, sixth-generation mobile communications and other fields as new drivers of economic growth.

Overseas expansion is increasingly built on this domestic base. Chinese companies can improve products at home, build scale and then reach foreign users through several routes, including direct sales, licensing and technology platforms. This differs from the older model of factories built mainly to serve overseas orders.

进一步引导和规范企业境外投资方向，支持有条件的企业开展互利共赢的境外投资合作，鼓励互联网平台、人工智能等新兴产业企业拓展海外应用场景。

Further guide and regulate the direction of enterprises’ outbound investment, support qualified enterprises in carrying out mutually beneficial overseas investment cooperation, and encourage companies in emerging industries such as internet platforms and artificial intelligence to expand their applications and use cases overseas. -- China’s national 15th Five-Year Plan

Will there be another “China Shock”?

Whether the global expansion of these industries will produce another “China shock” is still too early to tell. Their technologies, business models and routes overseas differ considerably from the manufactured exports that defined earlier waves of China’s industrial rise.

What is already visible, however, is a more cautious response in some countries as Chinese companies expand into these sectors. The U.S. Federal Communications Commission has introduced restrictions affecting certain foreign-made advanced robots. In Washington, the growing capabilities and low cost of Chinese open-weight AI models have also raised questions about cybersecurity, technological dependence and the strength of American alternatives.

Such resistance does not appear to be unexpected in China. Discussion of the “New New Trio” combines optimism about their growth with caution about the external environment they may face. On Wednesday, the CPC journal Qiushi reposted an article titled “The ‘New New Trio’ Is Reshaping China’s Development Logic” from Southern Daily, warning that technology restrictions, patent barriers, trade protection and higher overseas market-access thresholds could become increasingly important constraints:

从外部环境看，全球科技竞争日趋激烈，部分国家实施技术打压、专利限制、贸易保护政策，人工智能、生物医药、高端装备领域技术封锁加剧，海外市场准入门槛持续抬高。

From the external environment, global competition in science and technology is becoming more intense. Some countries have introduced technology restrictions, patent constraints and trade protection measures. Barriers are also rising in areas such as artificial intelligence, biomedicine and high-end equipment, making access to overseas markets more difficult.

从产业自身看，部分高端核心元器件、底层算力芯片、高端医疗设备材料仍存在短板，顶尖基础人才供给不足，中小企业创新转化能力偏弱，产学研深度融合机制仍需完善。

Within the industries themselves, gaps remain in some high-end core components, foundational computing chips, and advanced materials for medical equipment. There is also a shortage of top-tier talent in basic research, while small and medium-sized enterprises remain relatively weak in turning innovation into commercial applications. Closer integration among industry, universities and research institutions is still needed.

从行业生态看，人工智能伦理监管、生物医药国际审批、机器人行业全球统一标准等规则体系建设，仍滞后于产业扩张速度。

At the industry ecosystem level, rulemaking has not kept pace with market expansion in areas such as AI ethics and regulation, international approval of biopharmaceutical products, and globally harmonized standards for the robotics industry. -- Southern Daily

To address these challenges, the article proposes two responses: “strengthening weak links in the industrial chain and building an independent, controllable, secure and efficient science and technology innovation industrial chain,” and “improving the industrial ecosystem, facilitating the commercialization and application of scientific and technological achievements, and taking a more active role in shaping global rules for science and technology.” Both priorities are also written into China’s 15th Five-Year Plan.

The article concludes by spelling out the respective roles of the “old three,” the “new trio,” and the “New New Trio” in China’s development:

“老三样”承载稳定就业、保障民生供给，数字化改造后向功能性、高端化转型，持续稳住外贸基本盘；“新三样”依托成熟绿色产业链，持续扩大全球领先优势，夯实绿色发展底座；“新新三样”作为未来产业先导，带动全行业智能化、高端化升级，为传统产业转型提供技术工具。

The “Old Three” continue to support stable employment and meet everyday needs. With digital upgrading, they are moving toward higher-end and more specialized products while helping anchor China’s foreign trade. The “New Trio,” backed by mature green-industry supply chains, continue to strengthen their global competitiveness and provide a foundation for green development. As emerging industries, the “New New Trio” can help drive smarter and higher-end development across the economy and provide new technological tools for the transformation of traditional industries.

Given that the industries grouped under the “New New Trio” are still at an early stage, it may take more time before we can see the full picture. Commercial aerospace, quantum technology, low-altitude aviation and other sectors could eventually join this group of globally competitive industries. Will we one day be talking about a “New New New Trio”? Or perhaps some of them are already taking shape around us.

China’s gaming industry is another sector I would put on the watchlist. After Black Myth: Wukong made a considerable impact overseas in 2024, I was curious about how far that success had actually reached beyond Chinese and overseas Chinese players. So I asked ChatGPT to look at the available data. Its conclusion was that Black Myth: Wukong had not become “a mass cultural phenomenon in Europe and the United States,” but it had “become a mainstream title among core gamers worldwide.” That is already a fairly high bar to clear.

So I will end this article with the 15-minute gameplay demo of Black Myth: Zhong Kui, the new title from the studio behind Black Myth: Wukong, released on Thursday. I would also be very interested to hear what you think of the game. If you’re short on time, you can just watch the final minute. The first 14 minutes stay with a few longer sequences, while the last minute cuts quickly across many more settings and scenes from the game.

Hello and welcome to “Big Argument,” a commentary column in Beijing Scroll that takes a different look at major debates involving China, especially where perspectives from China are missing or underrepresented in mainstream international coverage.

Some of the views in this article may differ from those more commonly encountered in Western media and policy discussions. But hearing arguments you may not encounter elsewhere is also part of the reason many of you read this newsletter.

Much of the international discussion about the Taiwan Strait begins with the possibility of war. Attention tends to focus on military drills, defense budgets, arms sales to Taiwan and whether the United States would intervene if conflict broke out.

By comparison, far less attention is paid to the shortage of regular communication and people-to-people contact across the Strait.

Since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) returned to power in 2016, official cross-Strait communication has largely broken down. The DPP’s party platform still retains the goal of “establishing the Republic of Taiwan as a sovereign, independent, and autonomous nation.” Beijing has accused both Tsai Ing-wen and Lai Ching-te of working with external forces to advance separatist “Taiwan independence” goals.

It argues that Lai’s remarks since taking office — including his statement that “Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are not subordinate to each other” and his description of China as a “foreign hostile force” — have made that position more explicit, and has criticized his approach as a new “two states” theory.

The 1992 Consensus emerged in the early 1990s as the political formula that made cross-Strait dialogue possible. The DPP rejects that framework, while Beijing insists that official talks cannot resume without it. This disagreement over the basic political premise for dialogue has left the two sides without stable official channels through which to manage disputes and pursue peace.

The Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) party, led by Cheng Li-wun, has spent much of the first half of 2026 trying to fill part of that gap.

In April, Cheng led a KMT delegation to the mainland, becoming the first sitting party chair to make such a visit in about a decade. The trip also produced the first meeting between the leaders of the KMT and the Communist Party of China (CPC) in ten years. During the six-day visit, she met the CPC leadership and also visited companies, ports, local governments and historical and cultural sites.

Her message was straightforward: Taiwan should not become another crisis in an already unsettled world. The two sides should rebuild trust and give people more opportunities to travel, meet and interact.

Cheng Li-wun speaks at the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing, east China’s Jiangsu Province, on April 8, 2026.

On the final day of Cheng’s visit, Beijing announced ten measures aimed at expanding cross-Strait exchanges and co-operation. They included plans to resume individual travel to Taiwan for residents of Shanghai and Fujian, restore or add more direct passenger flights, and widen market access for Taiwanese agricultural and fishery products.

But Cheng and the KMT cannot put these measures fully into effect. The party remains in opposition, and decisions involving entry permits, transport arrangements and official negotiations remain in the hands of the DPP administration.

Even so, unofficial engagement should not be dismissed simply because it cannot resolve the underlying political dispute. A recent report by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) noted that experts from the United States, the Chinese mainland and Taiwan still saw sustained dialogue as one of the few practical tools available to reduce mistrust and lower the risks of accidental escalation.

Cheng’s mainland trip, together with some of the steps the KMT has taken in Taiwan since then, belongs to this broader effort to put engagement back on the agenda. It has created more room for cross-Strait exchanges and mutual visits to return to public discussion.

Some recent polling also points to clear demand in Taiwan for better relations and renewed communication. A June survey by the Taiwan-based Democracy Foundation found that 59.6% of respondents supported Taiwan taking the initiative to pursue peace talks with the mainland, while 68.7% supported improving cross-Strait relations and working for peace.

Can cross-Strait exchanges become two-way again?

“Communication is an urgent priority.”

That was how the NCAFP summarized one of the main conclusions of a recent high-level Track II dialogue involving experts from the United States, the Chinese mainland and Taiwan.

The report noted that “official cross-Strait dialogue is absent and even unofficial exchanges on issues in cross-Strait relations are rare ... With cross-Strait political trust at a low ebb and formal channels of communication absent, the risk of miscalculation remains uncomfortably high.”

Participants in the dialogue called for expanding cross-Strait exchanges and connections to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and make today’s fragile stability durable.

There is good reason for that argument. Exchange does not equal peace. But the past two decades provide at least one period in which political stability and closer interaction reinforced each other.

Between 2008 and 2016, during a period of relatively peaceful cross-Strait relations, two-way travel doubled and reached nearly 10 million trips in 2015. Cross-Strait movement became part of everyday life, creating something of a soft buffer between the two sides.

The experience suggests that political easing and people-to-people contact can work in both directions. Greater political trust made expanded tourism, flights and trade possible. More frequent travel and commerce, in turn, gave more people a direct stake in preserving stability.

Taiwan tourists pose for photos upon their arrival at Xiuying port in Haikou, capital of China’s Hainan Province, Feb. 8, 2010.

After the DPP returned to power in 2016, political relations deteriorated, and the scale of cross-Strait travel declined. Since pandemic restrictions were lifted, Beijing has repeatedly announced steps to restore travel to Taiwan for residents of selected regions and cities and has proposed adding more flights. The DPP administration, however, has yet to lift key pandemic-era restrictions on mainland visitors, while direct flights remain far below pre-pandemic levels.

As a result, cross-Strait travel has been recovering, but the flow remains markedly uneven.

According to China’s National Immigration Administration, there were 3.12 million cross-Strait trips in the first half of this year, up 22.1% from a year earlier. Taiwan residents accounted for 2.85 million trips to the mainland, an increase of 24.9%.

The figures also show that political tension has not eliminated the demand for contact. People from Taiwan continue to visit the mainland for work, study, family reasons and tourism. Movement in the other direction remains far more restricted.

The DPP administration has yet to produce a plan that can actually restart mainland tourism to Taiwan. It has also said that broader cross-Strait exchanges will be placed under a tighter “risk management” framework.

Earlier this year, the Financial Times published an article titled “Let Chinese mainland tourists return to Taiwan.” It argued that Beijing had already made high-profile political statements about restoring tourism and begun limited reopening measures without securing substantive concessions from Taipei. The article called on Taiwan to show greater flexibility and to compartmentalize tourism from the broader political dispute.

That argument found sympathy within Taiwan’s tourism industry, but it has not received the same response from the DPP administration.

The KMT’s role

The opposition KMT is now trying to serve as a channel of communication across the Strait.

After returning from the mainland, Cheng said the CPC leadership understood that Taiwan had developed a different political system and way of life. She also argued that people in Taiwan should be willing to acknowledge the mainland’s development achievements. Cheng offered to brief Lai personally on what she had heard and observed during the trip.

Her comments predictably drew criticism from political opponents in Taiwan. Some argued that Cheng was too willing to present Beijing’s perspective and paid too little attention to the military pressure around the island. Others worried that party-to-party contacts could allow Beijing to decide which Taiwanese political figures it regards as acceptable interlocutors.

Those concerns are not without basis, but they should not become a reason to reject all engagement.

Cheng’s approach also reflects a simple principle of communication across political divides: dialogue is often most valuable when differences are greatest. Explaining the mainland to people in Taiwan does not amount to endorsing its political system. Engaging and communicating with Beijing does not automatically mean entering talks on unequal terms.

The KMT also has historical experience with this approach.

In 2005, then-KMT chairman Lien Chan led a delegation to the mainland on what became known on both sides of the Strait as an “ice-breaking journey.” It produced the first formal meeting between the top leaders of the KMT and the CPC in six decades. Cheng was the KMT spokeswoman for that trip.

Lien Chan, then-KMT chairman, poses for a photo with other members of the delegation during a visit to the Tianfei Palace in Nanjing, east China’s Jiangsu Province, on April 27, 2005. Cheng Li-wun is third from right.

Three years later, the KMT returned to power, and the heightened cross-Strait tensions that had marked much of the Chen Shui-bian years gave way to a more stable period. Between 2008 and 2016, direct flights, tourism and trade expanded rapidly. In 2015, the leaders of the two sides met face-to-face for the first time since 1949.

Cheng’s decision to travel to the mainland as a sitting KMT chair therefore inevitably invites comparisons with that effort two decades ago.

Engagement matters beyond the Strait

At this year’s meeting between the leaders of the KMT and the CPC, the CPC leadership reiterated that Beijing would respond positively to proposals conducive to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations. It also described “Taiwan independence” as the principal threat to peace in the Strait.

The DPP does not accept that definition. But Beijing’s view of the issue remains impossible to ignore when trying to understand why official dialogue has been suspended for so long.

What is less disputed is that peace across the Taiwan Strait matters far beyond the two sides themselves.

For the United States, maintaining deterrence in its strategic competition with China and avoiding war are not contradictory goals.

After returning from China in May, U.S. President Donald Trump told Fox News that he did not want to see Taiwan move towards independence. He also questioned the idea of the United States traveling 9,500 miles to fight a war over the island, adding that he did not want such an outcome.

American public support for direct military intervention is also limited. A report published by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs on November 17, 2025 found that, in the event of a war over Taiwan, 51% of Americans opposed sending U.S. troops to defend Taiwan directly.

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during an interview with Fox News, in which he discussed his views on tensions across the Taiwan Strait.

For the rest of the world, the stakes are no less serious.

Taiwan is one of the world’s most important centers for advanced semiconductor production and a key node in East Asia’s manufacturing network. The Taiwan Strait is also one of the busiest maritime corridors. A conflict could hit semiconductor supplies, shipping, trade and financial markets within a very short period.

A Bloomberg Economics study published in February estimated that, in the most severe scenario, a U.S.-China war over Taiwan could cost the global economy 10.6 trillion U.S. dollars, roughly 9.6% of global gross domestic product, in the first year alone. The damage would extend far beyond the main parties. Japan, South Korea, the European Union, India and the United Kingdom could all face severe economic contractions.

A conflict in the Taiwan Strait would therefore be far more than a regional security crisis. It could quickly affect prices, production, investment and employment around the world.

Governments around the world may have limited ability to resolve the underlying political dispute. They do, however, have a clear interest in supporting measures that reduce the risk of escalation.

Economic interdependence and dense people-to-people ties across the Strait can provide additional buffers when tensions rise and preserve more channels for co-operation. Their value becomes greater, not smaller, when the risk of escalation is growing.

The exchanges promoted by Cheng and the KMT cannot resolve all the differences across the Strait. But expecting an opposition party to settle a decades-old cross-Strait issue would set an unreasonable standard.

What the KMT’s efforts help illustrate is that regular flights, functioning ports and ordinary people traveling across the Strait can give both sides a more tangible stake in keeping stability part of everyday life. They can also remind more people that political disagreement does not require all civilian contact to stop.

At a time when conflict has become more common in several parts of the world, creating room for cross-Strait relations to move back towards dialogue and exchange is, at the very least, a starting point worth taking seriously.

Beijing Scroll

China’s cross-Strait integration experiment in Xiamen and Kinmen

Nearly three years have passed since Chinese authorities unveiled a plan in September 2023 to support its eastern Fujian Province in exploring new approaches for integrated development across the Taiwan Strait…

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5 months ago · 10 likes · Jiang Jiang

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There have already been several good write-ups of the mission on Substack. So instead of recapping the launch itself, I’d like to look at another dimension of China’s commercial space industry: its rapidly expanding network of commercial launch sites.

The day after the recovery mission, City Evolution (城市进化论), a WeChat publication operated by the National Business Daily, argued that 2026 marks an important turning point for China’s commercial space sector. With reusable rockets entering an intensive phase of flight validation and the country’s national satellite internet constellations accelerating deployment, the industry, it argued, is moving from an experimental stage into a period of rapid growth.

The article also highlighted one increasingly important bottleneck: launch capacity. As more private rocket companies come online, launch pads have become scarce, and securing launch windows is becoming increasingly difficult.

This fits into a broader national strategy. China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) calls for accelerating the development of strategic emerging industries, including aerospace, and for speeding up the construction of an aerospace powerhouse.

Against this backdrop, local governments across the country are racing to position themselves within the commercial space economy, with new launch facilities becoming one of the key areas of competition.

Today, let’s take a look at how China’s commercial launch infrastructure is taking shape.

Most Chinese media now identify three major commercial launch sites currently in operation:

• the Hainan commercial spacecraft launch site in south China’s Hainan Province

• the Dongfeng commercial space innovation pilot zone in northwest China

• the Oriental Spaceport in Haiyang, a coastal city in east China’s Shandong Province

The Hainan commercial spacecraft launch site (Wenchang)

The rocket recovery mission that drew global attention last week took place at the Hainan commercial spacecraft launch site.

According to Oriental Outlook, a magazine affiliated with Xinhua, Wenchang is home to China’s first dedicated commercial space launch site. Its advantages begin with geography.

Located at low latitude and relatively close to the equator, Wenchang allows rockets to take greater advantage of the Earth’s rotational speed, reducing fuel consumption while increasing payload capacity. Unlike China’s inland launch centers, rockets launched from Wenchang fly almost entirely over the ocean, significantly reducing risks to populated areas. Its coastal location also makes it much easier to transport large rocket components by sea, an increasingly important advantage as China’s launch vehicles continue to grow in size.

One feature of the launch site that particularly impressed me is its versatility.

Traditionally, Chinese launch pads were designed around individual rocket models — essentially one launch pad for one type of rocket. That approach works for a government-led space program, but becomes inefficient when dozens of commercial rocket companies are developing different launch vehicles.

To address this, Hainan developed what it calls a universal launch pad. Rather than being customized for a single rocket, Launch Pad No. 2 can support rockets from more than ten companies across over twenty different rocket models.

As Yang Tianliang, chairman of the Hainan International Commercial Aerospace Launch Co., Ltd., explained to Oriental Outlook, engineers created a standardized launch interface, while each rocket company develops its own adapter to connect to it.

“Think of it like a universal charging station,” Yang said. “Different phone brands may use different connectors, but with the right adapter, they can all use the same charging point.”

Currently, all rockets with diameters below five meters can use the facility. The result is much higher launch-pad utilization.

This matters because Wenchang’s tropical climate brings frequent rainstorms, thunderstorms and typhoons. The less time a rocket occupies the launch pad, the less likely weather delays become.

To further improve efficiency, Hainan has adopted what’s known in China as the “three-horizontal” launch process: horizontal assembly, horizontal testing and horizontal transportation. Instead of standing vertically throughout preparation, rockets remain horizontal until shortly before launch.

According to Yang, this allows a rocket to arrive lying down, be raised vertically only at the final stage, and reduce its occupancy of the launch area to roughly three days.

By redesigning the entire workflow, the launch site aims to support a much higher launch cadence — an increasingly important capability as more commercial launch providers compete for access.

The Dongfeng commercial space innovation pilot zone in northwest China (Jiuquan)

If Wenchang represents China’s newest commercial launch hub, Jiuquan represents the industry’s roots.

The Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center is China’s oldest comprehensive launch facility. Within it, the Dongfeng commercial space innovation pilot zone serves as a dedicated area supporting commercial launch activities.

Today, many of China’s private rocket companies have built their own launch infrastructure there.

According to Xinhua, rocket developer LandSpace recently completed a static fire test of its reusable carrier rocket Zhuque-3 at the site. Zhuque-3 is a domestically developed, reusable launch vehicle powered by liquid oxygen-methane. It has been developed for large-scale satellite constellation networking missions.

The company said all key ground verification work before the launch has now been completed. In the next phase, the test team will carry out launch preparations as planned, fully preparing for the flight test mission.

The Oriental Spaceport (Haiyang, Shandong)

Haiyang represents a different model altogether. Rather than focusing primarily on land launches, Haiyang’s Oriental Spaceport specializes in sea-based launches.

Chen Yao, vice president and secretary-general of the China Regional Economics Association, told City Evolution that Haiyang’s biggest advantage lies in what he described as an integrated “port-behind-factory” model.

Rocket assembly facilities are located only a few kilometers from the launch terminal, allowing rockets to move almost directly from the factory to the launch vessel.

The city has also developed what Chinese media describe as a complete industrial chain covering satellites, rockets and support vessels, while simultaneously building a growing aerospace tourism industry.

According to the aerospace WeChat blog Hello Space (你好太空), China’s first sea launch took place off the coast of Haiyang on June 15, 2019, when a Long March 11 solid-fuel rocket successfully lifted off from an offshore platform.

By 2025, Haiyang had supported more than ten sea-launch missions and helped place over fifty satellites into orbit.

More launch sites are on the way

The expansion doesn’t stop with these three launch centers.

According to City Evolution, Sichuan’s Liangshan, Yangjiang in Guangdong, and Ningbo in Zhejiang are all planning commercial launch facilities as local governments compete for positions within China’s emerging commercial space industry.

Northeastern China is also joining the race. Liaoning Province’s recently released its 15th Five-Year Plan for the marine economy proposes building a commercial offshore launch base.

Chen Yao argues that the three northeastern provinces are already developing complementary roles: Jilin Province has built strengths in satellite manufacturing and applications through projects such as the Jilin-1 satellite constellation. Heilongjiang Province benefits from Harbin Institute of Technology’s aerospace research capabilities, particularly in satellite design and testing.

Liaoning Province, meanwhile, possesses something the other two provinces lack: a coastline. As China’s only coastal province in the northeast, it already has a well-established shipbuilding and offshore engineering industry, providing a natural foundation for developing launch vessels and offshore launch platforms without starting from scratch.

That gives it a comparative advantage in sea-based launch services that its inland neighbors cannot easily replicate.

I’m not an aerospace specialist, so today’s post is intended as a broad overview rather than a technical analysis. If you’d like to dive deeper into any of the topics covered here, I’ve embedded links to the original Chinese-language reporting throughout the article. Feel free to explore the original reporting in greater detail.

In a political commentary published by Xinhua News Agency on Jun. 29 to mark the Party’s 105th anniversary, the article noted that during the Party-wide campaign on establishing and practicing a correct view on governance performance, some cases involving deviations, distortions, and misplaced priorities in officials’ understanding of governance performance had been publicly reported and seriously dealt with. This, the commentary said, sent a strong signal that new achievements in Party self-governance would help safeguard the broad journey of Chinese modernization.

If you have been following China closely in recent years, you would be aware that after the 20th National Congress of the CPC, the Party launched a series of education campaigns: one in 2023 focused on studying and implementing Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era; one in 2024 on studying CPC discipline; and one in 2025 on strengthening compliance with a code of conduct known as the “Eight-Point Rules,” which many of you have read about in this newsletter. The campaign on the view of governance performance is this year’s equivalent theme.

Therefore, I believe this campaign is worth paying attention to.

As with many similar CPC campaigns, the Party has presented both model cases and cautionary cases. This is a very common method in such campaigns: using concrete cases to tell the whole Party what should be advocated, and what kinds of mistakes should be avoided as much as possible.

Just last month, the website of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) published five “typical cases of deviations in the view of governance performance.” One of them involved a local official who, in a one-sided pursuit of short-term economic benefits, placed economic indicators above ecological red lines and blindly introduced multiple highly polluting chemical companies into a county industrial park.

Meanwhile, in the 12th issue of China Discipline Inspection and Supervision (《中国纪检监察》杂志), a magazine overseen by the CCDI, published in June this year, a column on the view of governance performance included a model case related to ecological protection. The article was titled “Planting Trees for the People for 76 Years — The Plain View of governance performance in the ‘Youyu Spirit.’”

Because the concept of governance performance covers many fields, I will not summarize all of them in a single piece. So in today’s observation of the CPC’s campaign on the view of governance performance, I have decided to focus on ecological protection. I think readers from different countries can probably understand this topic more easily.

First of all, if you look at the CPC from a longer historical perspective, you will find that the Party has always attached considerable importance to ecology.

An article published in 2021 on the website of the Institute of Party History and Literature of the CPC Central Committee noted that during the revolutionary war years, the CPC carried out tree-planting and afforestation activities in revolutionary base areas. It also said that after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the first generation of the Party’s central leadership began to promote ecological civilization construction nationwide. The article further discussed the theoretical and practical achievements of China’s continued ecological civilization efforts after reform and opening-up, as well as in the current era.

In March this year, Guangming Daily, a newspaper run by the CPC Central Committee and mainly read by intellectuals, published an article titled “Understanding the Ecological and Environmental Dimension of the CPC’s Revolutionary History.” The author was Li Jinzheng, a professor at the Center for Chinese Social History and the School of History at Nankai University. The article offered a deeper discussion of the relationship between the CPC’s revolutionary history and the natural environment.

In its conclusion, the article said that the CPC “turned favorable natural conditions into advantages, and turned unfavorable natural conditions into favorable ones,” arguing that this reflected the Party’s strong initiative and creativity.

Against this broader backdrop, the article in China Discipline Inspection and Supervision about 76 years of tree planting in one county becomes particularly interesting.

The place in question is Youyu County in north China’s Shanxi Province.

I usually live in Beijing. One of the most visible changes I have felt over the years is that many international visitors who have been to Beijing now say that the weather is clearer than they had imagined. In the past, sandstorms often hit Beijing, and there were days when you could not see the blue sky.

Looking at the map, Youyu is basically at the same latitude as Beijing. It sits at the junction of Shanxi Province and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. Given this geographic location, strong winds and sandstorms were hardly surprising.

According to the magazine article, in June 1949, Zhang Ronghuai, the first Party secretary of Youyu County, arrived to take up his post. On the very day he arrived, he happened to encounter a strong wind:

“It was not an ordinary wind. It was the kind of wind that turned the sky yellowish brown. In broad daylight, you could not clearly see the face of someone standing opposite you. The sand hit people’s faces so hard that it hurt.”

This scene made even Zhang Ronghuai, who had been through battlefields, feel a sudden heaviness in his heart: What path was there for the people of Youyu to survive?

After discussing the issue with his colleagues, he came to believe that planting trees was the only way out for the county. This marked the beginning of stories in which 22 successive Party secretaries of Youyu County, over 76 years, led local people in planting trees.

During this process, a reporter once asked a local official: “If you always follow the same path, won’t people laugh at you for lacking ability?”

But the article noted that although the 22 county Party secretaries served in different eras and had different personalities and working methods, not one of them wavered on the question of “planting trees.” Some planted arbors, some planted shrubs, and some planted economic forests. The thinking was optimized over time, but the direction never shifted.

By the 1980s, as China began reform and opening-up and the tide of the market economy surged, in Youyu, some people began to argue that afforestation had already reached its limit. They said there were already enough trees, that the yellow sand had been brought under control, and that it was time to develop industry.

The article recorded one specific debate:

In the mid-to-late 1980s, as China began experimenting with GDP accounting, surrounding counties were opening small coal mines and setting up factories. Youyu had proven underground coal reserves of 500 million tonnes. At the time, someone calculated that opening a small coal mine could bring in 20 million yuan (about 3 million U.S. dollars) a year — equivalent to the county’s entire annual fiscal revenue.

At a meeting about the debate, Yuan Haoji, the 12th Party secretary of Youyu County, slammed the table and said: “Cutting down the forest to open coal mines may become the political achievement of our current leadership team, but it would leave a bad name for thousands of years!”

According to the article, 76 years later, Youyu has delivered a hard-core ecological answer: 90 percent of its desertified land has been effectively treated. The county, once pushed to the brink by wind and sand, has now become an important ecological barrier protecting the Beijing-Tianjin region. Every year, it reduces the amount of sediment flowing into the Yellow River by one million tonnes.

Today in Youyu, afforestation has developed into a mature green industry. For example, the county’s 300,000 mu of sea buckthorn forests have formed an industry with an annual output value of around 300 million yuan (about 44.2 million U.S. dollars).

China’s drone technology, which many of you are familiar with, has also found a role in Youyu. Today, drones are replacing manual labor in carrying saplings up the mountains. One drone can transport 120 saplings a day. The survival rate of Youyu’s afforestation has reached 92 percent, 18 times higher than in the early years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China.

There are many other interesting details in the article. If you are interested, you can read the full text with the help of a translation tool. I just want to add two more details.

First, a local journalist who has covered Shanxi for many years told me that while burning joss paper during the Qingming Festival, also known as Tomb-Sweeping Day, is a long-standing tradition across much of China, today, people in Youyu commemorate their ancestors by offering flowers instead of burning paper in order to protect the forests and the environment. Environmentally friendly forms of remembrance like this are, of course, not unique to China — I have encountered similar practices elsewhere in the world.

Second, he told me on that, according to the Youyu County Gazetteer, the county had just over 30 bird species in the 1980s. Today, that number has grown to more than 160, making Youyu a popular destination for birdwatchers.

In summarizing the view of governance performance represented by the “Youyu Spirit,” the article said:

True political achievement is not only about how many “highlights” an official creates during his or her term, but more importantly about how much foundation is left for future development. Seventy-six years. Twenty-two county Party secretaries. 130 million trees. Behind these numbers is a view of governance performance that goes beyond the individual, beyond the term of office, and beyond immediate interests. Local officials in Youyu often say: “Those who plant trees may not see the day when the trees become a forest, but they cannot refuse to plant them just because they may not see that day.”

The Youyu Spirit reminded me of the long-termism that is so often discussed today. This kind of trade-off is in fact not easy, because people sometimes tend to choose things that are beneficial to themselves in the short term, or pursue novelty in order to distinguish themselves from their predecessors. For that reason, the story of Youyu is indeed impressive.

I didn’t want to make this article too long, so I chose to focus on just this one case. I hope you found it helpful.

In March this year, Fujian released what it described as the first batch of milestone achievements in the construction of the cross-Strait integrated development demonstration zone. Among the achievements highlighted by the Fujian government was progress toward creating “same-city living circles” between Xiamen and Kinmen, and between Fuzhou and Matsu.

Having visited both Xiamen, the port city in Fujian, and Kinmen, a Taiwan-administered island group lying just off the mainland coast, I wanted to take a closer look at how integration between the two places has developed over the past three years.

This post was prompted by the recent 18th Straits Forum in Xiamen. Several side events focused on cooperation between Xiamen and Kinmen, bringing together officials, business representatives, researchers and residents familiar with developments on both sides. Journalist friends in Xiamen were therefore able to help me obtain some relatively detailed information about the projects now being pursued.

First, however, it is worth briefly considering the historical background. A line widely attributed to a Qing-dynasty edition of the Taiwan gazetteer compared Taiwan and Xiamen to “the two wings of a bird,” adding that local people regarded the two as closely interconnected.

The historical relationship was also examined in Xiamen’s Economic and Social Development Strategy, 1985–2000 (《1985年——2000年厦门经济社会发展战略》 ）, a long-term development study prepared in the 1980s. The book discussed the movement of people and goods between Xiamen and Taiwan and the importance of those connections to Xiamen’s development.

What, then, has made the relationship between Xiamen and Kinmen a testing ground for cross-Strait integration?

More than two decades ago, limited direct postal, trade and transport links were established between Fujian and the Taiwan-administered offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu. These arrangements became known as the “mini three links (“小三通”),” as distinct from the broader postal, trade and transport links established across the Taiwan Strait.

On Jan. 2, 2019, at a meeting marking the 40th anniversary of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, the Chinese leadership called for smoother economic and trade cooperation, infrastructure connectivity, the sharing of energy and resources, and the alignment of industry standards across the Strait. These proposals became known as the “new four links (“新四通“).”

The Chinese leadership also proposed that Kinmen and Matsu could take the lead in establishing direct links with nearby parts of Fujian in four specific areas: water, electricity, gas and bridges. These are commonly referred to on the mainland as the “mini four links.”

Kinmen, together with Xiamen and other coastal areas of Fujian, has therefore served as a testing ground for broader forms of cross-Strait integration.

The Chinese mainland has continued to promote this approach. In April 2026, the mainland rolled out a package of 10 policies and measures -- spanning inter-party communication, infrastructure, travel, trade and culture -- aimed at boosting exchanges and cooperation with Taiwan. They included renewed support for water, electricity, gas and bridge connections between coastal Fujian and Kinmen and Matsu, as well as a proposal allowing Kinmen residents to make use of Xiamen’s new airport.

The connections already in operation

How much integration between Xiamen and Kinmen currently exists in practice?

The passenger ferry offers one of the clearest indicators.

Ten vessels currently operate on the Xiamen–Kinmen route, with 24 sailings each day. The one-way journey takes about 30 minutes. According to data from the Xiamen General Station of Exit and Entry Frontier Inspection, annual passenger journeys on the route rose sharply over the past three years:

• 710,000 in 2023

• 1.25 million in 2024

• 1.74 million in 2025

These are passenger journeys rather than the number of unique travelers, meaning that a person making a round trip is normally counted twice. Even so, the figures show a substantial recovery and expansion of cross-Strait movement through the route.

Among the proposed water, electricity, gas and bridge connections, water is by far the most advanced.

Fujian began supplying water to Kinmen on August 5, 2018. According to Fujian Water Resources Investment & Development Group, Fujian has since supplied Kinmen with more than 49 million tonnes of water. Daily deliveries now stand at about 21,000 tonnes, accounting for approximately 87 percent of the water handled by Kinmen’s public water system.

When I was reporting in Kinmen earlier this year, I met Zhang Yangyang, a Kinmen native who moved to Xiamen in 2009 to study traditional Chinese medicine at Xiamen University. He recalled that water shortages were once a defining feature of everyday life for a generation of Kinmen residents.

“I remember that when I was a child, the water would sometimes be cut off, and we had to take storage containers and wait for water,” he said. “That no longer happens.”

Integration has also extended into selected areas of public services.

Xiamen has made school and kindergarten places available to children from Kinmen, with preferential policies applying at different stages of education. It has encouraged Kinmen residents to seek employment in the city and offers certain subsidies to qualifying companies that recruit talent from Kinmen.

Kinmen residents working or living in Xiamen may also be eligible for employee medical insurance, temporary assistance and a range of basic public-health services, including health records and vaccinations. Some can apply for public rental housing or subsidized housing.

These policies represent an effort to incorporate Kinmen residents into parts of Xiamen’s public service system.

Infrastructure prepared on one side

The remaining three elements of the “mini four links” — electricity, gas and a bridge — have made some progress on the Xiamen side, but none has yet resulted in a functioning connection across the water.

On electricity, the supporting alternating-current grid on the mainland side has been put into operation, while preparatory procedures for a planned converter station have been completed.

Academic and technical discussions on connecting the Xiamen and Kinmen power grids have taken place several times since 2020. The two power systems operate at different frequencies, so the proposed link would use a flexible direct-current conversion system in Xiamen to make the electricity compatible with Kinmen’s grid before sending it across the water by subsea cable.

According to people familiar with the project, there are no fundamental technical obstacles, but the main difficulty is the Taiwan authorities’ refusal to engage in direct communication.

Taiwan authorities have questioned whether such a connection is necessary. In August 2022, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council said that linking the power grids would involve the exercise of public authority by both sides and that no consultations had taken place. It added that, according to an assessment by Taiwan Power Company, existing generating capacity could meet projected growth in demand in Kinmen and Matsu for another decade. It therefore saw neither an urgent need nor an immediate necessity for a connection with Fujian.

On gas, an LNG supply station and part of the related pipeline network have been built on the Xiamen side. According to the Xiamen Municipal Bureau of Municipal Administration and Landscape, Taiwan authorities have not formally responded to the proposal for a Xiamen–Kinmen gas link, while the Kinmen county government has expressed support.

Regarding the proposed bridge, which is probably the most visible one of the projects, the Xiamen section of the Xiamen-Kinmen Bridge project is scheduled to open by the end of this year, and the project serves to link Xiamen island to Xiang’an International Airport and includes a reserved interface for a future extension to Kinmen. Taiwan authorities have not announced a corresponding construction plan on the Kinmen side.

Kinmen residents have told me that flights at Kinmen Airport are sometimes delayed or cancelled because of fog. In their view, access to the much larger airport in Xiamen could provide an alternative route when weather disrupts local services.

For Kinmen passengers to use the airport through a dedicated arrangement, the two sides would need to address immigration controls, customs procedures, transport links, aviation regulation and security responsibilities.

Why did water come first?

The contrast among the four projects raises an obvious question: why was water supply implemented while electricity, gas and a bridge remain incomplete?

Yang Kunfu, a council member of Xiamen Association for Taiwan Studies, argues that the main reason was the severity of Kinmen’s water shortage. A shortage of fresh water presented an immediate and widely recognized public need.

Compared with electricity, gas or a bridge, the water project also involved relatively straightforward engineering and was regarded as less politically sensitive. A bridge, by contrast, would have considerable symbolic as well as practical significance, making it much more difficult to advance in Taiwan’s current political environment.

Yang believes the four projects therefore need to proceed gradually, beginning with those that are easier to implement.

His explanation points to a broader distinction among the projects. Water, electricity, gas, a bridge and shared airport access are not one-off transactions. Each would create a long-term relationship involving investment, pricing, maintenance, emergency arrangements, regulation, security and the allocation of responsibility.

Infrastructure can be prepared by one side alone. A functioning cross-boundary connection cannot.

There is also a difference between local support and the authority to implement a project. The Kinmen county government and some local political and business figures have expressed support for deeper links with Xiamen. But decisions involving electricity, energy, cross-boundary roads, immigration and customs cannot be made by Kinmen alone.

In addition to several key reports, such as the government work report, and several key pieces of legislation, this year’s agenda also centers on the widely anticipated draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan for national economic and social development.

Compared with the Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership’s recommendations for formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan, released last October, the draft outline provides far more detail.

Spanning more than 70,000 Chinese characters and organized into 18 sections and 62 chapters, the outline is too extensive to cover fully in a single article.

So in this piece, I focus on a concept that has been widely discussed in Chinese policy circles over the past year: “invest in people,” or “investment in human capital” (投资于人).

The Emergence of the “Invest in People” Concept

The idea did not appear overnight. As early as 2023, the Chinese leadership mentioned in a high-level meeting that China should not only continue “investing in physical assets,” but should closely combine this with “investing in human capital.”

A year ago, during the 2025 “two sessions,” the government work report used the phrase “investment in people” for the first time, saying that “more funds and resources will be used to serve the people and meet their needs.”

The recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan released last year emphasized:

坚持扩大内需这个战略基点，坚持惠民生和促消费、投资于物和投资于人紧密结合

Guided by the strategy of expanding domestic demand, we should work toward improving living standards while increasing consumer spending and combine investment in physical assets with investment in human capital.

The draft outline released on March 5 continues this formulation.

Why Emphasize “Investing in People”?

An article published in December 2025 in Qiushi, a flagship magazine of the CPC Central Committee, helps clarify the policy logic.

According to the article, as China’s development stage and conditions change, the returns on “investing in physical assets,” such as infrastructure, housing, and machinery, have declined significantly. Between 2008 and 2023, China’s incremental capital-output ratio rose from 2.84 to 9.44, meaning that generating each additional yuan of GDP now requires several times more capital investment than before.

At the same time, capital-driven investment can expand production capacity in ways that do not necessarily match evolving consumer demand, leading to localized overcapacity and structural imbalances.

Meanwhile, rising incomes and the expansion of China’s middle-income population are increasing demands for better public services and higher quality of life. Yet mismatches in the domestic supply-demand structure continue to constrain people’s pursuit of a better life.

What Does “Investing in People” Mean?

In an interview with Qiushi, economist Yu Chunhai, a professor at Renmin University of China, explained the concept:

“投资于人”，是指将更多财政资金和公共资源投向教育、就业、医疗、社会保障等民生领域，投入到人的能力提升、健康维护、职业发展和潜力开发中，以消费潜力释放和人力资本提升驱动经济高质量发展。

“Investing in people” refers to directing greater fiscal funding and public resources toward livelihood-related sectors such as education, employment, healthcare, and social security, and toward enhancing human capabilities, safeguarding health, advancing career development, and unlocking individual potential, so as to drive high-quality economic development through the release of consumption potential and the strengthening of human capital.

Yu emphasized that “investing in people” is not merely a type of investment or a particular investment direction. Rather, it represents a new development orientation — one that serves as a correction to past models of investment, capacity expansion, and even the broader development paradigm.

Furthermore, “investing in people” aims to raise individuals’ levels of knowledge, skills, health, and social adaptability, thereby improving the overall human capital and professional skills of society. The goal is to transform “human resources” into “human capital” capable of sustainable value creation, and to move from a “demographic dividend” to a “talent dividend.”

Where Will China “Invest in People”?

Following this logic, “investing in people” covers a wide range of areas. From the draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan, I’ve picked out a few examples that, in my view, highlight how this people-centered investment approach will shape China’s policy priorities over the next five years.

1. New Livelihood-Focused Targets & Major Livelihood Projects

Among the plan’s 12 key expected indicators, many relate directly to people’s well-being. Compared with the 14th Five-Year Plan, some targets have been adjusted. Here are examples:

• Life expectancy is expected to rise from 79.25 years to 80 years.

• The previous indicator of basic pension insurance participation rate has been replaced with the share of nursing-care beds in eldercare institutions, expected to increase from 68% to 73%.

• The metric of childcare slots per 1,000 people has been replaced with childcare enrollment for children under age three, expected to increase by 6 percentage points.

• The indicator of physicians per 1,000 people has been refined into two metrics: licensed physicians (3.7 per 1,000) and registered nurses (5.1 per 1,000).

To me, these adjustments suggest a more refined approach to people-centered services and a stronger emphasis on their tangible outcomes.

In addition, it is noteworthy that Chinese policymakers have emphasized that “the most important indicator of modernization is still the health of the people” and that “health is 1, and everything else is the zeros that follow,” characterizing the steady increase in average life expectancy as a reflection of the advantages of China’s socialist system.

加强人力资源开发和人的全面发展投资，在“一老一小”服务、基层医疗卫生、普通高中和优质高等教育扩容、职业技能培训等领域实施一批民生工程，提高民生类政府投资比重。

Strengthen investment in human resource development and in the comprehensive development of people. Implement a number of public welfare projects in areas such as services for the elderly and children, primary-level healthcare, the expansion of general high schools and high-quality higher education, and vocational skills training, while increasing the share of government investment devoted to livelihood-related areas.

Among the 109 major projects listed in the draft outline, 25 are related to improving people’s livelihoods, including 4 projects on building a high-quality education system, 7 projects related to healthcare, 5 projects focused on services for “the elderly and the children” populations.

This morning, the heads of five ministries related to people’s livelihood held a joint press conference, answering journalists’ questions on issues in the livelihood sector during the 15th Five-Year Plan period. The full transcript is available for those interested.

2. Paid Leave and New School Vacation Policies

落实职工带薪休假制度，鼓励弹性错峰休假，探索推行中小学生春秋假。

Implement the paid annual leave system for employees, encourage flexible and staggered vacation arrangements, and explore the introduction of spring and autumn breaks for primary and secondary school students.

The earlier policy recommendations already mentioned paid leave. The new outline adds concrete language about staggered vacations and school holiday experiments. The government work report, which includes plans for the coming year, also reiterated this point, suggesting implementation may accelerate.

According to People’s Daily, several provinces in China have already begun experimenting with spring and autumn breaks.

Lu Ming, a professor at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, has long advocated optimizing holiday arrangements across the year. According to him, short breaks in spring and autumn could stimulate consumption while also giving children and families much-needed breathing room.

He argues that China hopes to make consumption a new driver of economic growth — and much of the potential lies in sectors such as education, healthcare, culture, and tourism. But these forms of consumption depend on people having both the time and the well-being to enjoy them.

Lu, who is also a national political advisor, points out that many workers today feel they cannot take leave even when legally entitled to it, due to widespread overtime culture. Policies such as school breaks may therefore need to be paired with flexible leave arrangements for parents.

3. Talent Development in Strategic Technologies

围绕科技创新、产业发展和国家战略需求协同育人，提高人才自主培养质量。聚焦优势学科适度扩大“双一流”建设范围，新建若干所新型研究型大学。

Coordinate talent development with technological innovation, industrial development, and national strategic needs, and improve the quality of independently trained talent. Focus on key disciplines and appropriately expand the scope of the “Double First-Class Initiative,” while establishing several new research-oriented universities.

健全高等教育学科专业设置调整机制，超常规布局人工智能、集成电路等新兴领域急需学科专业，深入实施基础学科和交叉学科突破计划。

Improve the mechanism for adjusting disciplines and programs in higher education, make extraordinary arrangements for urgently needed disciplines in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence (AI) and integrated circuits, and advance in-depth implementation of breakthrough plans for basic and interdisciplinary disciplines.

China’s AI-related industries will be valued at more than 10 trillion yuan (1.45 trillion U.S. dollars) by the end of the 15th Five-Year Plan period, Zheng Shanjie, head of the National Development and Reform Commission, said at a press conference on Friday.

Such projections underscore the importance of investing in people in frontier technological fields. Planning talent development early in sectors such as AI can ensure that more people have opportunities to apply their skills and build careers in emerging industries.

As AI becomes a defining technology of the next technological revolution, strengthening the talent pipeline is critical. According to Li Jinghong, a national political advisor and a professor at Tsinghua University, AI is not only a key technology for the next technological revolution but also a crucial indicator of national innovation capacity. This, he said, requires systemic reforms that allow education, science, and industry to reinforce one another.

4. Building a Birth-Friendly Society

坚持生育友好的政策取向，推动生育支持融入经济社会发展各项政策。

Adhere to a birth-friendly policy orientation and enhance childbirth support through various economic and social policies.

While last year’s recommendations called for improving childbirth support policies (”优化生育支持政策”), the new outline goes further, emphasizing that birth support should be integrated into various economic and social policies.

Specific measures include:

• effectively eliminating out-of-pocket costs for hospital childbirth within policy coverage

• fully implementing maternity leave systems

• encouraging flexible work arrangements for parents with children under three

• allowing children from multi-child families to attend the same school

• direct housing policies in favor of families with two or more children

These policies signal a stronger commitment over the next five years to building a birth-friendly social environment.

5. Reforming Population Management and Urbanization

探索建立全国统一的人口管理制度，逐步实现由常住地登记户口。稳步提高农民工参加城镇职工社会保险比例，推动更多城市将符合条件的未落户常住人口纳入公租房保障范围。

Explore the establishment of a nationally unified population management system, and gradually realize household registration based on place of habitual residence. Steadily increase the proportion of migrant workers participating in the urban employee social insurance system, and encourage more cities to include eligible long-term residents without local household registration in the public rental housing support system.

因地制宜放宽在流入地参加中考报名条件，推进符合条件的随迁子女连续接受基础教育。

According to local conditions, relax the requirements for registering for the senior high school entrance examination in the place of residence, and promote the continuous access to compulsory education for eligible children who move with their parents.

An analysis published in February in the journal Governance （《国家治理》), affiliated with the People’s Daily, notes that many regions still require household registration (hukou) to access subsidized medical and pension insurance. This creates barriers to equal social protection between registered and non-registered residents.

The analysis noted that the issue is significant because, as labor markets become more integrated and population mobility increases, the separation between a person’s place of residence and their household registration has become increasingly common. For example, in Zhejiang, more than 16 million of the province’s 66 million residents do not hold local household registration. The proportion is even higher in Guangdong.

Advancing people-centered urbanization, therefore, becomes crucial. Policies such as establishing a unified population management system help ensure equal access to social security and public services, representing another important dimension of China’s emerging “investing in people” development strategy.

There are many other elements in the draft outline related to “investing in people” that I have not covered here. If you think there are important points that I missed, feel free to leave a comment and share your thoughts.

I’d like to end this newsletter with an explanation from Qiushi:

“投资于人”不是摒弃“投资于物”，而是追求两者之间的紧密结合和良性互动。物的投入与积累，最终是为了实现人的发展 ...... 二者的紧密结合，是对我国投资理念、方向、重点的提升和优化。

“Investing in human capital” does not mean abandoning “investing in physical assets.” Rather, it seeks close integration and positive interaction between the two. Investment in and accumulation of material resources ultimately serve the purpose of human development ... The close combination of “investing in human capital” and “investing in physical assets” represents an upgrading and optimization of China’s investment philosophy, direction, and priorities.

Please note that the analysis in this piece does not represent any official view, and reflects only my personal analysis and judgment.

According to a report by China Youth Daily, on Dec. 30, 2025, scholars, government officials and industry practitioners gathered at a symposium on the structure and employment impact of China’s micro-drama sector. At the event, Peking University National School of Development (NSD) released a comprehensive study titled The 2025 Report on the Development Landscape of China’s Micro-Drama Industry and Its Employment Effects.

On Wednesday, NSD’s WeChat account made the full report available for download.

Around the same time, Qiushi, a flagship magazine of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, published a feature article in the second issue of 2026 on the development of the short-drama sector. The piece, written by Hu Yifeng, deputy director of the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles’ theory research office, didn’t directly cite the NSD report, but echoed several of its key data points.

Meanwhile, practitioners across Chinese social media have been sharing their own, ground-level observations about the business.

I don’t personally watch micro-dramas, but I think this industry is worth paying attention to.

Today, I want to walk through what stood out to me in these two pieces, especially how official and academic observers are evaluating the sector, and what the numbers suggest about its growing connection to employment and flexible work.

Before diving in, a brief word about the institution behind the report.

NSD, formerly the China Center for Economic Research (CCER), was founded in the 1990s and has long played a key role in China’s reforms. In 2024, the school marked its 30th anniversary. Its current dean, Huang Yiping, described it as a key driver of China’s systemic economic reforms. Over the years, many scholars affiliated with the school have written candid accounts of how academic research fed into policymaking. One memoir I’d especially recommend is by founding professor Zhang Weiying, for anyone curious about how university think tanks have shaped China’s reform trajectory.

According to NSD, the micro-drama study was led by Professor Zhang Dandan, together with a research team. In estimating the sector’s broader employment impact, they drew on methodologies used by organizations such as Boston Consulting Group and the Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre, as well as domestic research on China’s film and cultural industries.

1. The growing influence of micro-dramas in China

The article in Qiushi notes that in 2025, micro-dramas experienced explosive growth, emerging as a new frontier in China’s cultural consumption market.

China’s monthly output of micro-dramas has stabilized at around 3,000 titles, with the user base reaching 696 million — covering more than 60 percent of the country’s internet population. Hundreds of millions of viewers are hooked on these bite-sized shows, where twists come every five seconds and entire lifetimes unfold in just ten minutes.

The NSD report also sketches a profile of who is actually watching micro-dramas. It argues that the highly modular and easily replicable storytelling of micro-dramas, built around fast hooks and constant twists, neatly fills the fragmented downtime of food-delivery riders, commuting office workers, and even older viewers. The emergence of a user base exceeding 700 million, the report notes, reflects not a niche taste but a broad-based pattern of cultural consumption rooted in China’s mass audience.

Boosting consumption, of course, is a top priority for policymakers in China right now. From that perspective, the explosive growth of micro-dramas appears to align closely with the country’s broader push to optimize its economic structure and stimulate domestic demand.

2. Micro-dramas’ growing footprint overseas

The Qiushi article argues that micro-dramas have become an emerging force in China’s cultural “going global” push, with their international reach expanding rapidly. It also provides data to illustrate the sector’s rising overseas influence.

In just the first eight months of 2025, China’s overseas micro-drama market generated 1.525 billion U.S. dollars in total revenue, up 194.9 percent year on year.

The NSD report also highlights the industry’s growing international spillover effects:
“The wave of short dramas going overseas has created new professional niches serving foreign markets — including script translation, multilingual dubbing, overseas distribution and operations, and international rights trading. At the same time, foreign directors and actors have begun coming to China to produce English-language or bilingual short dramas, further expanding employment opportunities in cross-cultural production, audiovisual translation, and on-site coordination.”

3. The economic impact of micro-dramas, especially on employment in China

The micro-drama industry’s ecosystem has become more mature, with more than 100,000 companies now operating in the sector nationwide. In 2025, the industry directly employed about 690,000 people across China.

Both Qiushi article and the NSD report mentioned a key figure: the industry directly supports around 690,000 jobs. The NSD report provides a detailed explanation of how that number was calculated:

At present, there is no unified official statistical framework covering employment in either the production or acting segments of the micro-drama industry. Existing industry data tend to focus on market size or viewership, offering little systematic insight into the labor market. Against this backdrop, our research team conducted extensive fieldwork, in-depth interviews, and cross-verification across multiple data sources. Using a structured model built on clearly defined assumptions, we estimated the scale of employment in the short-drama sector. The findings show:

(1) Production crews — including in-house screenwriters, directors, producers, cinematographers, lighting technicians, art directors, costume and props staff, sound engineers, and post-production personnel — form the most stable and technically intensive segment of the industry’s workforce, totaling around 450,000 people.

(2) Lead and supporting actors represent a comparatively smaller but highly professional group, numbering about 32,000.

(3) Extras constitute the largest, most accessible, and most fluid segment of employment. This group most directly reflects the industry’s role in supporting flexible employment and migrant workers, with approximately 207,000 people.

Taken together, these three groups indicate that in 2025 the short-drama industry directly supported around 690,000 jobs nationwide.

Building on this baseline, the report applies an indirect employment multiplier of 1.95, estimating that in 2025 the short-drama sector indirectly supports another 1.34 million jobs across related industries.

It notes that employment multipliers in the broader cultural and film sector typically range between 1.95 and 3.0. Choosing 1.95 therefore represents a deliberately conservative assumption, helping avoid overstating the industry’s spillover effects.

Adding the 690,000 direct jobs to the 1.34 million indirect jobs, the report concludes that micro-dramas could support around 2.03 million jobs in total in 2025.

The study also places these numbers in the context of China’s broader employment pressures. The labor market, it argues, is marked by the coexistence of overall job pressures and structural mismatches. The number of university graduates continues to rise. The class of 2026 alone is expected to reach 12.7 million while key groups such as migrant workers face increasing uncertainty over job stability and job quality amid industrial restructuring and fluctuating demand.

Against this backdrop, an industry capable of generating roughly two million jobs is clearly worth paying attention to — especially given that many of these positions have relatively low entry barriers and offer flexible forms of work.

Qiushi also discusses the reasons behind the rise of micro-dramas and offers its own analysis of the sector’s rapid growth. Since I’m not approaching this from the perspective of an entertainment industry insider, I won’t go into detail here. If you’re curious, you can easily consult the original piece, or even have AI walk you through it.

4. “Growing pains” of a fast-developing industry

The magazine also lays out several of the industry’s current challenges:

As a new cultural format born of the digital age, micro-dramas have achieved rapid growth and impressive results. At the same time, however, the sector still faces shortcomings in areas such as content quality, industry governance, and evaluation systems — the inevitable “growing pains” of a fast-developing industry.

On the quality of micro-dramas, the article argues that the number of truly outstanding micro-dramas remains disproportionately small compared with the sector’s sheer scale. In its words, the situation resembles “vast forests producing only a tiny bit of coal,” a vivid way of saying that high output has yet to translate into high-quality hits.

Some productions are eager to brand themselves around “mainstream values,” yet lack careful script development or convincing performances. The result is often dull storytelling, rough production values, and lukewarm audience responses. Others manage to tap into popular social sentiments but stop at surface-level treatments of trending topics — with repetitive character setups, similar plots, and interchangeable aesthetics, making it hard to deliver anything substantive or memorable. Still others show little commitment to original storytelling, chasing clicks and traffic instead.

In terms of industry governance, the article notes that the workforce is highly fluid. While this mobility injects energy and speeds up iteration, it may also undermine the resilience and institutional stability the sector needs for long-term development. The piece also calls for improving platform algorithms to break out of “aesthetic echo chambers,” and for embracing innovation in response to new technologies such as AI-generated content (AIGC).

Finally, it points out that the evaluation system for micro-dramas — how quality and impact are assessed — remains relatively underdeveloped.

5. Viewing time & short-drama production bases

Beyond the headline numbers, a few other details in the report also caught my attention — particularly how much time people now spend watching micro-dramas, and the emergence of dedicated production hubs in cities like Zhengzhou and Xi’an.

The report notes that from January to August 2025, average daily usage per user rose steadily from 95.7 minutes to 120.5 minutes, and has since remained stable in the 1.5–2 hour range. What’s striking is that viewing time did not fall back after an initial burst of popularity. Instead, it continued to edge upward from an already high base. In other words, micro-dramas are no longer a passing trend — they have become deeply embedded in people’s daily routines, evolving into a highly “sticky,” habitual form of entertainment consumption.

Geographically, production has also begun to cluster. Zhengzhou and Xi’an have emerged as two of the country’s most important short-drama production bases. Industry estimates suggest that each city launches roughly 400–600 new productions per month, together accounting for nearly 30 percent of national output. Meanwhile, Hengdian, with its extensive historical and costume-drama sets, has become the filming location for nearly 90 percent of China’s period micro-dramas.

According to the report, this kind of regional specialization not only reduces homogenized competition but also improves professionalization and production efficiency across the industry.

If I get the chance, I’d love to visit one of these production hubs myself to see how these shows are actually made on the ground.

Have you watched any Chinese micro-dramas? If there’s anything you’re curious about, feel free to leave a comment.

Such meetings are a long-standing practice in China’s policy process. Before the Government Work Report is formally presented to the National People’s Congress, senior leaders typically convene representatives from different sectors to gather feedback and calibrate policy priorities.

At the meeting, Li urged officials to thoroughly implement the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee’s recommendations for formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan and the decisions made at the Central Economic Work Conference, using the certainty of high-quality development to address the uncertainties in the development environment, and called for a more proactive fiscal policy and a moderately loose monetary policy.

He also highlighted the need to closely integrate pro-people policies with consumption promotion, and combine investment in physical assets with investment in human capital to foster new drivers of economic growth and continuously enhance public welfare.

Nine representatives spoke at the symposium [video]. While official footage has not disclosed what each individual said, Xinhua’s readout notes that the speakers came from academia, the business community, and sectors including education, science, culture, public health, and sports.

On Tuesday, The Paper (澎湃新闻) published brief profiles of each of the nine speakers, drawing on their professional backgrounds and areas of expertise. I found these profiles particularly illuminating in understanding how policymakers may be thinking about the Government Work Report and the upcoming Five-Year Plan. Below, based on The Paper’s reporting, I share short introductions to the nine speakers who took part in this symposium:

1. 明明 Mingming: He received his master’s degree from the Tsinghua University People’s Bank of China School of Finance (PBCSF) and his PhD from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He previously worked at the Monetary Policy Department I and II of the People’s Bank of China and joined CITIC Securities in 2015. His research focuses on macroeconomics, interest rates, monetary policy, and liquidity.

2. 贺佳 He Jia: Professor, vice dean and PhD supervisor of the School of Finance at Nankai University, and a recipient of the Ministry of Education’s National Young Talent Program. She is a Fellow of the Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) and one of Nankai University’s “Top 100 Young Academic Leaders.” Her research interests include real estate finance, household finance, and consumer finance.

3. 闫俊杰 Yan Junjie: Born in 1989, he serves as CEO of MiniMax and represents China’s large AI model enterprises, making him the second such representative to attend Premier Li Qiang’s symposium after DeepSeek founder Liang Wenfeng. Public information shows that MiniMax was founded in early 2022 and is among the few large-model companies that have focused on full-modality model development since inception. MiniMax was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on January 9 this year, with a latest market capitalization of nearly HK$120 billion.

4. 张智刚 Zhang Zhigang: Currently an alternate member of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC, and Chairman and Party Secretary of State Grid Corporation of China.

5. 龚旗煌 Gong Qihuang: Currently an alternate member of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC, and the deputy party secretary and president of Peking University.

6. 余晓晖 Yu Xiaohui: Member of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, currently the president and deputy party secretary of the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, and a senior engineer. He has long been engaged in research on information and communications technology and industry, communication networks, informatization, industrial integration, and the digital economy.

In the 1990s, he focused on communication network simulation, routing technologies, and network optimization and planning. Since 2000, he has led systematic research in areas including the industrial internet, “Broadband China,” the internet and mobile internet, the Internet of Things, digital infrastructure, and digital transformation, helping to promote industrial technological innovation and applications.

7. 王拥军 Wang Yongjun: Academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences; deputy party secretary and president of Beijing Tiantan Hospital, Capital Medical University; chief scientist, professor and PhD supervisor of the Neurology Center; director of the National Medical Quality Control Center for Neurological Diseases; deputy director of the National Clinical Research Center for Neurological Diseases; and director of the Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Clinical Trials at Capital Medical University.

8. 周莉亚 Zhou Liya: Born in 1981, she and her partner Han Zhen are widely known in the dance community as the “Twin Stars of Dance.” They have jointly choreographed and directed dance dramas including A Tapestry of a Legendary Land (《只此青绿》) and The Eternal Wave, and also served as chief directors of China’s 80th Victory Anniversary Commemorative Gala. In 2021, the dance-poetry drama A Tapestry of a Legendary Land, which she co-directed with Han Zhen, became a nationwide cultural phenomenon and a landmark dance IP.

A Tapestry of a Legendary Land (《只此青绿》)

9. 石宇奇 Shi Yuqi: Born in 1996, he is a Chinese men’s singles badminton player and world champion.

Shi claimed the men’s singles title at the 2025 BWF World Championships, ending a decade-long title drought for China in the event.

As this move is unprecedented in scale, it has quickly attracted attention at home and abroad. Science and Technology Daily reported that a Chinese expert who has been deeply involved in ITU-related affairs said the filings should be viewed in a rational manner:

中国幅员辽阔，是卫星技术应用大国，结合卫星技术应用实际和未来发展需求，在国际规则框架下，此次申报了多份卫星网络资料，其中有两份超过9万颗卫星。

China is vast in territory and a major country in the application of satellite technologies. In light of the realities of satellite applications and future development needs, and within the framework of international rules, China has, this time, filed multiple sets of satellite network projects, two of which involve more than 90,000 satellites.

截至目前，已有多个国家根据自身情况申报了卫星规模10万颗以上的卫星网络资料。受卫星频率轨道资源国际协调、系统建设、市场需求变化等多种因素影响，多数情况下，相关公司后续实际部署的卫星规模、技术参数等还会进行动态优化调整。

As of now, multiple countries have, based on their own circumstances, filed satellite network projects involving more than 100,000 satellites. Influenced by a range of factors such as international coordination of satellite frequency and orbital resources, system construction, and changes in market demand, in most cases the actual number of satellites ultimately deployed, as well as technical parameters and other aspects, will be dynamically optimized and adjusted in subsequent steps by the relevant companies.

该专家表示，卫星系统从卫星网络资料国际申报、国际协调到卫星发射、系统建设、提供服务、应用推广，一般需要较长时间。此次我国相关单位申报的卫星网络资料，属于履行ITU相关程序的例行操作，应予以理性看待。

The expert said that the entire process—from international filing of satellite network information and international coordination, to satellite launches, system construction, service provision, and application rollout—generally takes a relatively long time. The satellite network information filed by relevant Chinese entities this time constitutes routine work in fulfilling ITU-related procedures and should be viewed rationally.

Yang Feng, founder and CEO of commercial satellite company Spacety, based in Changsha, Hunan province, said the 203,000 satellite filings reflect long-term national strategy and space resource planning rather than immediate engineering capability, China Daily reported.

A short explainer video released by the WeChat account of China Central Television’s flagship evening news program Xinwen Lianbo also noted that the filings amount to “a ticket for strategic reserve” (”战略储备的一张门票”), adding that China has the world’s largest demand for 5G and 6G communications, intelligent connected vehicles, and the Internet of Things. China’s vast market, the video said, is large enough to absorb massive volumes of satellite data services, providing a sustained flow of capital and momentum for the entire industry.

The video likewise called for a rational view of the applications, pointing out that under ITU rules governing frequencies used for broadband satellite internet, applicants must launch 10 percent of the satellites within seven years, complete 50 percent within nine years, and finish full deployment within 14 years. The number of satellites launched can also be adjusted in light of future conditions, including reductions in the overall scale.

The video further analyzed the long-term significance of the filings, highlighting several potential impacts:

1. No more loss of mobile connectivity. In the future, in areas such as oceans, deep mountains, deserts, and other terrestrial signal blind spots, ordinary mobile phones could connect directly to satellites, enabling voice calls and internet access without restrictions.

2. Smarter intelligent vehicles. Direct satellite connectivity could provide autonomous driving systems with round-the-clock, high-precision positioning and communications support.

3. More reliable emergency communications. When natural disasters cause ground-based networks to collapse, satellite networks could serve as the last lifeline.

In addition, the video noted that some Chinese companies have already achieved batch, assembly-line production of satellites, and that China’s capabilities in reusable rockets are expected to continue improving. As satellite mass production advances and launch costs decline, service prices are also expected to become more affordable.

It is worth noting that of the 203,000 satellites covered by the filings, roughly 193,000 of the satellites were proposed by the Institute of Radio Spectrum Utilization and Technological Innovation (无线电创新院), a newly registered national research institute on radio spectrum innovation and commercialization based in Hebei, according to an article published on the WeChat blog of China.com (中华网), a Chinese-language news and information website under China International Broadcasting Network (CIBN).

China.com reported that the institute was jointly established by seven entities, including the State Radio Monitoring Center (国家无线电监测中心) and China Satellite Network Group (中国卫星网络集团), underscoring strong organizational coordination and national-level planning. At the same time, China Satellite Network Group and China Mobile also filed their own constellation plans, forming a structure characterized by “state-led coordination with participation from multiple actors” (“国家队主导、多主体协同”)

China.com also analyzed the scarcity of low Earth orbit (LEO) resources. Although space may appear vast, the low-altitude orbital regions suitable for deploying communications satellites are in fact limited. Industry estimates suggest that even under the most relaxed assumptions on safe spacing, LEO can accommodate fewer than 180,000 satellites in total.

At present, U.S. company SpaceX has already deployed around 10,000 satellites for its Starlink constellation and plans to expand the network to as many as 42,000. Other countries, including Rwanda, have also submitted applications — often through third-party intermediaries — for hundreds of thousands of satellites, seeking to gain an early advantage.

From a broader perspective, China.com said that competition over orbital and frequency resources also reflects a struggle for influence in global space governance. For a long time, rules governing orbital slots and spectrum allocation have been dominated by Western countries. China’s active participation in this competition through compliant and rule-based channels represents not only adherence to international norms, but also a necessary step in securing fair development space for itself.

If you’re interested in the links between China’s latest filings and capital markets, you may want to read a related newsletter by Amber Zhang published on Baiguan, which explores this angle in greater detail.

Baiguan - China Insights, Data, Context

Space Race 2.0? 2026 is China’s "SpaceX Moment"

In the final days of 2025, China quietly filed a bombshell with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). China submitted plans for two “super-constellations,” CTC-1 and CTC-2, totaling over 193,428 satellites …

Read more

10 months ago · 7 likes · Amber Zhang

If you’d like to do your own close reading, I’ve included the full English text at the end of this newsletter.

The year 2025 marks the completion of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan for economic and social development ... Our economic strength, scientific and technological abilities, defense capabilities, and composite national strength all reached new heights.

Early in the address, Xi offers a retrospective on China’s development over the past five years. That framing matters: 2025 is the final year of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan, which likely explains why this year’s speech includes a more explicit assessment of China’s overall strength than last year’s did.

This language aligns closely with how Chinese policymakers currently describe the country’s trajectory. An official explanatory reader released this year alongside the 15th Five-Year Plan recommendations notes that “China’s international influence, appeal and capacity to shape the world continue to grow” (我国国际影响力、感召力、塑造力不断提升). Taken together, these formulations amount to a concise summary of how China’s leadership now evaluates China’s standing — and they also reflect a noticeably more self-assured national self-image.

We integrated science and technology deeply with industries, and made a stream of new innovations. Many large AI models have been competing in a race to the top, and breakthroughs have been achieved in the research and development of our own chips. All this has turned China into one of the economies with the fastest growing innovation capabilities.

The speech does not name DeepSeek, a “phenomenon-level” product that sparked a wave of attention in China’s tech sector at the start of the year. Still, when Xi turns to science and technology, he opens directly with AI models — a small but telling choice of emphasis. It signals both the priority Chinese leaders attach to this field and their confidence in China’s progress.

The description of China as “one of the economies with the fastest-growing innovation capabilities” reinforces a long-standing narrative about China’s development path. Many of you will be familiar with Dan Wang’s book Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future, which has been widely discussed in U.S. policy and analytical circles this year. The Economist called it “a useful way to think about industrial competition between America and China.”

Over the past year, the rights and interests of the workforce in new forms of employment have been better protected ... When the happy hum of daily life fills every home, the big family of our nation will go from strength to strength.

Any mention of the “workforce in new forms of employment” inevitably brings to mind China’s more than 10 million food-delivery riders. This year, several major internet platforms such JD.com began offering social insurance and other employee benefits to delivery workers — a move which marks a significant step toward standardizing the food delivery industry in China. Yuzhe He has an excellent piece on this shift.

China’s 7.48 million ride-hailing drivers are another group worth watching under this “new employment” umbrella. I’ve previously published a dedicated piece on them as well.

After announcing the three global initiatives on development, security, and civilization, I put forward the Global Governance Initiative to promote a more just and equitable global governance system. The world today is undergoing both changes and turbulence, and some regions are still engulfed in war.

The Global Governance Initiative is the fourth major global initiative China has proposed in recent years, following the Global Development, Security, and Civilization Initiatives. In an article published in Qiushi, the CPC Central Committee’s flagship magazine, Foreign Minister Wang Yi wrote that “global governance stands at a critical juncture. It will either move forward or fall back, and China’s diplomacy as a major country with Chinese characteristics has entered a historical stage in which it can accomplish more” (全球治理正处在承前启后、不进则退的关键时期；中国特色大国外交已进入可以更有作为的历史阶段).

This language is revealing when set against history. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Chinese leaders advanced the guideline often summarized as “keeping a low profile while accomplishing something” (韬光养晦，有所作为). Today’s formulation — “a historical stage in which it can accomplish more” (可以更有作为的历史阶段) — reflects how current policymakers assess both China’s development phase and the international environment.

If you want to dig deeper into what the Global Governance Initiative means, Wang Yi’s full article is worth reading.

We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait share a bond of blood and kinship. The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable!

References to Taiwan are a regular feature of China’s New Year addresses. Last year’s speech stated:
“We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one and the same family. No one can ever sever the bond of kinship between us, and no one can ever stop China’s reunification, a trend of the times.”

Personally, I don’t see a dramatic shift in tone this year. But if you read it differently, I’d genuinely like to hear your take.

Only a strong Communist Party of China can make our country strong. We launched the study and education program on fully implementing the central Party leadership’s eight-point decision on improving Party and government conduct. We exercised strict governance of the Party through credible measures, and promoted the Party’s self-revolution to fight corruption and advance healthy governance.

From March to July, a Party-wide education campaign was rolled out to implement the central Party leadership’s eight-point decision on improving work conduct.

Those familiar with China’s last decade will recall that the eight-point rules were issued by the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in December 2012 shortly after Xi Jinping first became the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee. The rules aim to reduce bureaucracy, extravagance and undesirable work practices of Party members.

Earlier this year, I published a standalone newsletter on the eight-point education campaign. It ended up being one of my ten most-read pieces of the year. At the time, I wrote:
“Looking forward to 2025, continuing to implement the spirit of the eight-point rules as a central theme in Party education holds profound importance.”

That framing now looks even more relevant. The article from the China Discipline Inspection and Supervision Newspaper explained that this year’s focus on the eight-point rules comes at a time when changes unseen in a century are unfolding across the world at a faster pace and an increasingly complex and severe external environment may exert a greater impact on China.

Even topics that appear highly domestic, such as the study and education campaigns around the eight-point rules, can offer useful insight for international readers trying to understand how China responds under pressure.

The year 2026 marks the beginning of the 15th Five-Year Plan. A successful venture should start with a good plan and with clear goals set.

If you want to read more about the 15th Five-Year Plan, I’ve linked two previous newsletters below.

The dream lofty, the journey long—bold strides will get us there. Let us charge ahead like horses with courage, vitality, and energy, fight for our dreams and our happiness, and turn our great vision into beautiful realities.

Readers familiar with China know that birth years follow a twelve-animal zodiac cycle. This year is the Year of the Snake — I was born in 1989, also a Snake year, for what it’s worth. From February 17, 2026, to February 5, 2027 (before Lunar New Year), it will be the Year of the Horse.

That timing makes it easy to understand why the speech includes several horse-related expressions of good fortune. Sometimes, the subtext is simply cultural.

Full text: Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2026 New Year Message

BEIJING, Dec. 31 (Xinhua) -- On New Year’s Eve, Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered his 2026 New Year message through China Media Group and the internet. The following is the full text of the message:
Greetings to all! Year after year, life opens a fresh chapter. As the new year begins, I extend my best wishes to you from Beijing!
The year 2025 marks the completion of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan for economic and social development. Over the past five years, we have pressed ahead with enterprise and fortitude, and overcome many difficulties and challenges. We met the targets in the Plan and made solid advances on the new journey of Chinese modernization. Our economic output has crossed thresholds one after another, and it is expected to reach RMB 140 trillion yuan this year. Our economic strength, scientific and technological abilities, defense capabilities, and composite national strength all reached new heights. Clear waters and lush mountains have become a salient feature of our landscape. Our people enjoy a growing sense of gain, happiness and security. The past five years have been a truly remarkable journey, and our accomplishments have not come easily. Your unwavering hard work has made our nation thrive and prosper. I salute you all for your exceptional diligence and invaluable contributions.
This year is full of indelible memories. We solemnly commemorated the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, and established the Taiwan Recovery Day. These grand national events were majestic and powerful, and the glory of victory will shine through the pages of history. They are inspiring all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation to remember history, honor fallen heroes, cherish peace, and create a better future. They are rallying a mighty force for the great rejuvenation of our nation.
We sought to energize high-quality development through innovation. We integrated science and technology deeply with industries, and made a stream of new innovations. Many large AI models have been competing in a race to the top, and breakthroughs have been achieved in the research and development of our own chips. All this has turned China into one of the economies with the fastest growing innovation capabilities. The Tianwen-2 probe began its star-chasing journey to explore asteroids and comets. Construction of the hydropower project at the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo River started. China’s first aircraft carrier equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system was officially commissioned. Humanoid robots did kung fu kicks, and drones performed spectacular light shows. Inventions and innovations have boosted new quality productive forces and added colorful dimensions to our lives.
We endeavored to nurture our spiritual home with cultural development. There was a surging public interest in cultural relics, museums, and intangible cultural heritage. A new Chinese cultural site was added to the World Heritage List. Cultural IPs such as Wukong and Nezha became global hits. The younger generation came to deem classic Chinese culture as the finest form of aesthetic expression. The cultural and tourism sectors thrived. The “super league” football games in our cities and villages attracted numerous fans. Ice and snow sports ignited people’s passion for the winter season. Tradition is now embracing modernity, and the Chinese culture is shining in even greater splendor.
We joined hands to build a better life and enjoyed it together. I attended celebrations in Xizang and Xinjiang. From the snow-covered plateau to both sides of the Tianshan Mountains, people of various ethnic groups are united as one, like seeds of a pomegranate sticking together. With white khatas and passionate singing and dancing, they expressed their love of the motherland and the happiness they enjoy. No issue of the people is too small; we care for every leaf and tend every branch in the garden of people’s well-being. Over the past year, the rights and interests of the workforce in new forms of employment have been better protected, facilities have been upgraded to bring more convenience to the elderly, and each family with childcare needs has received a subsidy of RMB 300 yuan per month. When the happy hum of daily life fills every home, the big family of our nation will go from strength to strength.
We continued to embrace the world with open arms. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Tianjin and the Global Leaders’ Meeting on Women were very successful; and island-wide special customs operations were launched in the Hainan Free Trade Port. To better address climate change, China announced new Nationally Determined Contributions. After announcing the three global initiatives on development, security, and civilization, I put forward the Global Governance Initiative to promote a more just and equitable global governance system. The world today is undergoing both changes and turbulence, and some regions are still engulfed in war. China always stands on the right side of history, and is ready to work with all countries to advance world peace and development and build a community with a shared future for humanity.
Not long ago, I attended the opening ceremony of the National Games, and I was glad to see Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao coming together in unity and acting in unison. We should unswervingly implement the policy of One Country, Two Systems, and support Hong Kong and Macao in better integrating into the overall development of our country and maintaining long-term prosperity and stability. We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait share a bond of blood and kinship. The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable!
Only a strong Communist Party of China can make our country strong. We launched the study and education program on fully implementing the central Party leadership’s eight-point decision on improving Party and government conduct. We exercised strict governance of the Party through credible measures, and promoted the Party’s self-revolution to fight corruption and advance healthy governance. As a result, the conduct of our Party and government steadily improved. We must stay true to our original aspiration and founding mission, and pursue our goal with perseverance and dedication. We should continue to give a good answer to the question on how to maintain long-term governance put forth in a cave dwelling in Yan’an and prove ourselves worthy of the people’s expectation in the new era.
The year 2026 marks the beginning of the 15th Five-Year Plan. A successful venture should start with a good plan and with clear goals set. We should focus on our goals and tasks, boost confidence, and build momentum to press ahead. We should take solid steps to promote high-quality development, further deepen reform and opening up across the board, deliver prosperity for all, and write a new chapter in the story of China’s miracle.
The dream lofty, the journey long—bold strides will get us there. Let us charge ahead like horses with courage, vitality, and energy, fight for our dreams and our happiness, and turn our great vision into beautiful realities.
The sun of the new year will soon rise. May our great motherland stand in magnificence! May the fields across the country deliver good harvest! May our nation bathe in the glory of the morning! May you all enjoy life to the fullest, and achieve every success! May all your dreams come true! Enditem

Like many others, I have been waiting for this day for a long time.

I have personally visited Hainan Island three times. Two of those trips were to attend friends’ seaside weddings — which, in a way, already says something about Hainan’s character. Through my regular interactions with people working and living there, I have also learned that the central government has dispatched a large number of officials from other provinces to support Hainan’s development. Over the years, I have consistently felt how strong Beijing’s determination is to make Hainan work.

For this newsletter, I reviewed official explanations of the launch of island-wide special customs operations and spoke with several Chinese experts, organizing their perspectives into this briefing.

I want to give special credit to my colleague Wu Maohui, a Xinhua reporter based long-term on Hainan Island. He has deep expertise on the Hainan FTP and provided me with a great deal of valuable background and insight.

Before diving in, two clarifications:

1. The views expressed by the experts quoted here represent their personal opinions. I have organized them by theme mainly to offer overseas readers a structured reference for understanding the Hainan FTP.

2. Information related to the Hainan FTP is vast. This piece does not aim to be exhaustive. Instead, it highlights issues that overseas readers may care most about. If you would like to explore further, or have feedback, feel free to write to me.

Where Is Hainan?

Hainan Province lies at the southernmost tip of China. It is separated from Guangdong Province to the north by the Qiongzhou Strait, faces Vietnam across the Beibu Gulf to the west, and borders the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia across the South China Sea to the east and south.

By the end of 2024, Hainan’s permanent population reached 10.48 million, an increase of 51,000 from the previous year, according to the official website of the Hainan FTP.

What’s Special About Hainan FTP?

Two-tiered special customs system. Under the island-wide customs operations, the Hainan FTP will implement a supervision model featuring “freer access at the first line, regulated access at the second line, and free flows within the island.”

The “first line” refers to Hainan’s connection with overseas markets. Meanwhile, the “second line” denotes the customs boundary between the island and China’s mainland.

In practice, “freer access at the first line” refers to freer trade between Hainan and areas outside China’s customs border, and “regulated access at the second line” means maintaining standard customs controls for China’s mainland.

What Does This Mean for Business?

Zero tariffs. With the launch of island-wide customs operations, the scope of zero-tariff treatment in Hainan will expand significantly. The number of tariff lines eligible for zero tariffs will increase from about 1,900 to around 6,600, raising the overall zero-tariff ratio from 21% to 74%.

Strong tax incentives. Companies can benefit from multiple policies across different stages of production and operation. Take a biopharmaceutical company as an example: during the construction and research phase, imported raw materials and equipment can qualify for zero tariffs, reducing import costs by 5 to 10 percent. In manufacturing, products made with zero-tariff imported inputs and meeting a value-added ratio of 30 percent or more can be shipped to the Chinese mainland free of import duties.

Once profitable, the company can also benefit from a preferential corporate income tax rate of 15 percent, while its executives and technical staff may qualify for a 15 percent personal income tax rate.

For foreign enterprises, this arrangement offers a stable interface through which they can simultaneously engage global markets and China’s vast domestic demand. For domestic firms, it provides a gateway to global resources, technologies and capital flows.

Why It Matters

Following the launch of island-wide customs operations, zero-tariff treatment now covers the entire industrial chain — from raw materials and components to final products. This is expected to help extend, reinforce, and optimize industrial chains, and support the cultivation of globally competitive industrial clusters in Hainan.

The 30% value-added threshold not only lowers operating costs for firms, but is also expected to attract more high-end manufacturing and high value-added processing industries to Hainan.

Key Industries

According to the Master Plan for the Construction of Hainan Free Trade Port and the Recommendations of the CPC Hainan Provincial Committee on Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, the post–customs-operations phase will focus on building a Hainan-specific modern industrial system.

The Hainan FTP will prioritize four leading sectors:

• Tourism

• Modern services

• High-tech industries

• Efficient tropical agriculture

At the same time, it aims to further develop consumer markets such as high-end shopping, healthcare, and international education.

Timeline: How We Got Here

(Analyzed by 赵晋平 Zhao Jinping, Vice Chairman of the China Association of Trade in Services, based on official documents)

Stage 1 (2018–2020): “Laying the foundation.”
In April 2018, The Chinese leadership announced the decision to build the entire island of Hainan into a pilot free trade zone. At the time, however, China already had more than a dozen FTZs nationwide. Hainan’s pilot FTZ did not yet differ fundamentally from others, nor did it fully reflect the ambition of “higher-standard opening-up.” This stage was primarily about accumulating experience.

Stage 2 (2020–2025): “Building institutions.”
In June 2020, China released the Master Plan for the Construction of Hainan Free Trade Port, emphasizing that by the time of customs operations, a basic institutional framework for the FTP should be “initially formed.” This phase focused on institutional construction on top of earlier groundwork.

Stage 3 (2025–2035): “Full coverage.”
Starting Dec. 18, 2025, island-wide special customs operations are implemented. “Full coverage” means replicating and institutionalizing the systems initially formed before customs operations across the entire province, turning them into long-term arrangements.

Stage 4 (After 2035): “Strengthening distinctive features.”

Financial Preparation

To facilitate high-level convenience for cross-border capital flows, China’s central bank and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange launched multi-functional free trade accounts in May 2024 to create an integrated local and foreign currency account system.

The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) said it has built a financial policy and institutional system specifically designed to support the high-standard construction of the FTP, providing strong momentum for the port’s development.

Other Points You May Find Interesting

How big is the Hainan FTP?
At 33,900 square kilometers, it is 31 times the size of Hong Kong and 47 times that of Singapore, making it the world’s largest free trade port by area, according to National Business Daily, a nationwide Chinese financial and economic daily newspaper.

Going Deeper: Geography and Strategy

In 2018, China unveiled the guidelines to support Hainan to deepen reform and opening up, making clear that the Hainan FTP is intended to serve as a key gateway for China’s opening-up toward the Pacific and Indian oceans

This positioning as a “key gateway of opening-up” is critical. Why does it matter so much?

迟福林 Chi Fulin, head of the China Institute for Reform and Development:

In my view, this point is particularly important. To begin with, the nature of globalization itself is changing. Regional economic integration has increasingly become the dominant feature of globalization, and this trend is now irreversible. Under these circumstances, the development of the Hainan FTP cannot be approached by “looking at Hainan from within Hainan.” Instead, it requires “looking at Hainan from beyond Hainan” — leveraging national strategy to drive Hainan’s development, and in turn using Hainan’s development to reinforce China’s broader strategic objectives.

Hainan’s orientation toward the South China Sea gives it a distinctive resource and geographic advantage. An estimated 60 to 70 percent of China’s imports and exports pass through the South China Sea, either entering the country or heading toward the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This geographic position is therefore of exceptional importance. Against the backdrop of deepening regional economic integration, Hainan’s regional role becomes particularly prominent.

Hainan’s locational advantages — especially its geographic, geopolitical, and resource advantages — are highly pronounced. Historically, Hainan has maintained close ties with regions centered on ASEAN. In building itself into an “important gateway of opening-up,” the most critical counterpart for Hainan is ASEAN. Hainan must become a hub for strategic cooperation between China and ASEAN. Without this hub role, the notion of an “important gateway of opening-up” would remain abstract and fail to materialize in practice. This positioning is therefore crucial — and at present, this trajectory is becoming increasingly evident.

What Does This Mean for Overseas Capital?

Hainan to issue 10-year offshore RMB aerospace bonds in HK -- China Daily (Sept. 12, 2025)

The government of Hainan province has announced plans to issue offshore renminbi bonds worth 5 billion yuan ($702 million) in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) this September, aiming to deepen cooperation between the island province and the HKSAR, advance the development of the Hainan Free Trade Port, and contribute to the internationalization of the yuan.

This year marks the fourth consecutive year that Hainan has issued offshore RMB bonds in Hong Kong. A global investor conference was held on Thursday at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) to provide more details about the issuance.

In addition to three-year green bonds and five-year blue bonds, this year will feature the inaugural issuance of a 10-year aerospace bond, with a portion of the proceeds allocated to infrastructure development at Hainan’s Wenchang Spacecraft Launch Site.

Hainan has now issued offshore RMB local government bonds in Hong Kong for four consecutive years. This carries two layers of significance, according to 曹远征 Cao Yuanzheng, former Chief Economist of the Bank of China and advisor to the Hainan FTP:

First, it serves as a signal of leading openness. It is relatively uncommon for local governments to issue renminbi-denominated bonds in Hong Kong, and even less common for the proceeds to be repatriated for use on the mainland. This, in practice, reflects the financial facilitation of the Hainan FTP.

Second, the issuance also carries strong symbolic meaning. Take the so-called “航天主题债” (”aerospace-themed bond”) as an example: Wenchang International Aerospace City in Hainan and related aerospace industries are experiencing rapid growth, and China is emerging as an important global leader in this field. These developments provide important support for Hainan’s successful bond issuance.

Looking ahead, as the Hainan FTP moves into the phase of special customs operations, Hainan will find it easier — and have greater confidence — to access international markets. As facilitation improves, more international capital is likely to flow into Hainan, helping to turn the province into a high ground for reform and opening-up.

Challenges Ahead (A Reality Check)

No ready-made model. Customs operations mark a new beginning rather than an endpoint for Hainan. There is no existing template to copy for Hainan FTP. China has explicitly called for building a “free trade port with Chinese characteristics,” meaning the model must be created through experimentation and continuous adjustment.
— 王新奎 Wang Xinkui, Chairman of the Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Center

Implementation discretion matters. The effectiveness of top-level design depends not only on how detailed it is, but also on the degree of flexibility local governments have in implementation. This requires both initiative at the local level and sufficient tolerance for trial and error from the center. Without such space, innovation becomes risky and policy implementation tends to fall into inertia.
— 刘尚希 Liu Shangxi, former President of the China Academy of Fiscal Sciences

Service trade remains a bottleneck. Although Hainan has a negative list for service trade, it still contains around 70 restrictive measures. Compared with CPTPP or even RCEP standards, gaps remain. During the 15th Five-Year Plan period, breakthroughs in this area will be crucial.
— 赵晋平 Zhao Jinping, Vice Chairman of the China Association of Trade in Services

More information:

1. Special customs operations promise broad gains for businesses, residents in Hainan FTP (Xinhua)

2. How individuals calculate income tax incentives in Hainan (National Business Daily)

3. Former Chongqing mayor Huang Qifan on the latest developments in Hainan FTP (New Economist)

It was Macron’s first visit to China since 2023 and his fourth state visit to China as French president. High on his agenda are economic issues such as bilateral trade and investment. Macron left for China just one day after he met the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Paris, and as expected, he and Chinese President Xi Jinping discussed the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

BEIJING AND CHENGDU -- A TALE OF TWO CITIES

Macron and his wife Brigitte arrived in Beijing on Dec. 3, where he was greeted at the airport by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who travelled to France days earlier to arrange this trip.

On Dec. 4, Xi Jinping and his wife, Peng Liyuan, held a welcome ceremony for Macron and Brigitte Macron. The two leaders then held talks and oversaw the signing of a range of cooperation documents covering nuclear energy, agriculture, food, education, and ecological environment. Following their discussions, they addressed the press together.

Later the same day, Xi and Macron attended the closing ceremony of the seventh meeting of the China-France Business Council. Macron also met with Chinese Premier Li Qiang, and Zhao Leji, China’s top legislator, on Thursday.

In the evening, the French presidential couple traveled to Chengdu, capital of southwest China’s Sichuan Province. The city of Chengdu, which established a sister-city relationship with Montpellier in 1981, holds historical significance as the first such partnership between the two countries.

Chengdu is also home to a research base of giant panda breeding, where a famous pair of giant pandas is undergoing quarantine after returning last month from France. The pair is retiring after spending more than a decade at ZooParc de Beauval.

On Dec. 5, Macron and his wife visited Dujiangyan, a 2,200-year-old irrigation system in Chengdu that made the local area a major grain-producing area and a “Land of Abundance” (天府之国), which continues to function to this day.

At the irrigation system site, Xi said ancient engineers of this irrigation system tailored measures to local conditions (因地制宜) and designed in harmony with the natural flow of water (顺势而为). Xi told Macron that this spirit can be used in many other fields. “We can draw inspiration for governing the country from this ancient wisdom and make sound decisions.”

It is worth noting that during a single state visit, President Macron held two separate meetings with President Xi Jinping in two different Chinese cities — an arrangement that is relatively uncommon and has drawn attention.

In recent years, a notable feature of interactions between Xi and Macron has been their efforts to broaden their exchanges beyond the capitals of their respective countries. In 2023, Macron traveled to Guangzhou, where he enjoyed a performance of the ancient Guqin melody “High Mountain and Flowing Water.” The following year, at Macron’s invitation, Xi traveled to the Hautes-Pyrénées department in France.

Shortly before returning to France, Macron also delivered a speech at Sichuan University and played table tennis with players from both countries, including Chinese world champions. He was spotted running around a lake in Chengdu on that morning and greeted local citizens. His encounters with cheering Chengdu locals later went viral on Chinese social media, showing crowds rushing to shake hands and take selfies with the French president -- a warmth and spontaneity that Macron himself might find increasingly rare in Paris.

On Friday, Brigitte visited the giant panda research and breeding base in Chengdu, where she was reunited with Yuan Meng, a panda born in France and named by the French first lady, who serves as his godmother.

During Macron’s stay in China, the two sides issued joint statements on global governance, climate and environmental challenges, nuclear energy, agriculture and food, and the situations in Ukraine and Palestine.

Notably, their statement on global governance introduces a new narrative regarding the international system -- one based on international law and rules of solidarity (基于国际法及团结规则的国际体系). This reminds people of the so-called “rules-based international order” long promoted by the United States. While the term “rules-based” sounds palatable to the ears, in practice, the U.S. takes liberty in interpreting what those “rules” actually entail.

The two couples at Dujiangyan, Chengdu City. (Xinhua)

SUBSTANTIVE, DETAILED PRESS READOUT

The most closely watched events of Macron’s visit included his talks with President Xi on Thursday, their joint press appearances, and speeches to both Chinese and French entrepreneurs. Xinhua News Agency released three detailed reports on these events. Below are the key points made by the two world leaders during their interactions.

*During his talks with Macron, Xi described China and France as independent, visionary and responsible major countries (有远见、有担当的独立自主大国). The two countries should demonstrate a sense of responsibility, uphold multilateralism, and stand firmly on the right side of history, he said.

*Xi encouraged the two countries to consolidate cooperation in traditional fields such as aviation, aerospace and nuclear energy, while tapping into the potential for cooperation in areas including the green economy, digital economy, biopharmaceuticals, artificial intelligence and new energy.

*China is willing to import more high-quality French products, welcomes more French enterprises to develop in China, and also hopes that France will provide a fair environment and stable conditions for Chinese enterprise, he added.

*China and France should practice true multilateralism, and uphold the UN-centered international system and the international order underpinned by international law, said Xi.

*Citing the interconnectedness of global industrial and supply chains, Xi emphasized that openness and cooperation will bring opportunities for development, while decoupling and severing supply chains will lead to isolation.

*Macron said France firmly upholds the one-China policy. It is ready to work with China to promote mutual investment, strengthen cooperation in such areas as economy, trade and renewable energy, and deepen friendly cultural exchanges.

*Given the global geopolitical instability and challenges to the multilateral order, cooperation between France and China is even more important and indispensable, said Macron.

*On Ukraine, Xi said China supports all efforts that are conducive to peace and will continue to play a constructive role in the political settlement of the crisis in its own way. He said China supports European countries in playing their due role toward the establishment of a balanced, effective and sustainable European security architecture.

*When meeting with the press, Xi revealed that the two leaders agreed to enhance political mutual trust, expand practical cooperation, promote people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and advance the reform and improvement of global governance.

*It is hoped that all parties can reach a fair, lasting and binding peace deal that is accepted by all parties involved through dialogue and negotiation, Xi told journalists on the spot. He also added that China will continue to play a constructive role in the political settlement of the crisis, while firmly opposing any irresponsible actions that shift blame or distort the situation.

*When addressing Chinese and French entrepreneurs in Beijing, Xi called on the two countries to collaborate in reforming and improving global governance. During the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2025 Summit, held in Tianjin from late August to early September, Xi put forward the Global Governance Initiative. Macron told Xi during their talks that France fully endorses President Xi Jinping’s proposals for reforming and improving global governance and promoting a more balanced global economy.

Macron speaks at Sichuan University, Chengdu (Xinhua)

TRADE, TRUST AND BEYOND

Beyond the immediate discussions on tariffs and trade, Macron’s visit revealed deeper layers of engagement -- a mutual quest for trust, investment reciprocity, and a shared vision for a multipolar world.

Zhao Yongsheng, professor from Beijing-based University of International Business and Economics and visiting scholar at Sorbonne University in Paris, told us that Macron’s visit was characterized by a high level of welcome and hospitality, widely regarded as “treatment of the highest caliber.” This reflects China’s strong emphasis on its relations with France and suggests that France may represent interests beyond its own on certain issues.

Analysts say France holds special value to China today, as it poses a notable challenge when the U.S. seeks Western leadership. In its foreign policy, China emphasizes rationalism and realism, always considering the bigger picture. The country handles trade disputes, such as those over electric vehicles, on a case-by-case basis, while its overall diplomatic framework, including France’s role, remains steady and unshaken.

Macron is a passionate advocate for European strategic autonomy and is trying to play a leading role in the EU after Angela Merkel’s retirement. Although trade is an EU competence, China hopes that France can do more for Beijing’s relations with Brussels, both on economic and political issues.

The core focus of the visit remained on economic and trade cooperation, as planned. A key new concept introduced during the discussions was Macron’s proposal to “promote mutual investment,” a formulation explicitly put forward for the first time. Zhao suggested that the emphasis lies particularly on increasing Chinese investment in France and the EU.

To achieve such mutual growth in investment, a critical obstacle remains the currently stalled EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) since 2021. It is speculated that the two sides may have discussed the possibility of France persuading other EU member states to resume negotiations on the agreement, according to Zhao.

French media observed a historical reversal: for four decades, technology had predominantly flowed from Europe to China. Today, Beijing ships electric vehicles, solar panels, batteries, and electronic components to Europe -- in other words, everything Europe needs to succeed in its energy transition. France is seeking technology transfers from China, said BFMTV.

Prof. Philippe Aghion, the 2025 Nobel laureate in economics, said, “Europe is still ahead of China in terms of research publications. We have very good researchers, but we do not always have the means to translate that research into breakthrough innovations. China, however, knows how to innovate. So the Chinese may well be interested in collaborations.”

Ukraine did not appear to be a central focus of Macron’s visit to China. Meanwhile, on trade frictions between the two sides — including the EU’s tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, a move in which France played a role, and China’s retaliatory anti-dumping measures on EU cognac — there has so far been no clear indication of a breakthrough.

Zhao believed that the visit held multi-layered significance. It is expected to advance China-EU relations positively, with Macron serving as an important channel for high-level dialogue on behalf of the EU.

Yin Jianlong, director of the European Union Studies Center at Anhui University, said that both France and the EU need to bolster their credibility in dealings with China, in a veiled reference to Macron’s support for EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Macron’s visit, he said, was essentially an attempt at self-preservation, aimed at strengthening France’s ties with China amid a challenging international environment for both France and the European Union.

At a strategic level, amid a U.S. tilt toward unilateralism, China and France jointly reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism. Moreover, their preference for resolving disputes through consultation -- rather than threats or sanctions -- offers a constructive model for global trade conflict resolution.

Airbus’s second Final Assembly Line for A320 family aircraft in Tianjin, China, is an icon of China-France cooperation (Xinhua)