In addition to several key reports, such as the government work report, and several key pieces of legislation, this year’s agenda also centers on the widely anticipated draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan for national economic and social development.

Compared with the Communist Party of China (CPC) leadership’s recommendations for formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan, released last October, the draft outline provides far more detail.

Spanning more than 70,000 Chinese characters and organized into 18 sections and 62 chapters, the outline is too extensive to cover fully in a single article.

So in this piece, I focus on a concept that has been widely discussed in Chinese policy circles over the past year: “invest in people,” or “investment in human capital” (投资于人).

The Emergence of the “Invest in People” Concept

The idea did not appear overnight. As early as 2023, the Chinese leadership mentioned in a high-level meeting that China should not only continue “investing in physical assets,” but should closely combine this with “investing in human capital.”

A year ago, during the 2025 “two sessions,” the government work report used the phrase “investment in people” for the first time, saying that “more funds and resources will be used to serve the people and meet their needs.”

The recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan released last year emphasized:

坚持扩大内需这个战略基点，坚持惠民生和促消费、投资于物和投资于人紧密结合

Guided by the strategy of expanding domestic demand, we should work toward improving living standards while increasing consumer spending and combine investment in physical assets with investment in human capital.

The draft outline released on March 5 continues this formulation.

Why Emphasize “Investing in People”?

An article published in December 2025 in Qiushi, a flagship magazine of the CPC Central Committee, helps clarify the policy logic.

According to the article, as China’s development stage and conditions change, the returns on “investing in physical assets,” such as infrastructure, housing, and machinery, have declined significantly. Between 2008 and 2023, China’s incremental capital-output ratio rose from 2.84 to 9.44, meaning that generating each additional yuan of GDP now requires several times more capital investment than before.

At the same time, capital-driven investment can expand production capacity in ways that do not necessarily match evolving consumer demand, leading to localized overcapacity and structural imbalances.

Meanwhile, rising incomes and the expansion of China’s middle-income population are increasing demands for better public services and higher quality of life. Yet mismatches in the domestic supply-demand structure continue to constrain people’s pursuit of a better life.

What Does “Investing in People” Mean?

In an interview with Qiushi, economist Yu Chunhai, a professor at Renmin University of China, explained the concept:

“投资于人”，是指将更多财政资金和公共资源投向教育、就业、医疗、社会保障等民生领域，投入到人的能力提升、健康维护、职业发展和潜力开发中，以消费潜力释放和人力资本提升驱动经济高质量发展。

“Investing in people” refers to directing greater fiscal funding and public resources toward livelihood-related sectors such as education, employment, healthcare, and social security, and toward enhancing human capabilities, safeguarding health, advancing career development, and unlocking individual potential, so as to drive high-quality economic development through the release of consumption potential and the strengthening of human capital.

Yu emphasized that “investing in people” is not merely a type of investment or a particular investment direction. Rather, it represents a new development orientation — one that serves as a correction to past models of investment, capacity expansion, and even the broader development paradigm.

Furthermore, “investing in people” aims to raise individuals’ levels of knowledge, skills, health, and social adaptability, thereby improving the overall human capital and professional skills of society. The goal is to transform “human resources” into “human capital” capable of sustainable value creation, and to move from a “demographic dividend” to a “talent dividend.”

Where Will China “Invest in People”?

Following this logic, “investing in people” covers a wide range of areas. From the draft outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan, I’ve picked out a few examples that, in my view, highlight how this people-centered investment approach will shape China’s policy priorities over the next five years.

1. New Livelihood-Focused Targets & Major Livelihood Projects

Among the plan’s 12 key expected indicators, many relate directly to people’s well-being. Compared with the 14th Five-Year Plan, some targets have been adjusted. Here are examples:

• Life expectancy is expected to rise from 79.25 years to 80 years.

• The previous indicator of basic pension insurance participation rate has been replaced with the share of nursing-care beds in eldercare institutions, expected to increase from 68% to 73%.

• The metric of childcare slots per 1,000 people has been replaced with childcare enrollment for children under age three, expected to increase by 6 percentage points.

• The indicator of physicians per 1,000 people has been refined into two metrics: licensed physicians (3.7 per 1,000) and registered nurses (5.1 per 1,000).

To me, these adjustments suggest a more refined approach to people-centered services and a stronger emphasis on their tangible outcomes.

In addition, it is noteworthy that Chinese policymakers have emphasized that “the most important indicator of modernization is still the health of the people” and that “health is 1, and everything else is the zeros that follow,” characterizing the steady increase in average life expectancy as a reflection of the advantages of China’s socialist system.

加强人力资源开发和人的全面发展投资，在“一老一小”服务、基层医疗卫生、普通高中和优质高等教育扩容、职业技能培训等领域实施一批民生工程，提高民生类政府投资比重。

Strengthen investment in human resource development and in the comprehensive development of people. Implement a number of public welfare projects in areas such as services for the elderly and children, primary-level healthcare, the expansion of general high schools and high-quality higher education, and vocational skills training, while increasing the share of government investment devoted to livelihood-related areas.

Among the 109 major projects listed in the draft outline, 25 are related to improving people’s livelihoods, including 4 projects on building a high-quality education system, 7 projects related to healthcare, 5 projects focused on services for “the elderly and the children” populations.

This morning, the heads of five ministries related to people’s livelihood held a joint press conference, answering journalists’ questions on issues in the livelihood sector during the 15th Five-Year Plan period. The full transcript is available for those interested.

2. Paid Leave and New School Vacation Policies

落实职工带薪休假制度，鼓励弹性错峰休假，探索推行中小学生春秋假。

Implement the paid annual leave system for employees, encourage flexible and staggered vacation arrangements, and explore the introduction of spring and autumn breaks for primary and secondary school students.

The earlier policy recommendations already mentioned paid leave. The new outline adds concrete language about staggered vacations and school holiday experiments. The government work report, which includes plans for the coming year, also reiterated this point, suggesting implementation may accelerate.

According to People’s Daily, several provinces in China have already begun experimenting with spring and autumn breaks.

Lu Ming, a professor at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, has long advocated optimizing holiday arrangements across the year. According to him, short breaks in spring and autumn could stimulate consumption while also giving children and families much-needed breathing room.

He argues that China hopes to make consumption a new driver of economic growth — and much of the potential lies in sectors such as education, healthcare, culture, and tourism. But these forms of consumption depend on people having both the time and the well-being to enjoy them.

Lu, who is also a national political advisor, points out that many workers today feel they cannot take leave even when legally entitled to it, due to widespread overtime culture. Policies such as school breaks may therefore need to be paired with flexible leave arrangements for parents.

3. Talent Development in Strategic Technologies

围绕科技创新、产业发展和国家战略需求协同育人，提高人才自主培养质量。聚焦优势学科适度扩大“双一流”建设范围，新建若干所新型研究型大学。

Coordinate talent development with technological innovation, industrial development, and national strategic needs, and improve the quality of independently trained talent. Focus on key disciplines and appropriately expand the scope of the “Double First-Class Initiative,” while establishing several new research-oriented universities.

健全高等教育学科专业设置调整机制，超常规布局人工智能、集成电路等新兴领域急需学科专业，深入实施基础学科和交叉学科突破计划。

Improve the mechanism for adjusting disciplines and programs in higher education, make extraordinary arrangements for urgently needed disciplines in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence (AI) and integrated circuits, and advance in-depth implementation of breakthrough plans for basic and interdisciplinary disciplines.

China’s AI-related industries will be valued at more than 10 trillion yuan (1.45 trillion U.S. dollars) by the end of the 15th Five-Year Plan period, Zheng Shanjie, head of the National Development and Reform Commission, said at a press conference on Friday.

Such projections underscore the importance of investing in people in frontier technological fields. Planning talent development early in sectors such as AI can ensure that more people have opportunities to apply their skills and build careers in emerging industries.

As AI becomes a defining technology of the next technological revolution, strengthening the talent pipeline is critical. According to Li Jinghong, a national political advisor and a professor at Tsinghua University, AI is not only a key technology for the next technological revolution but also a crucial indicator of national innovation capacity. This, he said, requires systemic reforms that allow education, science, and industry to reinforce one another.

4. Building a Birth-Friendly Society

坚持生育友好的政策取向，推动生育支持融入经济社会发展各项政策。

Adhere to a birth-friendly policy orientation and enhance childbirth support through various economic and social policies.

While last year’s recommendations called for improving childbirth support policies (”优化生育支持政策”), the new outline goes further, emphasizing that birth support should be integrated into various economic and social policies.

Specific measures include:

• effectively eliminating out-of-pocket costs for hospital childbirth within policy coverage

• fully implementing maternity leave systems

• encouraging flexible work arrangements for parents with children under three

• allowing children from multi-child families to attend the same school

• direct housing policies in favor of families with two or more children

These policies signal a stronger commitment over the next five years to building a birth-friendly social environment.

5. Reforming Population Management and Urbanization

探索建立全国统一的人口管理制度，逐步实现由常住地登记户口。稳步提高农民工参加城镇职工社会保险比例，推动更多城市将符合条件的未落户常住人口纳入公租房保障范围。

Explore the establishment of a nationally unified population management system, and gradually realize household registration based on place of habitual residence. Steadily increase the proportion of migrant workers participating in the urban employee social insurance system, and encourage more cities to include eligible long-term residents without local household registration in the public rental housing support system.

因地制宜放宽在流入地参加中考报名条件，推进符合条件的随迁子女连续接受基础教育。

According to local conditions, relax the requirements for registering for the senior high school entrance examination in the place of residence, and promote the continuous access to compulsory education for eligible children who move with their parents.

An analysis published in February in the journal Governance （《国家治理》), affiliated with the People’s Daily, notes that many regions still require household registration (hukou) to access subsidized medical and pension insurance. This creates barriers to equal social protection between registered and non-registered residents.

The analysis noted that the issue is significant because, as labor markets become more integrated and population mobility increases, the separation between a person’s place of residence and their household registration has become increasingly common. For example, in Zhejiang, more than 16 million of the province’s 66 million residents do not hold local household registration. The proportion is even higher in Guangdong.

Advancing people-centered urbanization, therefore, becomes crucial. Policies such as establishing a unified population management system help ensure equal access to social security and public services, representing another important dimension of China’s emerging “investing in people” development strategy.

There are many other elements in the draft outline related to “investing in people” that I have not covered here. If you think there are important points that I missed, feel free to leave a comment and share your thoughts.

I’d like to end this newsletter with an explanation from Qiushi:

“投资于人”不是摒弃“投资于物”，而是追求两者之间的紧密结合和良性互动。物的投入与积累，最终是为了实现人的发展 ...... 二者的紧密结合，是对我国投资理念、方向、重点的提升和优化。

“Investing in human capital” does not mean abandoning “investing in physical assets.” Rather, it seeks close integration and positive interaction between the two. Investment in and accumulation of material resources ultimately serve the purpose of human development ... The close combination of “investing in human capital” and “investing in physical assets” represents an upgrading and optimization of China’s investment philosophy, direction, and priorities.

Please note that the analysis in this piece does not represent any official view, and reflects only my personal analysis and judgment.

According to a report by China Youth Daily, on Dec. 30, 2025, scholars, government officials and industry practitioners gathered at a symposium on the structure and employment impact of China’s micro-drama sector. At the event, Peking University National School of Development (NSD) released a comprehensive study titled The 2025 Report on the Development Landscape of China’s Micro-Drama Industry and Its Employment Effects.

On Wednesday, NSD’s WeChat account made the full report available for download.

Around the same time, Qiushi, a flagship magazine of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, published a feature article in the second issue of 2026 on the development of the short-drama sector. The piece, written by Hu Yifeng, deputy director of the China Federation of Literary and Art Circles’ theory research office, didn’t directly cite the NSD report, but echoed several of its key data points.

Meanwhile, practitioners across Chinese social media have been sharing their own, ground-level observations about the business.

I don’t personally watch micro-dramas, but I think this industry is worth paying attention to.

Today, I want to walk through what stood out to me in these two pieces, especially how official and academic observers are evaluating the sector, and what the numbers suggest about its growing connection to employment and flexible work.

Before diving in, a brief word about the institution behind the report.

NSD, formerly the China Center for Economic Research (CCER), was founded in the 1990s and has long played a key role in China’s reforms. In 2024, the school marked its 30th anniversary. Its current dean, Huang Yiping, described it as a key driver of China’s systemic economic reforms. Over the years, many scholars affiliated with the school have written candid accounts of how academic research fed into policymaking. One memoir I’d especially recommend is by founding professor Zhang Weiying, for anyone curious about how university think tanks have shaped China’s reform trajectory.

According to NSD, the micro-drama study was led by Professor Zhang Dandan, together with a research team. In estimating the sector’s broader employment impact, they drew on methodologies used by organizations such as Boston Consulting Group and the Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre, as well as domestic research on China’s film and cultural industries.

1. The growing influence of micro-dramas in China

The article in Qiushi notes that in 2025, micro-dramas experienced explosive growth, emerging as a new frontier in China’s cultural consumption market.

China’s monthly output of micro-dramas has stabilized at around 3,000 titles, with the user base reaching 696 million — covering more than 60 percent of the country’s internet population. Hundreds of millions of viewers are hooked on these bite-sized shows, where twists come every five seconds and entire lifetimes unfold in just ten minutes.

The NSD report also sketches a profile of who is actually watching micro-dramas. It argues that the highly modular and easily replicable storytelling of micro-dramas, built around fast hooks and constant twists, neatly fills the fragmented downtime of food-delivery riders, commuting office workers, and even older viewers. The emergence of a user base exceeding 700 million, the report notes, reflects not a niche taste but a broad-based pattern of cultural consumption rooted in China’s mass audience.

Boosting consumption, of course, is a top priority for policymakers in China right now. From that perspective, the explosive growth of micro-dramas appears to align closely with the country’s broader push to optimize its economic structure and stimulate domestic demand.

2. Micro-dramas’ growing footprint overseas

The Qiushi article argues that micro-dramas have become an emerging force in China’s cultural “going global” push, with their international reach expanding rapidly. It also provides data to illustrate the sector’s rising overseas influence.

In just the first eight months of 2025, China’s overseas micro-drama market generated 1.525 billion U.S. dollars in total revenue, up 194.9 percent year on year.

The NSD report also highlights the industry’s growing international spillover effects:
“The wave of short dramas going overseas has created new professional niches serving foreign markets — including script translation, multilingual dubbing, overseas distribution and operations, and international rights trading. At the same time, foreign directors and actors have begun coming to China to produce English-language or bilingual short dramas, further expanding employment opportunities in cross-cultural production, audiovisual translation, and on-site coordination.”

3. The economic impact of micro-dramas, especially on employment in China

The micro-drama industry’s ecosystem has become more mature, with more than 100,000 companies now operating in the sector nationwide. In 2025, the industry directly employed about 690,000 people across China.

Both Qiushi article and the NSD report mentioned a key figure: the industry directly supports around 690,000 jobs. The NSD report provides a detailed explanation of how that number was calculated:

At present, there is no unified official statistical framework covering employment in either the production or acting segments of the micro-drama industry. Existing industry data tend to focus on market size or viewership, offering little systematic insight into the labor market. Against this backdrop, our research team conducted extensive fieldwork, in-depth interviews, and cross-verification across multiple data sources. Using a structured model built on clearly defined assumptions, we estimated the scale of employment in the short-drama sector. The findings show:

(1) Production crews — including in-house screenwriters, directors, producers, cinematographers, lighting technicians, art directors, costume and props staff, sound engineers, and post-production personnel — form the most stable and technically intensive segment of the industry’s workforce, totaling around 450,000 people.

(2) Lead and supporting actors represent a comparatively smaller but highly professional group, numbering about 32,000.

(3) Extras constitute the largest, most accessible, and most fluid segment of employment. This group most directly reflects the industry’s role in supporting flexible employment and migrant workers, with approximately 207,000 people.

Taken together, these three groups indicate that in 2025 the short-drama industry directly supported around 690,000 jobs nationwide.

Building on this baseline, the report applies an indirect employment multiplier of 1.95, estimating that in 2025 the short-drama sector indirectly supports another 1.34 million jobs across related industries.

It notes that employment multipliers in the broader cultural and film sector typically range between 1.95 and 3.0. Choosing 1.95 therefore represents a deliberately conservative assumption, helping avoid overstating the industry’s spillover effects.

Adding the 690,000 direct jobs to the 1.34 million indirect jobs, the report concludes that micro-dramas could support around 2.03 million jobs in total in 2025.

The study also places these numbers in the context of China’s broader employment pressures. The labor market, it argues, is marked by the coexistence of overall job pressures and structural mismatches. The number of university graduates continues to rise. The class of 2026 alone is expected to reach 12.7 million while key groups such as migrant workers face increasing uncertainty over job stability and job quality amid industrial restructuring and fluctuating demand.

Against this backdrop, an industry capable of generating roughly two million jobs is clearly worth paying attention to — especially given that many of these positions have relatively low entry barriers and offer flexible forms of work.

Qiushi also discusses the reasons behind the rise of micro-dramas and offers its own analysis of the sector’s rapid growth. Since I’m not approaching this from the perspective of an entertainment industry insider, I won’t go into detail here. If you’re curious, you can easily consult the original piece, or even have AI walk you through it.

4. “Growing pains” of a fast-developing industry

The magazine also lays out several of the industry’s current challenges:

As a new cultural format born of the digital age, micro-dramas have achieved rapid growth and impressive results. At the same time, however, the sector still faces shortcomings in areas such as content quality, industry governance, and evaluation systems — the inevitable “growing pains” of a fast-developing industry.

On the quality of micro-dramas, the article argues that the number of truly outstanding micro-dramas remains disproportionately small compared with the sector’s sheer scale. In its words, the situation resembles “vast forests producing only a tiny bit of coal,” a vivid way of saying that high output has yet to translate into high-quality hits.

Some productions are eager to brand themselves around “mainstream values,” yet lack careful script development or convincing performances. The result is often dull storytelling, rough production values, and lukewarm audience responses. Others manage to tap into popular social sentiments but stop at surface-level treatments of trending topics — with repetitive character setups, similar plots, and interchangeable aesthetics, making it hard to deliver anything substantive or memorable. Still others show little commitment to original storytelling, chasing clicks and traffic instead.

In terms of industry governance, the article notes that the workforce is highly fluid. While this mobility injects energy and speeds up iteration, it may also undermine the resilience and institutional stability the sector needs for long-term development. The piece also calls for improving platform algorithms to break out of “aesthetic echo chambers,” and for embracing innovation in response to new technologies such as AI-generated content (AIGC).

Finally, it points out that the evaluation system for micro-dramas — how quality and impact are assessed — remains relatively underdeveloped.

5. Viewing time & short-drama production bases

Beyond the headline numbers, a few other details in the report also caught my attention — particularly how much time people now spend watching micro-dramas, and the emergence of dedicated production hubs in cities like Zhengzhou and Xi’an.

The report notes that from January to August 2025, average daily usage per user rose steadily from 95.7 minutes to 120.5 minutes, and has since remained stable in the 1.5–2 hour range. What’s striking is that viewing time did not fall back after an initial burst of popularity. Instead, it continued to edge upward from an already high base. In other words, micro-dramas are no longer a passing trend — they have become deeply embedded in people’s daily routines, evolving into a highly “sticky,” habitual form of entertainment consumption.

Geographically, production has also begun to cluster. Zhengzhou and Xi’an have emerged as two of the country’s most important short-drama production bases. Industry estimates suggest that each city launches roughly 400–600 new productions per month, together accounting for nearly 30 percent of national output. Meanwhile, Hengdian, with its extensive historical and costume-drama sets, has become the filming location for nearly 90 percent of China’s period micro-dramas.

According to the report, this kind of regional specialization not only reduces homogenized competition but also improves professionalization and production efficiency across the industry.

If I get the chance, I’d love to visit one of these production hubs myself to see how these shows are actually made on the ground.

Have you watched any Chinese micro-dramas? If there’s anything you’re curious about, feel free to leave a comment.

Such meetings are a long-standing practice in China’s policy process. Before the Government Work Report is formally presented to the National People’s Congress, senior leaders typically convene representatives from different sectors to gather feedback and calibrate policy priorities.

At the meeting, Li urged officials to thoroughly implement the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee’s recommendations for formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan and the decisions made at the Central Economic Work Conference, using the certainty of high-quality development to address the uncertainties in the development environment, and called for a more proactive fiscal policy and a moderately loose monetary policy.

He also highlighted the need to closely integrate pro-people policies with consumption promotion, and combine investment in physical assets with investment in human capital to foster new drivers of economic growth and continuously enhance public welfare.

Nine representatives spoke at the symposium [video]. While official footage has not disclosed what each individual said, Xinhua’s readout notes that the speakers came from academia, the business community, and sectors including education, science, culture, public health, and sports.

On Tuesday, The Paper (澎湃新闻) published brief profiles of each of the nine speakers, drawing on their professional backgrounds and areas of expertise. I found these profiles particularly illuminating in understanding how policymakers may be thinking about the Government Work Report and the upcoming Five-Year Plan. Below, based on The Paper’s reporting, I share short introductions to the nine speakers who took part in this symposium:

1. 明明 Mingming: He received his master’s degree from the Tsinghua University People’s Bank of China School of Finance (PBCSF) and his PhD from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He previously worked at the Monetary Policy Department I and II of the People’s Bank of China and joined CITIC Securities in 2015. His research focuses on macroeconomics, interest rates, monetary policy, and liquidity.

2. 贺佳 He Jia: Professor, vice dean and PhD supervisor of the School of Finance at Nankai University, and a recipient of the Ministry of Education’s National Young Talent Program. She is a Fellow of the Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) and one of Nankai University’s “Top 100 Young Academic Leaders.” Her research interests include real estate finance, household finance, and consumer finance.

3. 闫俊杰 Yan Junjie: Born in 1989, he serves as CEO of MiniMax and represents China’s large AI model enterprises, making him the second such representative to attend Premier Li Qiang’s symposium after DeepSeek founder Liang Wenfeng. Public information shows that MiniMax was founded in early 2022 and is among the few large-model companies that have focused on full-modality model development since inception. MiniMax was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on January 9 this year, with a latest market capitalization of nearly HK$120 billion.

4. 张智刚 Zhang Zhigang: Currently an alternate member of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC, and Chairman and Party Secretary of State Grid Corporation of China.

5. 龚旗煌 Gong Qihuang: Currently an alternate member of the 20th Central Committee of the CPC, and the deputy party secretary and president of Peking University.

6. 余晓晖 Yu Xiaohui: Member of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, currently the president and deputy party secretary of the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, and a senior engineer. He has long been engaged in research on information and communications technology and industry, communication networks, informatization, industrial integration, and the digital economy.

In the 1990s, he focused on communication network simulation, routing technologies, and network optimization and planning. Since 2000, he has led systematic research in areas including the industrial internet, “Broadband China,” the internet and mobile internet, the Internet of Things, digital infrastructure, and digital transformation, helping to promote industrial technological innovation and applications.

7. 王拥军 Wang Yongjun: Academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences; deputy party secretary and president of Beijing Tiantan Hospital, Capital Medical University; chief scientist, professor and PhD supervisor of the Neurology Center; director of the National Medical Quality Control Center for Neurological Diseases; deputy director of the National Clinical Research Center for Neurological Diseases; and director of the Department of Clinical Epidemiology and Clinical Trials at Capital Medical University.

8. 周莉亚 Zhou Liya: Born in 1981, she and her partner Han Zhen are widely known in the dance community as the “Twin Stars of Dance.” They have jointly choreographed and directed dance dramas including A Tapestry of a Legendary Land (《只此青绿》) and The Eternal Wave, and also served as chief directors of China’s 80th Victory Anniversary Commemorative Gala. In 2021, the dance-poetry drama A Tapestry of a Legendary Land, which she co-directed with Han Zhen, became a nationwide cultural phenomenon and a landmark dance IP.

A Tapestry of a Legendary Land (《只此青绿》)

9. 石宇奇 Shi Yuqi: Born in 1996, he is a Chinese men’s singles badminton player and world champion.

Shi claimed the men’s singles title at the 2025 BWF World Championships, ending a decade-long title drought for China in the event.

As this move is unprecedented in scale, it has quickly attracted attention at home and abroad. Science and Technology Daily reported that a Chinese expert who has been deeply involved in ITU-related affairs said the filings should be viewed in a rational manner:

中国幅员辽阔，是卫星技术应用大国，结合卫星技术应用实际和未来发展需求，在国际规则框架下，此次申报了多份卫星网络资料，其中有两份超过9万颗卫星。

China is vast in territory and a major country in the application of satellite technologies. In light of the realities of satellite applications and future development needs, and within the framework of international rules, China has, this time, filed multiple sets of satellite network projects, two of which involve more than 90,000 satellites.

截至目前，已有多个国家根据自身情况申报了卫星规模10万颗以上的卫星网络资料。受卫星频率轨道资源国际协调、系统建设、市场需求变化等多种因素影响，多数情况下，相关公司后续实际部署的卫星规模、技术参数等还会进行动态优化调整。

As of now, multiple countries have, based on their own circumstances, filed satellite network projects involving more than 100,000 satellites. Influenced by a range of factors such as international coordination of satellite frequency and orbital resources, system construction, and changes in market demand, in most cases the actual number of satellites ultimately deployed, as well as technical parameters and other aspects, will be dynamically optimized and adjusted in subsequent steps by the relevant companies.

该专家表示，卫星系统从卫星网络资料国际申报、国际协调到卫星发射、系统建设、提供服务、应用推广，一般需要较长时间。此次我国相关单位申报的卫星网络资料，属于履行ITU相关程序的例行操作，应予以理性看待。

The expert said that the entire process—from international filing of satellite network information and international coordination, to satellite launches, system construction, service provision, and application rollout—generally takes a relatively long time. The satellite network information filed by relevant Chinese entities this time constitutes routine work in fulfilling ITU-related procedures and should be viewed rationally.

Yang Feng, founder and CEO of commercial satellite company Spacety, based in Changsha, Hunan province, said the 203,000 satellite filings reflect long-term national strategy and space resource planning rather than immediate engineering capability, China Daily reported.

A short explainer video released by the WeChat account of China Central Television’s flagship evening news program Xinwen Lianbo also noted that the filings amount to “a ticket for strategic reserve” (”战略储备的一张门票”), adding that China has the world’s largest demand for 5G and 6G communications, intelligent connected vehicles, and the Internet of Things. China’s vast market, the video said, is large enough to absorb massive volumes of satellite data services, providing a sustained flow of capital and momentum for the entire industry.

The video likewise called for a rational view of the applications, pointing out that under ITU rules governing frequencies used for broadband satellite internet, applicants must launch 10 percent of the satellites within seven years, complete 50 percent within nine years, and finish full deployment within 14 years. The number of satellites launched can also be adjusted in light of future conditions, including reductions in the overall scale.

The video further analyzed the long-term significance of the filings, highlighting several potential impacts:

1. No more loss of mobile connectivity. In the future, in areas such as oceans, deep mountains, deserts, and other terrestrial signal blind spots, ordinary mobile phones could connect directly to satellites, enabling voice calls and internet access without restrictions.

2. Smarter intelligent vehicles. Direct satellite connectivity could provide autonomous driving systems with round-the-clock, high-precision positioning and communications support.

3. More reliable emergency communications. When natural disasters cause ground-based networks to collapse, satellite networks could serve as the last lifeline.

In addition, the video noted that some Chinese companies have already achieved batch, assembly-line production of satellites, and that China’s capabilities in reusable rockets are expected to continue improving. As satellite mass production advances and launch costs decline, service prices are also expected to become more affordable.

It is worth noting that of the 203,000 satellites covered by the filings, roughly 193,000 of the satellites were proposed by the Institute of Radio Spectrum Utilization and Technological Innovation (无线电创新院), a newly registered national research institute on radio spectrum innovation and commercialization based in Hebei, according to an article published on the WeChat blog of China.com (中华网), a Chinese-language news and information website under China International Broadcasting Network (CIBN).

China.com reported that the institute was jointly established by seven entities, including the State Radio Monitoring Center (国家无线电监测中心) and China Satellite Network Group (中国卫星网络集团), underscoring strong organizational coordination and national-level planning. At the same time, China Satellite Network Group and China Mobile also filed their own constellation plans, forming a structure characterized by “state-led coordination with participation from multiple actors” (“国家队主导、多主体协同”)

China.com also analyzed the scarcity of low Earth orbit (LEO) resources. Although space may appear vast, the low-altitude orbital regions suitable for deploying communications satellites are in fact limited. Industry estimates suggest that even under the most relaxed assumptions on safe spacing, LEO can accommodate fewer than 180,000 satellites in total.

At present, U.S. company SpaceX has already deployed around 10,000 satellites for its Starlink constellation and plans to expand the network to as many as 42,000. Other countries, including Rwanda, have also submitted applications — often through third-party intermediaries — for hundreds of thousands of satellites, seeking to gain an early advantage.

From a broader perspective, China.com said that competition over orbital and frequency resources also reflects a struggle for influence in global space governance. For a long time, rules governing orbital slots and spectrum allocation have been dominated by Western countries. China’s active participation in this competition through compliant and rule-based channels represents not only adherence to international norms, but also a necessary step in securing fair development space for itself.

If you’re interested in the links between China’s latest filings and capital markets, you may want to read a related newsletter by Amber Zhang published on Baiguan, which explores this angle in greater detail.

Baiguan - China Insights, Data, Context

Space Race 2.0? 2026 is China’s "SpaceX Moment"

In the final days of 2025, China quietly filed a bombshell with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). China submitted plans for two “super-constellations,” CTC-1 and CTC-2, totaling over 193,428 satellites …

Read more

4 months ago · 7 likes · Amber Zhang

If you’d like to do your own close reading, I’ve included the full English text at the end of this newsletter.

The year 2025 marks the completion of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan for economic and social development ... Our economic strength, scientific and technological abilities, defense capabilities, and composite national strength all reached new heights.

Early in the address, Xi offers a retrospective on China’s development over the past five years. That framing matters: 2025 is the final year of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan, which likely explains why this year’s speech includes a more explicit assessment of China’s overall strength than last year’s did.

This language aligns closely with how Chinese policymakers currently describe the country’s trajectory. An official explanatory reader released this year alongside the 15th Five-Year Plan recommendations notes that “China’s international influence, appeal and capacity to shape the world continue to grow” (我国国际影响力、感召力、塑造力不断提升). Taken together, these formulations amount to a concise summary of how China’s leadership now evaluates China’s standing — and they also reflect a noticeably more self-assured national self-image.

We integrated science and technology deeply with industries, and made a stream of new innovations. Many large AI models have been competing in a race to the top, and breakthroughs have been achieved in the research and development of our own chips. All this has turned China into one of the economies with the fastest growing innovation capabilities.

The speech does not name DeepSeek, a “phenomenon-level” product that sparked a wave of attention in China’s tech sector at the start of the year. Still, when Xi turns to science and technology, he opens directly with AI models — a small but telling choice of emphasis. It signals both the priority Chinese leaders attach to this field and their confidence in China’s progress.

The description of China as “one of the economies with the fastest-growing innovation capabilities” reinforces a long-standing narrative about China’s development path. Many of you will be familiar with Dan Wang’s book Breakneck: China’s Quest to Engineer the Future, which has been widely discussed in U.S. policy and analytical circles this year. The Economist called it “a useful way to think about industrial competition between America and China.”

Over the past year, the rights and interests of the workforce in new forms of employment have been better protected ... When the happy hum of daily life fills every home, the big family of our nation will go from strength to strength.

Any mention of the “workforce in new forms of employment” inevitably brings to mind China’s more than 10 million food-delivery riders. This year, several major internet platforms such JD.com began offering social insurance and other employee benefits to delivery workers — a move which marks a significant step toward standardizing the food delivery industry in China. Yuzhe He has an excellent piece on this shift.

China’s 7.48 million ride-hailing drivers are another group worth watching under this “new employment” umbrella. I’ve previously published a dedicated piece on them as well.

After announcing the three global initiatives on development, security, and civilization, I put forward the Global Governance Initiative to promote a more just and equitable global governance system. The world today is undergoing both changes and turbulence, and some regions are still engulfed in war.

The Global Governance Initiative is the fourth major global initiative China has proposed in recent years, following the Global Development, Security, and Civilization Initiatives. In an article published in Qiushi, the CPC Central Committee’s flagship magazine, Foreign Minister Wang Yi wrote that “global governance stands at a critical juncture. It will either move forward or fall back, and China’s diplomacy as a major country with Chinese characteristics has entered a historical stage in which it can accomplish more” (全球治理正处在承前启后、不进则退的关键时期；中国特色大国外交已进入可以更有作为的历史阶段).

This language is revealing when set against history. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Chinese leaders advanced the guideline often summarized as “keeping a low profile while accomplishing something” (韬光养晦，有所作为). Today’s formulation — “a historical stage in which it can accomplish more” (可以更有作为的历史阶段) — reflects how current policymakers assess both China’s development phase and the international environment.

If you want to dig deeper into what the Global Governance Initiative means, Wang Yi’s full article is worth reading.

We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait share a bond of blood and kinship. The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable!

References to Taiwan are a regular feature of China’s New Year addresses. Last year’s speech stated:
“We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one and the same family. No one can ever sever the bond of kinship between us, and no one can ever stop China’s reunification, a trend of the times.”

Personally, I don’t see a dramatic shift in tone this year. But if you read it differently, I’d genuinely like to hear your take.

Only a strong Communist Party of China can make our country strong. We launched the study and education program on fully implementing the central Party leadership’s eight-point decision on improving Party and government conduct. We exercised strict governance of the Party through credible measures, and promoted the Party’s self-revolution to fight corruption and advance healthy governance.

From March to July, a Party-wide education campaign was rolled out to implement the central Party leadership’s eight-point decision on improving work conduct.

Those familiar with China’s last decade will recall that the eight-point rules were issued by the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in December 2012 shortly after Xi Jinping first became the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee. The rules aim to reduce bureaucracy, extravagance and undesirable work practices of Party members.

Earlier this year, I published a standalone newsletter on the eight-point education campaign. It ended up being one of my ten most-read pieces of the year. At the time, I wrote:
“Looking forward to 2025, continuing to implement the spirit of the eight-point rules as a central theme in Party education holds profound importance.”

That framing now looks even more relevant. The article from the China Discipline Inspection and Supervision Newspaper explained that this year’s focus on the eight-point rules comes at a time when changes unseen in a century are unfolding across the world at a faster pace and an increasingly complex and severe external environment may exert a greater impact on China.

Even topics that appear highly domestic, such as the study and education campaigns around the eight-point rules, can offer useful insight for international readers trying to understand how China responds under pressure.

The year 2026 marks the beginning of the 15th Five-Year Plan. A successful venture should start with a good plan and with clear goals set.

If you want to read more about the 15th Five-Year Plan, I’ve linked two previous newsletters below.

The dream lofty, the journey long—bold strides will get us there. Let us charge ahead like horses with courage, vitality, and energy, fight for our dreams and our happiness, and turn our great vision into beautiful realities.

Readers familiar with China know that birth years follow a twelve-animal zodiac cycle. This year is the Year of the Snake — I was born in 1989, also a Snake year, for what it’s worth. From February 17, 2026, to February 5, 2027 (before Lunar New Year), it will be the Year of the Horse.

That timing makes it easy to understand why the speech includes several horse-related expressions of good fortune. Sometimes, the subtext is simply cultural.

Full text: Chinese President Xi Jinping’s 2026 New Year Message

BEIJING, Dec. 31 (Xinhua) -- On New Year’s Eve, Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered his 2026 New Year message through China Media Group and the internet. The following is the full text of the message:
Greetings to all! Year after year, life opens a fresh chapter. As the new year begins, I extend my best wishes to you from Beijing!
The year 2025 marks the completion of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan for economic and social development. Over the past five years, we have pressed ahead with enterprise and fortitude, and overcome many difficulties and challenges. We met the targets in the Plan and made solid advances on the new journey of Chinese modernization. Our economic output has crossed thresholds one after another, and it is expected to reach RMB 140 trillion yuan this year. Our economic strength, scientific and technological abilities, defense capabilities, and composite national strength all reached new heights. Clear waters and lush mountains have become a salient feature of our landscape. Our people enjoy a growing sense of gain, happiness and security. The past five years have been a truly remarkable journey, and our accomplishments have not come easily. Your unwavering hard work has made our nation thrive and prosper. I salute you all for your exceptional diligence and invaluable contributions.
This year is full of indelible memories. We solemnly commemorated the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, and established the Taiwan Recovery Day. These grand national events were majestic and powerful, and the glory of victory will shine through the pages of history. They are inspiring all the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation to remember history, honor fallen heroes, cherish peace, and create a better future. They are rallying a mighty force for the great rejuvenation of our nation.
We sought to energize high-quality development through innovation. We integrated science and technology deeply with industries, and made a stream of new innovations. Many large AI models have been competing in a race to the top, and breakthroughs have been achieved in the research and development of our own chips. All this has turned China into one of the economies with the fastest growing innovation capabilities. The Tianwen-2 probe began its star-chasing journey to explore asteroids and comets. Construction of the hydropower project at the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo River started. China’s first aircraft carrier equipped with an electromagnetic catapult system was officially commissioned. Humanoid robots did kung fu kicks, and drones performed spectacular light shows. Inventions and innovations have boosted new quality productive forces and added colorful dimensions to our lives.
We endeavored to nurture our spiritual home with cultural development. There was a surging public interest in cultural relics, museums, and intangible cultural heritage. A new Chinese cultural site was added to the World Heritage List. Cultural IPs such as Wukong and Nezha became global hits. The younger generation came to deem classic Chinese culture as the finest form of aesthetic expression. The cultural and tourism sectors thrived. The “super league” football games in our cities and villages attracted numerous fans. Ice and snow sports ignited people’s passion for the winter season. Tradition is now embracing modernity, and the Chinese culture is shining in even greater splendor.
We joined hands to build a better life and enjoyed it together. I attended celebrations in Xizang and Xinjiang. From the snow-covered plateau to both sides of the Tianshan Mountains, people of various ethnic groups are united as one, like seeds of a pomegranate sticking together. With white khatas and passionate singing and dancing, they expressed their love of the motherland and the happiness they enjoy. No issue of the people is too small; we care for every leaf and tend every branch in the garden of people’s well-being. Over the past year, the rights and interests of the workforce in new forms of employment have been better protected, facilities have been upgraded to bring more convenience to the elderly, and each family with childcare needs has received a subsidy of RMB 300 yuan per month. When the happy hum of daily life fills every home, the big family of our nation will go from strength to strength.
We continued to embrace the world with open arms. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Tianjin and the Global Leaders’ Meeting on Women were very successful; and island-wide special customs operations were launched in the Hainan Free Trade Port. To better address climate change, China announced new Nationally Determined Contributions. After announcing the three global initiatives on development, security, and civilization, I put forward the Global Governance Initiative to promote a more just and equitable global governance system. The world today is undergoing both changes and turbulence, and some regions are still engulfed in war. China always stands on the right side of history, and is ready to work with all countries to advance world peace and development and build a community with a shared future for humanity.
Not long ago, I attended the opening ceremony of the National Games, and I was glad to see Guangdong, Hong Kong and Macao coming together in unity and acting in unison. We should unswervingly implement the policy of One Country, Two Systems, and support Hong Kong and Macao in better integrating into the overall development of our country and maintaining long-term prosperity and stability. We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait share a bond of blood and kinship. The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable!
Only a strong Communist Party of China can make our country strong. We launched the study and education program on fully implementing the central Party leadership’s eight-point decision on improving Party and government conduct. We exercised strict governance of the Party through credible measures, and promoted the Party’s self-revolution to fight corruption and advance healthy governance. As a result, the conduct of our Party and government steadily improved. We must stay true to our original aspiration and founding mission, and pursue our goal with perseverance and dedication. We should continue to give a good answer to the question on how to maintain long-term governance put forth in a cave dwelling in Yan’an and prove ourselves worthy of the people’s expectation in the new era.
The year 2026 marks the beginning of the 15th Five-Year Plan. A successful venture should start with a good plan and with clear goals set. We should focus on our goals and tasks, boost confidence, and build momentum to press ahead. We should take solid steps to promote high-quality development, further deepen reform and opening up across the board, deliver prosperity for all, and write a new chapter in the story of China’s miracle.
The dream lofty, the journey long—bold strides will get us there. Let us charge ahead like horses with courage, vitality, and energy, fight for our dreams and our happiness, and turn our great vision into beautiful realities.
The sun of the new year will soon rise. May our great motherland stand in magnificence! May the fields across the country deliver good harvest! May our nation bathe in the glory of the morning! May you all enjoy life to the fullest, and achieve every success! May all your dreams come true! Enditem

This latest round of moves unfolded against a broader backdrop. Washington has also just released its latest National Security Strategy, which references Taiwan eight times—highlighting its strategic location and the importance of its semiconductor industry—while reiterating that the U.S. “does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.”

In response, China’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office urged the U.S. to honor the serious political commitments made by its leaders, exercise extreme caution on the Taiwan question, stop emboldening “Taiwan independence” forces, and refrain from sending any further misleading signals.

For many in China, these moves reinforce a familiar but unsettling perception: that the current U.S. administration does not fully grasp—or does not sufficiently weigh—how central the Taiwan question is to China’s core interests and to the overall trajectory of China–U.S. relations. At the same time, there is growing curiosity, including among international readers, about how Chinese scholars themselves interpret Washington’s latest actions.

To explore that question, we spoke with several Chinese experts. Their perspectives range from how people on the mainland refer to Taiwan people and what that language reveals about cross-Strait relations, to the historical logic of “national unification” in Chinese political thought; from why Taiwan is widely seen as Beijing’s clearest red line, to how reunification—if and when it happens—would shape China–U.S. relations, Taiwan’s own future, and the broader Asia-Pacific landscape.

As always, the views below reflect those of the individual scholars, not any institution.

1. Why the mainland refers to Taiwan residents as “compatriots,” and what the term signals about the future of cross-Strait relations.
In Chinese political discourse, residents of Taiwan are commonly referred to as “tongbao” (同胞), a word often translated as “compatriots.” Standard Chinese dictionaries typically define “tongbao” in two ways: as people “born of the same parents,” and more broadly as “members of the same nation or ethnicity.” Usage examples frequently include “Taiwan compatriots” as well as “compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao.”

熊晓煜 Xiong Xiaoyu, the deputy director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Wuhan University: “Tongbao” carries a strong emotional resonance that is difficult to capture fully in English. The term reflects a deeply rooted sense of shared identity rather than a purely legal or political designation.

Beyond its historical and emotional dimensions, the term “tongbao” also carries implications for the future of cross-Strait relations. It reflects an understanding of the Chinese state as one whose people inherently include Taiwan residents. In this view, territory long inhabited by compatriots is considered an inseparable part of the nation, and reunification is therefore regarded as a domestic affair, not one subject to foreign intervention.
At the same time, the term conveys an expectation of restraint. By framing both sides of the Strait as kin, it implies that reunification should be pursued in a way that minimizes harm and emphasizes shared bonds rather than confrontation.

彭韬 Peng Tao, deputy director of the Center for East Asia and Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao Studies at Wuhan-based Central China Normal University: “Tongbao” is both a present identity and a forward-looking declaration. It signals the Chinese government’s confidence and resolve to resolve the Taiwan question and complete the process of national reunification. For the Communist Party of China, reunification has long been framed as an unshakable historical mission—one that continues to shape policy and rhetoric today.

2. Why “the maintenance of national unity” is important?

From the perspective of many Chinese historians, China’s civilization—spanning more than 5,000 years—has been shaped by a persistent commitment to what is known as “da yi tong,” (大一统) or “the maintenance of national unity.”

邢广程 Xing Guangcheng, an academician at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and a specialist in borderland and regional studies: “The maintenance of national unity” became a guiding principle of governance during the Qin (221–206 BCE) and Han (206 BCE–220 CE) dynasties and has been upheld by successive Chinese governments ever since. Each regarded national unity as a paramount political ideal. The Qing dynasty (1644–1911), in particular, brought this tradition to its apex, consolidating a vast, multi-ethnic realm and laying the groundwork for a modern sovereign state.

Although China’s history has alternated between periods of unity and division, the broader historical trajectory has consistently favored reunification. This continuity is often summarized in a widely cited formulation: “The territory cannot be divided, the nation cannot fall into chaos, the ethnic groups cannot be dispersed, and the civilization cannot be interrupted.”

熊晓煜 Xiong Xiaoyu: From Beijing’s perspective, national reunification thus occupies the very core of China’s core interests. On an emotional level, Taiwan is widely seen on the mainland as the last unresolved legacy of China’s modern-era humiliations, giving the issue a powerful resonance in popular sentiment.

3. Why Beijing draws a red line against any attempt to separate Taiwan
彭韬 Peng Tao: Opposition to “Taiwan independence” is grounded in principles that Beijing argues are consistent with international law. Safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity is widely recognized as a fundamental right of states. On this basis, China maintains that opposing separatist activities and pursuing reunification constitute a legitimate exercise of sovereignty. This position is understood—and in practice accepted—by the majority of sovereign states, which adhere to the one-China principle in their diplomatic relations.

In addition, reunification would contribute to regional stability. A prolonged stalemate increases the risk that separatist moves or external interference could trigger military confrontation, with potentially severe consequences for the Asia-Pacific.

In an era when economic and trade issues are increasingly framed through a security lens, resolving the Taiwan question would help remove a major source of uncertainty, facilitating smoother regional and global economic cooperation.

China’s pursuit of complete reunification and “Making America Great Again” are not mutually exclusive.

4. What would the United States gain from supporting China’s reunification?
Some Chinese scholars argue that Washington’s support for peaceful cross-Strait reunification would align with China’s interests and would not necessarily undermine those of the United States.
祝捷 Zhu Jie, a professor at Wuhan University Law School and executive director of its Center for Legal Studies on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao: Under a “one country, two systems” framework, Taiwan would retain a high degree of autonomy and space for industrial development after reunification. That arrangement, in turn, could open new avenues for U.S.-China engagement, enabling deeper integration of supply chains linking the Chinese mainland, Taiwan and the United States. Such integration would help anchor peace in the Asia-Pacific and deliver benefits not only to both sides of the Strait, but also to Washington and the broader international community.

王英津 Wang Yingjin, director of the Research Center for Cross-Strait Relations at Renmin University of China in Beijing: A peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question could help stabilize Sino-American relations while allowing the United States to benefit more fully from China’s vast and still-expanding market.

5. Reunification, national rejuvenation, and “Making America Great Again”
张云 Zhang Yun, a professor of international relations at Nanjing University: China’s pursuit of reunification and national rejuvenation need not conflict with America’s aspiration to “Make America Great Again.” China’s complete reunification is a natural outcome of its modernization process and a necessary condition for lasting regional stability. It would also inject fresh momentum into Asia-Pacific economic integration.
Resolving the Taiwan question within the framework of Sino-American relations would relieve the United States of an unnecessary strategic burden and a source of escalating risk. A fully reunified China would not pose a threat to U.S. security. An America seeking renewed strength can ill afford another cold war—or worse, a hot one. Mutual success and shared prosperity should form the foundation of a sound strategic understanding between the world’s two largest powers.

6. Implications for Taiwan, the Asia-Pacific, and global prosperity
彭韬 Peng Tao: China’s reunification would decisively eliminate the instability associated with “Taiwan independence” and allow Taiwan compatriots to share more fully in the dividends of national development. Peaceful reunification under a “one country, two systems” framework would establish a new foundation for China’s long-term development and national rejuvenation, while creating broad opportunities for Taiwan’s social and economic progress and delivering tangible benefits to its residents.
王英津 Wang Yingjin: Reunification would bring concrete developmental advantages supported by the mainland. Beyond Taiwan, China’s complete reunification would have wider implications: expanded markets, deeper regional integration, and shared prosperity across the Asia-Pacific—benefits that would ultimately extend to the global economy.

(Li Hanfang also contributed to this piece)

Like many others, I have been waiting for this day for a long time.

I have personally visited Hainan Island three times. Two of those trips were to attend friends’ seaside weddings — which, in a way, already says something about Hainan’s character. Through my regular interactions with people working and living there, I have also learned that the central government has dispatched a large number of officials from other provinces to support Hainan’s development. Over the years, I have consistently felt how strong Beijing’s determination is to make Hainan work.

For this newsletter, I reviewed official explanations of the launch of island-wide special customs operations and spoke with several Chinese experts, organizing their perspectives into this briefing.

I want to give special credit to my colleague Wu Maohui, a Xinhua reporter based long-term on Hainan Island. He has deep expertise on the Hainan FTP and provided me with a great deal of valuable background and insight.

Before diving in, two clarifications:

1. The views expressed by the experts quoted here represent their personal opinions. I have organized them by theme mainly to offer overseas readers a structured reference for understanding the Hainan FTP.

2. Information related to the Hainan FTP is vast. This piece does not aim to be exhaustive. Instead, it highlights issues that overseas readers may care most about. If you would like to explore further, or have feedback, feel free to write to me.

Where Is Hainan?

Hainan Province lies at the southernmost tip of China. It is separated from Guangdong Province to the north by the Qiongzhou Strait, faces Vietnam across the Beibu Gulf to the west, and borders the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia across the South China Sea to the east and south.

By the end of 2024, Hainan’s permanent population reached 10.48 million, an increase of 51,000 from the previous year, according to the official website of the Hainan FTP.

What’s Special About Hainan FTP?

Two-tiered special customs system. Under the island-wide customs operations, the Hainan FTP will implement a supervision model featuring “freer access at the first line, regulated access at the second line, and free flows within the island.”

The “first line” refers to Hainan’s connection with overseas markets. Meanwhile, the “second line” denotes the customs boundary between the island and China’s mainland.

In practice, “freer access at the first line” refers to freer trade between Hainan and areas outside China’s customs border, and “regulated access at the second line” means maintaining standard customs controls for China’s mainland.

What Does This Mean for Business?

Zero tariffs. With the launch of island-wide customs operations, the scope of zero-tariff treatment in Hainan will expand significantly. The number of tariff lines eligible for zero tariffs will increase from about 1,900 to around 6,600, raising the overall zero-tariff ratio from 21% to 74%.

Strong tax incentives. Companies can benefit from multiple policies across different stages of production and operation. Take a biopharmaceutical company as an example: during the construction and research phase, imported raw materials and equipment can qualify for zero tariffs, reducing import costs by 5 to 10 percent. In manufacturing, products made with zero-tariff imported inputs and meeting a value-added ratio of 30 percent or more can be shipped to the Chinese mainland free of import duties.

Once profitable, the company can also benefit from a preferential corporate income tax rate of 15 percent, while its executives and technical staff may qualify for a 15 percent personal income tax rate.

For foreign enterprises, this arrangement offers a stable interface through which they can simultaneously engage global markets and China’s vast domestic demand. For domestic firms, it provides a gateway to global resources, technologies and capital flows.

Why It Matters

Following the launch of island-wide customs operations, zero-tariff treatment now covers the entire industrial chain — from raw materials and components to final products. This is expected to help extend, reinforce, and optimize industrial chains, and support the cultivation of globally competitive industrial clusters in Hainan.

The 30% value-added threshold not only lowers operating costs for firms, but is also expected to attract more high-end manufacturing and high value-added processing industries to Hainan.

Key Industries

According to the Master Plan for the Construction of Hainan Free Trade Port and the Recommendations of the CPC Hainan Provincial Committee on Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, the post–customs-operations phase will focus on building a Hainan-specific modern industrial system.

The Hainan FTP will prioritize four leading sectors:

• Tourism

• Modern services

• High-tech industries

• Efficient tropical agriculture

At the same time, it aims to further develop consumer markets such as high-end shopping, healthcare, and international education.

Timeline: How We Got Here

(Analyzed by 赵晋平 Zhao Jinping, Vice Chairman of the China Association of Trade in Services, based on official documents)

Stage 1 (2018–2020): “Laying the foundation.”
In April 2018, The Chinese leadership announced the decision to build the entire island of Hainan into a pilot free trade zone. At the time, however, China already had more than a dozen FTZs nationwide. Hainan’s pilot FTZ did not yet differ fundamentally from others, nor did it fully reflect the ambition of “higher-standard opening-up.” This stage was primarily about accumulating experience.

Stage 2 (2020–2025): “Building institutions.”
In June 2020, China released the Master Plan for the Construction of Hainan Free Trade Port, emphasizing that by the time of customs operations, a basic institutional framework for the FTP should be “initially formed.” This phase focused on institutional construction on top of earlier groundwork.

Stage 3 (2025–2035): “Full coverage.”
Starting Dec. 18, 2025, island-wide special customs operations are implemented. “Full coverage” means replicating and institutionalizing the systems initially formed before customs operations across the entire province, turning them into long-term arrangements.

Stage 4 (After 2035): “Strengthening distinctive features.”

Financial Preparation

To facilitate high-level convenience for cross-border capital flows, China’s central bank and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange launched multi-functional free trade accounts in May 2024 to create an integrated local and foreign currency account system.

The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) said it has built a financial policy and institutional system specifically designed to support the high-standard construction of the FTP, providing strong momentum for the port’s development.

Other Points You May Find Interesting

How big is the Hainan FTP?
At 33,900 square kilometers, it is 31 times the size of Hong Kong and 47 times that of Singapore, making it the world’s largest free trade port by area, according to National Business Daily, a nationwide Chinese financial and economic daily newspaper.

Going Deeper: Geography and Strategy

In 2018, China unveiled the guidelines to support Hainan to deepen reform and opening up, making clear that the Hainan FTP is intended to serve as a key gateway for China’s opening-up toward the Pacific and Indian oceans

This positioning as a “key gateway of opening-up” is critical. Why does it matter so much?

迟福林 Chi Fulin, head of the China Institute for Reform and Development:

In my view, this point is particularly important. To begin with, the nature of globalization itself is changing. Regional economic integration has increasingly become the dominant feature of globalization, and this trend is now irreversible. Under these circumstances, the development of the Hainan FTP cannot be approached by “looking at Hainan from within Hainan.” Instead, it requires “looking at Hainan from beyond Hainan” — leveraging national strategy to drive Hainan’s development, and in turn using Hainan’s development to reinforce China’s broader strategic objectives.

Hainan’s orientation toward the South China Sea gives it a distinctive resource and geographic advantage. An estimated 60 to 70 percent of China’s imports and exports pass through the South China Sea, either entering the country or heading toward the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This geographic position is therefore of exceptional importance. Against the backdrop of deepening regional economic integration, Hainan’s regional role becomes particularly prominent.

Hainan’s locational advantages — especially its geographic, geopolitical, and resource advantages — are highly pronounced. Historically, Hainan has maintained close ties with regions centered on ASEAN. In building itself into an “important gateway of opening-up,” the most critical counterpart for Hainan is ASEAN. Hainan must become a hub for strategic cooperation between China and ASEAN. Without this hub role, the notion of an “important gateway of opening-up” would remain abstract and fail to materialize in practice. This positioning is therefore crucial — and at present, this trajectory is becoming increasingly evident.

What Does This Mean for Overseas Capital?

Hainan to issue 10-year offshore RMB aerospace bonds in HK -- China Daily (Sept. 12, 2025)

The government of Hainan province has announced plans to issue offshore renminbi bonds worth 5 billion yuan ($702 million) in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) this September, aiming to deepen cooperation between the island province and the HKSAR, advance the development of the Hainan Free Trade Port, and contribute to the internationalization of the yuan.

This year marks the fourth consecutive year that Hainan has issued offshore RMB bonds in Hong Kong. A global investor conference was held on Thursday at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) to provide more details about the issuance.

In addition to three-year green bonds and five-year blue bonds, this year will feature the inaugural issuance of a 10-year aerospace bond, with a portion of the proceeds allocated to infrastructure development at Hainan’s Wenchang Spacecraft Launch Site.

Hainan has now issued offshore RMB local government bonds in Hong Kong for four consecutive years. This carries two layers of significance, according to 曹远征 Cao Yuanzheng, former Chief Economist of the Bank of China and advisor to the Hainan FTP:

First, it serves as a signal of leading openness. It is relatively uncommon for local governments to issue renminbi-denominated bonds in Hong Kong, and even less common for the proceeds to be repatriated for use on the mainland. This, in practice, reflects the financial facilitation of the Hainan FTP.

Second, the issuance also carries strong symbolic meaning. Take the so-called “航天主题债” (”aerospace-themed bond”) as an example: Wenchang International Aerospace City in Hainan and related aerospace industries are experiencing rapid growth, and China is emerging as an important global leader in this field. These developments provide important support for Hainan’s successful bond issuance.

Looking ahead, as the Hainan FTP moves into the phase of special customs operations, Hainan will find it easier — and have greater confidence — to access international markets. As facilitation improves, more international capital is likely to flow into Hainan, helping to turn the province into a high ground for reform and opening-up.

Challenges Ahead (A Reality Check)

No ready-made model. Customs operations mark a new beginning rather than an endpoint for Hainan. There is no existing template to copy for Hainan FTP. China has explicitly called for building a “free trade port with Chinese characteristics,” meaning the model must be created through experimentation and continuous adjustment.
— 王新奎 Wang Xinkui, Chairman of the Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Center

Implementation discretion matters. The effectiveness of top-level design depends not only on how detailed it is, but also on the degree of flexibility local governments have in implementation. This requires both initiative at the local level and sufficient tolerance for trial and error from the center. Without such space, innovation becomes risky and policy implementation tends to fall into inertia.
— 刘尚希 Liu Shangxi, former President of the China Academy of Fiscal Sciences

Service trade remains a bottleneck. Although Hainan has a negative list for service trade, it still contains around 70 restrictive measures. Compared with CPTPP or even RCEP standards, gaps remain. During the 15th Five-Year Plan period, breakthroughs in this area will be crucial.
— 赵晋平 Zhao Jinping, Vice Chairman of the China Association of Trade in Services

More information:

1. Special customs operations promise broad gains for businesses, residents in Hainan FTP (Xinhua)

2. How individuals calculate income tax incentives in Hainan (National Business Daily)

3. Former Chongqing mayor Huang Qifan on the latest developments in Hainan FTP (New Economist)

It was Macron’s first visit to China since 2023 and his fourth state visit to China as French president. High on his agenda are economic issues such as bilateral trade and investment. Macron left for China just one day after he met the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Paris, and as expected, he and Chinese President Xi Jinping discussed the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

BEIJING AND CHENGDU -- A TALE OF TWO CITIES

Macron and his wife Brigitte arrived in Beijing on Dec. 3, where he was greeted at the airport by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who travelled to France days earlier to arrange this trip.

On Dec. 4, Xi Jinping and his wife, Peng Liyuan, held a welcome ceremony for Macron and Brigitte Macron. The two leaders then held talks and oversaw the signing of a range of cooperation documents covering nuclear energy, agriculture, food, education, and ecological environment. Following their discussions, they addressed the press together.

Later the same day, Xi and Macron attended the closing ceremony of the seventh meeting of the China-France Business Council. Macron also met with Chinese Premier Li Qiang, and Zhao Leji, China’s top legislator, on Thursday.

In the evening, the French presidential couple traveled to Chengdu, capital of southwest China’s Sichuan Province. The city of Chengdu, which established a sister-city relationship with Montpellier in 1981, holds historical significance as the first such partnership between the two countries.

Chengdu is also home to a research base of giant panda breeding, where a famous pair of giant pandas is undergoing quarantine after returning last month from France. The pair is retiring after spending more than a decade at ZooParc de Beauval.

On Dec. 5, Macron and his wife visited Dujiangyan, a 2,200-year-old irrigation system in Chengdu that made the local area a major grain-producing area and a “Land of Abundance” (天府之国), which continues to function to this day.

At the irrigation system site, Xi said ancient engineers of this irrigation system tailored measures to local conditions (因地制宜) and designed in harmony with the natural flow of water (顺势而为). Xi told Macron that this spirit can be used in many other fields. “We can draw inspiration for governing the country from this ancient wisdom and make sound decisions.”

It is worth noting that during a single state visit, President Macron held two separate meetings with President Xi Jinping in two different Chinese cities — an arrangement that is relatively uncommon and has drawn attention.

In recent years, a notable feature of interactions between Xi and Macron has been their efforts to broaden their exchanges beyond the capitals of their respective countries. In 2023, Macron traveled to Guangzhou, where he enjoyed a performance of the ancient Guqin melody “High Mountain and Flowing Water.” The following year, at Macron’s invitation, Xi traveled to the Hautes-Pyrénées department in France.

Shortly before returning to France, Macron also delivered a speech at Sichuan University and played table tennis with players from both countries, including Chinese world champions. He was spotted running around a lake in Chengdu on that morning and greeted local citizens. His encounters with cheering Chengdu locals later went viral on Chinese social media, showing crowds rushing to shake hands and take selfies with the French president -- a warmth and spontaneity that Macron himself might find increasingly rare in Paris.

On Friday, Brigitte visited the giant panda research and breeding base in Chengdu, where she was reunited with Yuan Meng, a panda born in France and named by the French first lady, who serves as his godmother.

During Macron’s stay in China, the two sides issued joint statements on global governance, climate and environmental challenges, nuclear energy, agriculture and food, and the situations in Ukraine and Palestine.

Notably, their statement on global governance introduces a new narrative regarding the international system -- one based on international law and rules of solidarity (基于国际法及团结规则的国际体系). This reminds people of the so-called “rules-based international order” long promoted by the United States. While the term “rules-based” sounds palatable to the ears, in practice, the U.S. takes liberty in interpreting what those “rules” actually entail.

The two couples at Dujiangyan, Chengdu City. (Xinhua)

SUBSTANTIVE, DETAILED PRESS READOUT

The most closely watched events of Macron’s visit included his talks with President Xi on Thursday, their joint press appearances, and speeches to both Chinese and French entrepreneurs. Xinhua News Agency released three detailed reports on these events. Below are the key points made by the two world leaders during their interactions.

*During his talks with Macron, Xi described China and France as independent, visionary and responsible major countries (有远见、有担当的独立自主大国). The two countries should demonstrate a sense of responsibility, uphold multilateralism, and stand firmly on the right side of history, he said.

*Xi encouraged the two countries to consolidate cooperation in traditional fields such as aviation, aerospace and nuclear energy, while tapping into the potential for cooperation in areas including the green economy, digital economy, biopharmaceuticals, artificial intelligence and new energy.

*China is willing to import more high-quality French products, welcomes more French enterprises to develop in China, and also hopes that France will provide a fair environment and stable conditions for Chinese enterprise, he added.

*China and France should practice true multilateralism, and uphold the UN-centered international system and the international order underpinned by international law, said Xi.

*Citing the interconnectedness of global industrial and supply chains, Xi emphasized that openness and cooperation will bring opportunities for development, while decoupling and severing supply chains will lead to isolation.

*Macron said France firmly upholds the one-China policy. It is ready to work with China to promote mutual investment, strengthen cooperation in such areas as economy, trade and renewable energy, and deepen friendly cultural exchanges.

*Given the global geopolitical instability and challenges to the multilateral order, cooperation between France and China is even more important and indispensable, said Macron.

*On Ukraine, Xi said China supports all efforts that are conducive to peace and will continue to play a constructive role in the political settlement of the crisis in its own way. He said China supports European countries in playing their due role toward the establishment of a balanced, effective and sustainable European security architecture.

*When meeting with the press, Xi revealed that the two leaders agreed to enhance political mutual trust, expand practical cooperation, promote people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and advance the reform and improvement of global governance.

*It is hoped that all parties can reach a fair, lasting and binding peace deal that is accepted by all parties involved through dialogue and negotiation, Xi told journalists on the spot. He also added that China will continue to play a constructive role in the political settlement of the crisis, while firmly opposing any irresponsible actions that shift blame or distort the situation.

*When addressing Chinese and French entrepreneurs in Beijing, Xi called on the two countries to collaborate in reforming and improving global governance. During the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2025 Summit, held in Tianjin from late August to early September, Xi put forward the Global Governance Initiative. Macron told Xi during their talks that France fully endorses President Xi Jinping’s proposals for reforming and improving global governance and promoting a more balanced global economy.

Macron speaks at Sichuan University, Chengdu (Xinhua)

TRADE, TRUST AND BEYOND

Beyond the immediate discussions on tariffs and trade, Macron’s visit revealed deeper layers of engagement -- a mutual quest for trust, investment reciprocity, and a shared vision for a multipolar world.

Zhao Yongsheng, professor from Beijing-based University of International Business and Economics and visiting scholar at Sorbonne University in Paris, told us that Macron’s visit was characterized by a high level of welcome and hospitality, widely regarded as “treatment of the highest caliber.” This reflects China’s strong emphasis on its relations with France and suggests that France may represent interests beyond its own on certain issues.

Analysts say France holds special value to China today, as it poses a notable challenge when the U.S. seeks Western leadership. In its foreign policy, China emphasizes rationalism and realism, always considering the bigger picture. The country handles trade disputes, such as those over electric vehicles, on a case-by-case basis, while its overall diplomatic framework, including France’s role, remains steady and unshaken.

Macron is a passionate advocate for European strategic autonomy and is trying to play a leading role in the EU after Angela Merkel’s retirement. Although trade is an EU competence, China hopes that France can do more for Beijing’s relations with Brussels, both on economic and political issues.

The core focus of the visit remained on economic and trade cooperation, as planned. A key new concept introduced during the discussions was Macron’s proposal to “promote mutual investment,” a formulation explicitly put forward for the first time. Zhao suggested that the emphasis lies particularly on increasing Chinese investment in France and the EU.

To achieve such mutual growth in investment, a critical obstacle remains the currently stalled EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) since 2021. It is speculated that the two sides may have discussed the possibility of France persuading other EU member states to resume negotiations on the agreement, according to Zhao.

French media observed a historical reversal: for four decades, technology had predominantly flowed from Europe to China. Today, Beijing ships electric vehicles, solar panels, batteries, and electronic components to Europe -- in other words, everything Europe needs to succeed in its energy transition. France is seeking technology transfers from China, said BFMTV.

Prof. Philippe Aghion, the 2025 Nobel laureate in economics, said, “Europe is still ahead of China in terms of research publications. We have very good researchers, but we do not always have the means to translate that research into breakthrough innovations. China, however, knows how to innovate. So the Chinese may well be interested in collaborations.”

Ukraine did not appear to be a central focus of Macron’s visit to China. Meanwhile, on trade frictions between the two sides — including the EU’s tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, a move in which France played a role, and China’s retaliatory anti-dumping measures on EU cognac — there has so far been no clear indication of a breakthrough.

Zhao believed that the visit held multi-layered significance. It is expected to advance China-EU relations positively, with Macron serving as an important channel for high-level dialogue on behalf of the EU.

Yin Jianlong, director of the European Union Studies Center at Anhui University, said that both France and the EU need to bolster their credibility in dealings with China, in a veiled reference to Macron’s support for EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. Macron’s visit, he said, was essentially an attempt at self-preservation, aimed at strengthening France’s ties with China amid a challenging international environment for both France and the European Union.

At a strategic level, amid a U.S. tilt toward unilateralism, China and France jointly reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism. Moreover, their preference for resolving disputes through consultation -- rather than threats or sanctions -- offers a constructive model for global trade conflict resolution.

Airbus’s second Final Assembly Line for A320 family aircraft in Tianjin, China, is an icon of China-France cooperation (Xinhua)

As I explained in the previous piece, the publication of two official “tutorials” after major Communist Party of China (CPC) meetings or the release of major documents has become routine in recent years. These tutorial-style books contain signed articles by senior officials on national development, as well as detailed Q&As on key strategic issues. They offer substantial information and nuance not found in the Recommendations themselves, making them essential reading for anyone who wants to understand China’s development trajectory.

Today’s theme is technology.

Given the global environment, I had expected that technology would be the topic mainstream international media jump on first—and that prediction was quickly confirmed. Reuters’ earliest headline on the Recommendations was “China’s five-year plan emphasizes tech self-reliance amid U.S. rivalry.”

Combined with the heightened interest in Chinese tech — from Silicon Valley to other global innovation hubs —it feels timely to dedicate one full issue of this newsletter to the technology-related content in the Recommendations. What follows are the key passages from the two tutorial books that I believe deserve highlighting, along with my comments. As with last time, I’ll cite the source and page number for each excerpt. I have yet to obtain the Chinese e-versions of these books, and they will not be published in English, based on past practice. However, a few of the included articles have been published by People’s Daily; where relevant, I will attach links for your reference.

Please note that while most of the essays in these two books are signed articles written by senior officials, the 108 questions and answers in the Q&A Guidebook are not attributed to individual authors. They can be viewed as the collective intelligence of the compilation team — essentially the group with the deepest involvement in, and the most comprehensive understanding of, the formulation of China’s five-year plans.

Let’s dive in.

1. “Major-power competition is a contest of productive forces.”

从现实逻辑看，发展新质生产力是推动高质量发展、赢得大国博弈战略主动的内在要求 ...... 大国博弈说到底是生产力的竞争，焦点是发展新质生产力。我们必须时不我待、主动作为，加快形成更多标志性、原创性、颠覆性科技和产业创新成果，在大国博弈中赢得战略主动。

From a practical standpoint, developing new quality productive forces is an intrinsic requirement for driving high-quality development and gaining strategic initiative in major-power competition. … Ultimately, major-power competition is a contest of productive forces, with the focus on developing new quality productive forces. We must seize the moment and act proactively, accelerating the creation of more iconic, original, and disruptive scientific and industrial breakthroughs to gain the strategic upper hand.

(Source: Tutorial on the Recommendations…, p.80, Article “Developing New Quality Productive Forces According to Local Conditions,” by He Lifeng, Chinese vice premier and a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee)

The phrase “major-power competition” (“大国博弈”) appears only once in the Recommendations. But in the tutorials, Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng — who has led China’s economic and trade talks with the U.S. across multiple locations this year — further underscores the centrality of technological development in this broader strategic context.

2. Technology and the race for “first-mover advantage”

要增强抢占发展先机的紧迫感，强化未来产业布局的前瞻性。纵观近现代历史，科技革命是产业变革的先导，每一次科技革命都会孕育出一批重塑全球竞争格局的新产业，引发大国兴衰。

We must heighten our sense of urgency in seizing development opportunities and strengthen forward-looking planning for future industries. Throughout modern history, scientific revolutions have preceded industrial transformations. Each technological revolution has birthed new industries that reshape global competition and trigger the rise and fall of major powers.

…

科技革命和产业变革没有到“临界点”并不意味着各国都“处在同一条起跑线上”，早做多做积累才能占领先机、赢得优势。

The fact that the current technological revolution has not yet reached a “tipping point” does not mean all countries are standing at the same starting line. Early and sustained accumulation is the only way to gain the advantage.

当今世界，新一轮科技革命和产业变革加速突破，正催生出一批事关战略全局和长远发展的未来产业，它们可能就是“明天”的战略性新兴产业、“后天”的支柱产业。我们必须更加注重前瞻规划布局未来产业发展，走在产业体系现代化的前列，掌握全球创新版图重构、经济结构重塑的主动权。

Today, a new round of scientific and industrial transformation is accelerating. A range of future industries with strategic, long-term significance is emerging — industries that may become tomorrow’s strategic emerging sectors and the day after tomorrow’s pillar industries. We must strengthen forward-looking planning, stay at the forefront of industrial modernization, and seize the initiative in the restructuring of global innovation and economic systems.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p.21, Q10: “How should we understand forward-looking planning for future industries?”)

Again, the urgency China feels around technology development is clear.

3. AI and global competition: China’s self-assessment

尽管我国人工智能发展处在全国第一方阵，但在基础理论、关键核心技术等方面还存在短板弱项。

Although China’s AI development is among the leading group globally, we still have shortcomings in basic theories and key core technologies.

...

许多国家纷纷出台人工智能发展战略，加强人工智能产业布局，催生出无人驾驶、人形机器人、自主飞行无人接、脑机接口、智能手机、智能电视、智能电脑、智能穿戴设备等新领域新赛道，这些都可能成长为改变未来商业格局、重塑全球经济的“竞技场”。在激烈国际竞争面前，谁在人工智能技术产品化、产业化上先行一步，谁就在市场开拓上占有先机。

Countries around the world are releasing AI strategies and expanding industrial layouts, giving rise to new arenas such as autonomous driving, humanoid robots, autonomous drones, brain–computer interfaces, smart phones, smart TVs, smart computers, and wearable intelligent devices. These emerging sectors may become the competitive battlegrounds that reshape global commerce and the world economy. In the face of intense international competition, whoever achieves earlier breakthroughs in AI productization and industrialization will gain the first-mover advantage in the marketplace.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p.41, Q20: “Why does China fully implement the ‘AI+’ initiative?”)

The first sentence is perhaps the most concise — and clearest — official statement of how China judges its current global position in AI. The second paragraph underscores China’s close tracking of global AI developments and its view of AI as a transformative economic arena.

4. Basic research as China’s key bottleneck

人工智能、量子科技、生物技术等领域深入发展，我国迎来换道超车的历史机遇。新一轮科技革命和产业变革抓住了就是机遇，抓不主就是挑战。

With advances in AI, quantum technology, and biotechnology, China faces a historic opportunity for leapfrogging. The new round of scientific and industrial transformation is an opportunity if seized, and a challenge if missed.

作为科学探索的源头，基础研究不仅是技术突破的基石，更是产业变革的底层驱动力；它既为技术突破提供理论支撑，又为产业升级注入持续动力。

As the source of scientific discovery, basic research is the cornerstone of technological breakthroughs and the underlying driver of industrial transformation. It provides the theoretical foundation for innovation and continuous momentum for industrial upgrading.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p.29, Q14: “Why strengthen original innovation in scientific research and technology development?”)

This emphasis on basic research echoes a recent Qiushi Journal article (Issue No. 22, 2025) by Shanghai official Xiao Guiyu. Qiushi Journal is the CPC Central Committee’s flagship magazine. Citing comparative data, Xiao notes:

• China’s basic research expenditure in 2024 accounted for 6.9% of total R&D, versus

  • 18% in the U.S.

  • 13% in Japan

  • 19% in EU member states

• Less than 10% of Chinese university patents were commercialized in 2024

  • compared with over 50% in the U.S. and Germany

Much scientific output in China, he argues, remains stuck in papers, labs, and technical reports rather than being translated into productivity.

The Q&A Guidebook make this link even more explicit when discussing “tech bottlenecks.”

“卡脖子”技术问题的根子是基础理论研究跟不上，源头和底层的东西没有搞清楚

The root cause of “bottleneck” technological problems is that our basic theoretical research has not kept pace— we have not fully understood the foundational and underlying principles.

...

关键核心技术攻关要防止简单的模仿性创新，陷入“追赶——落后——再追赶”模式，必须注重加强原始创新和颠覆性创新，从根本上解决原理性、基础性问题，在新一轮科技革命和产业变革的时代浪潮中抢占科技制高点、掌握发展主动权，构筑新动能新优势。

In tackling key core technologies, we must avoid imitative innovation and the pattern of “catch up — fall behind — catch up again.” Instead, we must strengthen original and disruptive innovation, solve fundamental theoretical problems, seize the commanding heights of technology in the new wave of global scientific and industrial transformation, and secure strategic initiative.”

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p.28, Q13: “Why pursue decisive breakthroughs across the full chain of key core technologies?”)

Taken together, these passages show a clear strategic objective: to escape the cycle of perpetual catch-up and instead position China at the front of emerging fields through deep investment in basic research.

5. Reforming China’s talent evaluation system (“the hats problem”)

...... 统一规范教育科技人才评价的原则、标准。切断人才“帽子”与各类创新资源的关联，不把人才“帽子”作为承担国家科技计划项目、获得科技奖励、职称评定、岗位聘用、薪酬待遇确定的限制性条件，使人才称号回归学术性、荣誉性本质。

... We must unify and standardize principles and criteria for evaluating education, science, and talent. The link between talent “hats” and innovation resources must be severed. Titles must no longer serve as restrictive conditions for undertaking national science projects, receiving awards, gaining professional titles or positions, or determining compensation. Talent designations should return to their academic and honorary nature.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p.35, Q17: “How to promote positive interaction between scientific innovation and talent cultivation?”)

“The hats problem” (“帽子问题”) is a term used to describe the heavy reliance on honorary titles, talent labels, and designated status categories as gateways to resources in China. These “hats” are not merely academic honors — they are tied to research funding, project eligibility, institutional support, and career advancement. As a result, they have become highly competitive, quasi-credentialized markers of prestige and access within China’s scientific system.

An August report in Guangzhou Daily illustrates the pressures created by this system:

The article notes that researchers today face not only the widely discussed “45-and-under” eligibility limit for major talent programs, but also a proliferation of newer thresholds—“35-and-under,” “38-and-under,” “40-and-under.” Each of these age caps corresponds to a different category of national or local talent sponsorship. For scientists whose careers should ideally allow long periods of deep thinking, experimentation, and failure, these rigid cutoffs create what the paper calls a “breathless climb up the staircase,” forcing young scholars into a race against time.

Instead of focusing on long-term research questions, many feel compelled to maximize the number of papers published and the volume of grants secured to build a résumé strong enough to win a coveted “hat.” In practice, a “hat” can signify not only academic recognition but also privileged access to state-funded laboratories, major research platforms, and high-value projects. Guangzhou Daily describes these hats as having become “universal ration coupons” — highly sought-after tokens that determine access to scarce scientific resources.

In other words, the overemphasis on titles has gradually distorted incentives, pushing young scientists away from their original motivations for pursuing research and toward short-term metrics that are easier to quantify but less conducive to scientific breakthroughs.

This is essentially a debate about resource allocation and incentives in China’s scientific ecosystem.

6. AI and the future of warfare

To close, here are passages from the tutorials on AI and military development:

人工智能在军事领域的广泛应用，给军队武器装备和组织形态带来重大影响，引发军事领域链式突破，催生军事发展模式和战争制胜机理发生重大变化，推动战争形态加速演进。

The widespread application of artificial intelligence in the military has had a profound impact on weapons, equipment, and force structures, triggering chain reactions of breakthroughs across the military domain. It has led to major changes in models of military development and mechanisms for winning wars, and is accelerating the evolution of the very forms of warfare.

在近期发生的几场局部战争和武装冲突中，无人智能装备大量运用，智能化支援保障彰显威力，人工智能系统在辅助作战筹划、支撑指挥通信、加持认知对抗等方面大放异彩，智能化作战方式不断涌现，展现出军事智能改写战争规则的前景，现代战争智能化特征日益显现。

In several recent regional wars and armed conflicts, unmanned intelligent equipment has been deployed on a large scale, and intelligent support systems have demonstrated significant effectiveness. AI systems have excelled in assisting operational planning, supporting command and communications, and enhancing cognitive confrontation. New forms of intelligent combat are continually emerging, revealing the potential of military intelligence to rewrite the rules of warfare and making the intelligent characteristics of modern war increasingly evident.

世界主要国家纷纷加大军事智能化投入和布局，出台相关战略和规划，加快军事智能力量建设和运用，围绕智能化加紧推进军事转型，抢占军事战略制高点。

Major countries are increasing investment in military intelligence, releasing strategies and plans, accelerating the development and application of intelligent military forces, pushing forward military transformation, and competing to seize strategic heights.

适应技术发展和军事变革潮流，我们应当抓住军事智能化发展的历史机遇，融入国家加快发展新一代人工智能的战略布局，构建具有我军特色的智能化军事体系，推动军事实力加速提升。

To adapt to technological and military trends, we must seize this historic opportunity in military intelligence, integrate with the national strategy for accelerating next-generation AI development, build an intelligent military system with Chinese characteristics, and accelerate the enhancement of military capabilities.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…,p.196, Q93: “How should we understand building an intelligent military system?”)

I am not a military expert, so I offer no further technical commentary. But given global interest in how recent regional conflicts have deployed drones and AI-enabled systems, this section may be of particular interest.

The two publications are:

• Tutorial on the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (《〈中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划的建议〉辅导读本》)

• Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (《党的二十届四中全会〈建议〉学习辅导百问》)

Readers familiar with China—especially many of you—may know that after major political events or the release of key guiding documents, China has in recent years published two supplementary reading books: one “tutorial” volume and one “Q&A” guidebook. For instance, after the Third Plenary Session last year adopted the reform master plan, two similar books were released. I wrote multiple newsletters at that time summarizing key themes from those books.

Why these two books matter

1. They collect essays written by China’s top policymakers.

Such compilation is rare. These essays offer a more direct window into policymakers’ strategic thinking in key areas. In line with past practice, these articles are also being published—one by one—in People’s Daily.

So far, signed articles by Li Qiang, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, who are members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee, and Wang Yi, Liu Guozhong, Li Shulei, who are members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, have already appeared in People’s Daily.

If the publication sequence continues to follow the order of the Tutorial volume, articles by 9 more senior officials will be released in the coming weeks. Reading the tutorial books now allows an early look at all the essays at once. The two books also include articles by other officials, along with extensive explanatory content.

2. Compared with the Recommendations document, the tutorial books offer more specifics and directional signals.

For example, regarding the “domestic circulation” part of China’s economic strategy, the Recommendations state:

“Strengthen the domestic circulation” 做强国内大循环 and “enhance the endogenous driving force and reliability of the domestic circulation” 增强国内大循环内生动力和可靠性.

[Note: Domestic circulation is part of the new development paradigm of “dual circulation”, which was unveiled by the CPC Central Committee in 2020 to meet the challenge of mounting global uncertainties. Dual circulation takes the domestic market as the mainstay, with the domestic and international markets reinforcing each other.

Domestic circulation relies on a unified domestic market to optimize production, distribution, circulation, consumption and other aspects, with a view to stimulating domestic demand potential and enhancing economic resilience.]

But in his signed article in the Tutorial, Premier Li Qiang makes the priority explicit:

“十五五”时期要把发展立足点更多放在做强国内大循环上

During the 15th Five-Year Plan period (2026-2030), we will place greater emphasis on strengthening the domestic circulation as the foundation of development.

Li explains the logic:

大国经济具有内需为主导、内部可循环的独特优势 ...... 以国内大循环的内在稳定性和长期成长性对冲国际循环的不确定性

A major economy has the unique advantage of demand-led growth and an internally sustainable circulation ...... The stability and long-term growth of the domestic circulation can hedge the uncertainties arising from the international circulation.

This does not mean the international circulation — trade and external engagement — becomes unimportant. Rather, it reflects policymakers’ strategic assessment of today’s geopolitical environment.

This is not Li’s first time expressing such a view. Li made similar remarks in May at a State Council meeting to promote domestic circulation. What is new here is that the Tutorial places this strategic shift explicitly within the time horizon of the next five-year plan.

Another example:

The Recommendations call for:

深化文明交流互鉴。

Deepening exchanges and mutual learning among civilizations.

They do not specify how. But in the Tutorial, in his signed article, Li Shulei, who is also the head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, writes:

支持社交媒体平台国际化发展

Support the international development of social media platforms

Clearly, this refers to Chinese social media platforms. Traditionally, platforms like Douyin (China’s version of TikTok), Xiaohongshu (RedNote), and Weibo (China’s version of “X”) served mainly domestic users. But the “TikTok Refugee” wave earlier this year brought many overseas users to RedNote. How China responds—open or restrict—has been debated.

Li’s wording signals a possible direction: supporting platforms like RedNote in developing more functions to serve international users, making “civilizations exchanges” concrete rather than abstract.

What I’m doing with the books

I have finished all articles in both books — nearly 700 pages in total. My plan is to produce two to three newsletter issues, each centered on a theme. If interest turns out low, I will keep it to one.

Today’s theme is “China’s assessment of the external environment,” covering topics such as major-country competition, military development, and the relationship between security and development.

Below are selected excerpts, with my interpretation. Please note that while most of the essays in these two books are signed articles written by senior officials, the 108 questions and answers in the Q&A Guidebook are not attributed to individual authors. They can be viewed as the collective intelligence of the compilation team — essentially the group with the deepest involvement in, and the most comprehensive understanding of, the formulation of China’s five-year plans.

Table of contents of Tutorial on the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development

Table of contents of Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development

少数西方国家对多极化进程的快速发展明显不适，仍妄图维持单级霸权，但遭到国际社会的广泛抵制。

Some Western countries are uncomfortable with the rapid advance of multipolarity and still attempt to maintain unipolar hegemony, but such actions face widespread resistance from the international community.

......

经济全球化虽遭遇逆流但仍是不可阻挡的历史潮流。

Economic globalization is encountering headwinds, yet it remains an unstoppable trend.

......

战略安全威胁增多，拥核国家互信减弱，有可能陷入新一轮军备竞赛。

Strategic security risks are increasing, mutual trust among nuclear-armed countries is weakening, and a new round of arms race is possible.

......

周边涉我安全环境复杂因素增多。

More complex factors are involved in China’s surrounding security environment.

......

(Source: Tutorial on the Recommendations…, pp. 175–177; Article: Profound and Complex Changes in China’s Development Environment During the “15th Five-Year Plan” Period, By Tian Peiyan, deputy head of the Policy Research Office of the CPC Central Committee.)

The first sentence does not name any country, but the phrase “unipolar hegemony” could be interpreted as indirectly referring to the United States.

The second sentence shows that China’s policymakers continue to believe that economic globalization will persist in the long run. This suggests that China intends to remain integrated into the global economy as much as possible — while ensuring security.

The third sentence feels particularly timely, as it appears in the book before President Trump ordered the U.S. military to immediately restart the process for testing nuclear weapons on Oct. 30 after a halt of 33 years.

The fourth sentence immediately reminded me of the Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries, which China convened again in April this year after a 12-year gap — a meeting I analyzed at the time. One of the conclusions from that conference was that “China’s relations with its neighboring countries are currently at their best in modern times.” When read together with this sentence, it raises the possibility that the “complex factors” mentioned here may be referring to actors outside China’s immediate neighborhood.

进入机遇和挑战并存、不确定难预料因素增多的时期，唯有保持昂扬的斗志、顽强的意志，锻造敢斗善斗的过硬本领，才能在风高浪急甚至惊涛骇浪重大考研中赢得主动，立于不败之地。

As China enters a period where opportunities and challenges coexist and where uncertainties and unpredictable factors are on the rise, only by maintaining high morale and strong willpower, and by forging the capability to face difficulties head-on and prevail in struggles, can we seize the initiative amid turbulent waves and remain invincible.

面对外部围堵遏制打压，要保持不畏强暴、反抗强权的风骨，核心利益不让步，原则问题不妥协，威胁讹诈不退缩。

In the face of external containment, suppression and coercion, we must stand firm — never yielding to power politics or intimidation. On matters involving core interests, we will not concede; on matters of principle, we will not compromise; and under threats or blackmail, we will not back down.

(Source: Tutorial on the Recommendations…, p. 182; Article: Profound and Complex Changes in China’s Development Environment During the “15th Five-Year Plan” Period, By Tian Peiyan, deputy head of the Policy Research Office of the CPC Central Committee.)

These two sentences make it clear that if China faces threats or challenges in trade or other areas, its strategy will remain unchanged: it will not back down, but will continue to “fight” until the end.

别国越是搞“小院高墙”、“脱钩断链”，我们越要坚持高水平对外开放不动摇。“十五五”时期，进一步扩大高水平对外开放，需要稳步扩大制度型开放，维护多边贸易体制，拓展国际循环。

The more others build ‘small yards with high fences’ or push for decoupling, the more firmly we will promote high-level opening up. During the 15th Five-Year Plan period, we will steadily expand institutional opening up, uphold the multilateral trading system, and broaden the international circulation.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p. 15, Article: Deepening Reform of the Economic System and Promoting High-quality Development, By Wang Huning, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the CPPCC National Committee)

This sentence shows that China continues to value openness as a strategic choice, and that the “international circulation” component of the “dual circulation” strategy remains important. In fact, the idea of “the more others close up, the more we should open up” has frequently appeared in China’s academic discussions over the past two years. For example, prominent scholar Zheng Yongnian has repeatedly called for further opening-up — including unilateral opening: “Even if some Western countries do not open to us, we have to open to them. “

In practice, China is acting on the idea of further opening up its economy. According to a post on the Ministry of Commerce’s WeChat blog, Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao on Tuesday signed the framework agreement to upgrade economic partnership with representatives from five Pacific Island countries — the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of Nauru, the Republic of Vanuatu and the Republic of Fiji.

On the same day, Wang also signed an arrangement on the early outcomes on shared development of an economic partnership between the governments of China and Congo, an important step in implementing the zero-tariff policy announced by Chinese top leader. It is also a concrete action to advance the spirit of the Third and Fourth Plenary Sessions of the 20th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and to expand China’s self-initiated opening-up, according to a statement from the website of Ministry of Commerce.

必须着眼国际军事竞争战略制高点前瞻先机。不仅要赶上潮流、赶上时代，还要力争走在时代前列。

We must focus on the strategic high ground of international military competition. We should not only keep pace with the times, but strive to lead.

......

要坚持自主可控，扭住高水平科技自立自强，大力推进自主创新、原始创新，解决好关键技术“卡脖子”问题。

We must uphold self-reliance and maintain control in key areas, pursue high-level scientific and technological self-sufficiency, vigorously advance independent innovation and original innovation, and resolve bottlenecks in critical technologies.

......

实施国防发展重大工程，加紧国防科技创新和先进技术转化，研制建造更多制强制胜的“杀手锏”武器装备。

We will advance major defense development projects, accelerate innovation and application of defense technologies, and develop more “trump card” equipment capable of gaining decisive advantage.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, pp. 87–89, Article: Promoting the Modernization of National Defense and the Armed Forces, By Zhang Youxia, member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission)

There are quite a few articles in the tutorial books related to China’s military development, but since I am not a military expert, I won’t comment on them in detail here. What stands out is China’s recognition that foreign technology restrictions make self-reliance in defense science and technology a necessity.

回顾新中国成立以来的历史，在“站起来”阶段，我们党更加注重安全；在“富起来”阶段，我们党更加注重发展；在“强起来”的新阶段，要统筹好发展和安全。要进一步树立发展是硬道理、安全也是硬道理的理念，在发展中固安全，在安全中谋发展，有效防范化解各类风险。

Looking back at the history since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Party placed greater emphasis on security during the stage of “standing up,” and greater emphasis on development during the stage of “becoming prosperous.” In the new stage of “becoming strong,” development and security must be better coordinated. We must further establish the notion that development is the absolute principle and security is also the absolute principle — strengthening security through development and pursuing development in a secure environment, while effectively preventing and defusing various risks.

.....

要完善涉外国际安全机制，构建海外安全保障体系，加强发制裁、反干预、反“长臂管辖”斗争，深化国际执法安全合作。

We must improve mechanisms for safeguarding international security in foreign-related affairs, build a comprehensive system for protecting China’s overseas security interests, strengthen efforts to counter sanctions, interference and long-arm jurisdiction, and deepen international law-enforcement and security cooperation.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, pp. 107–108, Article: Building a Higher Level of Peace and Security in China, By Chen Wenqing, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and head of the Commission for Political and Legal Affairs of the CPC Central Committee)

The “standing up” stage probably refers to the period from the founding of the People’s Republic of China to the beginning of reform and opening-up. The “becoming prosperous” stage probably refers to the period after reform and opening-up began. The “becoming strong” stage likely refers to the period from 2012 to the present.

The reform master plan released last year included a dedicated section on “strengthening the rule of law in foreign-related affairs.” The second sentence above aligns closely with that direction.

国际力量对比深刻调整，世界多极化在曲折中发展，我国国际影响力、感召力、塑造力不断提升，在国际事务中已经并将继续发挥重要作用。

With major changes in the balance of international forces, multipolarity is advancing amid twists and turns. China’s international influence, appeal and capacity to shape the world continue to grow. China has played, and will continue to play, an important role in global affairs.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p. 7, Q&A No. 3: How to Understand the International and Domestic Situation During the 15th Five-Year Plan period)

This sentence can be seen as a summary assessment by policymakers of China’s international influence.

The commentaries are titled:“The Origin and Nature of the Taiwan Question” (台湾问题的由来和性质), “The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Reunification” (两岸关系发展和统一利好), and “National Reunification Is Inevitable and Unstoppable” (祖国必然统一势不可挡)

Some seasoned overseas China-watchers noted that, based on naming conventions commonly used in the articles published by China’s central news organizations, “Zhongtaiwen” is almost certainly a collective pen name rather than an individual author. The name likely indicates commentary associated with agencies or institutions responsible for Taiwan-related affairs.

Xinhua later published an English-language piece on Tuesday summarizing these three commentaries, and said “Xinhua News Agency was entrusted to publish” them—but without explaining the meaning of “Zhongtaiwen.”

During those three days, some overseas China-watchers and several friends asked me the same question:

What is the purpose of these articles, especially when they clearly emphasize the theme of “reunification”?

From my reading, four points stand out:

1. The articles are consistent with the message conveyed at Saturday’s gathering.

At the commemorative meeting, China’s top political advisor Wang Huning said that after peaceful reunification, with the support of a strong motherland, Taiwan will enjoy better economic development, stronger energy and resource security, improved infrastructure, enhanced security, broader external exchanges, better livelihoods for its people, and a more vibrant cultural and spiritual life. 和平统一之后，有强大祖国做后盾，台湾经济发展会更好、能源资源保障会更好、基础设施建设会更好、安全保障会更好、对外交往会更好，台湾同胞民生福祉会更好、精神文化生活会更好。

Addressing about 500 attendees, Wang, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference National Committee, called on people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to work together to advance national reunification, and to leave no room for “Taiwan independence” separatist activities in any form.

2. The emphasis on reunification is not entirely new — it reflects themes already present in recent top-level documents.

“Promoting national reunification” is already written into the report to the 20th CPC National Congress in 2022, as a guiding policy direction. In the full text of the newly released Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, the Taiwan-related section once again highlights 推进祖国统一大业 (“advancing the cause of national reunification”).

Seen through this lens, the purpose of the commentaries is consistent and expected:

• to explain the historical and political logic of the Taiwan question

• to outline the governance framework envisioned after reunification,

• and to convey Beijing’s confidence and determination that reunification is inevitable.

3. The commentaries offer clues about what Beijing envisions after reunification

Below are several excerpts I found noteworthy, with my interpretation.

我们追求的国家统一，不仅是形式上的统一，更重要的是两岸同胞的心灵契合。

Our goal is not only an institutional reunification but also unity between hearts of people across the Strait.

(from Article 2: The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Reunification” )

This suggests Beijing is emphasizing emotional and social integration, not just administrative control. Implicitly, reunification without mutual trust could lead to new tensions.

两岸在文化教育、医疗卫生、社会保障等民生领域可以实现资源同享，长期困扰台湾同胞的民生难题，可以得到根本性解决。

Resources in education, healthcare and social security can be shared across the Strait after reunification, thereby addressing long-standing livelihood challenges.

(from Article 2: The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Reunification” )

This indicates that Beijing believes it understands Taiwan’s socioeconomic issues and is positioning reunification as a solution provider. Understanding must come before solving.

…… 私人财产、宗教信仰、合法权益将得到充分保障，爱台爱乡的感情将得到充分照顾。

…… Personal property, religious beliefs and the legal rights and interests of local people will be fully protected in Taiwan, while their connections to the island’s traditions and heritage will be valued.

(from Article 2: The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Reunification” )

Religions widely practiced in Taiwan—Chinese folk religion or traditional religion (folk Taoism + ancestral worship), Buddhism, Taoism, and related Chinese cultural beliefs—already align with mainland traditions, so Beijing does not appear to view religion as a major post-reunification challenge.

经中国中央政府批准，外国可以在台湾设立领事机构或其他官方、半官方机构，国际组织和机构可以在台湾设立办事机构，有关国际公约可以在台湾适用，有关国际会议可以在台湾举办。

(After reunification) With approval from the central government, foreign countries could set up consulates and other official or semi-official institutions in Taiwan, and international organizations will have offices in Taiwan. In addition, international agreements could be applied in Taiwan and international events held there.

(from Article 2: The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Reunification” )

This suggests that a post-reunification Taiwan could, in theory, host major international events — for example, APEC or Shanghai Cooperation Organization summits.

4. The articles underline that Beijing sees reunification as inevitable

统一不是一种选择，而是一种必然。

Reunification is not a matter of choice, but an inevitability.

...... 决定两岸关系走向的关键因素是祖国大陆的发展进步。...... 中华民族一定是强必统，统更强。从两岸实力对比和国际格局演变趋势看，只会对支持统一的正义一方越来越有利。

The key factor determining the direction of cross-Strait relations is the development and progress of the mainland. ...... A strong nation must be unified; reunification will further strengthen the nation. Given the shifting cross-Strait balance of strength and global dynamics, situation will only become increasingly favorable for the just cause of supporting reunification.

(from Article 3: “National Reunification Is Inevitable and Unstoppable” ）

While some observers argue that “time is not on Beijing’s side,” the commentaries express the opposite view: the stronger China becomes (economically, technologically, socially), the more favorable the environment for reunification. In other words, China’s attractiveness and influence—including innovation, lifestyle and development—are viewed as important drivers, not just hard power.

Final thought

These commentaries reveal not only Beijing’s messaging about why reunification will happen, but also how it imagines governing Taiwan afterward. Regardless of one’s position, they offer rare insight into Beijing’s internal framing of the issue.

Liu Yanhua, an associate research fellow at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, highlighted several of these maps in an article published Tuesday on the institute’s WeChat blog. Today’s piece is a translation of the main points of Liu’s article by Jiang Jiang, Xia Tian and Wang Xiaopeng.

In this piece, Liu noted that

中国拥有南海诸岛主权建立于长期的历史实践中，具有发现、命名、开发利用、行政管辖的完整证据链条。但是，早期西方国家“获得”主权的方式却带有浓厚的殖民色彩，往往是来到一块“未知”土地、插旗鸣炮就“获得”主权，这种主权获得是建立在漠视原住民权利的基础之上，也让英国、法国、日本尽管在南海诸岛见到驻岛生产的中国渔民，仍将其视为“无主地”。

China’s sovereignty over the Nanhai Zhudao was established through a long course of historical practice, supported by a complete chain of evidence covering discovery, naming, development and utilization, and administrative jurisdiction. By contrast, the ways in which early Western powers “acquired” sovereignty were deeply colored by colonialism. Typically, they would arrive at a so-called “unknown” land, plant a flag, fire ceremonial shots, and claim sovereignty — a process that disregarded the rights of indigenous peoples. As a result, even when British, French or Japanese explorers encountered Chinese fishermen living and working on the islands, they still regarded the Nanhai Zhudao as terra nullius, or land belonging to no one.

Liu then gave an example: In 1947, when France sought arbitration with China over sovereignty of the Xisha Islands, Qiu Zuming, then First Secretary and Acting Chargé d’Affaires of the Chinese Embassy in Turkey, noted in reference to China’s traditional mode of territorial administration:

“按照国际公法，无主荒地之占领，依照占领时之国际法规，我国将该岛划归粤省管辖时，远在国际法成为专书之前，只有渔人前往，自无设官之必要。”

“According to international law, the occupation of terra nullius should be judged in light of the legal norms in effect at the time of occupation. When China placed the islands under the jurisdiction of Guangdong Province, it was long before international law had been systematized. At that time, only fishermen went there, and therefore there was no need to establish official administration.”

Such differences in legal concepts and practices concerning territorial sovereignty, in effect, provided Western countries with a pretext for encroaching upon China’s sovereignty over the Nanhai Zhudao, said Liu. Recognizing the harm caused by these differences, the Chinese government later adopted approaches in line with international norms to reaffirm its sovereignty.

For example, Li Zhun’s patrol of the Xisha Islands was acknowledged by the Western world — though in their eyes, his patrol was seen as an “occupation” rather than an assertion of sovereignty over China’s own territory.

In 1909, Li Zhun, commander of the Guangdong Fleet of the Qing Dynasty, conducted the first official inspection of the Xisha Islands on behalf of the Chinese government, proclaiming the islands as Chinese territory.

In the article, Liu introduced maps that included those published by China in 1935 concerning the South China Sea. These maps represented the efforts of the then Republic of China (ROC) government to assert China’s sovereignty over the region. Liu noted that such efforts have been deliberately downplayed — for instance, the Wikipedia entry on the “Spratly Islands Dispute” claims that China only began asserting sovereignty over the Nansha and Xisha Islands after drawing the nine-dash line map in 1947.

The maps in 1935 were worked out as numerous errors and inconsistencies were found in maps published in China at the time, particularly regarding national boundaries, according to the first issue of the Journal of the Commission for the Examination of Land and Water Maps. To address this, the then Ministry of the Interior convened an inter-ministerial meeting in 1930 to discuss and formulate rules for the examination of land and water maps, and in 1933, the Commission for the Examination of Land and Water Maps (“水陆地图审查委员会”) was officially established. Each participating ministry assumed specific responsibilities — the Ministry of the Interior was in charge of reviewing administrative divisions and related matters, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for boundaries and treaty-related territories, while the Ministry of Education oversaw academic terminology, historical evolution, meteorology, and the intended uses of the maps.

From its establishment on June 7, 1933, to the end of December 1934, this commission held a total of 26 meetings. At its 25th meeting on December 21, 1934, the commission approved a list of 172 Chinese and English names for islands in the South China Sea. These names were published in the first issue of the Journal of the Commission for the Examination of Land and Water Maps in January 1935, followed by the publication of the Map of the Islands in the South China Sea of China in the second issue in April that year.

The compilation of these maps was deeply rooted in China’s long-standing historical practice of exercising sovereignty over the Nanhai Zhudao. From a cartographic perspective, it continued the tradition of depicting the South China Sea islands —historically referred to as “Changsha” and “Shitang” since the Ming and Qing dynasties — on territorial maps such as the Complete Map of the Everlasting Unified Great Qing Empire. The depiction of the Nanhai Zhudao thus evolved from collective references to more detailed representations of individual islands, reefs, and shoals. Subsequent Chinese maps followed this model, marking both the extent of the Nanhai Zhudao and the names of their features.

Created in the 15th year of the Jiaqing reign (1810) during the Qing Dynasty, the map is printed in two colors on paper, composed of 24 joined sheets, with the artist unspecified. (This map was shown in the exhibition)

Liu said that the effort to explain China to the international community in ways accepted by Western audiences took shape in various aspects of modern Chinese history. A group of Chinese scholars well-versed in both Chinese and Western learning undertook this important task.

To “meet the long-felt needs of English readers,” The Chinese Year Book 1935–1936 was published by the Commercial Press in Shanghai in 1935. Unlike The China Year Book, edited by British scholar H.G.W. Woodhead since 1921, this was the first English-language Chinese Year Book written entirely by Chinese editors and scholars.

According to Liu, the yearbook contained 45 chapters covering subjects such as history, geography, climate, population, the military, industry, culture, religion, and government institutions. Its contributors included leading Chinese scholars of the time, such as Gu Jiegang, Zhu Kezhen, Wang Shijie, and Weng Wenhao. Publication of The Chinese Year Book continued in different locations after China started a whole-of-nation resistance against Japanese aggression in July 1937.

Beginning with the 1938–1939 edition, the English-language Chinese Year Book took on the mission of presenting China’s war efforts to the world. In the foreword to that edition, Xu Shuxi, then Director of the Commission for International Affairs, wrote that this was a “war issue,” with three-fourths of its content devoted to the war and related matters. “Just as the 1937 edition bore testimony to the achievements of reconstruction under the National Government before Japan’s destruction of it,” Xu wrote, “we hope this volume will serve as a record for posterity — of how the Chinese people, against great odds, heroically defended their nation and the civilization they share with the rest of the world, including the aggressors themselves.”

The Map of China compiled for the English-language Chinese Year Book vividly demonstrated the Chinese people’s determination to safeguard their territorial sovereignty. In the 1936–1937 edition, the Map of China was published as a separate supplement, said Liu. It featured a brick-red hardcover with the title MAP OF CHINA and the note “Drawn Specially for the Chinese Year Book by Sheng-tsu Wang.”

Wang Shengzu, one of China’s earliest geographers to study in the United States, obtained a master’s degree in geography from the University of Chicago in 1929. Upon returning to China, he taught at Tsinghua University and other institutions. His research combined a national perspective with an international outlook, and his strong command of English likely made him the ideal author for the English version of the Map of China. In the same edition, Wang also wrote the section on “Northeast China,” which systematically described Japan’s military invasion, economic plunder, and colonial rule in the region.

In the MAP OF CHINA, the lower-right corner featured a boxed inset labeled “South China Sea.” The area was shaded in the same color as the Chinese mainland, with the islands marked and named in accordance with the official designations published by China in 1935 — serving as an English-language presentation of China’s sovereignty claims over the Nanhai Zhudao. The 1938–1939 edition also carried an updated English version of the Map of China, copies of which are still preserved in libraries in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere.

In November 1937, to strengthen international communication and win foreign support, the National Government established the International Information Division under its Central Headquarters, led by Dong Xianguang, a prominent journalist educated in the United States. The division had a Compilation Section responsible for foreign-language publications. From February 1938, it was placed under the Central Publicity Department, with an overseas office established in New York — then a key hub for international publicity — and branches in London and other cities.

According to incomplete statistics, during the war years the division published over 290 foreign-language periodicals exposing Japanese atrocities and publicizing China’s war efforts and major political figures. It also distributed more than 11,000 publicity photographs abroad, including to Japan. This indicates that the 1938–1939 edition of The Chinese Year Book was likely promoted through this external publicity network, giving it broad international circulation and readership. Alongside China’s resistance narrative, the publication also conveyed China’s claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea islands.

After 14 years of arduous struggle, China achieved victory in 1945, recovering all territories seized by Japan, including the South China Sea islands.

In February 1948, the Chinese government (ROC) officially published the Administrative Map of the ROC. The map included an inset titled Location Map of the South China Sea Islands. (This map was shown in the exhibition)

In 1947, when the Ministry of the Interior and other departments convened to discuss the scope of the South China Sea islands, they reaffirmed the boundaries announced in 1935: “The southernmost extent of China’s South China Sea territory reaches Zengmu Shoal. Before the war, this demarcation had been consistently used by government agencies, schools, and publishers, and had been formally filed with the Ministry of the Interior. The original record remains unchanged.”

At the end of the article, Liu concluded that China’s sovereignty claims over the Nanhai Zhudao thus continued to gain international recognition after the war, supported by its renewed administrative and developmental activities over the islands.

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In the previous edition of the meeting in 2015, Xi also delivered a keynote address. He presented four key proposals in both his 2015 and 2025 addresses. Comparing the two reveals important shifts that highlight China’s latest progress and top-level policy guidance on gender equality, as well as its evolving perspective on women’s development from a global standpoint.

First, we should jointly foster an enabling environment for women’s growth and development. Their all-round development is achieved under the prerequisite of peace and tranquility. We need to uphold the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, and must safeguard world peace, so that all women can bask in the sunlight of happiness and tranquility and stay away from the shadow of war and turmoil.

The shift in the ordering of points is notable. In 2015, “combating violence against women” and “peace and tranquility” were addressed as the third and fourth points, respectively. This year, they were moved to the first point, with significant emphasis on the importance of peace. This change comes against the backdrop of an increasingly turbulent world marked by frequent regional conflicts and multiple humanitarian crises.

Additionally, in 2015, the statement “We must eradicate all forms of violence against women, including domestic violence“ specifically highlighted domestic violence. Just a year later, the Anti-Domestic Violence Law of the People’s Republic of China came into effect, signaling a rapid legislative response to the issue.

拓宽妇女参政议政渠道，支持妇女广泛参与国家和社会治理。共同营造尊重妇女的良好氛围，使性别平等真正内化为全社会的文明共识和行为准则。

We should broaden the channels for women to participate in and deliberate on political affairs, and support their extensive engagement in state and social governance. We should jointly nurture an environment that respects women, and morph gender equality into a common value and a code of conduct embraced by everyone in our society.

Reuters suggests in a report that the first sentence above, which calls for greater political participation for women, will “ensure” gender equality being “truly internalized” within society as noted in the second sentence.

BEIJING/HONG KONG, Oct 13 (Reuters) - Chinese President Xi Jinping on Monday called for greater representation for women in politics and government at a global women’s summit in Beijing, a move he said would ensure that gender equality is “truly internalized” within society.

Reuters’ interpretation suggests a direct cause-and-effect relationship between the two. However, given the conventions of Chinese official speeches and documents, as well as the structure of this paragraph, the two sentences are more likely intended as separate points addressing different dimensions of gender equality — one concerning policy-level participation, and the other broader cultural and societal change. In this sense, Reuters’ report misrepresented the logical relationship between the two.

To further compare those two sentences with the statement made in 2015, the shift reflects a clear change in focus.

2015 version:

要增强妇女参与政治经济活动能力，提高妇女参与决策管理水平，使妇女成为政界、商界、学界的领军人物。

We must build up women’s capacity to play their part in society and economy, involve women in higher levels of decision-making, and support them in becoming leaders in political, business, and academic fields.

In 2015, the emphasis was on individual empowerment, focusing on enhancing women’s personal capabilities and providing opportunities for leadership roles across various sectors. The statement targeted personal development, encouraging women’s involvement in politics, business, and academia.

In contrast, the 2025 statement places greater emphasis on systemic support, particularly within political and governance structures. The focus is on creating broader channels for women’s participation and influence in decision-making processes, signaling a clear message to support women’s roles in governance.

The absence of specific references to business and academia in the 2025 statement likely reflects the progress women have already made in these areas. It reminds me of a recent podcast episode with Professor Yueping Song from the School of Population and Health at Renmin University of China, who noted that eight of her ten PhD students are women.

Ginger River Review

How far has China come on gender equality? - with Yueping Song

This week on Inside the China Room with Jiang Jiang, I’m joined by Professor Yueping Song from the School of Population and Health at Renmin University of China to explore the current landscape of gender equality in China…

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7 months ago · 1 like · Jiang Jiang and Yifei Shi

According to a white paper on China’s achievements in women’s well-rounded development, released by the State Council Information Office in September, points out that women now make up over 50 percent of internet entrepreneurs, indicating significant strides in these sectors.

今天，中国妇女在经济社会发展中真正发挥着“半边天”作用。中国全社会就业人员中女性占比超过四成，互联网领域创业者中女性超过一半，过去4届夏季奥运会奖牌获得者中女性占比超过60%。新时代的中国女性正在以前所未有的自信和活力参与国家和社会治理全过程，奋战在乡村振兴和共同富裕第一线，拼搏于科技创新和数字转型最前沿，书写着昂扬奋进的巾帼华章。中国式现代化新征程上，每一位妇女都是主角！

Today, women in China truly “hold up half the sky” in economic and social development. They make up more than 40 percent of the workforce, more than half of internet start-up founders, and more than 60 percent of all medalists in the past four Summer Olympic Games. In the new era, Chinese women, more confident and vibrant than ever before, are taking part in the whole process of state and social governance. They are fighting on the front lines for rural revitalization and common prosperity as well as scientific innovation and digital transition. They are writing a splendid history of the cause of women in China. On the new journey of Chinese modernization, every woman is a star.

Aligning with the idea of women as stars in Chinese modernization, the chair’s statement emphasizes “fully leveraging the principal role and transformative power of women in development, and empowering women to participate in and lead the pursuit of sustainable development and prosperity.”

It should be noted that the concept of “a Chinese path to modernization” holds significant weight in China’s political sphere. In his report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi emphasized that it is the central task of the Party leadership.

Compared to the corresponding section 2015 (below), this year’s address highlights more specifically Chinese women’s achievements in key areas of modernization, such as entrepreneurship, sports, tech innovation, and grassroots governance.

Two key stats: over 50 percent of internet entrepreneurs are women, and women account for more than 60 percent of medalists in the past four Summer Olympics.

2015 version:

在中国人民追求美好生活的过程中，每一位妇女都有人生出彩和梦想成真的机会。中国将更加积极贯彻男女平等基本国策，发挥妇女“半边天”作用，支持妇女建功立业、实现人生理想和梦想。中国妇女也将通过自身发展不断促进世界妇女运动发展，为全球男女平等事业作出更大贡献。

As the Chinese people pursue a happy life, every Chinese woman has the opportunities to excel in life and make their dream come true. China will do more to enhance gender equality as its basic state policy, give play to women’s important role as “half of the sky” and support them in realizing their own dreams and aspirations in both career and life. The Chinese women, through their own development, will also play a greater part in global women’s movement and make greater contribution to gender equality in the world.

The phrase “Women hold up half the sky,” first introduced in the 1950s in China to promote gender equality, has been widely used for over 70 years.

Compared to a decade ago, when the role of women as “half the sky” was mentioned, there is a clear tone shift, which reflects a subtle but strategic evolution in messaging.

The earlier statement, “China will give play to women’s important role as ‘half of the sky,’” was framed in terms of potential -- an aspirational goal indicating intention but not yet fully realized. It projected a need for action, implying women’s role was something to be nurtured.

In contrast, the current statement, “Today, women in China truly ‘hold up half the sky’ in economic and social development,” firmly establishes that this goal has been achieved. It’s no longer aspirational but declarative, positioning women’s contributions as not only integral but already embedded in the nation’s core development narrative.

Another big difference, compared with many Western countries, lies in China’s residential communities. Here, many people live in what’s called a xiaoqu “小区” — a cluster of apartment buildings grouped together within a gated compound, with multiple entrances for people and vehicles. Whether it’s a luxury development, a middle-class complex, or what locals half-jokingly call an old , shabby little community (lao po xiao “老破小”), one thing is consistent: there are usually security guards posted at the gates.

When I lived in the U.S., I rarely saw this. Some upscale apartment buildings might have a front desk on the first floor, but that’s quite different from the setup in China. And the guards you see at the entrances here—often middle-aged uncles in their forties or fifties—don’t exactly project overwhelming defensive power. Still, they’re part of the standard landscape of almost every community. Think about it: millions of Chinese people pass by their community’s guards every day on their way to work or errands, and in turn, these guards quietly watch over the daily comings and goings of one of the most populous countries on Earth.

But who are these guards, really? Beyond the official role of “keeping the community safe,” do they serve other functions? And how do Chinese residents view them?

Today’s newsletter is about China’s community security guards. Guangzhou-based Southern Weekly recently interviewed Dr. He Wapi, a cultural anthropology Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin–Madison, who conducted fieldwork between 2017 and 2018 in Shanghai’s Dadi Community—an enormous residential compound of more than 100 high-rise buildings, once home to some 60,000 residents. I found the interview fascinating and wanted to share it with you.

Dr. He Wapi

Dr. He is also a novelist and the writer behind the WeChat blog Meiyao Garden, which explores criminal cases in China, with a special focus on unsolved mysteries and headline-making incidents.

Security guards, as the name implies, exist to protect safety. In a residential community, one might assume that when a sudden violent incident occurs, guards should be the first to respond. That was precisely what He Wapi thought at first.

For her doctoral dissertation, He Wapi chose to study security guards in Chinese residential communities. Between 2017 and 2018, she conducted fieldwork in Dadi Community, a Shanghai neighborhood with over 100 high-rise buildings and a population that once peaked at 60,000. Only then did she realize that reality was far from what she had imagined.

While having meals with the guards, she heard them discuss a 2016 homicide that occurred in the community. She casually remarked that if they had arrived earlier that day, they might have saved the victim.

“Are you kidding? How could we stop someone who’s gone mad? He had a knife, and we had nothing,” one guard said. “I wouldn’t even try.”

She asked the other guards what they would do if they faced a similar situation again.

“Run, of course!” one said. Another added that they would call the police before fleeing.

Of course, the likelihood of encountering such emergencies is low. After 2010, the SkyNet surveillance project expanded across cities in China. As a result, urban crime rates began to fall, yet the number of residential security guards continued to rise. Why does the guard presence keep growing even as the environment becomes safer? He Wapi sees it as a reflection of middle-class anxieties over social status and wealth.

1. Moving Stone Blocks, Clearing Trash, and Cracking Down on Illegal Group Rentals

Southern Weekly: What inspired you to study security guards?

He Wapi: I’ve always been interested in crime research and have paid close attention to public safety data. Compared to other developing countries and even some developed nations, urban crime rates in China are actually very low. According to official reports, China’s homicide rate in 2016 was 0.62 per 100,000 people—one of the lowest in the world. By contrast, the U.S. rate in 2015 was 4.88. Between 2012 and 2016, major violent crimes in China dropped by 43%.

Given how safe Chinese cities are, I wondered: why are there so many security guards in residential communities? How much does their daily work actually relate to public safety? In a global context, Chinese residential guards are quite unique.

Southern Weekly: What were communities like when you lived in the U.S.?

He Wapi: I initially lived in graduate dormitories, scattered along sloping hills with no walls. Any outsider could walk into the apartments. The only community I lived in with security measures had controlled access at each building entrance, but the overall area was open. I never saw community guards where I lived.

In the U.S., only a few gated, upscale communities can afford 24-hour guards. These guards usually receive training in restraint techniques, first aid, and emergency equipment. Even without firearms, they carry tools like batons, pepper spray, and handcuffs. China is different. Today, whether it’s a luxury development or an old neighborhood, guards are standard. I have relatives living in an old Shanghai lane — there’s no property management, but the local residents’ committee still hires guards for them.

Southern Weekly: Was your fieldwork in Dadi Community as you imagined?

He Wapi: I chose Dadi Community because of its reputation for chaos and danger. I thought I would witness many dangerous incidents and see guards actively perform their security duties. But reality was very different.

Within two days of arriving, the property management needed to move three large stone blocks that were blocking a road, so that an engineering vehicle could pass. Captain Ade and two guards arrived. Each block weighed 100-150 kilos, difficult for two people to lift. Guards spend most of their time handling such trivial tasks.

Southern Weekly: So what role do guards actually play during emergencies?

He Wapi: In Dadi Community, the security contract clearly instructs guards not to harm themselves or others, and not to let themselves be harmed. When danger arises, they are not encouraged to confront criminals directly—they are told to call the police.

Most guards have no combat training and are not allowed to carry weapons. In 2014, a Shanghai guard killed his team leader with a knife after being reprimanded in front of other guards. Following that, many security companies banned dangerous tools in monitoring rooms or dormitories. Today, when faced with danger, community guards simply dial 110 or 119. In some new communities, guards are now provided with shields and anti-riot forks.

Southern Weekly: Shields and forks are defensive—guards cannot actively attack.

He Wapi: Exactly. It reflects a lack of trust in guards. For security companies, any injury to a guard is costly. In Dadi, a company earns about 10,000 yuan per month—an accident could wipe out years of profit. Some companies now deduct 30 yuan from guards’ salaries monthly to buy accident insurance, so the insurance covers any injuries.

Southern Weekly: Besides moving stone blocks, what other “trivial tasks” do guards perform?

He Wapi: For example, after renovations, residents often leave building materials in stairwells. Since the cleaning staff are mostly elderly with limited strength, guards are asked to clear the trash. Another example: in 2017, shared bikes were popular. Despite signs forbidding them in the community, hundreds of bikes still entered daily. Two guards would search the entire community each night, load the bikes onto carts, and move them outside in batches.

Southern Weekly: These tasks don’t seem like they should be part of a guard’s duties. Why are they willing to do this work?

He Wapi: The thing is, in Dadi Community there’s a lot of manual labor in public areas that needs to be done every day. Who else could handle it besides the guards? The scope of a guard’s responsibilities is vague —there’s little clarity on which resident requests or emergencies they should respond to. Because of this ambiguity, security companies, residents, property management, and the local neighborhood committee often overstep boundaries, asking guards to handle chores beyond traditional security duties.

The most obvious example is “Cracking Down on Illegal Group Rentals.” In 2016, when the campaign to regulate illegal group rentals began (per capita living space below the legal standard, or occupancy exceeding the permitted number per room), the street office required the security team to send four or five guards to participate in routine apartment inspections. It was physically demanding work, requiring four half-days per week. The street office promised 50 yuan per guard per day, but the payment was never delivered. Although the guards were disappointed, no one asked the street office about it.

I asked a guard why he hadn’t followed up. His response was, “We didn’t really lose anything, we just spent the time.” They tend to underestimate the value of their time and labor, and property managers, residents, and street offices may share the same mindset: a guard’s time and effort aren’t considered valuable.

2. Male, Young, Strong

Southern Weekly: You mention in your book that in 2017 the Dadi Community guards underwent changes: instead of being directly hired from Shanghai locals, property management outsourced to security companies, which mostly employed guards from outside the city. What differences exist between local and non-local guards?

He Wapi: Dadi Community is divided into east and west sections. The east outsourced its guards in 2014, while the west followed in 2017. In that year, a local guard in his fifties suffered a fatal heart attack during a night shift. The property management compensated his family 700,000 yuan (about 98,000 U.S. dollars). After that, they outsourced the west section too, so that any future incidents would be the company’s responsibility, not theirs.

Local guards are usually over 55, sometimes over 60. Most live in Dadi or nearby neighborhoods, with socioeconomic backgrounds similar to the residents. The property management pays them only Shanghai’s minimum wage, 2,600 yuan every month (about 365 U.S. dollars), but provides social insurance. They are legally aware, largely undisciplined, and difficult to manage. They work 8-hour shifts, enjoy paid sick leave, and legal holidays.

I conducted fieldwork with Wenwu Security Company in the east section. There, outsourced guards work 12–13 hours a day, 7 days a week, with no holidays. If they take a day off for illness or personal matters, their pay is deducted.

Southern Weekly: How did local guards gradually get replaced by non-local ones?

He Wapi: China’s first security company was founded in December 1984 in Shekou, Shenzhen. It was a state-owned enterprise, established by a police officer, Zhang Zhongfang, who borrowed 100,000 yuan from the local government. Later, the government allowed property companies to hire guards from the market, but private capital was barred from entering the industry. Around 2000, policies stipulated that security service companies could only be fully state-owned, often led by mid-level police officers.

In 2010, the Regulations on the Administration of Security Services allowed private capital into the market. From then on, security companies became independent of the police. Newly established private companies competed for contracts, offering lower prices and better services. Property management, seeking profit maximization, easier oversight, and lower risk, increasingly outsourced guards.

Southern Weekly: You mention that guard age is a standard set by security companies.

He Wapi: At Wenwu, service standards are strictly age-based. Grade A guards are under 35, Grade B between 35 and 45, and Grade C between 45 and 55.

Wenwu Company implements Grade C standards at Dadi Community. Yet even so, not everyone meets the criteria. Out of 40 guards, many are over 55.

Captain Ade believes he advanced quickly in the industry due to his height—1.88 meters (6’2”)—and young, being in his twenties. He assigns older or smaller guards to night shifts, thinking the property manager and residents won’t notice their age at night.

Southern Weekly: Don’t personality or education matter?

He Wapi: When Ade interviews new guards, age and physique are his main concerns. Work experience, education, personality, mental resilience, and even criminal history are largely ignored.

In 2018, 25-year-old Xiao Liang was promoted to team leader. He spoke softly and had a slight stutter. Even without a commanding personality, a young, fit guard can be made team leader. In Dadi, although guards change frequently, most are over 45, while day and night shift leaders never exceed 30.

Southern Weekly: Why are age and physique so important?

He Wapi: Residents view this as the most visible sign of a community’s status. Young, tall, handsome guards signal that high property fees are needed to afford them—indicating a high-end neighborhood. Conversely, a community staffed with elderly guards lowers the perceived status and can affect property values. Whether residents truly believe younger guards provide better safety is secondary. Based on my field interviews, appearance and symbolism matter more.

At the start of the 20th century, Thorstein Veblen coined the term “conspicuous consumption,” describing how the leisure class uses spending to showcase power, wealth, and status. At its core, conspicuous consumption is about wasting time and resources. The demand for young, tall guards carries this same logic: in an aging society, among those willing to work as security guards, such labor is increasingly scarce—and therefore costly.

Southern Weekly: In China, security guards aren’t highly regarded socially. Why do young people choose this job?

He Wapi: Many have limited education, making other jobs hard to come by. Plus, long-term guard work gradually dulls reaction speed and focus. Once people settle into the routine, switching to jobs like food delivery becomes difficult—it requires constant attention, quick reflexes, and vigilance on the roads.

At the same time, young guards are more mobile. Dadi Community is near the train station, so some can move into the guard dorm the day they arrive, saving on hotels. They can work as guards while job hunting, then leave as soon as they find a better opportunity.

3. Expressing Fear as a Marker of Status

Southern Weekly: When you interviewed residents, many mentioned wanting more guards. What reasons did they give?

He Wapi: Most residents officially cite fear of crime. But when I asked dozens of them about the issues that actually bothered them, they almost always mentioned group rentals, aging facilities, poor maintenance, or lack of parking.

They want more guards and a fully gated community mainly to prevent outsiders from using community amenities, like the greenery or parking spaces.

Online complaints about Dadi often focus on property values. Residents paid a premium—between 5 million and 20 million yuan—but over time, the neighborhood became comparatively cheap. They blame property management for disorder and high group-rental rates, which hurt the community’s reputation. Guards are a key part of that management.

Southern Weekly: So residents’ demand for guards isn’t just about fear of crime?

He Wapi: Exactly. What residents seek in a gated community is not just physical safety but also protection of asset value and social status. In major cities, a family’s biggest investment is usually their home, often under a decades-long mortgage. Fluctuations in property value can directly affect their social and economic standing.

For example, wealthy buyers of large luxury apartments prefer communities made entirely of large units rather than mixed-size developments. Fewer residents and uniform socioeconomic status—the “purity” I describe in my book—are the goals. A visible, disciplined team of young, tall guards not only keeps outsiders out but also signals the residents’ wealth and status.

Southern Weekly: In your research, guards themselves often didn’t know how to respond when asked if they were afraid.

He Wapi: That’s right. People often focus on middle-class residents’ fears, but rarely ask guards, “Are you afraid on night shift?” If asked, guards may be uninterested—or amused. They usually say things like, “What’s there to be afraid of?” or “Shanghai is safe. Dadi is safe.”

Research shows that people living in safe communities often report more fear than those in dangerous ones. U.S. data indicate low-income residents are more likely to experience violent crime or burglary. For them, fear revolves around losing housing or income, not crime itself, so they rarely voice concerns about neighborhood safety.

Middle-class anxiety over social stability or food safety is common, while migrant workers worry about pensions and long separations from family. These are fundamental survival issues, real worries that aren’t expressed. Middle-class fear, however, is socially amplified, reinforced through communication and shared concern.

Southern Weekly: Why aren’t guards’ basic survival worries given more attention?

He Wapi: Many reasons. They may lack the skills or experience to express themselves. They may feel they’re at the bottom and unqualified to speak.

Meanwhile, middle-class residents rarely admit worry over status or wealth in public. Instead, they translate it into fear of crime. Fear of crime allows them to adopt a victim role, gain moral authority, justify more guards and stricter gates, and indirectly protect property values.

Low-income groups don’t have an alternative mode of expression, so they stay silent. In this context, expressing fear becomes a symbol of status, a marker of membership or class.

Southern Weekly: Can this situation change?

He Wapi: Anthropologist Caroline Humphrey argues that fear comes from knowing others have nothing and may act desperately. One way to reduce that fear is to acknowledge the “other’s” right to express all emotions, including fear, and empower them to avoid desperation.

When the fears of marginalized groups are recognized, and “the other” is accepted as part of “us,” anxiety can truly be eased. For the middle class, whose main worry is downward mobility, well-managed security personnel provide both safety and peace of mind.

Southern Weekly: Are you still in touch with the guards you interviewed? What are they doing now?

He Wapi: Some, yes. A few have returned home after sending their children to college, prioritizing family over income. Others have switched to delivery work. Captain Ade now works for a security company in another city as a regional manager, overseeing multiple communities.

Xiao Liang, who worried about finding a girlfriend, moved to a higher-end community as a team leader, earning over 8,000 yuan a month. He told me that even as a team leader, he’s still a guard—less desirable than a university graduate earning 3,000-yuan a month when it comes to dating in Shanghai. He faces a dilemma: in his thirties, he can’t find a girlfriend in Shanghai, and at home, he can’t find a job with comparable pay. Whenever I ask, he says he must return home soon—or it’s “over.” Yet he hasn’t left, because the job opportunities are here.

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Against the backdrop of economic headwinds and structural shifts, ride-hailing has become an important employment buffer in China. By 2024, the number of licensed ride-hailing drivers nationwide had reached 7.48 million — a figure roughly equal to the entire population of Hong Kong. Earlier this month, the China Research Center on New Forms of Employment (CNFE) released a comprehensive report on the country’s ride-hailing workforce. The study draws on 5,417 questionnaires collected from drivers across 13 provincial-level regions in July 2025, supplemented with big data analysis and in-depth interviews.

The findings paint a detailed picture of this rapidly growing labor group. According to the report, 62.8 percent of drivers are the sole breadwinners in their families, 77 percent entered the profession after losing a previous job, and 7.4 percent are recent graduates from 2024 onwards. The average driver is around 40 years old, and men make up the overwhelming majority. The report also compares ride-hailing drivers with other blue-collar occupations, including delivery workers, truck drivers, couriers, manufacturing production workers, and construction workers.

As China’s economy develops and transforms, a vast number of flexible jobs have emerged — and the profile of these workers deserves closer attention. This report, I believe, offers one of the most comprehensive looks to date. That’s why I’ve chosen to share its highlights here. The highlights are based in part on Caixin’s reporting and CNFE’s WeChat blog on this report. I have also uploaded the full Chinese text of the report to Google Drive, where you can download it.

About CNFE

The China Research Center on New Forms of Employment (CNFE) (中国新就业形态研究中心) was jointly launched by Capital University of Economics and Business and China Association of Employment Promotion (CAEP), with the aim of advancing both theoretical and empirical research on new employment patterns and providing evidence-based analysis for policymakers. The center is operated by Capital University of Economics and Business under the guidance of the CAEP, a nationwide nonprofit organization established in 1993 under the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security.

The report points out that China’s online ride-hailing sector has surged in the past decade, offering numerous low barrier to entry level employment opportunities to individuals experiencing unemployment or having to find another job. It has also served as an employment stabilizer in regions facing employment pressures. Compared to other blue-collar professions, online ride-hailing drivers enjoy certain advantages in terms of job autonomy, income, and satisfaction.

However, the report cautions that the sector faces development hurdles amid an economic slowdown. In 2024, the number of certified online ride-hailing drivers in China reached 7,483,000, a substantial increase of 159 percent from 2020. This surging supply contrasted with a mere 38.3 percent rise in the number of monthly average orders. These issues, alongside fiercer industry competition, demanding working hours, and insufficient social security benefits, continue to challenge the employment quality for this emerging blue-collar demographic.

The report reveals that online ride-hailing drivers are predominantly middle-aged. The average age of surveyed drivers is around 40, and males are the overwhelming majority. Citing data from the China mobile internet database, the report notes that in April 2025, “Didi Driver” was the top-ranked app for males aged 31-45, indicating that a significant number of middle-aged men depend on the Didi online ride-hailing platform for their livelihood.

Female online ride-hailing drivers represent less than 10 percent, but their proportion is growing annually. The “2025 Didi Digital Mobility Female Ecosystem Report” shows that in 2024, over 1.5 million women globally generated income through Didi. More than 1.05 million of these were in China, where 79 percent of them were the sole income providers for their households.

Another notable demographic trend is the growing presence of older individuals in online ride-hailing. The report’s survey data reveals that the average age of online ride-hailing drivers stands at 39.8 years, aligning closely with the average age of China’s workforce. While male drivers aged over 55 represent 2.4 percent, female drivers over 50 constitute a greater proportion at 10.2 percent.

Against the backdrop of a phased increase in the statutory retirement age, online ride-hailing is becoming a new avenue for some older individuals to achieve a “semi-retirement” or flexible work-life balance. The report notes that more than 20 cities, such as Hangzhou, Chengdu, Kunming, Shenzhen, Qingdao, and Weifang, have now raised the maximum registration age for online ride-hailing drivers to 65.

The report highlights that for middle-aged drivers, the backbone of the online ride-hailing sector, this job plays a unique role in meeting urgent employment needs and providing a “safety net” for families struggling to make ends meet.

More than half of the surveyed drivers, 62.8 percent, are the sole or primary contributors to household income, while 77 percent of them have transitioned into the sector after being displaced, meaning their families are under immense financial pressure.

Drivers come from a variety of previous professions. The report indicates that nearly 70 percent hailed from traditional blue-collar sectors like manufacturing, construction, and catering. Some others were individuals who had experienced entrepreneurial failure or had previously run their own businesses. They might have transitioned into the sector due to different reasons, such as layoffs, pay cuts, and entrepreneurial setbacks. Yet, a common thread unites them: the ride-hailing sector offers immediate payment, low entry requirements, and flexible working hours, providing a vital employment buffer that allows them to quickly resume earning and balance family responsibilities.

Despite the huge base of drivers, the report mentions, less than 30 percent are highly active — those who consistently log on and remain available for ride requests. This suggests that the remaining drivers function more as “part-time” workers, flexibly juggling their work with family responsibilities.

Notably, the surveyed sample included veterans at 13.2 percent and recent college graduates (from 2024 onwards) at 7.4 percent. Both groups, the report notes, commonly encounter frictional unemployment and are in need of a low-cost, low-barrier “transitional position” to ease their move to the next stage. This is precisely the kind of opportunity that becoming an online ride-hailing driver can offer.

In regions experiencing industrial relocation and upgrading or fluctuations in foreign trade, the online ride-hailing sector serves as an anchor, helping to stabilize employment. In the same vein, it serves to cover income shortfalls for workers affected by industry downturns or seasonal employment, filling the “off-season” income vacuum.

To illustrate, the report cites the efforts to cut overcapacity in the steel and coal sectors from 2014 to 2019. According to estimates by China’s Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS), roughly 1.8 million employees were part of this relocation and resettlement process, primarily male workers aged 40 to 50. Characteristically, they had a narrow range of skills that hindered inter-industry mobility and bore heavy family burdens.

According to Caixin, Zhang Chenggang, director of the research center for new forms of employment and an associate professor at the Capital University of Economics and Business, investigated the impact of new forms of employment on the reemployment of workers displaced by overcapacity reduction. His findings revealed that by June 2017, 352,000 steel and coal workers had transitioned to the Didi platform, making up 19.6 percent of the 1.8 million.

The report also compares online ride-hailing drivers with other typical blue-collar professions, including delivery workers, truck drivers, couriers, manufacturing production workers, and construction workers.

Data shows that online ride-hailing drivers earn an average monthly income of 7,623 yuan (about 1,072 U.S. dollars), trailing only truck drivers (8,424 yuan). This figure is markedly higher than that of delivery workers (7,496 yuan), couriers (6,124 yuan), as well as manufacturing production workers and construction workers (5,900 yuan). Geographically, highly active drivers in first-tier cities earn more: an average of over eight hours online daily (with 5.1 hours on average spent on actual deliveries) can yield a monthly income of 11,557 yuan, exceeding the monthly average disposable income (7,705 yuan) for Beijing’s urban residents in 2024.

Currently, online ride-hailing drivers report an income satisfaction rate of 81.4 percent, significantly higher than truck drivers (21.95 percent) and delivery workers (64 percent), placing them first among blue-collar workers. The report attributes this to three key factors: firstly, a relatively comfortable working environment that avoids exposure to extreme heat and cold; secondly, timely settlements leading to strong cash flow; and thirdly, a more equal labor relationship, where drivers have the right to refuse orders and appeal negative ratings, thereby safeguarding their professional dignity.

In terms of career development, online ride-hailing drivers have the highest safety training coverage at 95 percent and a retention intention of 75.7 percent, both the highest among blue-collar groups. In comparison, delivery workers’ retention intention stands at 68.4 percent, while for truck drivers and construction workers, it is less than half.

However, the report points out that the current online ride-hailing market is experiencing capacity saturation and slowing order growth. Although platforms like Didi are implementing measures such as “transparent billing,” reduced commissions, and diversified subsidies to help drivers maintain stable incomes, the overall industry imbalance between supply and demand, leading to price competition and declining earnings, still poses a core challenge to driver satisfaction.

Citing data from the MOHRSS, it notes that by 2024, there were 7,483,000 licensed drivers nationwide, a whopping 159 percent increase since 2020. The substantial increase in the supply of drivers contrasted with a mere 38.3 percent rise in the number of monthly average orders.

Simultaneously, multiple platforms engage in price wars, leading to a decrease in order prices. To achieve their target income, drivers are compelled to extend their working hours. The report’s survey indicates an average daily online time of 6.41 hours for drivers, with a peak distribution around 10 hours.

[Editor’s note: Since July, several local governments across China have rolled out policies to tighten regulation of ride-hailing trips with upfront pricing and curb cut-price competition.”

Platform commissions are also an important factor affecting drivers’ perception of their income. Survey samples show that the average monthly commission rate for drivers is 18.9 percent, with a median of 18.8 percent. While commissions show little fluctuation, driver perceptions vary considerably. The report analyzes that despite Didi's launch of “transparent billing,” allowing drivers to view commission rates in real-time, certain online communities and discussions have fostered an impression of “excessively high commissions.” Combined with the seasonal fluctuations in subsidies, this amplifies negative perceptions.

Furthermore, due to intense industry competition, some car rental companies have ceased operations, and smaller platforms have exited the market, resulting in financial losses for some drivers. Beyond internal competition, some cities have seen traditional taxis squeezing out ride-hailing services, with restrictions on operating zones, pricing, or apparent bias-based policing. Some drivers, facing insufficient order volumes, have transitioned to part-time work or even re-entered unstable employment cycles.

Insufficient social security coverage is another concern. The survey indicates that only 10.5 percent of online ride-hailing drivers contribute to basic old-age insurance and medical insurance for urban employees, remarkably lower than construction workers (41.2 percent) and truck drivers (32.24 percent). While the Didi platform offers supplementary insurance through programs like the “Didi Driver Protection Plan” and “Didi Guanhuaibao,” the overall participation rate remains inadequate, leaving long-term occupational safety without systematic support.

The report concludes that ride-hailing work excels in terms of income flexibility (a mix of fixed and variable remuneration), work-life flexibility, and growth and career opportunities, though the formalization of social security benefits remains an area for improvement. It states that a key policy challenge for the future is how to explore more inclusive and sustainable social security solutions, for example, promoting the integration of commercial insurance with basic social security, that do not stifle the vitality of flexible employment, thereby bridging the protection gap for flexible workers.

Hello and welcome to the "Big Argument" column, a distinctive commentary column in our newsletter that diverges from traditional Western narratives and perspectives. It focuses on hot-button issues that have yet to fully reflect the Chinese stance and perspective. Some notable pieces of the column, which are also among the most engaging articles in the history of this newsletter include Three key takeaways from latest Taiwan Strait military drills and Stabilizing U.S.-China relations: Trump can do it, if drawing lessons from past.

You might find that some views in the article differ from the typical Western perspectives, but I believe understanding different viewpoints might be one of the reasons some of you subscribe to this newsletter.

This year marks the 80th anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II and of the Chinese nation's triumph in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. The victory carries extraordinary significance for the entire Chinese nation, as it was the first major victory China had achieved in a war of resistance against foreign aggression since the 19th century.

However, this victory of justice over evil and fairness over power has nevertheless been met with misguided questioning over facts, including Taiwan's restoration to China, a victorious outcome of WWII, and it was an integral part of the postwar international order.

On August 15, the anniversary of Japan's announcement of unconditional surrender 80 years ago, Taiwan leader Lai Ching-te publicly referred to it with the neutral phrase "end of the war," the same wording used by Japan, which seeks to whitewash its past aggression and ultimate defeat.

Lai's remarks blurred the fundamental line between justice and evil, between the victors and the defeated. In doing so, he has betrayed the Chinese nation that made immense sacrifices to end Japanese aggression.

This reveals a fundamental issue confronting the Chinese nation: the distortion of Taiwan's identity and status, which has shaped perceptions of both historical and current matters. This is known as the "Taiwan question."

To grasp why Taiwan has come to be seen as a "question," one must understand that, in the final stage of World War II, a series of documents of international law required Japan to return Taiwan to China. After winning the war in 1945, China had already restored its sovereignty over Taiwan. This was a consensus among the Allies, but Cold War divisions and geopolitics in recent years have obscured that reality for some—and even led to its outright denial.

1945: Taiwan comes home

In 1895, following its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Qing Dynasty government was forced to cede Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan. However, people across the Taiwan Strait never stopped fighting to reclaim the island, carrying out successive waves of armed and unarmed resistance against Japanese occupation in and outside Taiwan.

But Japan's ambition extended far beyond Taiwan. In 1931, it invaded and occupied China's northeastern region, and six years later launched the full-scale war of aggression in the country. During the war of resistance, over 50,000 people in Taiwan went across the Strait to fight Japanese invaders. They held the belief that "to save Taiwan, one must first save the motherland."

Between 1895 and 1945, more than 600,000 Taiwan people died resisting Japanese rule, a powerful proof that the people of Taiwan, as an integral part of the Chinese nation, stood shoulder to shoulder with their compatriots on the mainland in the nation's darkest hour.

The dawn broke as the Allies joined forces to crush the Axis powers. In 1943, leaders of China, the United States and the United Kingdom met in Egypt, and stated in the Cairo Declaration that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria (Northeast China), Formosa (Taiwan), and The Pescadores (Penghu Islands), shall be restored to the Republic of China."

Chiang Kai-shek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill met at the Cairo Conference in Cairo, 25 November 1943.

The three Allied nations reaffirmed this term in their 1945 Potsdam Proclamation, which was endorsed by the Soviet Union shortly after, and accepted by Japan upon its surrender.

On Oct. 25, 1945, the Chinese government announced that it was resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan, and a ceremony to accept Japan's surrender in the Taiwan Province of the China war theater of the Allied Powers was held in Taipei. Days earlier, Chinese servicemen landed at the Port of Keelung. Their arrival was welcomed by millions of people across Taiwan.

Since then, China has recovered Taiwan, both de jure and de facto.

In September 1946, prominent figures from Taiwan, led by Lin Hsien-tang, traveled to the mainland to pay homage at the mausoleum of the Yellow Emperor, revered as the common ancestor of the Chinese nation.

This act proclaimed Taiwan's return to the big family of China, with Taiwan compatriots once again standing tall as proud Chinese.

That year, civil war broke out. After their defeat, the remnants of the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) fled to Taiwan and entrenched themselves there. Across the Strait, on Oct. 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded.

The KMT regime had been overthrown, and the ROC was succeeded by the PRC, so that the Central People's Government in Beijing became the only legitimate government of all whole China. The process only involved the succession of the government, not the succession of the state. Thus, the PRC inherited the ROC's political power, its territory, and its international legal status. From the ROC to the PRC, the subject of international law -- China as a STATE -- did not change.

As a natural result, the PRC government enjoys and exercises China's full sovereignty, which includes its sovereignty over Taiwan, and Taiwan remains a part of its territory.

From clarity to contrived ambiguity

China's sovereignty over Taiwan ought to be an indisputable matter -- and was for years after 1949, had geopolitics not come into play.

The retreat of Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT remnants to Taiwan led to decades of confrontation across the Taiwan Strait. The 1950s saw repeated clashes across the Strait.

Even though the KMT claimed its regime -- rather than the central government in Beijing -- was the sole legal government representing China, both sides of the Strait recognized Taiwan as part of the Chinese territory.

To this day, no peace agreement or armistice has ever been signed between the two sides. The Chinese civil war that broke out in the 1940s has, in essence, not reached a definitive conclusion. The absence of such a formal arrangement has left the Strait in a special state of protracted political confrontation. This has been exploited by certain countries outside the region as a tool against China.

During the Korean War, or China's War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (1950-1953), the United States dramatically re-calibrated its strategic calculus and upgraded Taiwan's geopolitical value. In June 1950, shortly after the war broke out, U.S. President Harry Truman sent the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait and declared that the island's future must await "a peace settlement or UN consideration."

The phrase "status undetermined," an invention tailored by the United States and its allies to Cold War needs, laid the groundwork for the legal ambiguity that would soon follow.

The main prop was the so-called San Francisco Peace Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Peace with Japan, produced in September 1951. Drafted without the PRC, the sole legal government of China since 1949, the treaty recorded Japan's renunciation of Taiwan, yet named no recipient deliberately.

The fact that the treaty was drafted and signed behind China's back was a blatant breach of postwar legal norms. As per the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent. In other words, a treaty signed without China's involvement has no authority to determine the future of Chinese territory.

Notably, the KMT was not invited to the San Francisco conference either.

In addition, as a major Allied Power that joined the war against Japan in 1945, the Soviet Union did not sign the treaty. While they participated in the conference, their delegation strongly opposed the treaty's terms.

On Oct. 25, 1971, the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) explicitly rejected proposals for "Two Chinas" and "Taiwan self-determination." The UNGA Resolution 2758 was adopted with an overwhelming majority, expelling the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek, i.e., the representatives of the KMT regime in Taiwan, from the place which they unlawfully occupied at the United Nations and restoring all its rights to the PRC.

The resolution was unequivocal: the two words, "RESTORE" and "OCCUPY," meant that the UN recognized that the PRC succeeded the ROC as the sole representative of all China since 1949. Thus, the seat of China in the United Nations has always represented the entirety of China, including Taiwan.

On the day of the vote on Resolution 2758, Chiang Kai-shek's representative also acknowledged in a statement that other countries "have stressed the fact that Taiwan is Chinese territory," "on this I cannot agree more..." and "the people of Taiwan are Chinese in terms of race, history and culture."

The "undetermined status" thesis, born of Cold War maneuvering, had no legitimacy except in the narrative of Taiwan secessionists.

Eighty years on: Why the record matters

The Taiwan question sits at the core of China's core national interests, and the one-China principle is the political foundation and a fundamental premise upheld by the People's Republic of China when establishing diplomatic relations with other countries.

The most important content of this principle is that there is only one China in the world, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory.

As China has established diplomatic ties with over 180 countries in the world, the one-China principle has become the widely recognized consensus of the international community.

However, China's continued rise has caused unease among some Western nations still clinging to a Cold War mentality, leading their policies toward China to increasingly favor containment over engagement. Thus, the Taiwan issue has become a strategic leverage point for counterbalancing China.

In particular, the United States deliberately maintains ambiguity on the Taiwan question -- the so-called "strategic ambiguity" -- seeking to constrain China politically, economically, and militarily.

In recent years, from massive arms deals to high-profile visits to Taiwan by politicians such as Nancy Pelosi, as well as repeated "stopovers" by Taiwan leaders, the United States has been hollowing out the one-China principle, sending wrong signals to secessionists on the island and blurring that principle in the eyes of the world.

On the other hand, with drastic changes in Taiwan's political landscape since the late 1980s, the secessionists, especially the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), seized the chance to push ahead with their independence agenda. One major campaign is to rewrite the history of Taiwan, including its restoration to China in 1945. It also refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, which embodies the one-China principle.

Oct. 25 was a public holiday in Taiwan to celebrate its restoration to China until it was canceled in 2001 by the DPP authorities. Since the DPP took office again in 2016, the authorities have halted commemorative activities, leading to a gradual fading of public memory -- particularly among Taiwan's younger generation.

While the United States and Taiwan's secessionist-minded authorities repeatedly tampered with the historical narrative of Taiwan's restoration to China, Beijing has upheld the facts with consistency and clarity.

China will hold activities around Oct. 25 to mark the 80th anniversary of Taiwan's restoration to China from Japanese occupation, as part of the events for the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.

The anniversary is more than commemoration. It is a reminder that the Taiwan question arose when the Chinese nation was weak and divided, and it will be resolved when the Chinese nation's rejuvenation is complete.

Remembering China's victory in 1945 affirms that whatever turbulence arises in Taiwan's political landscape, and whatever meddling comes from outside, China's reunification remains certain. It is an essential part of national rejuvenation.

The only question that remains is how.

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Hello and welcome to the "Big Argument" column, a distinctive commentary column in our newsletter that diverges from traditional Western narratives and perspectives. As some of you know, this column is periodically featured in this newsletter. It focuses on hot-button issues that have yet to fully reflect the Chinese stance and perspective. One notable piece of the column, which also stands as one of the most engaging articles in the history of this newsletter, was a piece published last May on PLA's military drills around the Taiwan island.

You might find that some views in the article differ from the typical Western perspectives, but I believe understanding different viewpoints might be one of the reasons some of you subscribe to this newsletter.

If you have any thoughts or comments about the article, feel free to share them below!

What does power look like for Washington in 2025? A percentage sign. Threats of 30 percent to 50 percent tariffs hung over capitals from Brussels to Manila like a sword, and “agreements” followed in a rush — each one trading a tariff cliff for a still‑punishing baseline: a 15 percent wall on all EU goods, 15 percent on Japan, 20 percent on Vietnam, and 19 percent on Indonesia and the Philippines. U.S. goods, meanwhile, often slipped in duty‑free, while multibillion‑dollar purchase orders and investment pledges were funneled toward America. Tribute by any other name would smell as steep.

When tariffs replaced gunboats

For much of the 19th and early 20th centuries, Washington pried open markets with literal gunboat diplomacy—from Commodore Perry’s Black Ships off Edo Bay to U.S. cruisers enforcing debt payments in the Caribbean. Trade concessions were negotiated under a broadside’s shadow. In 2025, the warships stayed in port, but the logic survived: a tariff notice now does the job a cannon once did.

Europe’s experience set the pattern. Brussels arrived insisting on zero‑for‑zero. It left with a flat 15 percent tariff on most of its exports — roughly six times last year’s average U.S. rate — plus a promise to channel about 600 billion U.S. dollars of investment into the United States and to buy roughly 750 billion U.S. dollars of American energy and defense products. Steel and aluminum remained hit with 50 percent. The White House reserved the right to crank duties back up if deliveries lagged. “The best we could get,” Ursula von der Leyen conceded. In Paris, it was simply “a dark day.”

Tokyo’s script scarcely diverged. Japan avoided a harsher levy only by accepting a 15 percent ceiling and assembling a 550 billion U.S. dollar package deployed largely at U.S. discretion, with Trump boasting of a 90 percent profit share. Detroit promptly cried foul: American carmakers still face 50 percent tariffs on steel and aluminum and 25 percent on many parts, leaving them, they say, “definitely at a disadvantage.”

Further south and east, leverage hardened into outright asymmetry. Indonesia agreed to zero tariffs on almost all U.S. goods, dropped key resource and regulatory barriers, accepted U.S. auto and FDA standards and signed up for billions in U.S. aircraft, farm and energy purchases — even as Washington locked a 19 percent duty on Indonesian exports.

The Philippines took the same 19 percent rate — down a token point from the threat—while granting zero tariffs for American imports and deepening military cooperation. Vietnam accepted 20 percent across the board and 40 percent on goods Washington deems “transshipped,” while opening its own market duty‑free to U.S. products.

Tariff fire even reached the produce aisle. Tomatoes — 90 percent of which the United States imports from Mexico — lost their long‑standing duty‑free status and now face a 17 percent levy. Salad, salsa, ketchup and pasta sauce will cost more. Domestic growers cannot fill the gap.

New economic colonialism

The tariff pacts Washington struck embody what can be called new economic colonialism, built on tariff‑tributaryism: a system that swaps imperial gunboats for tariff clocks and cannonades for compliance clauses. It runs on three moves.

First, threaten annihilation to make “consent” inevitable. Partners negotiated under a countdown to ruinous duties. Signing staved off disaster. It did not signal parity. The signature sealed coercion, not compromise.

Second, convert mercy into one‑way flows. The reprieve carried a price tag in capital, commodities, and standards. Europe’s energy payments flow west. Japan’s half‑trillion fund props up U.S. priorities. Indonesia’s minerals and regulations are rewritten to American codes. Vietnam’s market swings open while its goods still pay the toll. Technical‑sounding rules — auto safety, FDA approvals — hand Washington the gatekeeping keys and lock other economies into U.S.-led value chains.

Third, keep the trigger within reach. Even after the ink dried, U.S. officials said the White House could restore higher tariffs—potentially back to the originally threatened levels—if a partner “fell short.” Mercy is provisional, leverage perpetual. Where a gunboat once loitered offshore, a tariff letter now sits in a drawer marked “if needed.”

This isn’t classic neocolonialism in treaty form, nor mere protectionism. It is a hybrid — tributary logic fused to modern instruments — hence new economic colonialism centered on tariff‑tributaryism. Coercion without conquest. Dependency without direct rule. A sphere of influence drawn not with borders, but with baselines, quotas, and purchase commitments.

Unequal treaties won't make America great again

Europe calculates that a 15 percent tariff is roughly quadruple the pre‑Trump average. Japanese exporters have already slashed prices 19.4 percent year‑on‑year to keep their foothold, eroding profits and threatening the wage gains that finally nudged Japan out of deflation. Vietnamese manufacturers now juggle impossible deadlines and razor‑thin margins to meet U.S. rules while paying double penalties for alleged “transshipment.” None of this spells “win‑win.”

Americans are hardly insulated. Analysts warn U.S. firms are absorbing much of the tariff cost and will pass it on. Bloomberg’s models show the new levies already stunting global growth as investment stalls and supply chains contort. Even niche duties — like that tomato tax — flow straight to grocery bills. And at home, U.S. automakers complain the patchwork left them paying more for steel, aluminum and parts than their foreign rivals, undermining the very “Made in America” push tariffs were supposed to defend.

Politically, “submission,” “imbalanced,” “dark day” aren’t the words of partners celebrating reciprocity. They are the vocabulary of coerced compromise. History’s verdict on such arrangements is clear. Unequal treaties breed resentment, not durable peace. They paper over conflict until the bill comes due.

If Washington’s goal is a rules‑based order and making America great again, tariff tribute is the wrong foundation. Real prosperity grows from predictability and perceived fairness, not new economic colonialism.

The lesson from a century ago still applies: victories secured by pressure unravel. Only genuinely mutual agreements endure.

According to the EU, the meeting is scheduled for July 24 in Beijing. The President of the European Council, António Costa, and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, will meet Chinese President Xi Jinping. However, China has yet to make an official announcement, as its diplomatic protocol typically discloses leaders' foreign engagements only a few days in advance.

This year's summit holds special importance as it coincides with the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and the EU. Earlier this month, Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and China’s Foreign Minister, visited the EU headquarters in Brussels, as well as Germany and France, underscoring the importance both sides attach to this relationship.

Wang told European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen that the upcoming China-EU leaders' meeting is a significant event taking place at a critical juncture. China looks forward to working with the EU to summarize the valuable experience and important insights from the past 50 years of China-EU relations, and map out the future direction of dialogue and cooperation for the next 50 years.

This week also saw a key event between China and the EU. On July 14, Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang held the sixth China-EU High-Level Environment and Climate Dialogue jointly with Teresa Ribera, Executive Vice President of the European Commission. Cooperation in environmental protection and climate protection is one of the few fields in which China and the EU have few disputes.

Also, earlier this month, the 13th World Peace Forum (WPF) held at Tsinghua University also discussed China-EU relations. When addressing the opening ceremony of the forum, former President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy called for more dialogues between countries, governments and peoples, expressing optimism regarding an upcoming China-EU summit.

His opinions on China-EU relations were echoed by Shi Mingde, former Chinese ambassador to Germany. When speaking at a panel discussion focusing on China-EU ties, Shi reiterated that China-EU relations should not be affected by a third country, saying that the upcoming China-EU summit will be a valuable opportunity where both sides can reflect on the achievements the two sides have made over the past 50 years, and take a closer look at the problems at hand.

Former President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy addressing the World Peace Forum

At the invitation of Beijing Scroll, two Chinese experts have contributed insightful articles on China-EU relations, with a focus on the upcoming summit, and we have translated them verbatim into English. Their analysis delves into the current dilemmas and concerns within the EU, which are shaping—and at times distorting—European perceptions of its relationship with China.

Prof. Ding Chun is director of the Center for European Studies, Fudan University, and vice president of the Chinese Association for European Studies. He believes that the upcoming China-EU summit will test whether both sides can rebuild trust and stable cooperation amid rising tensions and protectionism. Despite differences, the article urges China and the EU to focus on dialogue and practical collaboration, as their partnership remains crucial for global stability.

Back at the crossroads -- Looking at next 50 years of China-EU relations through lens of upcoming summit: view from Prof. Ding Chun

The upcoming China-EU summit once again draws international attention to this half-century-old bilateral relationship that has weathered many storms.

At a time of geopolitical fragmentation, global economic slowdown, tariff hikes and rising protectionism, the meeting is not only of commemorative significance but a real test: can China and the European Union (EU) rebuild a stable, mature, and sustainable cooperation framework in an environment of growing differences?

Currently, expectations for the summit's outcomes are more cautious. Observers anticipate that during the summit, both sides will reaffirm their support for dialogue mechanisms, express a willingness to deepen cooperation in new areas such as green and digital development, and emphasize the need to manage differences properly.

Compared to previous idealism, such expectation reflects the status quo of bilateral relations as well as their corresponding stance and policy atmosphere.

Over the past 50 years, China-EU relations have expanded from initial economic exchanges to a comprehensive relationship spanning politics, security, culture, and global governance. The China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, established in 2003, was a testament to a high degree of mutual trust and a shared aspiration between the two sides.

In recent years, tensions and misunderstandings between China and the EU have continued intensifying. Within the EU's three-dimensional policy approach to China -- partner for cooperation, economic competitor, and a systemic rival -- the "rival" tone has become increasingly prominent, eroding the fundamental trust that underpins bilateral cooperation.

China has consistently advocated for the partnership. However, the status quo of China-EU relations and the EU's stance on China stand in stark contrast to it, with a clear deficit in strategic coordination and political trust.

Moreover, the EU's concerns and criticisms on issues regarding China's institutional model, the so-called "overcapacity," and human rights have recently become more intense. Internal political considerations partly drove these concerns, but many of them have been overstated and detached from facts.

For example, when simply attributing China's advantages in electric vehicles (EVs) and green energy to subsidies, they have overlooked China's long-term investments in innovation chains, infrastructure, and industrial organization. At the same time, accusations of so-called "forced labor" in Xinjiang were often forged in disregard of China's efforts in opening access to third-party inspections and data clarifications.

China never shies away from differences but advocates resolving them through dialogue based on facts.

The fundamental issue lies in the difference in perception: does the EU see China as a threat to its value system, or as an important partner in dealing with global challenges?

The EU side is choosing a tougher economic policy towards China, taking politicized actions such as launching anti-subsidy investigations into Chinese EVs and restricting high-tech cooperation with China. The escalating accusations have seriously impacted the stability of global industrial chains.

China, by contrast, has continuously called for resolving disputes within the WTO framework and advocated open markets and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Facts have proven that protectionism will not bring recovery; only dialogue and cooperation can build resilience.

China and the EU are naturally complementary on global issues such as climate change, AI governance, and public health. They should work together to become a model of win-win cooperation instead of restraining each other as rivals. Applying a zero-sum mindset will not only miss opportunities for cooperation but also exacerbate the fragmentation of the global multilateral system.

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of China-EU diplomatic ties. Building on this milestone, both sides should reassess the strategic importance of their relations -- not just summarizing the past but also envisaging the future.

China and the EU urgently need to reopen channels, rebuild trust, and reshape mechanisms regarding high-level dialogue, people-to-people exchanges, and sub-national cooperation. Existing platforms such as the China-EU green partnership and the China-EU High-level Digital Dialogue need further institutionalization and strategic enhancement, promoting the establishment of a "sustainable strategic partnership" and ensuring the partnership is truly "comprehensive" in practice.

For Europe, it is also necessary to guard against the politicization of economic and trade disputes and to prevent ideology from spilling over into areas like technology and industry, which should remain neutral.

If the EU wants to maintain its image as a defender of global rules, it must formulate policies based on rules rather than geopolitical games. Decoupling from or excluding China will not enhance its so-called "strategic autonomy," but will only limit its room for maneuver.

Looking forward to the next 50 years, China-EU relations should focus on managing differences instead of eliminating them; on shaping stability instead of creating confrontation.

The two sides should seek common ground while accommodating differences. A rational and healthy China-EU relationship not only concerns the well-being of 1.9 billion people but also carries crucial significance for world peace and the stability of the multilateral order.

The China-EU summit has yet to be held, but its preparatory process has already sent a positive signal: dialogue is still going on, and cooperation remains necessary.

The direction of China-EU relations in the future depends not on who is stronger, but on whether mutual trust and understanding are chosen. The future needs to begin with rational dialogue, time and again.

Prof. Zhao Yongsheng is a researcher and head of the French economy research center at the Academy of China Open Economy Studies, University of International Business and Economics. He is currently a visiting scholar at Sorbonne University in Paris. In Zhao's article, he argues that the real source of China-EU tensions on economic and trade issues lies in Europe's "three anxieties:" being sidelined by the U.S. in global affairs, unease over trade imbalances, and a deep-seated fear of declining industrial capacity. While these concerns fuel restrictive measures, the EU still relies on China's vast market, advanced technologies, and industrial strength to realize its re-industrialization goals, making continued cooperation both necessary and resilient.

Three anxieties on EU's side are hampering China-EU economic cooperation: views from Prof. Zhao Yongsheng

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the official establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the European Union (EU). Over the past half-century, China-EU relations have achieved considerable development. In particular, economic and trade cooperation has become the cornerstone for the stable and healthy development of bilateral relations.

However, in recent years, the EU has imposed so-called punitive tariffs or taken restrictive measures against China in areas such as electric vehicles and the purchase of medical devices, proposed to "de-risk" from China, and called for strengthening trade barriers to protect the European economy from the impact of Chinese goods.

How come these "noises" are in the "harmonious sounds" of economic and trade cooperation between China and Europe?

Despite the noises, likely, the main tune of China-EU economic and trade cooperation will not be negatively affected. The foundation of such cooperation remains solid and the fundamentals remain good. China and the EU are important trade partners to each other, with a bilateral trade volume stable at around 2.7 billion U.S. dollars daily, and China has maintained its position as the second-largest trading partner of the EU for many consecutive years.

In short, in spite of the ups and downs in China-EU economic and trade relations over the past few decades, in the context of relations among major economies, their major characteristics have always been stability and resilience.

So how come the clamor? I believe that it stems from the three major anxieties of the EU and its member states, namely "being-at-the-table anxiety," "economic and trade anxiety," and "re-industrialization anxiety."

The anxiety of "being-at-the-table" originates from European countries' relations with the U.S. It is well known that while the U.S. is theoretically the closest ally of the EU, it arbitrarily refuses to let the EU "sit at the table" in negotiations of key issues, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict. As a result, the EU and its members developed an anxiety of being left out. Therefore, when dealing with countries other than the U.S., especially major powers like China, the anxiety kicks in.

The EU has always raised the Russia-Ukraine conflict and Iran's nuclear weapons as key issues to China. But as is known to all, neither of these issues was caused by or exacerbated by China. Instead, China did its best to solve and defuse the situation. By throwing these two issues at China, policymakers of the EU exhibit a loss of composure, indicating the worsening of their anxiety.

The second anxiety has to do with the economy and trade. The EU, along with China and the U.S. are referred to as the world's three major economies. Yet when dealing with the three groups of economic and trade relations: that between Europe and the U.S., between China and Europe, and between China and the U.S., the EU and its member states are more likely to fall into "economic and trade anxiety" than the other two.

The underlying logic is simple. The United States, a global leader in many fields, holds a more powerful and proactive position in economic and trade relations with other countries and regions, and naturally is less likely to develop anxiety in comparison with the other two. As for China, which is slightly behind the United States in overall strength but is catching up with the U.S. in some fields, it has developed a large economy that champions and adheres to the principles of free trade, economic openness and globalization. It also has little reason to be anxious.

Of the aforementioned three groups of economic and trade relations, the complementarity and mutual penetration of the economic and trade relations between China and the U.S. are quite high, and reaching a consensus is not all hard. In the meantime, although there seem to be many obstacles in China-EU economic and trade relations for the time being, it is also highly complementary. From a practical perspective, it is not difficult for the two sides to reach an agreement.

The economic and trade relations between Europe and the U.S., on the other hand, are the most difficult of the three to handle. Although the EU refer to the U.S. as a "cousin" in certain official documents, since they do not differ as much as China and the U.S. in terms of development stage and industrial advantages, and both are developed economies with similar development paths and industrial layouts, the economic and trade complementarity between the U.S. and the EU is far lower than that between China and the U.S. and between China and the EU.

This is also why, while the United Kingdom and the U.S. reached a basic agreement early on and China and the U.S. have agreed on a framework, economic and trade negotiations between the EU and the U.S. remain fraught with difficulties. In fact, progress on this front has been the slowest among the three major relationships.

The third anxiety lies in the EU's prospects of re-industrialization. The two aforementioned anxieties, though both important, are on a superficial level. The "re-industrialization anxiety," on the other hand, touches on the more profound parts of the EU's mindset.

Let us take France as an example. France once surpassed the United States in manufacturing and was once the world's top manufacturing country. However, with the gradual implementation of the "de-industrialization" policy and the acceleration of the trend, France's manufacturing industry has long since fallen behind. Its industrial chain and value chain, in the meantime, became fragmented and highly dependent on large economies such as China and the U.S.

When looking at the relations between China and the EU, it can be deduced that China can certainly lend a hand to their "re-industrialization." To be fair, China is perhaps the only country that is both willing and able to do so, and can be a reliable strategic partner to France and the EU in this regard. Below are three reasons that support this claim.

First, in terms of economic aggregate, China's nominal GDP in 2023 was 17.67 trillion U.S. dollars, second only to that of the United States. If calculated by purchasing power parity (PPP), China has surpassed the United States. In terms of economic growth rate, China has become the largest contributor to the world's GDP in absolute terms.

Secondly, Chinese enterprises are brimming with innovation and have become the world's innovation centers in some fields. The number of unicorn companies in China is second only to that of the U.S. In the fields of artificial intelligence (AI) and the chip industry, China is also developing rapidly to be the world's largest chip producer. In the meantime, China's electricity generation is greater than the combined total of the U.S., the EU and India.

Thirdly, for the readers' reference, here are eight industrial sectors in which China leads the world.

1. 5G technology. China's Huawei holds 8,400 5G technology patents, accounting for 15 percent of the world's total. Many European enterprises even regard Huawei as their strategic partner.

2. Artificial intelligence. By 2024, there were 4,500 AI professional enterprises in China. In 2024 alone, 114 AI startups were born in China, among which 58 received an average of tens of millions of US dollars in investment.

3. High-speed railway. By 2024, China had 162,000 kilometers of railway, of which 48,000 kilometers are high-speed, ranking first in the world.

4. New energy vehicles. In 2024, the production and sales volume of new energy vehicles in China were 12.89 million and 12.87 million, respectively, with growth rates of 34.4 percent and 35.5 percent. German car manufacturers have regarded Chinese car manufacturers as strategic partners.

5. Satellite Navigation. In 2023, China's satellite navigation services reached 536 billion yuan, and 137 countries have signed cooperation agreements with China's BeiDou Navigation System.

6. Mobile Payment. By 2024, a total of 1.029 billion people in China were using mobile payments, an increase of 195.2 percent compared to 2017. China's online sales and mobile payment penetration rates both rank first in the world.

7. Lithium batteries. China owns 78.6 percent of the world's battery production capacity and is home to six of the world's top 10 battery manufacturers.

8. Household Robots. Since 2023, the production of household robots in China has increased sharply. In 2024, Chinese hotels will already have 30,000 robots, and a new robot training center will be opened in Shanghai in the same year.

In conclusion, the foundation for China-EU economic and trade cooperation remains steady, and its fundamentals remain promising, and continue to show stability and resilience. The reason behind the noises that disturb this cooperation is the three anxieties on the EU's part, namely "being-at-the-table anxiety" "economic and trade anxiety" and "re-industrialization anxiety."

To achieve its goal of re-industrialization, the EU and its members need the help of Chinese technologies, capital and strategies. After all, there aren't many countries that can and want to help the EU reach this goal.

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Participants engaged in in-depth discussions and exchanges on topics such as "Post WWII International Order and Sovereignty over Nanhai Zhudao", "History of the South China Sea from Political and Legal Perspectives", and "Re-evaluation of the South China Sea Arbitration Award."

Diplomats from the embassies of Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Thailand, Cambodia, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand, Mexico, the European Union, and other countries and international organizations in China also attended the event.

Today's newsletter includes highlights of the keynote speeches delivered by two scholars during the workshop. They are Wu Shicun, Chairman of the Huayang Center and Chairman of the Academic Committee of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCSS), and Li Guoqiang, Deputy Director of the Chinese Academy of History and Member of the Academic Divisions of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

In addition, it includes highlights of two articles analyzing the South China Sea issue by Lei Xiaolu, a professor in China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies (CIBOS), Wuhan University, and Ding Duo, an associate research fellow at the NISCSS, respectively.

Wu Shicun, Chairman of the Huayang Center and Chairman of the Academic Committee of NISCSS

Wu Shicun emphasized that China's sovereignty over the South China Sea islands is supported by solid historical and legal grounds. The Chinese people have exercised administration and jurisdiction over the South China Sea since ancient times. After World War II, China lawfully recovered the islands in 1946 in accordance with the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation, and publicly announced the recovery to the world.

He pointed out that the root causes of the current disputes lie in the illegal occupation of certain islands and reefs by the Philippines, Vietnam, and others starting in the 1970s, compounded by overlapping claims under modern maritime law. Wu Shicun identified three major challenges currently facing the South China Sea situation:

1. U.S. intervention has intensified tensions. Under the pretext of "Freedom of Navigation", the U.S. has strengthened its military presence and supported unlawful claims by other countries.

2. Escalating violations by claimant states, particularly the Philippines, has provoked incidents at Ren'ai Jiao (Second Thomas Shoal) and introduced intermediate-range missile systems, posing a threat to regional security.

3. Stalled progress in the Code of Conduct (COC) consultations, as extra-regional forces exploit the illegal arbitration ruling to obstruct the negotiation process and undermine efforts by China and ASEAN to manage crises.

Wu Shicun also refuted the “2016 South China Sea Arbitration Award,” and pointed out that it was entirely illegal and invalid due to serious flaws in jurisdiction, tribunal composition, legal reasoning, factual findings, and evidence handling. He argued that the “award” has become a "troublemaker undermining stability in the South China Sea."

Wu Shicun called on regional countries to jointly uphold the post-WWII international order, resist external interference, accelerate the COC negotiation process, and build a community of shared future in the South China Sea through practical maritime cooperation.

Li Guoqiang, Deputy Director of the Chinese Academy of History and Member of the Academic Divisions of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Li Guoqiang pointed out that the victory in World War II 80 years ago brought an end to Fascist Japan's illegal occupation of the South China Sea islands. This outcome, affirmed through a series of significant international treaties, confirmed China's sovereignty over the South China Sea islands. The Chinese government successfully reclaimed these islands with broad support from the international community.

He emphasized that history is the root of reality, and reality is the continuation of history. Only by understanding where the South China Sea issue originated, can we comprehend why the situation today is what it is - and not something else - and gain clarity about where the South China Sea is heading, and where it is not.

Li Guoqiang concluded by saying that a sea of peace, friendship, cooperation, and goodwill was the original state of the South China Sea, and that it should likewise reflect the aspirations of our era.

Lei Xiaolu, professor in China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies (CIBOS)

The Zhongsha Islands and Nansha Islands have historically and geographically been regarded as integral wholes. Not only do neighboring countries view them as unified entities, but countries outside the region also recognize them as such, consistently describing them as integral wholes in official documents and archives. The Philippines' request for separate determinations on the legal status and maritime entitlements of Huangyan Island and eight features in the Nansha Islands essentially denies China's territorial sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and misrepresents the nature and scope of the China-Philippines sovereignty dispute over the Nansha Islands.

The “arbitral tribunal” adopted a fragmentation approach in characterizing the disputes raised in the Philippines' submissions, failing to conduct objective analysis based on facts. For instance, it surreptitiously replaced the concept of "islands" (群岛) as an integral whole with "a group of features" (“一组岛礁). In Paragraph 160 of “the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility,” the “tribunal” deliberately changed "China's Nansha Islands is" in China's note verbale to "China's Nansha Islands are," distorting China's claims regarding territorial sovereignty and maritime entitlements over the Nansha Islands as an integral whole into claims based on individual features.

Through this sleight of hand fragmentation, the “arbitration award” transformed the territorial sovereignty dispute over the Nansha Islands into questions of whether features like Ren'ai Jiao fall within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, effectively determining the ownership of certain features in the Nansha Islands in disguise. This is far from what the Philippines claimed as "not requesting the tribunal to determine territorial sovereignty issues."

Ding Duo, associate research fellow at the NISCSS

In dealing with the South China Sea issue, the Philippines needs to return to reality, and Manila must also undertake necessary psychological adjustments.

First, it must abandon the illusion of "judicial omnipotence." That “award,” which exceeded jurisdiction and perverted justice, no matter how elegantly packaged, cannot change its invalid nature. It is both unreasonable and unrealistic to fantasize about resolving South China Sea disputes involving complex history, sovereignty, and geopolitics through a single award or by initiating similar litigation again, or to impose results devoid of any fairness upon China. Both historical experience and current reality prove this path leads nowhere.

Second, it must recognize the nature and harm of external interference. Actively courting major powers from outside the region to intervene in regional disputes is tantamount to inviting the wolf into the house. External forces act based on their own interests, and their intervention will only exacerbate tensions, pushing regional countries to the forefront of major power confrontation, ultimately sacrificing the region's peace, stability, and development prospects. Fantasizing about relying on external forces to suppress another party to resolve issues will only backfire.

Third, it should actively seek paths for cooperation. While disputes concerning the South China Sea are difficult to resolve in the short term, the immediate priority is to promote maritime cooperation in less sensitive areas. Countries directly concerned can engage in practical cooperation in areas such as joint conservation and management of fishery resources, marine ecological environment protection, maritime search and rescue, and marine scientific research. Such cooperation does not touch upon complex core disputes, yet can effectively provide public goods and create a favorable atmosphere for resolving more difficult issues in the future.

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The event has brought together over 600 guests — including scholars, experts, and political figures from around 140 countries and regions — for in-depth discussions on civilization, underscoring the importance of cultural diversity and cooperation in a world marked by turbulence and uncertainty.

At the forum, several Chinese speakers shared valuable insights on China's approaches to cultural heritage protection and the promotion of cultural exchanges.

I noticed a common point mentioned by all these Chinese experts: international exchange and cooperation have played a crucial role in the preservation and transmission of China’s cultural heritage. The reform and opening-up policy has been essential in advancing preservation techniques and helping the world better understand Chinese culture.

Today's newsletter highlights key perspectives from this important dialogue.

Topic: Major Challenges Facing China's Cultural Heritage Protection

Speaker: Liu Yuzhu, head of the China Foundation for Cultural Heritage Conservation

Key Insights:

China's cultural heritage protection faces several critical challenges, including insufficient social consensus, conflicts between economic development and heritage preservation, limited social participation, and the need for enhanced international cooperation. These challenges are not unique to China—I've observed that countries worldwide, with the possible exception of some European nations, face similar issues.

How can we address these challenges? First, we must actively engage society in understanding and protecting cultural heritage values, transforming people from bystanders into participants and guardians.

Second, governments must fulfill their primary responsibilities, particularly in establishing legal frameworks, institutional mechanisms, and public investment—areas where government action is irreplaceable.

Third, social participation remains insufficient in China. We need to learn from international best practices, especially from European countries, regarding legal frameworks, incentive policies, rights and obligations, and recognition systems. Given China's 5,000-year civilization and vast array of heritage sites, government efforts alone cannot ensure comprehensive protection—social engagement is indispensable. Finally, international cooperation has proven highly effective over the years, particularly in combating transnational cultural property crimes, artifact repatriation, archaeological research, and exhibitions.

Topic: Preserving Dunhuang's Cultural Heritage

Speaker: Su Bomin, dean of the Dunhuang Academy,

Key Insights:

The Dunhuang Academy's development has been inseparable from international cooperation. Through reform, opening up, and a favorable environment for global collaboration, we've enhanced our conservation techniques, broadened our perspectives, and adopted advanced international preservation concepts and practices, significantly improving Dunhuang's cultural heritage protection.

Furthermore, Dunhuang Studies has deepened cross-cultural exchanges between nations. Dunhuang culture itself represents a crystallization of multicultural exchange. As Professor Ji Xianlin noted, traces of all four major world civilizations can be found in Dunhuang, making it a concentrated hub of multicultural interaction. Through international exchanges, we've enabled people worldwide to gain deeper understanding of Dunhuang culture while benefiting from global perspectives in interpretation and analysis.

Currently, we have an American expert working with us, bringing valuable international perspectives. We've held "Dunhuang Culture Week" events in the United States twice in recent years. During these embassy-hosted events, American visitors were amazed by the vibrant colors and diverse imagery of Dunhuang murals. This reinforces our commitment to taking Dunhuang culture global and fostering greater cultural exchange.

Topic: Effective Cultural Transmission

Speaker: Wang Wei, Director of Henan Provincial Institute of Cultural Relics and Archaeology

Key Insights:

As an archaeologist with 43 years of experience, I initially focused on the origins and development of Chinese civilization before expanding internationally to excavate sites in Egypt, Honduras, and Uzbekistan. Chinese civilization's longevity stems from its continuous absorption of advanced foreign elements while maintaining innovation. For instance, wheat, cattle, sheep, and metallurgy came from West Asia, while China contributed silk, ceramics, jade, and millet cultivation techniques westward. Civilization exchange drives progress.

Through reform and opening up, Chinese archaeology and heritage protection have absorbed advanced methods from Europe and America, demonstrating the vital importance of exchange for civilization's existence and development. We're delighted to witness China's "museum boom" and growing public interest in traditional culture.

Effective cultural transmission requires: 1) Deepening research—studying both our own and other cultures for mutual understanding; 2) Strengthening protection; 3) Enhancing interpretation and promotion. Today's "archaeology fever" results from museums becoming more accessible. Twenty years ago, only archaeologists could understand museum displays; now exhibitions are more engaging and accessible. Good interpretation helps audiences appreciate our culture's rich connotations while maintaining interest. This applies internationally—whether through physical or virtual exhibitions, cultural artifacts should enable people of all nationalities to deeply understand their meaning and facilitate exchange, sharing our civilizational achievements globally.

Topic: Building a Sound Art Museum

Speaker: Qin Siyuan, Co-founder of the Sound Art Museum

Key Insights:

The Sound Art Museum represents a fascinating project that raises fundamental questions: What is a sound art museum? How do we display and exhibit sound? As the world's first institution to present sound through a museum format, we face unique challenges.

Traditional music requires physical structures for display and performance—ancient instruments like the guqin exemplify this. However, theoretically, we don't need such physical frameworks to perform music. In the 21st century, new musical presentation models have become commonplace.

When creating our sound museum, we first needed to construct the physical space, completed in Beijing in 2023. We exhibit both tangible music and people's sonic memories. Visitors can immerse themselves in Antarctic sounds, natural sounds including those unique to Xinjiang, southern Chinese silk and bamboo music, as well as sounds of science, art, society, and contemporary sound art—all presented in our Beijing facility.

We now aim to transcend musical limitations, exploring how digital technology and museums can present richer content to the public. Recently, we've partnered with two important Chinese organizations—the Institute of Zoology at the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the China Environmental United Association—on a collaborative project. We invite artists and professionals from various fields and countries to help create innovative projects in China, enabling unprecedented exploration and understanding of nature through digital technology, including new ways of sharing music and information.

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