This latest round of moves unfolded against a broader backdrop. Washington has also just released its latest National Security Strategy, which references Taiwan eight times—highlighting its strategic location and the importance of its semiconductor industry—while reiterating that the U.S. “does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.”

In response, China’s State Council Taiwan Affairs Office urged the U.S. to honor the serious political commitments made by its leaders, exercise extreme caution on the Taiwan question, stop emboldening “Taiwan independence” forces, and refrain from sending any further misleading signals.

For many in China, these moves reinforce a familiar but unsettling perception: that the current U.S. administration does not fully grasp—or does not sufficiently weigh—how central the Taiwan question is to China’s core interests and to the overall trajectory of China–U.S. relations. At the same time, there is growing curiosity, including among international readers, about how Chinese scholars themselves interpret Washington’s latest actions.

To explore that question, we spoke with several Chinese experts. Their perspectives range from how people on the mainland refer to Taiwan people and what that language reveals about cross-Strait relations, to the historical logic of “national unification” in Chinese political thought; from why Taiwan is widely seen as Beijing’s clearest red line, to how reunification—if and when it happens—would shape China–U.S. relations, Taiwan’s own future, and the broader Asia-Pacific landscape.

As always, the views below reflect those of the individual scholars, not any institution.

1. Why the mainland refers to Taiwan residents as “compatriots,” and what the term signals about the future of cross-Strait relations.
In Chinese political discourse, residents of Taiwan are commonly referred to as “tongbao” (同胞), a word often translated as “compatriots.” Standard Chinese dictionaries typically define “tongbao” in two ways: as people “born of the same parents,” and more broadly as “members of the same nation or ethnicity.” Usage examples frequently include “Taiwan compatriots” as well as “compatriots from Hong Kong and Macao.”

熊晓煜 Xiong Xiaoyu, the deputy director of the Institute of Taiwan Studies at Wuhan University: “Tongbao” carries a strong emotional resonance that is difficult to capture fully in English. The term reflects a deeply rooted sense of shared identity rather than a purely legal or political designation.

Beyond its historical and emotional dimensions, the term “tongbao” also carries implications for the future of cross-Strait relations. It reflects an understanding of the Chinese state as one whose people inherently include Taiwan residents. In this view, territory long inhabited by compatriots is considered an inseparable part of the nation, and reunification is therefore regarded as a domestic affair, not one subject to foreign intervention.
At the same time, the term conveys an expectation of restraint. By framing both sides of the Strait as kin, it implies that reunification should be pursued in a way that minimizes harm and emphasizes shared bonds rather than confrontation.

彭韬 Peng Tao, deputy director of the Center for East Asia and Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao Studies at Wuhan-based Central China Normal University: “Tongbao” is both a present identity and a forward-looking declaration. It signals the Chinese government’s confidence and resolve to resolve the Taiwan question and complete the process of national reunification. For the Communist Party of China, reunification has long been framed as an unshakable historical mission—one that continues to shape policy and rhetoric today.

2. Why “the maintenance of national unity” is important?

From the perspective of many Chinese historians, China’s civilization—spanning more than 5,000 years—has been shaped by a persistent commitment to what is known as “da yi tong,” (大一统) or “the maintenance of national unity.”

邢广程 Xing Guangcheng, an academician at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and a specialist in borderland and regional studies: “The maintenance of national unity” became a guiding principle of governance during the Qin (221–206 BCE) and Han (206 BCE–220 CE) dynasties and has been upheld by successive Chinese governments ever since. Each regarded national unity as a paramount political ideal. The Qing dynasty (1644–1911), in particular, brought this tradition to its apex, consolidating a vast, multi-ethnic realm and laying the groundwork for a modern sovereign state.

Although China’s history has alternated between periods of unity and division, the broader historical trajectory has consistently favored reunification. This continuity is often summarized in a widely cited formulation: “The territory cannot be divided, the nation cannot fall into chaos, the ethnic groups cannot be dispersed, and the civilization cannot be interrupted.”

熊晓煜 Xiong Xiaoyu: From Beijing’s perspective, national reunification thus occupies the very core of China’s core interests. On an emotional level, Taiwan is widely seen on the mainland as the last unresolved legacy of China’s modern-era humiliations, giving the issue a powerful resonance in popular sentiment.

3. Why Beijing draws a red line against any attempt to separate Taiwan
彭韬 Peng Tao: Opposition to “Taiwan independence” is grounded in principles that Beijing argues are consistent with international law. Safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity is widely recognized as a fundamental right of states. On this basis, China maintains that opposing separatist activities and pursuing reunification constitute a legitimate exercise of sovereignty. This position is understood—and in practice accepted—by the majority of sovereign states, which adhere to the one-China principle in their diplomatic relations.

In addition, reunification would contribute to regional stability. A prolonged stalemate increases the risk that separatist moves or external interference could trigger military confrontation, with potentially severe consequences for the Asia-Pacific.

In an era when economic and trade issues are increasingly framed through a security lens, resolving the Taiwan question would help remove a major source of uncertainty, facilitating smoother regional and global economic cooperation.

China’s pursuit of complete reunification and “Making America Great Again” are not mutually exclusive.

4. What would the United States gain from supporting China’s reunification?
Some Chinese scholars argue that Washington’s support for peaceful cross-Strait reunification would align with China’s interests and would not necessarily undermine those of the United States.
祝捷 Zhu Jie, a professor at Wuhan University Law School and executive director of its Center for Legal Studies on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao: Under a “one country, two systems” framework, Taiwan would retain a high degree of autonomy and space for industrial development after reunification. That arrangement, in turn, could open new avenues for U.S.-China engagement, enabling deeper integration of supply chains linking the Chinese mainland, Taiwan and the United States. Such integration would help anchor peace in the Asia-Pacific and deliver benefits not only to both sides of the Strait, but also to Washington and the broader international community.

王英津 Wang Yingjin, director of the Research Center for Cross-Strait Relations at Renmin University of China in Beijing: A peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question could help stabilize Sino-American relations while allowing the United States to benefit more fully from China’s vast and still-expanding market.

5. Reunification, national rejuvenation, and “Making America Great Again”
张云 Zhang Yun, a professor of international relations at Nanjing University: China’s pursuit of reunification and national rejuvenation need not conflict with America’s aspiration to “Make America Great Again.” China’s complete reunification is a natural outcome of its modernization process and a necessary condition for lasting regional stability. It would also inject fresh momentum into Asia-Pacific economic integration.
Resolving the Taiwan question within the framework of Sino-American relations would relieve the United States of an unnecessary strategic burden and a source of escalating risk. A fully reunified China would not pose a threat to U.S. security. An America seeking renewed strength can ill afford another cold war—or worse, a hot one. Mutual success and shared prosperity should form the foundation of a sound strategic understanding between the world’s two largest powers.

6. Implications for Taiwan, the Asia-Pacific, and global prosperity
彭韬 Peng Tao: China’s reunification would decisively eliminate the instability associated with “Taiwan independence” and allow Taiwan compatriots to share more fully in the dividends of national development. Peaceful reunification under a “one country, two systems” framework would establish a new foundation for China’s long-term development and national rejuvenation, while creating broad opportunities for Taiwan’s social and economic progress and delivering tangible benefits to its residents.
王英津 Wang Yingjin: Reunification would bring concrete developmental advantages supported by the mainland. Beyond Taiwan, China’s complete reunification would have wider implications: expanded markets, deeper regional integration, and shared prosperity across the Asia-Pacific—benefits that would ultimately extend to the global economy.

(Li Hanfang also contributed to this piece)

The commentaries are titled:“The Origin and Nature of the Taiwan Question” (台湾问题的由来和性质), “The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Reunification” (两岸关系发展和统一利好), and “National Reunification Is Inevitable and Unstoppable” (祖国必然统一势不可挡)

Some seasoned overseas China-watchers noted that, based on naming conventions commonly used in the articles published by China’s central news organizations, “Zhongtaiwen” is almost certainly a collective pen name rather than an individual author. The name likely indicates commentary associated with agencies or institutions responsible for Taiwan-related affairs.

Xinhua later published an English-language piece on Tuesday summarizing these three commentaries, and said “Xinhua News Agency was entrusted to publish” them—but without explaining the meaning of “Zhongtaiwen.”

During those three days, some overseas China-watchers and several friends asked me the same question:

What is the purpose of these articles, especially when they clearly emphasize the theme of “reunification”?

From my reading, four points stand out:

1. The articles are consistent with the message conveyed at Saturday’s gathering.

At the commemorative meeting, China’s top political advisor Wang Huning said that after peaceful reunification, with the support of a strong motherland, Taiwan will enjoy better economic development, stronger energy and resource security, improved infrastructure, enhanced security, broader external exchanges, better livelihoods for its people, and a more vibrant cultural and spiritual life. 和平统一之后，有强大祖国做后盾，台湾经济发展会更好、能源资源保障会更好、基础设施建设会更好、安全保障会更好、对外交往会更好，台湾同胞民生福祉会更好、精神文化生活会更好。

Addressing about 500 attendees, Wang, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference National Committee, called on people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to work together to advance national reunification, and to leave no room for “Taiwan independence” separatist activities in any form.

2. The emphasis on reunification is not entirely new — it reflects themes already present in recent top-level documents.

“Promoting national reunification” is already written into the report to the 20th CPC National Congress in 2022, as a guiding policy direction. In the full text of the newly released Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, the Taiwan-related section once again highlights 推进祖国统一大业 (“advancing the cause of national reunification”).

Seen through this lens, the purpose of the commentaries is consistent and expected:

• to explain the historical and political logic of the Taiwan question

• to outline the governance framework envisioned after reunification,

• and to convey Beijing’s confidence and determination that reunification is inevitable.

3. The commentaries offer clues about what Beijing envisions after reunification

Below are several excerpts I found noteworthy, with my interpretation.

我们追求的国家统一，不仅是形式上的统一，更重要的是两岸同胞的心灵契合。

Our goal is not only an institutional reunification but also unity between hearts of people across the Strait.

(from Article 2: The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Reunification” )

This suggests Beijing is emphasizing emotional and social integration, not just administrative control. Implicitly, reunification without mutual trust could lead to new tensions.

两岸在文化教育、医疗卫生、社会保障等民生领域可以实现资源同享，长期困扰台湾同胞的民生难题，可以得到根本性解决。

Resources in education, healthcare and social security can be shared across the Strait after reunification, thereby addressing long-standing livelihood challenges.

(from Article 2: The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Reunification” )

This indicates that Beijing believes it understands Taiwan’s socioeconomic issues and is positioning reunification as a solution provider. Understanding must come before solving.

…… 私人财产、宗教信仰、合法权益将得到充分保障，爱台爱乡的感情将得到充分照顾。

…… Personal property, religious beliefs and the legal rights and interests of local people will be fully protected in Taiwan, while their connections to the island’s traditions and heritage will be valued.

(from Article 2: The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Reunification” )

Religions widely practiced in Taiwan—Chinese folk religion or traditional religion (folk Taoism + ancestral worship), Buddhism, Taoism, and related Chinese cultural beliefs—already align with mainland traditions, so Beijing does not appear to view religion as a major post-reunification challenge.

经中国中央政府批准，外国可以在台湾设立领事机构或其他官方、半官方机构，国际组织和机构可以在台湾设立办事机构，有关国际公约可以在台湾适用，有关国际会议可以在台湾举办。

(After reunification) With approval from the central government, foreign countries could set up consulates and other official or semi-official institutions in Taiwan, and international organizations will have offices in Taiwan. In addition, international agreements could be applied in Taiwan and international events held there.

(from Article 2: The Development of Cross-Strait Relations and the Benefits of Reunification” )

This suggests that a post-reunification Taiwan could, in theory, host major international events — for example, APEC or Shanghai Cooperation Organization summits.

4. The articles underline that Beijing sees reunification as inevitable

统一不是一种选择，而是一种必然。

Reunification is not a matter of choice, but an inevitability.

...... 决定两岸关系走向的关键因素是祖国大陆的发展进步。...... 中华民族一定是强必统，统更强。从两岸实力对比和国际格局演变趋势看，只会对支持统一的正义一方越来越有利。

The key factor determining the direction of cross-Strait relations is the development and progress of the mainland. ...... A strong nation must be unified; reunification will further strengthen the nation. Given the shifting cross-Strait balance of strength and global dynamics, situation will only become increasingly favorable for the just cause of supporting reunification.

(from Article 3: “National Reunification Is Inevitable and Unstoppable” ）

While some observers argue that “time is not on Beijing’s side,” the commentaries express the opposite view: the stronger China becomes (economically, technologically, socially), the more favorable the environment for reunification. In other words, China’s attractiveness and influence—including innovation, lifestyle and development—are viewed as important drivers, not just hard power.

Final thought

These commentaries reveal not only Beijing’s messaging about why reunification will happen, but also how it imagines governing Taiwan afterward. Regardless of one’s position, they offer rare insight into Beijing’s internal framing of the issue.

Hello and welcome to the "Big Argument" column, a distinctive commentary column in our newsletter that diverges from traditional Western narratives and perspectives. It focuses on hot-button issues that have yet to fully reflect the Chinese stance and perspective. Some notable pieces of the column, which are also among the most engaging articles in the history of this newsletter include Three key takeaways from latest Taiwan Strait military drills and Stabilizing U.S.-China relations: Trump can do it, if drawing lessons from past.

You might find that some views in the article differ from the typical Western perspectives, but I believe understanding different viewpoints might be one of the reasons some of you subscribe to this newsletter.

This year marks the 80th anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II and of the Chinese nation's triumph in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. The victory carries extraordinary significance for the entire Chinese nation, as it was the first major victory China had achieved in a war of resistance against foreign aggression since the 19th century.

However, this victory of justice over evil and fairness over power has nevertheless been met with misguided questioning over facts, including Taiwan's restoration to China, a victorious outcome of WWII, and it was an integral part of the postwar international order.

On August 15, the anniversary of Japan's announcement of unconditional surrender 80 years ago, Taiwan leader Lai Ching-te publicly referred to it with the neutral phrase "end of the war," the same wording used by Japan, which seeks to whitewash its past aggression and ultimate defeat.

Lai's remarks blurred the fundamental line between justice and evil, between the victors and the defeated. In doing so, he has betrayed the Chinese nation that made immense sacrifices to end Japanese aggression.

This reveals a fundamental issue confronting the Chinese nation: the distortion of Taiwan's identity and status, which has shaped perceptions of both historical and current matters. This is known as the "Taiwan question."

To grasp why Taiwan has come to be seen as a "question," one must understand that, in the final stage of World War II, a series of documents of international law required Japan to return Taiwan to China. After winning the war in 1945, China had already restored its sovereignty over Taiwan. This was a consensus among the Allies, but Cold War divisions and geopolitics in recent years have obscured that reality for some—and even led to its outright denial.

1945: Taiwan comes home

In 1895, following its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Qing Dynasty government was forced to cede Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan. However, people across the Taiwan Strait never stopped fighting to reclaim the island, carrying out successive waves of armed and unarmed resistance against Japanese occupation in and outside Taiwan.

But Japan's ambition extended far beyond Taiwan. In 1931, it invaded and occupied China's northeastern region, and six years later launched the full-scale war of aggression in the country. During the war of resistance, over 50,000 people in Taiwan went across the Strait to fight Japanese invaders. They held the belief that "to save Taiwan, one must first save the motherland."

Between 1895 and 1945, more than 600,000 Taiwan people died resisting Japanese rule, a powerful proof that the people of Taiwan, as an integral part of the Chinese nation, stood shoulder to shoulder with their compatriots on the mainland in the nation's darkest hour.

The dawn broke as the Allies joined forces to crush the Axis powers. In 1943, leaders of China, the United States and the United Kingdom met in Egypt, and stated in the Cairo Declaration that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria (Northeast China), Formosa (Taiwan), and The Pescadores (Penghu Islands), shall be restored to the Republic of China."

Chiang Kai-shek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill met at the Cairo Conference in Cairo, 25 November 1943.

The three Allied nations reaffirmed this term in their 1945 Potsdam Proclamation, which was endorsed by the Soviet Union shortly after, and accepted by Japan upon its surrender.

On Oct. 25, 1945, the Chinese government announced that it was resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan, and a ceremony to accept Japan's surrender in the Taiwan Province of the China war theater of the Allied Powers was held in Taipei. Days earlier, Chinese servicemen landed at the Port of Keelung. Their arrival was welcomed by millions of people across Taiwan.

Since then, China has recovered Taiwan, both de jure and de facto.

In September 1946, prominent figures from Taiwan, led by Lin Hsien-tang, traveled to the mainland to pay homage at the mausoleum of the Yellow Emperor, revered as the common ancestor of the Chinese nation.

This act proclaimed Taiwan's return to the big family of China, with Taiwan compatriots once again standing tall as proud Chinese.

That year, civil war broke out. After their defeat, the remnants of the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT) fled to Taiwan and entrenched themselves there. Across the Strait, on Oct. 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was founded.

The KMT regime had been overthrown, and the ROC was succeeded by the PRC, so that the Central People's Government in Beijing became the only legitimate government of all whole China. The process only involved the succession of the government, not the succession of the state. Thus, the PRC inherited the ROC's political power, its territory, and its international legal status. From the ROC to the PRC, the subject of international law -- China as a STATE -- did not change.

As a natural result, the PRC government enjoys and exercises China's full sovereignty, which includes its sovereignty over Taiwan, and Taiwan remains a part of its territory.

From clarity to contrived ambiguity

China's sovereignty over Taiwan ought to be an indisputable matter -- and was for years after 1949, had geopolitics not come into play.

The retreat of Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT remnants to Taiwan led to decades of confrontation across the Taiwan Strait. The 1950s saw repeated clashes across the Strait.

Even though the KMT claimed its regime -- rather than the central government in Beijing -- was the sole legal government representing China, both sides of the Strait recognized Taiwan as part of the Chinese territory.

To this day, no peace agreement or armistice has ever been signed between the two sides. The Chinese civil war that broke out in the 1940s has, in essence, not reached a definitive conclusion. The absence of such a formal arrangement has left the Strait in a special state of protracted political confrontation. This has been exploited by certain countries outside the region as a tool against China.

During the Korean War, or China's War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (1950-1953), the United States dramatically re-calibrated its strategic calculus and upgraded Taiwan's geopolitical value. In June 1950, shortly after the war broke out, U.S. President Harry Truman sent the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait and declared that the island's future must await "a peace settlement or UN consideration."

The phrase "status undetermined," an invention tailored by the United States and its allies to Cold War needs, laid the groundwork for the legal ambiguity that would soon follow.

The main prop was the so-called San Francisco Peace Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Peace with Japan, produced in September 1951. Drafted without the PRC, the sole legal government of China since 1949, the treaty recorded Japan's renunciation of Taiwan, yet named no recipient deliberately.

The fact that the treaty was drafted and signed behind China's back was a blatant breach of postwar legal norms. As per the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent. In other words, a treaty signed without China's involvement has no authority to determine the future of Chinese territory.

Notably, the KMT was not invited to the San Francisco conference either.

In addition, as a major Allied Power that joined the war against Japan in 1945, the Soviet Union did not sign the treaty. While they participated in the conference, their delegation strongly opposed the treaty's terms.

On Oct. 25, 1971, the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) explicitly rejected proposals for "Two Chinas" and "Taiwan self-determination." The UNGA Resolution 2758 was adopted with an overwhelming majority, expelling the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek, i.e., the representatives of the KMT regime in Taiwan, from the place which they unlawfully occupied at the United Nations and restoring all its rights to the PRC.

The resolution was unequivocal: the two words, "RESTORE" and "OCCUPY," meant that the UN recognized that the PRC succeeded the ROC as the sole representative of all China since 1949. Thus, the seat of China in the United Nations has always represented the entirety of China, including Taiwan.

On the day of the vote on Resolution 2758, Chiang Kai-shek's representative also acknowledged in a statement that other countries "have stressed the fact that Taiwan is Chinese territory," "on this I cannot agree more..." and "the people of Taiwan are Chinese in terms of race, history and culture."

The "undetermined status" thesis, born of Cold War maneuvering, had no legitimacy except in the narrative of Taiwan secessionists.

Eighty years on: Why the record matters

The Taiwan question sits at the core of China's core national interests, and the one-China principle is the political foundation and a fundamental premise upheld by the People's Republic of China when establishing diplomatic relations with other countries.

The most important content of this principle is that there is only one China in the world, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory.

As China has established diplomatic ties with over 180 countries in the world, the one-China principle has become the widely recognized consensus of the international community.

However, China's continued rise has caused unease among some Western nations still clinging to a Cold War mentality, leading their policies toward China to increasingly favor containment over engagement. Thus, the Taiwan issue has become a strategic leverage point for counterbalancing China.

In particular, the United States deliberately maintains ambiguity on the Taiwan question -- the so-called "strategic ambiguity" -- seeking to constrain China politically, economically, and militarily.

In recent years, from massive arms deals to high-profile visits to Taiwan by politicians such as Nancy Pelosi, as well as repeated "stopovers" by Taiwan leaders, the United States has been hollowing out the one-China principle, sending wrong signals to secessionists on the island and blurring that principle in the eyes of the world.

On the other hand, with drastic changes in Taiwan's political landscape since the late 1980s, the secessionists, especially the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), seized the chance to push ahead with their independence agenda. One major campaign is to rewrite the history of Taiwan, including its restoration to China in 1945. It also refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus, which embodies the one-China principle.

Oct. 25 was a public holiday in Taiwan to celebrate its restoration to China until it was canceled in 2001 by the DPP authorities. Since the DPP took office again in 2016, the authorities have halted commemorative activities, leading to a gradual fading of public memory -- particularly among Taiwan's younger generation.

While the United States and Taiwan's secessionist-minded authorities repeatedly tampered with the historical narrative of Taiwan's restoration to China, Beijing has upheld the facts with consistency and clarity.

China will hold activities around Oct. 25 to mark the 80th anniversary of Taiwan's restoration to China from Japanese occupation, as part of the events for the 80th anniversary of the victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.

The anniversary is more than commemoration. It is a reminder that the Taiwan question arose when the Chinese nation was weak and divided, and it will be resolved when the Chinese nation's rejuvenation is complete.

Remembering China's victory in 1945 affirms that whatever turbulence arises in Taiwan's political landscape, and whatever meddling comes from outside, China's reunification remains certain. It is an essential part of national rejuvenation.

The only question that remains is how.

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Hello and welcome to the "Big Argument" column, a distinctive commentary column in our newsletter that diverges from traditional Western narratives and perspectives. It focuses on hot-button issues that have yet to fully reflect the Chinese stance and perspective. Some notable pieces of the column, which are also among the most engaging articles in the history of this newsletter include Three key takeaways from latest Taiwan Strait military drills and Stabilizing U.S.-China relations: Trump can do it, if drawing lessons from past.

You might find that some views in the article differ from the typical Western perspectives, but I believe understanding different viewpoints might be one of the reasons some of you subscribe to this newsletter.

Today’s article is co-authored by Ren Ke, Cheng Zhuo, Yue Xitong, and Zhao Bo, all of whom have previously worked as journalists in Taiwan. The piece examines UNGA Resolution 2758 and Taiwan's status under international law.

How has the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758 addressed the Taiwan question without mentioning the renegade province, and established the one-China principle under international law?

Topic of the Taiwan question, which is at the core of China's core interests, has gained greater prominence as Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities have pushed further toward "Taiwan independence" since Lai Ching-te took office a year ago. Lai has promoted a "new two-state theory" centered on the notion of "non-subordination," claiming that "the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are not subordinate to each other," and asserting that "Taiwan has never been part of the People's Republic of China (PRC)." He has even labeled the Chinese mainland as a "foreign hostile force."

Furthermore, the DPP authorities are now attempting to undermine the historical significance of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758—the legitimate historical document that affirmed the one-China principle. They claim that "China is distorting the meaning of the resolution," arguing that the resolution did not specifically mention Taiwan.

On October 25, 1971, the 26th session of the United Nations General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted Resolution 2758, titled Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. This resolution restored the seat and representation of China at the UN to the government of the People's Republic of China, while expelling the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Kuomintang (KMT) Party and the former nationalist government in Nanjing who had retreated to Taiwan after losing the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949) against the Communist Party of China (CPC) but continued to claim authority under the name "Republic of China" (ROC).

UNGA Resolution 2758 is the central topic of our discussion. It holds significant importance, yet narratives contradicting the resolution's original spirit have gained traction. Some politicians in the United States, the European Union, and Japan have been using these arguments as part of anti-China propaganda. The most recent example is the passage of the so-called "Taiwan International Solidarity Act" by the U.S. House of Representatives in early May 2025. This act "clarifies" that Resolution 2758 does not prevent the U.S. from using its vote, voice, and influence to counter efforts to marginalize Taiwan on the global stage.

These interpretations rely on biased "research" driven by political motives, such as a report from the German Marshall Fund (GMF). Supported by Taiwan's "Ministry of Foreign Affairs" and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the U.S. (TECRO), authors Jacques deLisle and Bonnie S. Glaser accused China of "distorting UNGA2758." They claimed that the resolution does not mention Taiwan or clarify that Taiwan is part of China, arguing that "the resolution does not contain the words 'Taiwan' or 'Republic of China.'" They also denied that the resolution affirms China's one-China principle.

Original text of UNGA Resolution 2758 , United Nations Digital Library

Indeed, UNGA Resolution 2758 does not mention Taiwan, but it is all about Taiwan and its status under international law. It does not need to name it, and the text of the resolution has its considerations. A deeper study of this document reveals that its significance goes far beyond the surface of its text.

The issue is related to three key questions:

1. Why is Taiwan not mentioned in UNGA Resolution 2758?

2. What are the relations among China, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC)?

3. What is Taiwan's real status under international law?

In a bid to answer these questions, we have studied relevant essays by some leading scholars on international law and Taiwan question in China and also interviewed them, including Rao Geping (饶戈平), professor at the prestigious Peking University; Chen Guiqing (陈桂清), a seasoned expert at the Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Yang Zewei (杨泽伟), Luojia Distinguished Professor at Wuhan University School of Law; and Wang Yingjin (王英津), Professor of the Department of Political Science, School of International Relations, Beijing-based Renmin University of China (RUC) and Director of the Research Center for Cross-Strait Relations in RUC.

Chinese scholars argue that the resolution’s core significance lies in three key questions. By analyzing these questions, one can fully understand why the Resolution affirms the one-China principle—recognizing Taiwan as an inalienable part of China—even though the resolution does not explicitly mention the province, which is currently controlled by a separatist local regime.

The original Chinese text of UNGA Resolution 2758, United Nations Digital Library

Why is Taiwan not mentioned?

One of the key arguments made by those opposing China's position on UNGA Resolution 2758 centers on the absence of any direct reference to Taiwan in the resolution's text. Instead, it refers to "the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek." On this basis, some separatist voices claim that the resolution has no bearing on Taiwan's status or its relationship with the PRC.

"There was simply no need to mention it," said Chen Guiqing. He explained that the resolution's carefully worded language reflects the United Nations' consistent position—that it has never recognized representatives sent in the name of Taiwan, nor will it accept Taiwan as a separate member or allow it to obtain an additional seat at the UN.

Prior to the resolution's adoption, there was already broad international consensus that Taiwan is a part of China (a point we will elaborate on later). It was on the basis of this historical fact and global consensus that the UN General Assembly decided to restore China's lawful seat to the People's Republic of China.

Chen said the resolution was aimed at determining "who represents China at the UN" rather than "adding a UN seat." Now that Taiwan is a part of China, just like Guangdong, Fujian, or any other provinces of China, there is obviously no need to spell out a particular Chinese province in the UN document.

It is also worth noting that many in China — including experts, officials, and diplomats — point out that although the People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949, the Chinese Civil War has not officially concluded, as the Kuomintang (KMT) retreated to Taiwan. As a result, national reunification remains incomplete, and Taiwan is viewed as a renegade province defying the authority of the central government in Beijing.

Rao Geping believed that UNGA Resolution 2758 is closely bound up with the question of Taiwan's status. Though it tactically avoided mentioning Taiwan, it explicitly mentioned Chiang Kai-shek by name, which was the political symbol of a renegade regime unlawfully occupying Taiwan under the name of the ROC. Thus, by mentioning Chiang Kai-shek, the resolution was actually referring to the self-proclaimed authorities in Taiwan, with the aim to settle the issue of the relations between the UN and Taiwan.

UNGA Resolution 2758 expelled the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek, who was head of the former ROC government, which was no longer qualified to represent China, instead of the representatives of Taiwan. Therefore, Taiwan has never been represented as a "state" in the UN; it has always been a part of China and is covered by China in terms of international law. The resolution is thus consistent with a historical fact that Taiwan has been part of China's territory, and has never been an independent country. There is no room for the name "Taiwan" to appear in a United Nations document as a member state.

Chen Guiqing argued that it is particularly noteworthy that the Chiang Kai-shek regime at that moment also viewed itself as representative of China, the ROC to be specific, including Taiwan and the Chinese mainland, rather than Taiwan only. On the day the UN General Assembly voted on the resolution, Chiang Kai-shek's representatives in the UN reiterated their agreement to Taiwan's belonging to China.

The Chiang Kai-shek regime never rejected the one-China principle. Even remnants of the Chinese Kuomintang Party retreated to Taiwan in 1949 following a failure in the civil war, the Chiang Kai-shek regime was opposed to splitting Taiwan from China, and the rhetoric of "two Chinas." Its political divergence with Beijing only lies in who represents the whole of China, or who is the only legitimate central government of China.

The historical facts also showed that the so-called "Taiwan independence" has never been an issue until in recent decades as the authorities in Taiwan are trying to go further on the road seeking separatism, a dangerous move trying to change the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, which is supported by the United States and some Western countries in many ways, including the GMF report.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) occupied the Presidential Palace in Nanjing. April, 1949.

What are the relations among China, the PRC and the ROC?

UNGA Resolution 2758 does not name Taiwan, or the ROC. However, this leaves no ambiguity or room for misinterpretation. Instead, it shows that the UN followed the precondition for the adoption of the resolution -- one-China principle and Taiwan is part of China.

To properly understand the issue, it is crucial to clearly define the relationship between China, the PRC, and the ROC. This relationship lies at the heart of the Taiwan question — a topic that confuses many and is intentionally misrepresented by some to advance "Taiwan independence" and to strategically contain China's rise. Many advocates of "Taiwan independence," including Lai Ching-te himself, have claimed that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are "not affiliated with each other" — a narrative that stems from a distorted interpretation of this fundamental issue.

The name of a state is consistent, continuous, and stable, whereas the state title changes with the succession of governments. Following the collapse of the communist rule in Eastern Europe in 1989, the Polish People's Republic became the Republic of Poland, and the Socialist Republic of Romania was renamed the Republic of Romania. These were changes in regime and state titles, but the states themselves—Poland and Romania—remained the same. The subjects of international law did not change, and the new regimes inherited the international legal status of their predecessors.

In the case of China, "China" is the state name, while the "Republic of China (ROC)" and the "People's Republic of China (PRC)" are the state titles China has during different historical periods. From the ROC to the PRC, the subject of international law did not change, neither the state of China.

From the perspective of a specific historical period, a state's name and its official designation are inseparable and constitute a singular identity. Therefore, currently, the PRC and China share the identity.

The ROC was established in 1912 following the 1911 Revolution that toppled the Qing Dynasty. From 1927, the Kuomintang (KMT), or the nationalists, reunified the country and ruled it as a one-party state. In 1949, the KMT-led government was defeated in the Chinese civil war by the CPC and retreated to Taiwan. The PRC was established in the same year.

Here comes the core dispute between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan: the KMT and following authorities in Taiwan continued to call themselves "the ROC," yet they have remained faithful to the "Constitution of the ROC," which stipulates that both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan belong to one China. They believed that the ROC continued to exist after the 1949 defeat.

Both Wang Yingjin and Rao Geping argued that the principle of effectiveness, which is generally followed in modern international law practice, should be applied to judge this issue. The principle holds that a regime within a country can be recognized as the legitimate and effective central government as long as it controls the vast majority of the country's territory, exercises stable and effective governance over a considerable period of time, and gains the recognition of the overwhelming majority of the population within its controlled areas, even without completely overthrowing the former regime or occupying the entire national territory.

Hence, the ROC had been overthrown and the PRC inherited the ROC's political power, its territory, and its international legal status. Although Chiang Kai-shek's remnants continued to use the name of "ROC," they had essentially become a local rebel force of China and lost their qualification to represent China. The name of "ROC" was no longer the name of China as a subject under international law, but merely a term of the past.

This argument was also endorsed by UNGA Resolution 2758 in an ingenious way. Since the PRC replaced the ROC in 1949 according to the principle of effectiveness, the PRC government has become the sole legitimate representative of China. However, due to the Cold War and the U.S. Intervention, the PRC's place in the UN had been unlawfully occupied from 1949 to 1971.

UNGA Resolution 2758 decides to "RESTORE," rather than recognize, all its rights to the PRC and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate representatives of China to the UN, which means that the UN endorsed the regime change in China from the ROC to the PRC.

Thus, Chen Guiqing regards the Resolution as "the UN version of the one-China principle." The Resolution can be seen as an authoritative affirmation for the fact that "Taiwan belongs to China."

As Rao Geping has noted, the reason why the United Nations tolerated the representation of China by the Chiang Kai-shek regime for over 20 years was that it claimed itself, and was deemed by some others, as the representative of China and believed that Taiwan belongs to China. The seat it occupied in the UN was not other's, but China's. This fact testifies from another perspective that the UN only recognizes one China, with Taiwan being treated as part of China.

Chinese representative's seats in the 26th UN General Assembly, New York, Oct. 25, 1971. The photo was taken immediately after UNGA Resolution 2758 was adopted and the PRC's rights in the UN were restored. On the left is Qiao Guanhua, Chinese vice foreign minister, and Huang Hua, China's permanent representative to the UN, on the right.

What is Taiwan's status under international law?

Let us introduce the official stance of the PRC first and then explain why this stance is correct per international law and historical documents.

The official description of the one-China principle is that there is but one China in the world, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China, and the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.

Many officials, spokespersons and diplomats talked about Taiwan's status under international law. At a press conference on March 7, 2025, Wang Yi, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Chinese Foreign Minister, responded to the narrative questioning UNGA Resolution 2758. He said the only reference to the Taiwan region in the UN is "Taiwan, Province of China." Taiwan is never a country, not in the past, and never in the future.

In December 2024, Zhu Fenglian, spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, said at a press conference that Taiwan has no international legal status other than being a part of China.

Prof. Yang Zewei from Wuhan University noted that such stance has also been endorsed in Resolution 2758, and the resolution has developed into customary international law, receiving recognition and support from over 180 countries worldwide.

According to Yang, a faithful interpretation of the essence of the resolution can help us understand the issue of Taiwan's status under international law.

Yang said the legal implications of UNGA resolutions should be interpreted following relevant rules of international law, including the general rule regarding treaty interpretation in Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

China, as a party to the Resolution 2758, has the right to interpret the resolution. Its interpretation constitutes an official interpretation, and is also deemed an "authentic interpretation."

Also, the document should be interpreted "in good faith" and "in the light of its object and purpose," which includes the United Nations' purposes and principles, such as those regarding maintaining international peace and security and non-interference in internal affairs.

The interpretation should also consider relevant history. For UNGA Resolution 2758, important historical materials concerning Taiwan should be taken into account: Taiwan's return to China is an important part of the outcomes of the victory in World War II and the postwar international order. The Cairo Declaration issued by China, the United States and the United Kingdom in end of November 1943, stated that it was the purpose of the three allies that all the territories Japan had stolen from China, "such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." (Manchuria is Northeast China, Formosa is Taiwan Island, and the Pescadores is Penghu Islands.) Such statements can also prove that Taiwan is part of China. Later in July 1945, China (ROC), the United States and the UK issued the Potsdam Declaration, saying that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out..."

Prof. Rao also noted that on October 25, 1945, then government of China (ROC) accepted Japan's surrender and announced that it was resuming the exercise of sovereignty over Taiwan. From that point forward, China had recovered Taiwan as part of its territory, de jure and de facto.

Yang further pointed out that after the resolution, the vast majority of UN member states adopted a position consistent with the resolution by recognizing the PRC government as the sole legitimate government representing China, establishing diplomatic relations with it on such basis, and cutting off their diplomatic ties with the authorities in Taiwan or refusing to engage in official contacts with them.

Also, UN agencies made corresponding actions based on the one-China principle as reflected in resolution, and they show a firm belief in practice that adhering to this resolution is a legal obligation, and resolutely resist and clearly oppose actions that violate or may violate the resolution.

According to Yang, such practices are widespread and consistent and constitute an acceptance of that practice as law (opinio juris), meeting the criteria for the formation of a rule of customary international law.

The exercises focus on subjects of identification and verification, warning and expulsion, and interception and detention to test the troops' capabilities of area regulation and control, joint blockade and control, and precision strikes on key targets, according to Senior Colonel Shi Yi, spokesperson for the theater command.

The Shandong aircraft carrier task group was deployed to simulate strikes on ground and maritime targets in areas to the east of Taiwan Island, said Shi.

The picture shows aircraft carrier Shandong berths at a naval port in Sanya. China's first domestically-made aircraft carrier Shandong (Hull 17) was officially commissioned to the PLA Navy at a military port in Sanya, South China's Hainan Province, on the afternoon of December 17, 2019, making China one of the few countries in the world that have multiple carriers. Photo: China Military

The PLA Eastern Theater Command started to conduct joint exercises around Taiwan Island on Tuesday. Many people have been wondering: Why did the PLA’s exercises begin on Tuesday, but the codename wasn’t announced until Wednesday? According to Yuyuan Tantian, a social media account affiliated with China Media Group, the "Strait Thunder-2025A" drill actually refers only to Wednesday’s exercise -- Tuesday’s one was not part of it.

Fu Zhengnan, an expert at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, explained to Yuyuna Tantian that the fact that Tuesday's drills had no codename, while Wednesday’s were given one, reveals a key message behind the PLA’s operations -- adaptability. This demonstrates that the PLA can flexibly adjust, dynamically update, and precisely control its combat plans at any time based on battlefield needs.

“兵无常势、水无常形。”

"There are no fixed tactics in war, just as water has no constant form."

"Some claim the PLA is playing its cards "face-up," but when the time comes to act, the other side won’t know which card we’ll play -- or when, or whether it might change mid-course. A move could come at midnight, in broad daylight, or even involve a hidden card. At any moment, we can launch a decisive strike against 'Taiwan independence' separatists in ways, at times, and in places they least expect, " said Fu.

Fu Zhengnan

"The PLA is increasingly becoming an unpredictable 'magician,'" Fu said. "This reflects years of rigorous drills by theater command forces, honing their mastery of tactics to deter 'Taiwan independence' and their intimate familiarity with the fatal weaknesses of the island’s defense systems."

According to Zhu Fenglian, a spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, PLA's joint exercises around the Taiwan Island serve as a resolute punishment against the reckless provocations of the Lai Ching-te authorities in seeking "Taiwan independence."

Zhu Fenglian, a spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council Photo: the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council

Lai recently announced "17 major strategies" including policies to investigate into Taiwan residents who hold mainland identity documents, expand the scope of scrutiny over Taiwan artists' remarks and behaviors, and establish a review system targeting cross-Strait exchanges in religion, culture and education.

Zhu said that those policies aimed at provoking confrontation, inciting anti-China sentiment, obstructing cross-Straits exchanges and cooperation, and escalating tensions in the Taiwan Straits, which have fully exposed Lai as a destroyer of cross-Straits peace and a creator of crisis in the region, revealing his true anti-peace, anti-exchange, anti-democracy, and anti-humanitarian nature.

"Such behavior is intolerable and unacceptable," Zhu said, noting that "it must be resolutely countered and severely punished."

It should be noted that the exercise this time and previous ones, such as Joint Sword-2024A and Joint Sword-2024B in 2024, were all responses to provocative statements made by Taiwan leader Lai Ching-te.

Yingtai Lung, a former cultural official in Taiwan, authored an opinion piece entitled "The Clock Is Ticking for Taiwan," which was published in The New York Times on Tuesday.

Lung said that "Rather than reaching out to all sides in Taiwan to initiate an urgent national discussion on the direction we should take, Lai Ching-te is instead going for fear, confrontation and a revival of dark Cold War rhetoric."

The problem with Mr. Lai’s approach is that Taiwan can no longer bank on U.S. support. This isn’t something that we are just now realizing because of Mr. Trump, who, besides betraying Ukraine, has already sown doubt about his commitment to defending Taiwan, even accusing us of stealing the semiconductor business from America. -- Yingtai Lung

Since Tuesday, the WeChat blog of the PLA Eastern Theater Command has been continuously releasing updates and images related to the military exercises. It’s evident that the Chinese military has become highly adept at posting updates through social media platforms.

Theme Poster “Overwhelming Grip” Released by PLA Eastern Theater Command: 围锁瞰制 Comprehensive superiority at display 尽在掌握 Securing control all the way

I recommend that all China watchers, if possible, include WeChat blogs as part of your information channels. Alternatively, you could also subscribe to Beijing Scroll -- I'll do my best to share good stuff here.

According to Xinhua News Agency, the forum was jointly organized by the Institute of Taiwan Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the National Society of Taiwan Studies, the Graduate Institute for Taiwan Studies of Xiamen University, the Taiwan 21st Century Foundation, the Graduate Institute of National Department and mainland China Studies of the Chinese Culture University in Taiwan. More than 60 experts and scholars from both sides of the Taiwan Strait attended the event.

Some of you might be wondering why I’m bringing up a speech which was delivered three months ago. Actually, based on my research, most of the content from Professor Wang’s speech has only recently been made public. It’s not necessarily intentional to release it at this moment, as publishing academic or theoretical content weeks or months after an event is not uncommon in China.

Professor Wang’s speech covered a wide range of topics on Taiwan, including his analysis of the possibility of non-peaceful unification by the Chinese mainland and the impact of China-U.S. relations on the Taiwan question. I believe people who are interested in reading today's piece about Wang's speech should focus more on the content itself rather than the timing of its release.

The article about Professor Wang’s speech was published by China Review News Agency on Feb. 10 via its WeChat blog. I have translated it into English for you. The bolded markings in this article were also labeled by me.

Additionally, I’d like to highlight that, based on my personal observation, discussions on the Taiwan question within China’s academic circles are rich and diverse. Such a variety of perspectives is beneficial in allowing China to ultimately approach the Taiwan question from the standpoint that best serves its national interests. Therefore, I believe it’s important for readers not to interpret an individual expert’s viewpoint as representing the official stance of the Chinese government. However, I believe that policymakers, after considering a range of expert opinions, will draw their conclusions. As such, understanding these expert perspectives is meaningful.

Wang Yingjin

Wang explained that, in the context of growing strategic competition between China and the United States, the Taiwan question has become more complex. Legally, the Taiwan question is entirely an internal affair for China, and this fundamental reality won’t change despite external interference. However, in practical terms, international factors—especially the unprecedented involvement of the U.S. and Western powers—have made resolving the issue much more difficult and costly. For years, these external forces have used Taiwan to undermine China’s development. If this continues, it will only increase the costs of resolving the issue and slow down the progress of China’s rejuvenation. Given this, Wang argued, China must carefully assess the current situation, understand its strengths, and seize the right moment to resolve the Taiwan issue.

First, China has the strength and capability to resolve the Taiwan issue. Wang pointed out that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China, and today, 183 sovereign nations in the world recognize the one-China principle. With China’s growing military power, the country is fully capable of addressing the Taiwan issue. Faced with the large disparity in military strength across the Taiwan Strait, pro-independence forces in Taiwan know they can’t resist the mainland militarily, so they rely on hopes that the U.S. and its Western allies will intervene. However, the question remains: if China decides to use non-peaceful measures to resolve the issue under the Anti-Secession Law, will the U.S. and its allies actually intervene? It’s well-known that the U.S. and China have different interests and bottom lines when it comes to Taiwan. For China, the Taiwan issue is a core national interest, and if a war were to break out in the Taiwan Strait, China would spare no effort to win. Even if the situation becomes difficult at first, China will not back down, but will continue to invest whatever is needed to secure victory.

On the other hand, for the U.S., Taiwan is just a strategic foothold in its broader Asia-Pacific (or Indo-Pacific) strategy—not a core interest. Wang pointed out that the differing importance of Taiwan for both countries means the U.S. would not be willing to invest the same resources into a war as China would. Moreover, Taiwan is so close to the mainland and within range of China’s rocket artillery, and the balance of power between the U.S. and China is not as stark as some might think. Unless the U.S. were to invest all its resources, it simply cannot win against China and achieve its goal of "protecting Taiwan."

On the other hand, investing too much would make the costs far exceed any potential benefits. This contradiction is what makes the United States' potential involvement in a Taiwan Strait conflict both unpredictable and limited. As a result, prominent Taiwanese strategist Su Qi has predicted that, should a conflict break out, the U.S. is unlikely to send troops directly to defend Taiwan. And as long as the U.S. doesn’t intervene, allies like Japan and Australia will be even less likely to engage, as they have far less at stake in the Taiwan issue than the U.S. Given China’s rise as an economic, technological, and military power, it’s clear that the U.S. and its allies would carefully weigh the costs and risks of engaging in direct military conflict with China.

Wang Yingjin stated that once the war begins, no matter the obstacles, victory will ultimately belong to the Chinese mainland. The struggle between intervention and counter-intervention, pro-independence and anti-independence forces, and the rejection versus promotion of reunification, will determine that the Chinese mainland is on the side of justice and righteousness, while the U.S. and Taiwan are in the wrong. The nature of the conflict, along with the justice, legitimacy, and legality of China’s decision to use non-peaceful means to combat "Taiwan independence," will fundamentally shape the war’s course and final outcome.

Second, the timing for resolving the Taiwan issue is "almost ripe, but not quite." Wang pointed out that while China has the strength and capability to resolve the Taiwan issue, it doesn’t mean the time is fully right yet. Given the enormous costs involved in taking non-peaceful measures, including the risks of delaying or even derailing China’s national rejuvenation, and the increased difficulty of governing Taiwan post-conflict, The Chinese mainland will avoid using force unless absolutely necessary. Instead, China will continue to pursue peaceful reunification. Moreover, the urgency of the Taiwan issue hasn’t yet reached a point where it must be resolved immediately, which is why the Chinese mainland has held off from using non-peaceful measures despite repeated provocations from pro-independence forces in Taiwan.

Furthermore, if the Chinese mainland were to resort to non-peaceful means, even if it won the war, it would likely face sweeping sanctions from the U.S. and its allies in areas like the economy, energy, food, trade, finance, and technology. Wang believes that, despite China’s growing strength, handling the economic and political pressure from the U.S. and the West would still be challenging. If this scenario unfolds, it could significantly disrupt China’s progress toward national rejuvenation, or even slow it down. This is a cost that China must carefully weigh, especially as it nears its goal of national revival. The U.S., Western powers, and pro-independence forces understand this concern, which is why they continue to provoke China with impunity. What they fail to realize is that their constant pressure could "backfire," pushing the Chinese mainland into a position where it feels compelled to decisively resolve the Taiwan issue and shift the current dynamics.

Third, the Taiwan issue is entering a "critical decade." Wang explained that, from an external perspective, U.S. figures like former President Biden, former Secretary of State Blinken, and various strategic experts have all noted that the next ten years will likely be the most intense period of competition between China and the U.S. This means that the next decade will be crucial not just for the strategic standoff over Taiwan but also for the future of cross-Strait relations. The decisions made during this time will deeply influence, if not determine, the future direction of the Taiwan issue. It’s clear that, during this "critical decade," the U.S. and other external powers will continue to intervene in Taiwan’s affairs and block China’s efforts to reunify. In this context, no matter how much goodwill China shows, it won’t change the United States’ strategy of containing China. So, how should China respond? Should it be passive, or take proactive action? Historically, "extreme situations often lead to reversal," and sometimes, being "forced into a corner" can trigger an instinctive counterattack, allowing China to break through and change the situation in its favor.

Looking at the situation from the island’s perspective, pro-independence activities in Taiwan are becoming more brazen, and the public’s sense of identification with the one-China principle is steadily weakening. Support for reunification is also dwindling. If Taiwan’s issue continues to be left unresolved indefinitely, the chances for peaceful reunification across the Strait will only grow slimmer. Since 2016, the situation across the Taiwan Strait has worsened, leading to the tense standoff we see today. What’s even more worrying is that the situation is still deteriorating, with no signs of improvement in the near future. This only adds to the uncertainty about how things will unfold in the coming years.

From the Chinese mainland’s perspective, achieving national reunification has been a steadfast mission for the Communist Party of China and the government since 1949. In the 1980s, the Party and the government set three major historical goals, one of which was the "great cause of national reunification." As the new century began, reunification was once again placed at the forefront of China’s historical agenda. To date, the other two goals have largely been achieved—though not yet fully completed, progress continues along the current strategic path, and their eventual realization seems inevitable. However, the reunification cause has faced significant setbacks, and the resistance encountered has only intensified over time.

[Beijing Scroll’s note: It is worth noting that the other two tasks include advancing modernization and maintaining world peace while promoting common development. When you consider these three tasks together, you can see not only the mainland's determination to achieve reunification but also its sincere intention to do so through peaceful means.]

Wang believes that, in the face of these obstacles, the Chinese mainland urgently needs to break the deadlock and push the reunification process into a new stage. However, since the conditions and timing aren’t fully mature yet, the Chinese mainland won’t rush into invoking the Anti-Secession Law and taking non-peaceful measures. Instead, it will delay the reunification timeline slightly, making the necessary preparations to lay a more solid foundation and create more favorable conditions for a future resolution of the Taiwan issue. But this approach hinges on one key factor: external interference and pro-independence forces in Taiwan must not cross the Chinese mainland’s "red line." If they do, China will take whatever steps are necessary to eliminate "Taiwan independence" and complete the reunification of the nation.

China's “Two Sessions,” the annual meetings of the top legislature and top political advisory body, will be held in two weeks. I will soon release a preview of the key highlights for this year's “Two Sessions.” Stay tuned and be sure to subscribe.

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On May 20, 65-year-old doctor-turned-politician Lai Ching-te assumed office as Taiwan's new leader. He had scant time to draw breath before unveiling his true agenda, with his inaugural speech peppered with provocative statements advancing "Taiwan independence."

Three days later, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) initiated its third military exercise surrounding Taiwan Island since 2022. The maneuvers were the most extensive to date, with droves of jets and ships edging closer to the island than ever before.

The PLA explicitly said the drills were carried out to punish "Taiwan independence" provocations and send a stern warning against external interference.

Did Beijing overreact?

To find the answer, one needs to take a closer look at Lai's inaugural speech.

Among other provocations, he proclaimed that "the Republic of China", "the Republic of China Taiwan", and "Taiwan" are interchangeable, as they are all "names of our country." It was a rhetorical leap not even attempted by his independence-minded predecessors.

The intent of Taiwan's new leader was clear: recasting "the Republic of China" -- the keyword here is China -- into simply "Taiwan" to forge a distinct sovereign identity for the island.

The provocative remarks severing Taiwan's ties to China flies in the face of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 that recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China, whose territory includes Taiwan.

Imagine if the pro-independence movement in Texas declared that the United States is equivalent to the United States Texas or Texas is not subordinate to the federal government, would Washington stand idly by?

Therefore, to the Chinese mainland, Lai's speech was promoting the "two states" theory and attempting to justify "Taiwan independence." This has constituted a serious provocation against the one-China principle. At the very outset of his four-year term, Lai sent a dangerous signal.

Recall the August 2022 drills triggered by Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, where she, then third in line to the U.S. presidency, met with Taiwan's leader Tsai Ing-wen and said her visit was intended to make it unequivocally clear that the United States would not abandon Taiwan.

Both Lai's rhetoric and Pelosi's maneuvers spotlight two burgeoning threats: the emboldened independence factions within Taiwan and the brazen interventions by external actors.

Confronted with these provocations, Beijing must take resolute countermeasures. Failure to respond would constitute a glaring appeasement of secession aimed at "Taiwan independence" and foreign interference, risking the legitimacy of the Chinese government and the support of its people, with peace across the Taiwan Strait hanging in the balance.

That's why there is no agitated response from the international community to the latest PLA drills. A spokesperson for the UN secretary-general reiterated that the UN is guided by Resolution 2758, which, he said, means "Taiwan is a province of China." In Manila, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro emphasized that he would not comment on anything related to the Taiwan Strait as "it is considered an internal issue for China."

Even the staunchest critics of China have refrained from talking about the threat of an "annexation" or "aggression." This phenomenon reflects the international community's view that the Taiwan question is entirely different from the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Imagine if it were a sovereign island state that had been surrounded by fighter jets and warships of a foreign country, the reaction from the international community would be totally different.

From this vantage point, the recent military exercise was meant to send a strong message that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory and any separatist maneuver that crosses the line will face countermeasures and bear consequences.

Have the drills changed the Taiwan Strait status quo?

Those who ask this question might not be familiar with contemporary Chinese history or deliberately choose to disregard it. The Taiwan Strait tensions are in fact a scar left over by a full-blown civil war dating back nearly 80 years ago.

The war was fought between Chinese communists led by Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT) regime. In 1949, Chiang and the remnants of the defeated KMT retreated to Taiwan. Later that year, on Oct. 1, 1949, Mao, standing on the Tian'anmen Rostrum in Beijing, proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China.

But the civil war never truly ended. For many years after retreating to Taiwan, the KMT vowed to "retake the mainland." It sent military aircraft to harass the mainland's southeastern coast, and the two sides constantly engaged in direct live-fire conflicts.

For example, in mid-July 1953, the KMT troops raided the island of Dongshan in Fujian Province, only to be fiercely countered by the PLA. On August 23, 1958, the PLA began shelling the island of Kinmen. The KMT forces returned fire. The Kinmen bombardment lasted for two decades.

The international community, the United States included, did not label these military maneuvers launched by either side of the Strait as "acts of invasion." Rather, it recognized them as part and parcel of China's internal strife.

In 1979, Beijing proposed peaceful reunification. Since then, direct military conflicts have largely been avoided. But no ceasefire agreement has ever been negotiated or signed, with nothing like the armistice agreement of the Korean War.

As Beijing's overall strength continued to grow, Taiwan did cease flying its military jets across the Strait. The wounds of the civil war stopped bleeding, but the scar never fully healed.

The United States cannot label cross-Strait conflicts from 1949 to 1979 as part of the Chinese civil war on the one hand, but portray Beijing's anti-secession efforts today as "China's aggression against Taiwan" on the other. It is like calling it a spade today, but a fork tomorrow.

In the same vein, when the KMT planes flew across the Strait to harass the mainland coast in the 1950s, neither the United States nor Taiwan recognized the Taiwan Strait "median line." The "line" did not exist at that time and should not exist today.

Given the ongoing status of an unresolved civil war, it should not come as a surprise when provocations by "Taiwan independence" separatists or interference by foreign countries lead to unintentional discharges.

The PLA drills should by no means be interpreted as a message sent by the mainland that it will soon forcefully reunify Taiwan. Instead, they should be seen as a clear signal of deterrence to "Taiwan independence" separatists and foreign forces trying to interfere, and a warning that in such drills, if the Taiwan side dares to use force first, the PLA will not back down and will not hesitate to strike back.

What Role Does the United States Intends to Play in Cross-Strait Relations?

The pages of history, spanning the globe and China itself, tell a recurring tale: civil conflicts among peoples bound by shared ethnicity and culture culminate in unification, rather than permanent division or independence. Unification finds its path through either peaceful negotiation or the use of force, a process commonly referred to as reunification. To label this process as "annexation" or "aggression" is a gross distortion of reality.

Sovereignty and territorial integrity are the highest principles of international law. The issue of governance patterns -- be they "democratic" or "authoritarian" -- cannot override this bedrock. Nor can it justify foreign interference.

Yet America flouts these norms. It needlessly involves itself in China's Taiwan affairs.

Reckless meddling that defies history, reality and international law stokes instability in the Strait. Washington's repeated arms sales to Taiwan, for example, violate the stipulations of the three China-U.S. joint communiqués, particularly the August 17 Communiqué of 1982, in which the United States declared its commitment to gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan, with the ultimate goal of eventually ceasing these sales.

By ramping up arms sales to Taiwan, Washington interferes with China's internal affairs and is virtually getting itself involved in the unfinished Chinese civil war.

In addition, on several occasions during his presidency, Joe Biden either misspoken or intentionally stated "Yes" in answers to the question of whether the U.S. would defend Taiwan against an attack from Beijing. In a recent interview with TIME magazine conducted on May 28, Biden once again said that he would not rule out the use of U.S. force in the event of an "invasion" of Taiwan.

This is seen as edging the long-standing U.S. policy of "strategic ambiguity" toward "strategic clarity" about whether the United States would intervene in a conflict across the Taiwan Strait.

History is replete with such American misadventures. On the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam, U.S. interventions in civil wars ended in humiliating defeats — and left deep scars. Does wading in the internal strife of others truly serve America's interests? Its people, grasping this folly's logic, would surely oppose the reckless provocations of Washington politicians.

The United States refrained from sending troops to directly support Chiang Kai-shek during the Chinese civil war, nor did it send troops to support the KMT's efforts to "retake the mainland" after it retreated to Taiwan. At that time, the PLA was in a millet-plus-rifle state, sustaining itself on basic supplies and simple weaponry. Today, China's military prowess has made great leaps forward. Any intervention in the Taiwan Strait now would come at a much higher cost for the United States, not a lesser one.

For its own good, America should steer well clear of the Strait.

The Taiwan question remains a lingering scar from the Chinese civil war. External interference and provocations risk reopening this old wound, and no one stands to benefit. Enditem

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