China’s technological ambitions, in its own words

What Beijing’s newly released internal-style guides reveal about the country’s technological priorities for the next Five-Year Plan

Good evening. This is the second piece in my newsletter series on the newly released internal-style guidebooks that follow the Party’s Recommendations for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) — widely regarded as the most important documents for understanding how China’s policymakers think about the country’s future development.

As I explained in the previous piece, the publication of two official “tutorials” after major Communist Party of China (CPC) meetings or the release of major documents has become routine in recent years. These tutorial-style books contain signed articles by senior officials on national development, as well as detailed Q&As on key strategic issues. They offer substantial information and nuance not found in the Recommendations themselves, making them essential reading for anyone who wants to understand China’s development trajectory.

Today’s theme is technology.

Given the global environment, I had expected that technology would be the topic mainstream international media jump on first—and that prediction was quickly confirmed. Reuters’ earliest headline on the Recommendations was “China’s five-year plan emphasizes tech self-reliance amid U.S. rivalry.”

Combined with the heightened interest in Chinese tech — from Silicon Valley to other global innovation hubs —it feels timely to dedicate one full issue of this newsletter to the technology-related content in the Recommendations. What follows are the key passages from the two tutorial books that I believe deserve highlighting, along with my comments. As with last time, I’ll cite the source and page number for each excerpt. I have yet to obtain the Chinese e-versions of these books, and they will not be published in English, based on past practice. However, a few of the included articles have been published by People’s Daily; where relevant, I will attach links for your reference.

Please note that while most of the essays in these two books are signed articles written by senior officials, the 108 questions and answers in the Q&A Guidebook are not attributed to individual authors. They can be viewed as the collective intelligence of the compilation team — essentially the group with the deepest involvement in, and the most comprehensive understanding of, the formulation of China’s five-year plans.

Let’s dive in.

1. “Major-power competition is a contest of productive forces.”

从现实逻辑看，发展新质生产力是推动高质量发展、赢得大国博弈战略主动的内在要求 ...... 大国博弈说到底是生产力的竞争，焦点是发展新质生产力。我们必须时不我待、主动作为，加快形成更多标志性、原创性、颠覆性科技和产业创新成果，在大国博弈中赢得战略主动。

From a practical standpoint, developing new quality productive forces is an intrinsic requirement for driving high-quality development and gaining strategic initiative in major-power competition. … Ultimately, major-power competition is a contest of productive forces, with the focus on developing new quality productive forces. We must seize the moment and act proactively, accelerating the creation of more iconic, original, and disruptive scientific and industrial breakthroughs to gain the strategic upper hand.

(Source: Tutorial on the Recommendations…, p.80, Article “Developing New Quality Productive Forces According to Local Conditions,” by He Lifeng, Chinese vice premier and a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee)

The phrase “major-power competition” (“大国博弈”) appears only once in the Recommendations. But in the tutorials, Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng — who has led China’s economic and trade talks with the U.S. across multiple locations this year — further underscores the centrality of technological development in this broader strategic context.

2. Technology and the race for “first-mover advantage”

要增强抢占发展先机的紧迫感，强化未来产业布局的前瞻性。纵观近现代历史，科技革命是产业变革的先导，每一次科技革命都会孕育出一批重塑全球竞争格局的新产业，引发大国兴衰。

We must heighten our sense of urgency in seizing development opportunities and strengthen forward-looking planning for future industries. Throughout modern history, scientific revolutions have preceded industrial transformations. Each technological revolution has birthed new industries that reshape global competition and trigger the rise and fall of major powers.

…

科技革命和产业变革没有到“临界点”并不意味着各国都“处在同一条起跑线上”，早做多做积累才能占领先机、赢得优势。

The fact that the current technological revolution has not yet reached a “tipping point” does not mean all countries are standing at the same starting line. Early and sustained accumulation is the only way to gain the advantage.

当今世界，新一轮科技革命和产业变革加速突破，正催生出一批事关战略全局和长远发展的未来产业，它们可能就是“明天”的战略性新兴产业、“后天”的支柱产业。我们必须更加注重前瞻规划布局未来产业发展，走在产业体系现代化的前列，掌握全球创新版图重构、经济结构重塑的主动权。

Today, a new round of scientific and industrial transformation is accelerating. A range of future industries with strategic, long-term significance is emerging — industries that may become tomorrow’s strategic emerging sectors and the day after tomorrow’s pillar industries. We must strengthen forward-looking planning, stay at the forefront of industrial modernization, and seize the initiative in the restructuring of global innovation and economic systems.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p.21, Q10: “How should we understand forward-looking planning for future industries?”)

Again, the urgency China feels around technology development is clear.

3. AI and global competition: China’s self-assessment

尽管我国人工智能发展处在全国第一方阵，但在基础理论、关键核心技术等方面还存在短板弱项。

Although China’s AI development is among the leading group globally, we still have shortcomings in basic theories and key core technologies.

...

许多国家纷纷出台人工智能发展战略，加强人工智能产业布局，催生出无人驾驶、人形机器人、自主飞行无人接、脑机接口、智能手机、智能电视、智能电脑、智能穿戴设备等新领域新赛道，这些都可能成长为改变未来商业格局、重塑全球经济的“竞技场”。在激烈国际竞争面前，谁在人工智能技术产品化、产业化上先行一步，谁就在市场开拓上占有先机。

Countries around the world are releasing AI strategies and expanding industrial layouts, giving rise to new arenas such as autonomous driving, humanoid robots, autonomous drones, brain–computer interfaces, smart phones, smart TVs, smart computers, and wearable intelligent devices. These emerging sectors may become the competitive battlegrounds that reshape global commerce and the world economy. In the face of intense international competition, whoever achieves earlier breakthroughs in AI productization and industrialization will gain the first-mover advantage in the marketplace.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p.41, Q20: “Why does China fully implement the ‘AI+’ initiative?”)

The first sentence is perhaps the most concise — and clearest — official statement of how China judges its current global position in AI. The second paragraph underscores China’s close tracking of global AI developments and its view of AI as a transformative economic arena.

4. Basic research as China’s key bottleneck

人工智能、量子科技、生物技术等领域深入发展，我国迎来换道超车的历史机遇。新一轮科技革命和产业变革抓住了就是机遇，抓不主就是挑战。

With advances in AI, quantum technology, and biotechnology, China faces a historic opportunity for leapfrogging. The new round of scientific and industrial transformation is an opportunity if seized, and a challenge if missed.

作为科学探索的源头，基础研究不仅是技术突破的基石，更是产业变革的底层驱动力；它既为技术突破提供理论支撑，又为产业升级注入持续动力。

As the source of scientific discovery, basic research is the cornerstone of technological breakthroughs and the underlying driver of industrial transformation. It provides the theoretical foundation for innovation and continuous momentum for industrial upgrading.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p.29, Q14: “Why strengthen original innovation in scientific research and technology development?”)

This emphasis on basic research echoes a recent Qiushi Journal article (Issue No. 22, 2025) by Shanghai official Xiao Guiyu. Qiushi Journal is the CPC Central Committee’s flagship magazine. Citing comparative data, Xiao notes:

• China’s basic research expenditure in 2024 accounted for 6.9% of total R&D, versus

  • 18% in the U.S.

  • 13% in Japan

  • 19% in EU member states

• Less than 10% of Chinese university patents were commercialized in 2024

  • compared with over 50% in the U.S. and Germany

Much scientific output in China, he argues, remains stuck in papers, labs, and technical reports rather than being translated into productivity.

The Q&A Guidebook make this link even more explicit when discussing “tech bottlenecks.”

“卡脖子”技术问题的根子是基础理论研究跟不上，源头和底层的东西没有搞清楚

The root cause of “bottleneck” technological problems is that our basic theoretical research has not kept pace— we have not fully understood the foundational and underlying principles.

...

关键核心技术攻关要防止简单的模仿性创新，陷入“追赶——落后——再追赶”模式，必须注重加强原始创新和颠覆性创新，从根本上解决原理性、基础性问题，在新一轮科技革命和产业变革的时代浪潮中抢占科技制高点、掌握发展主动权，构筑新动能新优势。

In tackling key core technologies, we must avoid imitative innovation and the pattern of “catch up — fall behind — catch up again.” Instead, we must strengthen original and disruptive innovation, solve fundamental theoretical problems, seize the commanding heights of technology in the new wave of global scientific and industrial transformation, and secure strategic initiative.”

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p.28, Q13: “Why pursue decisive breakthroughs across the full chain of key core technologies?”)

Taken together, these passages show a clear strategic objective: to escape the cycle of perpetual catch-up and instead position China at the front of emerging fields through deep investment in basic research.

5. Reforming China’s talent evaluation system (“the hats problem”)

...... 统一规范教育科技人才评价的原则、标准。切断人才“帽子”与各类创新资源的关联，不把人才“帽子”作为承担国家科技计划项目、获得科技奖励、职称评定、岗位聘用、薪酬待遇确定的限制性条件，使人才称号回归学术性、荣誉性本质。

... We must unify and standardize principles and criteria for evaluating education, science, and talent. The link between talent “hats” and innovation resources must be severed. Titles must no longer serve as restrictive conditions for undertaking national science projects, receiving awards, gaining professional titles or positions, or determining compensation. Talent designations should return to their academic and honorary nature.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…, p.35, Q17: “How to promote positive interaction between scientific innovation and talent cultivation?”)

“The hats problem” (“帽子问题”) is a term used to describe the heavy reliance on honorary titles, talent labels, and designated status categories as gateways to resources in China. These “hats” are not merely academic honors — they are tied to research funding, project eligibility, institutional support, and career advancement. As a result, they have become highly competitive, quasi-credentialized markers of prestige and access within China’s scientific system.

An August report in Guangzhou Daily illustrates the pressures created by this system:

The article notes that researchers today face not only the widely discussed “45-and-under” eligibility limit for major talent programs, but also a proliferation of newer thresholds—“35-and-under,” “38-and-under,” “40-and-under.” Each of these age caps corresponds to a different category of national or local talent sponsorship. For scientists whose careers should ideally allow long periods of deep thinking, experimentation, and failure, these rigid cutoffs create what the paper calls a “breathless climb up the staircase,” forcing young scholars into a race against time.

Instead of focusing on long-term research questions, many feel compelled to maximize the number of papers published and the volume of grants secured to build a résumé strong enough to win a coveted “hat.” In practice, a “hat” can signify not only academic recognition but also privileged access to state-funded laboratories, major research platforms, and high-value projects. Guangzhou Daily describes these hats as having become “universal ration coupons” — highly sought-after tokens that determine access to scarce scientific resources.

In other words, the overemphasis on titles has gradually distorted incentives, pushing young scientists away from their original motivations for pursuing research and toward short-term metrics that are easier to quantify but less conducive to scientific breakthroughs.

This is essentially a debate about resource allocation and incentives in China’s scientific ecosystem.

6. AI and the future of warfare

To close, here are passages from the tutorials on AI and military development:

人工智能在军事领域的广泛应用，给军队武器装备和组织形态带来重大影响，引发军事领域链式突破，催生军事发展模式和战争制胜机理发生重大变化，推动战争形态加速演进。

The widespread application of artificial intelligence in the military has had a profound impact on weapons, equipment, and force structures, triggering chain reactions of breakthroughs across the military domain. It has led to major changes in models of military development and mechanisms for winning wars, and is accelerating the evolution of the very forms of warfare.

在近期发生的几场局部战争和武装冲突中，无人智能装备大量运用，智能化支援保障彰显威力，人工智能系统在辅助作战筹划、支撑指挥通信、加持认知对抗等方面大放异彩，智能化作战方式不断涌现，展现出军事智能改写战争规则的前景，现代战争智能化特征日益显现。

In several recent regional wars and armed conflicts, unmanned intelligent equipment has been deployed on a large scale, and intelligent support systems have demonstrated significant effectiveness. AI systems have excelled in assisting operational planning, supporting command and communications, and enhancing cognitive confrontation. New forms of intelligent combat are continually emerging, revealing the potential of military intelligence to rewrite the rules of warfare and making the intelligent characteristics of modern war increasingly evident.

世界主要国家纷纷加大军事智能化投入和布局，出台相关战略和规划，加快军事智能力量建设和运用，围绕智能化加紧推进军事转型，抢占军事战略制高点。

Major countries are increasing investment in military intelligence, releasing strategies and plans, accelerating the development and application of intelligent military forces, pushing forward military transformation, and competing to seize strategic heights.

适应技术发展和军事变革潮流，我们应当抓住军事智能化发展的历史机遇，融入国家加快发展新一代人工智能的战略布局，构建具有我军特色的智能化军事体系，推动军事实力加速提升。

To adapt to technological and military trends, we must seize this historic opportunity in military intelligence, integrate with the national strategy for accelerating next-generation AI development, build an intelligent military system with Chinese characteristics, and accelerate the enhancement of military capabilities.

(Source: Q&A Guidebook on the Recommendations…,p.196, Q93: “How should we understand building an intelligent military system?”)

I am not a military expert, so I offer no further technical commentary. But given global interest in how recent regional conflicts have deployed drones and AI-enabled systems, this section may be of particular interest.

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